serai/coordinator/src/p2p.rs

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use core::{time::Duration, fmt};
use std::{
sync::Arc,
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io::{self, Read},
collections::{HashSet, HashMap},
time::{SystemTime, Instant},
};
use async_trait::async_trait;
use rand_core::{RngCore, OsRng};
use scale::{Decode, Encode};
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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use borsh::{BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize};
use serai_client::{primitives::NetworkId, validator_sets::primitives::ValidatorSet, Serai};
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
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use serai_db::Db;
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use futures_util::{AsyncRead, AsyncReadExt, AsyncWrite, AsyncWriteExt, StreamExt};
use tokio::{
sync::{Mutex, RwLock, mpsc, broadcast},
time::sleep,
};
use libp2p::{
core::multiaddr::{Protocol, Multiaddr},
identity::Keypair,
PeerId,
tcp::Config as TcpConfig,
noise, yamux,
request_response::{
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Codec as RrCodecTrait, Message as RrMessage, Event as RrEvent, Config as RrConfig,
Behaviour as RrBehavior, ProtocolSupport,
},
gossipsub::{
IdentTopic, FastMessageId, MessageId, MessageAuthenticity, ValidationMode, ConfigBuilder,
IdentityTransform, AllowAllSubscriptionFilter, Event as GsEvent, PublishError,
Behaviour as GsBehavior,
},
swarm::{NetworkBehaviour, SwarmEvent},
SwarmBuilder,
};
pub(crate) use tributary::{ReadWrite, P2p as TributaryP2p};
use crate::{Transaction, Block, Tributary, ActiveTributary, TributaryEvent};
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// Block size limit + 1 KB of space for signatures/metadata
const MAX_LIBP2P_GOSSIP_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = tributary::BLOCK_SIZE_LIMIT + 1024;
const MAX_LIBP2P_REQRES_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize =
(tributary::BLOCK_SIZE_LIMIT * BLOCKS_PER_BATCH) + 1024;
const MAX_LIBP2P_MESSAGE_SIZE: usize = {
// Manual `max` since `max` isn't a const fn
if MAX_LIBP2P_GOSSIP_MESSAGE_SIZE > MAX_LIBP2P_REQRES_MESSAGE_SIZE {
MAX_LIBP2P_GOSSIP_MESSAGE_SIZE
} else {
MAX_LIBP2P_REQRES_MESSAGE_SIZE
}
};
const LIBP2P_TOPIC: &str = "serai-coordinator";
// Amount of blocks in a minute
const BLOCKS_PER_MINUTE: usize = (60 / (tributary::tendermint::TARGET_BLOCK_TIME / 1000)) as usize;
// Maximum amount of blocks to send in a batch
const BLOCKS_PER_BATCH: usize = BLOCKS_PER_MINUTE + 1;
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
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#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
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pub struct CosignedBlock {
pub network: NetworkId,
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pub block_number: u64,
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
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pub block: [u8; 32],
pub signature: [u8; 64],
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug)]
pub enum ReqResMessageKind {
KeepAlive,
Heartbeat([u8; 32]),
Block([u8; 32]),
}
impl ReqResMessageKind {
pub fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Option<ReqResMessageKind> {
let mut kind = [0; 1];
reader.read_exact(&mut kind).ok()?;
match kind[0] {
0 => Some(ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive),
1 => Some({
let mut genesis = [0; 32];
reader.read_exact(&mut genesis).ok()?;
ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(genesis)
}),
2 => Some({
let mut genesis = [0; 32];
reader.read_exact(&mut genesis).ok()?;
ReqResMessageKind::Block(genesis)
}),
_ => None,
}
}
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive => vec![0],
ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(genesis) => {
let mut res = vec![1];
res.extend(genesis);
res
}
ReqResMessageKind::Block(genesis) => {
let mut res = vec![2];
res.extend(genesis);
res
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug)]
pub enum GossipMessageKind {
Tributary([u8; 32]),
CosignedBlock,
}
impl GossipMessageKind {
pub fn read<R: Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Option<GossipMessageKind> {
let mut kind = [0; 1];
reader.read_exact(&mut kind).ok()?;
match kind[0] {
0 => Some({
let mut genesis = [0; 32];
reader.read_exact(&mut genesis).ok()?;
GossipMessageKind::Tributary(genesis)
}),
1 => Some(GossipMessageKind::CosignedBlock),
_ => None,
}
}
