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Add hash to point writeup

See merge request monero-project/monero-site!1205
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3
_i18n/ar.yml
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@ -507,6 +507,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: نبذه مختصره
introduction: المقدمه
read-paper: قراءة البحث
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: ملاحظه علي التتبع في برتوكول كريبتونوت ( CryptoNote ) 2.0
mrl1_abstract: هذه النشره البحثيه تصف هجوماً جديراً بالإهتمام في نظام إخفاء الهويه القائم علي توقيعات-الطوق. نستخدم بروتوكول كريبتونوت (CryptoNote) 2.0 الذي تم نشره ظاهرياً بواسطه نيكولاس فان سابريرهاجن في 2012. لقد تم إثبات سابقًا أن التعتيم علي إمكانية التتبع لزوج مفتاح لمرة واحدة يعتمد على عدم إمكانية الوصول إلى كافة المفاتيح المستخدمة في إنشاء توقيع-الطوق. ويتيح ذلك إمكانيه التتبع بين توقيعات-الطوق, مسبباً خساره فادحه في التعتيم علي التتبع في الشبكه كلها إذا تم إختيار عناصر ضعيفه او إذ كان المهاجم يمتلك جزء كبير من الشبكه. التوقعيات مازلات تستخدم مره واحده, ولذلك, اي هجوم مماثل لن يقوم بالضروره بإنتهاك خصوصيه المستخدمين. وبالرغم من هذا, يمكن لمثل هذا الهجوم أن يضعف مقاومه بروتوكول كريبتونوت (CryptoNote) أمام تحليل سلسله الكتل. هذه النشره البحثيه لم تخضع للمراجعه, ولا تعكس سوي نتائج التحقيق الداخلي.
mrl2: التزييف في العملات الرقميه التي تستخدم بروتوكول كريبتونوت (CryptoNote) بإستخدام ثغره شجره ميركل (Merkle Tree)

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_i18n/de.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Kurzfassung
introduction: Einleitung
read-paper: Abhandlung lesen
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: Anmerkungen zu Kettenreaktionen im Hinblick auf Nachverfolgbarkeit in CryptoNote 2.0 (A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0)
mrl1_abstract: Diese Abhandlung beschreibt plausible Angriffe auf ein Ringsignaturen-basiertes Anonymitätssystem. Unsere Motivation soll hier das CryptoNote 2.0 Protokoll sein, welches angeblich von Nicolas van Saberhagen im Jahre 2012 veröffentlicht wurde. Es wurde bereits gezeigt, dass die Unnachverfolgbarkeit eines einmalig genutzten Schlüsselpaares davon abhängen kann, wie unnachverfolgbar die in der Ringsignatur beteiligten Schlüssel sind. Dies macht Kettenreaktionen im Hinblick auf die Nachverfolgbarkeit von Ringsignaturen plausibel, was eine kritische Verletzung der Unnachverfolgbarkeit des gesamten Netzwerkes zur Folge haben kann, wenn Parameter ungünstig gewählt werden und ein Angreifer einen maßgeblichen Anteil am Netzwerk hält. Die Signaturen sind jedoch für den einmaligen Gebrauch und ein solcher Angriff muss nicht zwingend den Verlust der Anonymität der Nutzer zur Folge haben. Nichtsdestotrotz kann ein derartiger Angriff die Widerstandsfähigkeit, die CryptoNote gegen Blockchainanalysen aufweist, schwächen. Diese Abhandlung wurde nicht peer-reviewed und spiegelt nur die Ergebnisse interner Untersuchungen wider.
mrl2: Erzeugung von Falschgeld durch Ausnutzen von Schwachstellen im Merkle-Tree innerhalb von virtuellen Währungen, die auf dem CryptoNote-Protokoll basieren (Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol)

3
_i18n/en.yml
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@ -537,6 +537,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Abstract
introduction: Introduction
read-paper: Read Paper
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

