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142 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
142 lines
11 KiB
Markdown
---
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layout: post
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title: Logs for the Monero Research Lab Meeting Held on 2019-07-29
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summary: Sarang work, Surae work, and miscellaneous
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tags: [dev diaries, crypto, research]
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author: el00ruobuob / sarang
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---
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# Logs
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**\<sarang>** OK, let's begin
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**\<sarang>** Hello all
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**\<sarang>** Logs of this meeting will be posted to the GitHub agenda issue afterward
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**\<sarang>** GREETINGS
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**\<suraeNoether>** greetings!
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** hey
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**\<sarang>** Whoops, here is the current agenda: https://github.com/monero-project/meta/issues/377
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**\<sarang>** Let's go ahead with ROUNDTABLE
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**\<sarang>** I've been working hard on an RCT3 implementation, integrating some nice optimizations and seeing if it's possible to get key images working as expected
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**\<sarang>** This also led to a bunch of other library updates that the code relies on
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**\<sarang>** So generally just a lot of coding
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**\<sarang>** I also gave a fun lecture on the Enigma cipher machine and the math behind it, which is always fun ;)
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**\<suraeNoether>** nice, what was that for? a meetup or something?
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**\<sarang>** A friend teaches at a university and thought it would be good for an undergrad crypto class
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**\<sarang>** Since the Enigma break is all about permutation groups
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**\<suraeNoether>** nice
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**\<sarang>** I should be able to finish up an integration of the BP inner product verifier optimization into RCT3 shortly
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**\<sarang>** Then, of course, DEF CON approaches!
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**\<suraeNoether>** neat
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**\<suraeNoether>** i have a very dirty branch on my computer with my matching simulations and experiments being worked upon
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**\<sarang>** How are those going?
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**\<hyc>** defcon - anyone got grasshopper repellent?
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**\<sarang>** -\_\_\_\_-
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**\<suraeNoether>** i've proven all the theorems necessary to prove that the algorithm in graphtheory.py does what i claim it does, and i'm currently testing that my simulated ledgers are doing what i expect.
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**\<sarang>** noice
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**\<sarang>** Will be very neat to see the results, and to see if/how they can work with the analysis that Isthmus et al. are doing on Monero and Zcash
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**\<suraeNoether>** in addition to that, i have a bunch of MAGIC stuff I need to get done, and my discussions with isthmus' digital forensics work are leaning in that direction
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**\<suraeNoether>** i'm thinking the content of this project may take up more than two papers :\\
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**\<sarang>** Cool!
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**\<sarang>** Also worth noting that the CLSAG paper has been updated on IACR, thanks mainly to kenshamir[m]'s comments and questions
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**\<sarang>** kenshamir[m] has also been working on a Rust implementation of CLSAG/MLSAG using the dalek library
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**\<suraeNoether>** hyc: i hear grasshoppers are delicious, i wonder if any of those fancy vegas michelin star restaurants are capitalizing on the swarm
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**\<sarang>** Anything you'd like to share on that, kenshamir[m] ?
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** Hi, the library is finished, not interopable with monero because it uses a different curve though. The numbers are quite impressive and I believe it is due to the way cLSAG was created
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**\<sarang>** aw shucks
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**\<sarang>** Will be great to see your MLSAG vs CLSAG numbers at different ring sizes
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**\<suraeNoether>** i believe there was a question re: ristretto and multi-exp like pippenger right before the meeting that would be relevant here?
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**\<sarang>** I brought it up a while back because we handle different linear combination sizes \_very\_ differently in the codebase
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**\<scoobybejesus>** is that rust code in a public repo?
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**\<sarang>** We use no fewer than 4 methods
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** The numbers above were for different ring sizes, I may have mis-typed key sizes by accident
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** 256 and 512 were for the decoy sizes; if I was not clear
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**\<sarang>** A big part of the reason CLSAG verification is faster than MLSAG is because of the introduction of a new linear combination evaluation algorithm
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**\<sarang>** kenshamir[m]: can you link them again for the logs?
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**\<sarang>** (if comfortable having them public)
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** \<scoobybejesus "is that rust code in a public re"> Not the cLSAG code, once I add documentation and sanitise it I can post it in here
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**\<sarang>** ty
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** \<sarang "kenshamir: can you link them aga"> Yep sure
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**\<scoobybejesus>** :)
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**\<sarang>** What does "without Pippenger/Straus" mean? Simple iterative evaluation of linear combinations?
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** Yep exactly
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**\<sarang>** Impressive numbers
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**\<sarang>** Of course, it's a different hash function
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** I just did scalarbase mult in a for loop
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** haha yeah that too
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**\<suraeNoether>** hmmmmm
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**\<sarang>** But if the hash function is the same across both of your CLSAG/MLSAG, then the relative numbers are good
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**\<suraeNoether>** something that is both faster and smaller and with equivalent security is a no-brainer for implementation (pending audits)
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**\<sarang>** Speaking of this, still in contact with potential auditors, who are moving very slowly
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**\<sarang>** Nothing to report on that front :/
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**\<suraeNoether>** the improved space allows for a logarithmic increase in verification time without actually slowing down the network (at least when it comes to new nodes downloading the network). judging by these numbers, a ring size of 16 or 32 is no longer like pouring molasses or concrete onto the network
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**\<sarang>** OK, any other interesting research to report?