pub fn serialize(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
match self {
GossipMessageKind::Tributary(genesis) => {
let mut res = vec![0];
res.extend(genesis);
res
}
GossipMessageKind::CosignedBlock => {
vec![1]
}
}
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Debug)]
pub enum P2pMessageKind {
ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind),
Gossip(GossipMessageKind),
}
impl P2pMessageKind {
fn genesis(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
match self {
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive) |
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::CosignedBlock) => None,
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(
ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(genesis) | ReqResMessageKind::Block(genesis),
) |
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::Tributary(genesis)) => Some(*genesis),
}
}
}
impl From<ReqResMessageKind> for P2pMessageKind {
fn from(kind: ReqResMessageKind) -> P2pMessageKind {
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(kind)
}
}
impl From<GossipMessageKind> for P2pMessageKind {
fn from(kind: GossipMessageKind) -> P2pMessageKind {
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(kind)
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Message<P: P2p> {
pub sender: P::Id,
pub kind: P2pMessageKind,
pub msg: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
pub struct BlockCommit {
pub block: Vec<u8>,
pub commit: Vec<u8>,
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, Encode, Decode)]
pub struct HeartbeatBatch {
pub blocks: Vec<BlockCommit>,
pub timestamp: u64,
}
#[async_trait]
pub trait P2p: Send + Sync + Clone + fmt::Debug + TributaryP2p {
type Id: Send + Sync + Clone + Copy + fmt::Debug;
async fn subscribe(&self, set: ValidatorSet, genesis: [u8; 32]);
async fn unsubscribe(&self, set: ValidatorSet, genesis: [u8; 32]);
async fn send_raw(&self, to: Self::Id, msg: Vec<u8>);
async fn broadcast_raw(&self, kind: P2pMessageKind, msg: Vec<u8>);
async fn receive(&self) -> Message<Self>;
async fn send(&self, to: Self::Id, kind: ReqResMessageKind, msg: Vec<u8>) {
let mut actual_msg = kind.serialize();
actual_msg.extend(msg);
self.send_raw(to, actual_msg).await;
}
async fn broadcast(&self, kind: impl Send + Into<P2pMessageKind>, msg: Vec<u8>) {
let kind = kind.into();
let mut actual_msg = match kind {
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(kind) => kind.serialize(),
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(kind) => kind.serialize(),
};
actual_msg.extend(msg);
/*
log::trace!(
"broadcasting p2p message (kind {})",
match kind {
P2pMessageKind::KeepAlive => "KeepAlive".to_string(),
P2pMessageKind::Tributary(genesis) => format!("Tributary({})", hex::encode(genesis)),
P2pMessageKind::Heartbeat(genesis) => format!("Heartbeat({})", hex::encode(genesis)),
P2pMessageKind::Block(genesis) => format!("Block({})", hex::encode(genesis)),
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 21:57:21 +00:00
P2pMessageKind::CosignedBlock => "CosignedBlock".to_string(),
}
);
*/
self.broadcast_raw(kind, actual_msg).await;
}
}
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#[derive(Default, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
struct RrCodec;
#[async_trait]
impl RrCodecTrait for RrCodec {
type Protocol = &'static str;
type Request = Vec<u8>;
type Response = Vec<u8>;
async fn read_request<R: Send + Unpin + AsyncRead>(
&mut self,
_: &Self::Protocol,
io: &mut R,
) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
let mut len = [0; 4];
io.read_exact(&mut len).await?;
let len = usize::try_from(u32::from_le_bytes(len)).expect("not at least a 32-bit platform?");
if len > MAX_LIBP2P_REQRES_MESSAGE_SIZE {
Err(io::Error::other("request length exceeded MAX_LIBP2P_REQRES_MESSAGE_SIZE"))?;
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}
// This may be a non-trivial allocation easily causable
// While we could chunk the read, meaning we only perform the allocation as bandwidth is used,
// the max message size should be sufficiently sane
let mut buf = vec![0; len];
io.read_exact(&mut buf).await?;
Ok(buf)
}
async fn read_response<R: Send + Unpin + AsyncRead>(
&mut self,
proto: &Self::Protocol,
io: &mut R,
) -> io::Result<Vec<u8>> {
self.read_request(proto, io).await
}
async fn write_request<W: Send + Unpin + AsyncWrite>(
&mut self,
_: &Self::Protocol,
io: &mut W,
req: Vec<u8>,
) -> io::Result<()> {
io.write_all(
&u32::try_from(req.len())
.map_err(|_| io::Error::other("request length exceeded 2**32"))?
.to_le_bytes(),
)
.await?;
io.write_all(&req).await
}
async fn write_response<W: Send + Unpin + AsyncWrite>(
&mut self,
proto: &Self::Protocol,
io: &mut W,
res: Vec<u8>,
) -> io::Result<()> {
self.write_request(proto, io, res).await
}
}
#[derive(NetworkBehaviour)]
struct Behavior {
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reqres: RrBehavior<RrCodec>,
gossipsub: GsBehavior,
}
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct LibP2p {
subscribe: Arc<Mutex<mpsc::UnboundedSender<(bool, ValidatorSet, [u8; 32])>>>,
send: Arc<Mutex<mpsc::UnboundedSender<(PeerId, Vec<u8>)>>>,
broadcast: Arc<Mutex<mpsc::UnboundedSender<(P2pMessageKind, Vec<u8>)>>>,
receive: Arc<Mutex<mpsc::UnboundedReceiver<Message<Self>>>>,
}
impl fmt::Debug for LibP2p {
fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
fmt.debug_struct("LibP2p").finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
impl LibP2p {
#[allow(clippy::new_without_default)]
pub fn new(serai: Arc<Serai>) -> Self {
log::info!("creating a libp2p instance");
let throwaway_key_pair = Keypair::generate_ed25519();
let behavior = Behavior {
reqres: { RrBehavior::new([("/coordinator", ProtocolSupport::Full)], RrConfig::default()) },
gossipsub: {
let heartbeat_interval = tributary::tendermint::LATENCY_TIME / 2;
let heartbeats_per_block =
usize::try_from(tributary::tendermint::TARGET_BLOCK_TIME / heartbeat_interval).unwrap();
use blake2::{Digest, Blake2s256};
let config = ConfigBuilder::default()
.heartbeat_interval(Duration::from_millis(heartbeat_interval.into()))
.history_length(heartbeats_per_block * 2)
.history_gossip(heartbeats_per_block)
.max_transmit_size(MAX_LIBP2P_GOSSIP_MESSAGE_SIZE)
// We send KeepAlive after 80s
.idle_timeout(Duration::from_secs(85))
.validation_mode(ValidationMode::Strict)
// Uses a content based message ID to avoid duplicates as much as possible
.message_id_fn(|msg| {
MessageId::new(&Blake2s256::digest([msg.topic.as_str().as_bytes(), &msg.data].concat()))
})
// Re-defines for fast ID to prevent needing to convert into a Message to run
// message_id_fn
// This function is valid for both
.fast_message_id_fn(|msg| {
FastMessageId::new(&Blake2s256::digest(
[msg.topic.as_str().as_bytes(), &msg.data].concat(),
))
})
.build();
let mut gossipsub = GsBehavior::<IdentityTransform, AllowAllSubscriptionFilter>::new(
MessageAuthenticity::Signed(throwaway_key_pair.clone()),
config.unwrap(),
)
.unwrap();
// Subscribe to the base topic
let topic = IdentTopic::new(LIBP2P_TOPIC);
gossipsub.subscribe(&topic).unwrap();
gossipsub
},
};
// Uses noise for authentication, yamux for multiplexing
// TODO: Do we want to add a custom authentication protocol to only accept connections from
// fellow validators? Doing so would reduce the potential for spam
// TODO: Relay client?