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**\<gingeropolous>** re: audits, or roll-out in general. Is this the kind of thing that could be rolled-out in parallel with existing? i.e., have an overlap, where the network uses the existing as the primary / default, but can optionally use the new thing, and then once new thuing is vetted, just prune the old?
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**\<hyc>** ^ slow auditors - a lot of people are on summer holiday now
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**\<gingeropolous>** or, switch to the new and no longer have to relay / verify the old style during the overlap?
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**\<suraeNoether>** sarang: am i wrong in saying that gingeropolous is correct that clsag could be implemented in parallel before mlsag is deprecated?
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**\<hyc>** we had a 24hr overlap in the last hardfork for this sort of thing
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**\<gingeropolous>** this would be kinda different.
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**\<sarang>** I suppose it could be overlapping, provided the fee model supports it properly
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**\<sarang>** I don't really see why this would be useful
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**\<gingeropolous>** i dunno. i'm just opening the conversation regarding the model that all new things need to be audited
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**\<gingeropolous>** i mean, obvi auditing is great
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**\<sarang>** yes
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**\<gingeropolous>** but its not perfect
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** hyc: Yeah in general, summer constitutes low activity
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**\<sarang>** It's good for inspiring confidence, as well as the obvious benefits of catching any errors
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** Can Monero benefit from using bulletproofs for arithmetic circuits?
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** gingeropolous: Didn't we discuss that kind of model for Bulletproofs or RingCT too?
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**\<sarang>** Likely not, with our current tx model
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**\<gingeropolous>** yeah dEBRUYNE
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**\<sarang>** The scaling isn't great
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** I think it was shot down for good reasons, but I cannot remember them exactly :-P
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**\<gingeropolous>** i think that was post audit though
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**\<sarang>** and we have hash functions, which screw things up
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**\<sarang>** Zooko had a slide in some presentation where his team estimated the verification time for a circuit with the complexity of Sapling (Sprout? don't recall)
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**\<sarang>** and BP verification was O(1 s)
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**\<sarang>** Compared to our current verification time which is probably 1/50th of that
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**\<sarang>** maybe 1/100th
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** yikes
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**\<suraeNoether>** kenshamir: if we designed an arithmetic circuit to describe a ring confidential transaction language, then yes, but that's sort of what RCT3 and omniring and lelantus try to do... sarang, i think zooko was showing "what it would look like for a Sapling transaction language to be proven in the bulletproof setting" not ring confidential transactions, so it's not clear to me whether it'd be slower.
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**\<suraeNoether>** in our setting
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**\<suraeNoether>** with the exception of our non-AC-compatible hash function
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** sarang: That's verification time for fully shielded transactions?
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**\<suraeNoether>** dEBRUYNE yeah, iirc
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** Yikes
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**\<sarang>** Yeah, that timing was just to give an example of what a production-size tx circuit might look like
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** Especially given that, as far as I know, you have to run a full node in order to properly perform fully shielded transactions
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**\<dEBRUYNE>** Anyway, I digress :-P
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**\<sarang>** Anyway, suraeNoether is right in that RCT3 and Omniring try to bring the BP benefits to specific languages used to prove RingCT-type statements
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**\<sarang>** which is why we're interested in them
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**\<suraeNoether>** yeah, bulletproofs for use in SNARK-style languages is like... uhm... putting a large-diameter turbofan engine into a Mini Cooper. It's not going to do what you think it's going to do.
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**\<sarang>** BPs can be much more efficient for languages built for it
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**\<sarang>** which is why range proofs are so efficient
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**\<kenshamir[m]>** haha
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**\<suraeNoether>** indeed
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**\<suraeNoether>** moving along
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**\<sarang>** heh
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**\<sarang>** ok, other research?
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**\<sarang>** Or QUESTIONS, from the agenda?
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**\<sarang>** OK then! To ACTION ITEMS
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**\<sarang>** I'll be finalizing some things for my DEF CON talk, workshop, and panel; and finalizing some RCT3 integration optimizations
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**\<sarang>** suraeNoether: ?
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**\<suraeNoether>** oh gosh sorry
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**\<suraeNoether>** i was computing a number sorry about that. :P
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**\<sarang>** it's 7
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**\<suraeNoether>** my action items are: work on sims and the experimenter, and work with isthmus to formalize statistical hypotheses for testing all this
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**\<sarang>** Having data from Isthmus's group will be extremely valuable for this kind of analysis
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**\<suraeNoether>** actually the number is O(153.58\*N), which is the number of bits used to describe the number of possible spend histories at ring size 32 with N outputs.
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**\<suraeNoether>** which is nutters
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**\<sarang>** This is all assuming no external information?
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**\<sarang>** Or other graph-based information on chain reactions and provably-spent outputs?
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**\<suraeNoether>** merely the total number of self-consistent spend histories
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**\<sarang>** Ah ok, so for a hypothetical graph
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**\<suraeNoether>** yeah
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**\<sarang>** got it
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**\<gingeropolous>** O(153.58\*N) ... great. now your math is talking in math
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**\<suraeNoether>** well it means that for, say, 1000 transactions at ring size 32, there are 2^(153,580) possible spend histories.
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**\<suraeNoether>** anyway
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**\<suraeNoether>** (N has to be a lot bigger than the ring size for the above formula to hold btw)
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**\<sarang>** which is... quite reasonable
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**\<sarang>** Any other final thoughts or questions before we adjourn?
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**\<sarang>** OK then! Thanks to everyone for participating. We are adjourned
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