let mut swarm = SwarmBuilder::with_existing_identity(throwaway_key_pair)
.with_tokio()
.with_tcp(TcpConfig::default().nodelay(true), noise::Config::new, || {
let mut config = yamux::Config::default();
// 1 MiB default + max message size
config.set_max_buffer_size((1024 * 1024) + MAX_LIBP2P_MESSAGE_SIZE);
// 256 KiB default + max message size
config
.set_receive_window_size(((256 * 1024) + MAX_LIBP2P_MESSAGE_SIZE).try_into().unwrap());
config
})
.unwrap()
.with_behaviour(|_| behavior)
.unwrap()
.build();
const PORT: u16 = 30563; // 5132 ^ (('c' << 8) | 'o')
swarm.listen_on(format!("/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/{PORT}").parse().unwrap()).unwrap();
let (send_send, mut send_recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (broadcast_send, mut broadcast_recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (receive_send, receive_recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (subscribe_send, mut subscribe_recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
fn topic_for_set(set: ValidatorSet) -> IdentTopic {
IdentTopic::new(format!("{LIBP2P_TOPIC}-{}", hex::encode(set.encode())))
}
// TODO: If a network has less than TARGET_PEERS, this will cause retries ad infinitum
2024-04-23 16:59:34 +00:00
const TARGET_PEERS: usize = 5;
// The addrs we're currently dialing, and the networks associated with them
let dialing_peers = Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new()));
// The peers we're currently connected to, and the networks associated with them
let connected_peers = Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::<Multiaddr, HashSet<NetworkId>>::new()));
// Find and connect to peers
let (connect_to_network_send, mut connect_to_network_recv) =
tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (to_dial_send, mut to_dial_recv) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
tokio::spawn({
let dialing_peers = dialing_peers.clone();
let connected_peers = connected_peers.clone();
let connect_to_network_send = connect_to_network_send.clone();
async move {
loop {
let connect = |network: NetworkId, addr: Multiaddr| {
let dialing_peers = dialing_peers.clone();
let connected_peers = connected_peers.clone();
let to_dial_send = to_dial_send.clone();
let connect_to_network_send = connect_to_network_send.clone();
async move {
log::info!("found peer from substrate: {addr}");
let protocols = addr.iter().filter_map(|piece| match piece {
// Drop PeerIds from the Substrate P2p network
Protocol::P2p(_) => None,
// Use our own TCP port
Protocol::Tcp(_) => Some(Protocol::Tcp(PORT)),
other => Some(other),
});
let mut new_addr = Multiaddr::empty();
for protocol in protocols {
new_addr.push(protocol);
}
let addr = new_addr;
log::debug!("transformed found peer: {addr}");
let (is_fresh_dial, nets) = {
let mut dialing_peers = dialing_peers.write().await;
2024-04-21 11:30:18 +00:00
let is_fresh_dial = !dialing_peers.contains_key(&addr);
if is_fresh_dial {
dialing_peers.insert(addr.clone(), HashSet::new());
}
// Associate this network with this peer
dialing_peers.get_mut(&addr).unwrap().insert(network);
let nets = dialing_peers.get(&addr).unwrap().clone();
(is_fresh_dial, nets)
};
// Spawn a task to remove this peer from 'dialing' in sixty seconds, in case dialing
// fails
// This performs cleanup and bounds the size of the map to whatever growth occurs
// within a temporal window
tokio::spawn({
let dialing_peers = dialing_peers.clone();
let connected_peers = connected_peers.clone();
let connect_to_network_send = connect_to_network_send.clone();
let addr = addr.clone();
async move {
tokio::time::sleep(core::time::Duration::from_secs(60)).await;
let mut dialing_peers = dialing_peers.write().await;
if let Some(expected_nets) = dialing_peers.remove(&addr) {
log::debug!("removed addr from dialing upon timeout: {addr}");
// TODO: De-duplicate this below instance
// If we failed to dial and haven't gotten enough actual connections, retry
let connected_peers = connected_peers.read().await;
for net in expected_nets {
let mut remaining_peers = 0;
for nets in connected_peers.values() {
if nets.contains(&net) {
remaining_peers += 1;
}
}
// If we do not, start connecting to this network again
if remaining_peers < TARGET_PEERS {
connect_to_network_send.send(net).expect(
"couldn't send net to connect to due to disconnects (receiver dropped?)",
);
}
}
}
}
});
if is_fresh_dial {
to_dial_send.send((addr, nets)).unwrap();
}
}
};
// TODO: We should also connect to random peers from random nets as needed for
// cosigning
// Drain the chainnel, de-duplicating any networks in it
let mut connect_to_network_networks = HashSet::new();
while let Ok(network) = connect_to_network_recv.try_recv() {
connect_to_network_networks.insert(network);
}
for network in connect_to_network_networks {
if let Ok(mut nodes) = serai.p2p_validators(network).await {
// If there's an insufficient amount of nodes known, connect to all yet add it
// back and break
if nodes.len() < TARGET_PEERS {
log::warn!(
"insufficient amount of P2P nodes known for {:?}: {}",
network,
nodes.len()
);
// Retry this later
connect_to_network_send.send(network).unwrap();
for node in nodes {
connect(network, node).await;
}
continue;
}
2024-04-23 16:59:34 +00:00
// Randomly select up to 150% of the TARGET_PEERS
for _ in 0 .. ((3 * TARGET_PEERS) / 2) {
if !nodes.is_empty() {
let to_connect = nodes.swap_remove(
usize::try_from(OsRng.next_u64() % u64::try_from(nodes.len()).unwrap())
.unwrap(),
);
connect(network, to_connect).await;
}
}
}
}
// Sleep 60 seconds before moving to the next iteration
tokio::time::sleep(core::time::Duration::from_secs(60)).await;
}
}
});
// Manage the actual swarm
tokio::spawn({
let mut time_of_last_p2p_message = Instant::now();
async move {
let connected_peers = connected_peers.clone();
let mut set_for_genesis = HashMap::new();
loop {
let time_since_last = Instant::now().duration_since(time_of_last_p2p_message);
tokio::select! {
biased;
// Subscribe to any new topics
set = subscribe_recv.recv() => {
let (subscribe, set, genesis): (_, ValidatorSet, [u8; 32]) =
set.expect("subscribe_recv closed. are we shutting down?");
let topic = topic_for_set(set);
if subscribe {
log::info!("subscribing to p2p messages for {set:?}");
connect_to_network_send.send(set.network).unwrap();
set_for_genesis.insert(genesis, set);
swarm.behaviour_mut().gossipsub.subscribe(&topic).unwrap();
} else {
log::info!("unsubscribing to p2p messages for {set:?}");
set_for_genesis.remove(&genesis);
swarm.behaviour_mut().gossipsub.unsubscribe(&topic).unwrap();
}
}
msg = send_recv.recv() => {
let (peer, msg): (PeerId, Vec<u8>) =
msg.expect("send_recv closed. are we shutting down?");
swarm.behaviour_mut().reqres.send_request(&peer, msg);
},
// Handle any queued outbound messages
msg = broadcast_recv.recv() => {
// Update the time of last message
time_of_last_p2p_message = Instant::now();
let (kind, msg): (P2pMessageKind, Vec<u8>) =
msg.expect("broadcast_recv closed. are we shutting down?");
if matches!(kind, P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(_)) {
// Use request/response, yet send to all connected peers
for peer_id in swarm.connected_peers().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>() {
swarm.behaviour_mut().reqres.send_request(&peer_id, msg.clone());
}
} else {
// Use gossipsub
let set =
kind.genesis().and_then(|genesis| set_for_genesis.get(&genesis).copied());
let topic = if let Some(set) = set {
topic_for_set(set)
} else {
IdentTopic::new(LIBP2P_TOPIC)
};
match swarm.behaviour_mut().gossipsub.publish(topic, msg.clone()) {
Err(PublishError::SigningError(e)) => {
panic!("signing error when broadcasting: {e}")
},
Err(PublishError::InsufficientPeers) => {
log::warn!("failed to send p2p message due to insufficient peers")
}
Err(PublishError::MessageTooLarge) => {
panic!("tried to send a too large message: {}", hex::encode(msg))
}
Err(PublishError::TransformFailed(e)) => panic!("IdentityTransform failed: {e}"),
Err(PublishError::Duplicate) | Ok(_) => {}
}
}
}
// Handle new incoming messages
event = swarm.next() => {
match event {
Some(SwarmEvent::Dialing { connection_id, .. }) => {
log::debug!("dialing to peer in connection ID {}", &connection_id);
}
Some(SwarmEvent::ConnectionEstablished {
peer_id,
connection_id,
endpoint,
..
}) => {
if &peer_id == swarm.local_peer_id() {
log::warn!("established a libp2p connection to ourselves");
swarm.close_connection(connection_id);
continue;
}
let addr = endpoint.get_remote_address();
let nets = {
let mut dialing_peers = dialing_peers.write().await;
if let Some(nets) = dialing_peers.remove(addr) {
nets
} else {
log::debug!("connected to a peer who we didn't have within dialing");
HashSet::new()
}
};
{
let mut connected_peers = connected_peers.write().await;
connected_peers.insert(addr.clone(), nets);
log::debug!(
"connection established to peer {} in connection ID {}, connected peers: {}",
&peer_id,
&connection_id,
connected_peers.len(),
);
}
}
Some(SwarmEvent::ConnectionClosed { peer_id, endpoint, .. }) => {
let mut connected_peers = connected_peers.write().await;
2024-04-21 12:02:13 +00:00
let Some(nets) = connected_peers.remove(endpoint.get_remote_address()) else {
log::debug!("closed connection to peer which wasn't in connected_peers");
continue;
};
// Downgrade to a read lock
let connected_peers = connected_peers.downgrade();
// For each net we lost a peer for, check if we still have sufficient peers
// overall
for net in nets {
let mut remaining_peers = 0;
for nets in connected_peers.values() {
if nets.contains(&net) {
remaining_peers += 1;
}
}
// If we do not, start connecting to this network again
if remaining_peers < TARGET_PEERS {
connect_to_network_send
.send(net)
.expect(
"couldn't send net to connect to due to disconnects (receiver dropped?)"
);
}
}
log::debug!(
"connection with peer {peer_id} closed, connected peers: {}",
connected_peers.len(),
);
}
Some(SwarmEvent::Behaviour(BehaviorEvent::Reqres(
RrEvent::Message { peer, message },
))) => {
let message = match message {
RrMessage::Request { request, .. } => request,
RrMessage::Response { response, .. } => response,
};
let mut msg_ref = message.as_slice();
let Some(kind) = ReqResMessageKind::read(&mut msg_ref) else { continue };
let message = Message {
sender: peer,
kind: P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(kind),
msg: msg_ref.to_vec(),
};
receive_send.send(message).expect("receive_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
Some(SwarmEvent::Behaviour(BehaviorEvent::Gossipsub(
GsEvent::Message { propagation_source, message, .. },
))) => {
let mut msg_ref = message.data.as_slice();
let Some(kind) = GossipMessageKind::read(&mut msg_ref) else { continue };
let message = Message {
sender: propagation_source,
kind: P2pMessageKind::Gossip(kind),
msg: msg_ref.to_vec(),
};
receive_send.send(message).expect("receive_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
_ => {}
}
}
// Handle peers to dial
addr_and_nets = to_dial_recv.recv() => {
let (addr, nets) =
addr_and_nets.expect("received address was None (sender dropped?)");
// If we've already dialed and connected to this address, don't further dial them
// Just associate these networks with them
if let Some(existing_nets) = connected_peers.write().await.get_mut(&addr) {
for net in nets {
existing_nets.insert(net);
}
continue;
}
if let Err(e) = swarm.dial(addr) {
log::warn!("dialing peer failed: {e:?}");
}
}
// If it's been >80s since we've published a message, publish a KeepAlive since we're
// still an active service
// This is useful when we have no active tributaries and accordingly aren't sending
// heartbeats
// If we are sending heartbeats, we should've sent one after 60s of no finalized blocks
// (where a finalized block only occurs due to network activity), meaning this won't be
// run
2023-12-17 01:54:24 +00:00
() = tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(80).saturating_sub(time_since_last)) => {
time_of_last_p2p_message = Instant::now();
for peer_id in swarm.connected_peers().copied().collect::<Vec<_>>() {
swarm
.behaviour_mut()
.reqres
.send_request(&peer_id, ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive.serialize());
}
}
}
}
}
});
LibP2p {
subscribe: Arc::new(Mutex::new(subscribe_send)),
send: Arc::new(Mutex::new(send_send)),
broadcast: Arc::new(Mutex::new(broadcast_send)),
receive: Arc::new(Mutex::new(receive_recv)),
}
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl P2p for LibP2p {
type Id = PeerId;
async fn subscribe(&self, set: ValidatorSet, genesis: [u8; 32]) {
self
.subscribe
.lock()
.await
.send((true, set, genesis))
.expect("subscribe_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
async fn unsubscribe(&self, set: ValidatorSet, genesis: [u8; 32]) {
self
.subscribe
.lock()
.await
.send((false, set, genesis))
.expect("subscribe_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
async fn send_raw(&self, peer: Self::Id, msg: Vec<u8>) {
self.send.lock().await.send((peer, msg)).expect("send_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
async fn broadcast_raw(&self, kind: P2pMessageKind, msg: Vec<u8>) {
self
.broadcast
.lock()
.await
.send((kind, msg))
.expect("broadcast_send closed. are we shutting down?");
}
// TODO: We only have a single handle call this. Differentiate Send/Recv to remove this constant
// lock acquisition?
async fn receive(&self) -> Message<Self> {
self.receive.lock().await.recv().await.expect("receive_recv closed. are we shutting down?")
}
}
#[async_trait]
impl TributaryP2p for LibP2p {
async fn broadcast(&self, genesis: [u8; 32], msg: Vec<u8>) {
<Self as P2p>::broadcast(self, GossipMessageKind::Tributary(genesis), msg).await
}
}
pub async fn heartbeat_tributaries_task<D: Db, P: P2p>(
p2p: P,
mut tributary_event: broadcast::Receiver<TributaryEvent<D, P>>,
) {
let ten_blocks_of_time =
Duration::from_secs((10 * Tributary::<D, Transaction, P>::block_time()).into());
let mut readers = HashMap::new();
loop {
loop {
match tributary_event.try_recv() {
Ok(TributaryEvent::NewTributary(ActiveTributary { spec, tributary })) => {
readers.insert(spec.set(), tributary.reader());
}
Ok(TributaryEvent::TributaryRetired(set)) => {
readers.remove(&set);
}
Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Empty) => break,
Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Lagged(_)) => {
panic!("heartbeat_tributaries lagged to handle tributary_event")
}
Err(broadcast::error::TryRecvError::Closed) => panic!("tributary_event sender closed"),
}
}
for tributary in readers.values() {
let tip = tributary.tip();
let block_time =
SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(tributary.time_of_block(&tip).unwrap_or(0));
// Only trigger syncing if the block is more than a minute behind
if SystemTime::now() > (block_time + Duration::from_secs(60)) {
log::warn!("last known tributary block was over a minute ago");
let mut msg = tip.to_vec();
let time: u64 = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system clock is wrong")
.as_secs();
msg.extend(time.to_le_bytes());
P2p::broadcast(&p2p, ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(tributary.genesis()), msg).await;
}
}
// Only check once every 10 blocks of time
sleep(ten_blocks_of_time).await;
}
}
pub async fn handle_p2p_task<D: Db, P: P2p>(
p2p: P,
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 21:57:21 +00:00
cosign_channel: mpsc::UnboundedSender<CosignedBlock>,
mut tributary_event: broadcast::Receiver<TributaryEvent<D, P>>,
) {
let channels = Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::<_, mpsc::UnboundedSender<Message<P>>>::new()));
tokio::spawn({
let p2p = p2p.clone();
let channels = channels.clone();
let mut set_to_genesis = HashMap::new();
async move {
loop {
match tributary_event.recv().await.unwrap() {
TributaryEvent::NewTributary(tributary) => {
let genesis = tributary.spec.genesis();
set_to_genesis.insert(tributary.spec.set(), genesis);
let (send, mut recv) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
channels.write().await.insert(genesis, send);
// Subscribe to the topic for this tributary
p2p.subscribe(tributary.spec.set(), genesis).await;
let spec_set = tributary.spec.set();
2023-10-14 23:55:14 +00:00
// Per-Tributary P2P message handler
tokio::spawn({
let p2p = p2p.clone();
async move {
loop {
let Some(msg) = recv.recv().await else {
// Channel closure happens when the tributary retires
break;
};
match msg.kind {
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive) => {}
// TODO: Slash on Heartbeat which justifies a response, since the node
// obviously was offline and we must now use our bandwidth to compensate for
// them?
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(msg_genesis)) => {
assert_eq!(msg_genesis, genesis);
if msg.msg.len() != 40 {
log::error!("validator sent invalid heartbeat");
continue;
}
// Only respond to recent heartbeats
let msg_time = u64::from_le_bytes(msg.msg[32 .. 40].try_into().expect(
"length-checked heartbeat message didn't have 8 bytes for the u64",
));
if SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(SystemTime::UNIX_EPOCH)
.expect("system clock is wrong")
.as_secs()
.saturating_sub(msg_time) >
10
{
continue;
}
log::debug!("received heartbeat with a recent timestamp");
let reader = tributary.tributary.reader();
let p2p = p2p.clone();
// Spawn a dedicated task as this may require loading large amounts of data
// from disk and take a notable amount of time
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut latest = msg.msg[.. 32].try_into().unwrap();
let mut to_send = vec![];
while let Some(next) = reader.block_after(&latest) {
to_send.push(next);
latest = next;
}
if to_send.len() > 3 {
// prepare the batch to sends
let mut blocks = vec![];
for (i, next) in to_send.iter().enumerate() {
if i >= BLOCKS_PER_BATCH {
break;
}
blocks.push(BlockCommit {
block: reader.block(next).unwrap().serialize(),
commit: reader.commit(next).unwrap(),
});
}
let batch = HeartbeatBatch { blocks, timestamp: msg_time };
p2p
.send(msg.sender, ReqResMessageKind::Block(genesis), batch.encode())
.await;
}
});
}
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind::Block(msg_genesis)) => {
assert_eq!(msg_genesis, genesis);
// decode the batch
let Ok(batch) = HeartbeatBatch::decode(&mut msg.msg.as_ref()) else {
log::error!(
"received HeartBeatBatch message with an invalidly serialized batch"
);
continue;
};
// sync blocks
for bc in batch.blocks {
// TODO: why do we use ReadWrite instead of Encode/Decode for blocks?
// Should we use the same for batches so we can read both at the same time?
let Ok(block) = Block::<Transaction>::read(&mut bc.block.as_slice()) else {
log::error!("received block message with an invalidly serialized block");
continue;
};
let res = tributary.tributary.sync_block(block, bc.commit).await;
log::debug!(
"received block from {:?}, sync_block returned {}",
msg.sender,
res
);
}
}
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 21:57:21 +00:00
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::Tributary(msg_genesis)) => {
assert_eq!(msg_genesis, genesis);
log::trace!("handling message for tributary {:?}", spec_set);
if tributary.tributary.handle_message(&msg.msg).await {
P2p::broadcast(&p2p, msg.kind, msg.msg).await;
}
}
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::CosignedBlock) => unreachable!(),
}
}
}
});
}
TributaryEvent::TributaryRetired(set) => {
if let Some(genesis) = set_to_genesis.remove(&set) {
p2p.unsubscribe(set, genesis).await;
channels.write().await.remove(&genesis);
}
}
}
}
}
});
loop {
let msg = p2p.receive().await;
match msg.kind {
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(ReqResMessageKind::KeepAlive) => {}
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::Tributary(genesis)) |
P2pMessageKind::ReqRes(
ReqResMessageKind::Heartbeat(genesis) | ReqResMessageKind::Block(genesis),
) => {
if let Some(channel) = channels.read().await.get(&genesis) {
channel.send(msg).unwrap();
}
}
P2pMessageKind::Gossip(GossipMessageKind::CosignedBlock) => {
Reattempts (#483) * Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here: """ This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol. The alternatives were: 1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%. 2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol. This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses). """ Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be re-attempted until it no longer does. * Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code * Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys * Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more * Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB * Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts * Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts * Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's redundant and unhelpful. * Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator * Remove old TODO * Final comment cleanup * Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler It's in ms and I assumed it was in s. * Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist * Bug fix and pointless oddity removal We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts (not one more). The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit. * Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests * Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts * Further bump timeout by a minute AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds. This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long. * Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
2023-12-12 17:28:53 +00:00
let Ok(msg) = CosignedBlock::deserialize_reader(&mut msg.msg.as_slice()) else {
Add a cosigning protocol to ensure finalizations are unique (#433) * Add a function to deterministically decide which Serai blocks should be co-signed Has a 5 minute latency between co-signs, also used as the maximal latency before a co-sign is started. * Get all active tributaries we're in at a specific block * Add and route CosignSubstrateBlock, a new provided TX * Split queued cosigns per network * Rename BatchSignId to SubstrateSignId * Add SubstrateSignableId, a meta-type for either Batch or Block, and modularize around it * Handle the CosignSubstrateBlock provided TX * Revert substrate_signer.rs to develop (and patch to still work) Due to SubstrateSigner moving when the prior multisig closes, yet cosigning occurring with the most recent key, a single SubstrateSigner can be reused. We could manage multiple SubstrateSigners, yet considering the much lower specifications for cosigning, I'd rather treat it distinctly. * Route cosigning through the processor * Add note to rename SubstrateSigner post-PR I don't want to do so now in order to preserve the diff's clarity. * Implement cosign evaluation into the coordinator * Get tests to compile * Bug fixes, mark blocks without cosigners available as cosigned * Correct the ID Batch preprocesses are saved under, add log statements * Create a dedicated function to handle cosigns * Correct the flow around Batch verification/queueing Verifying `Batch`s could stall when a `Batch` was signed before its predecessors/before the block it's contained in was cosigned (the latter being inevitable as we can't sign a block containing a signed batch before signing the batch). Now, Batch verification happens on a distinct async task in order to not block the handling of processor messages. This task is the sole caller of verify in order to ensure last_verified_batch isn't unexpectedly mutated. When the processor message handler needs to access it, or needs to queue a Batch, it associates the DB TXN with a lock preventing the other task from doing so. This lock, as currently implemented, is a poor and inefficient design. It should be modified to the pattern used for cosign management. Additionally, a new primitive of a DB-backed channel may be immensely valuable. Fixes a standing potential deadlock and a deadlock introduced with the cosigning protocol. * Working full-stack tests After the last commit, this only required extending a timeout. * Replace "co-sign" with "cosign" to make finding text easier * Update the coordinator tests to support cosigning * Inline prior_batch calculation to prevent panic on rotation Noticed when doing a final review of the branch.
2023-11-15 21:57:21 +00:00
log::error!("received CosignedBlock message with invalidly serialized contents");
continue;
};
cosign_channel.send(msg).unwrap();
}
}
}
}