3
_i18n/es.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Abstracto
introduction: Introducción
read-paper: Leer el papel
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: Una nota en Reacciones en Cadena en Trazabilidad en CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: Este boletín de investigación describe un ataque plausible en un sistema de anonimato basado en firma circular. Utilizamos como motivación el protocolo de criptomoneda CryptoNote 2.0 aparentemente publicado por Nicolas van Saberhagen en 2012. Ha sido previamente demostrado que la imposibilidad de rastrear un par de llaves de un solo uso puede ser dependiente sobre la imposibilidad de rastrear toda llave utilizada en componer esa firma circular. Esto permite la posibilidad de reacciones en cadena en trazabilidad entre firmas circulares, causando una pérdida crítica en imposibilidad de rastreo a través de la red entera si los parámetros son mal seleccionados y si un agresor posee un porcentaje suficiente de la red. La firma es todavía de un solo uso, no obstante, cualquier ataque de este tipo no necesariamente violará el anonimato de los usuarios. Además, tal ataque podría debilitar plausiblemente la resistencia que CryptoNote ha demostrado en contra de análisis a la blockchain. Este boletín de investigación no ha sido revisado más de una vez, y refleja sólo los resultados de investigación interna.
mrl2: Falsificación a través de Merkle Tree Exploits dentro de monedas virtuales que emplean el protocolo CryptoNote

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_i18n/fr.yml
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@ -510,6 +510,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Résumé
introduction: Introduction
read-paper: Lire le rapport complet (en Anglais)
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: Rapport des réaction de la chaine à la traçabilité dans CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: Ce bulletin de recherche décrit une attaque plausible sur un système anonyme basé sur les signatures de cercle. Nous nous appuyons sur le protocol de cryptomonnaie CryptoNote 2.0 apparemment publié par Nicolas van Saberhagen en 2012. Il a déjà été démontré que l'intraçabilité obscurcissant une pair de clefs à usage unique peut être dépendant de l'intraçabilité de toutes les clefs utilisées dans la composition de cette signature de cercle. Cela rend possible des réactions en chaine de la traçabilité entre les signatures de cercle, pouvant causer une réduction drastique de l'intraçabilité de l'ensemble du réseau si les paramètres sont piètrement choisis et si un attaquant possède un pourcentage suffisant du réseau. Les signatures sont cependant toujours à usage unique, et une telle attaque ne permettrait pas nécessairement de violer l'anonymat des utilisateurs. Cependant, une telle attaque pourrait potentiellement réduire la résistance dont fait preuve CryptoNote contre l'analyse de la chaîne de blocs. Ce bulletin de recherche n'a pas fait l'objet d'un examen par des tiers, et ne reflète que les résultats d'investigations internes.
mrl2: Contrefaçon par l'exploitation de l'arbre de Merkle dans des monnaies virtuelles employant le protocole CryptoNote.

3
_i18n/it.yml
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@ -509,6 +509,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Abstract
introduction: Introduzione
read-paper: Leggi Articolo
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: Una nota sulle reazioni a catena nella tracciabilità in CryptoNote 2.0.
mrl1_abstract: Questo bollettino di ricerca descrive un possibile attacco ad un sistema di anonimato basato sulle firme ad anello. Usiamo come motivazione il protocollo di criptovaluta CryptoNote 2.0 apparentemente pubblicato da Nicolas van Saberhagen nel 2012. È stato precedentemente dimostrato che la non tracciabilità che oscura una coppia di chiavi usa e getta può dipendere dalla non rintracciabilità di tutte le chiavi usate nella composizione di quella firma ad anello. Ciò consente la possibilità di reazioni a catena nella tracciabilità tra le firme degli anelli, causando una perdita critica nella non tracciabilità attraverso l'intera rete se i parametri sono scelti in modo errato e se un utente malintenzionato possiede il controllo di una percentuale sufficiente della rete. Tuttavia, le firme sono ancora "una tantum" e qualsiasi attacco di questo tipo non viola necessariamente l'anonimato degli utenti. Tuttavia, un tale attacco potrebbe indebolire la resistenza che CryptoNote presenta contro l'analisi blockchain. Questo bollettino di ricerca non ha subito revisioni tra pari e riflette solo i risultati di indagini interne.
mrl2: Contraffazione tramite exploit dei Merkle Tree all'interno di valute virtuali che utilizzano il protocollo CryptoNote

3
_i18n/nl.yml
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@ -509,6 +509,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Samenvatting
introduction: Inleiding
read-paper: Paper lezen
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: Dit onderzoeksbulletin beschrijft een plausibele aanval op een anonimiteitssysteem dat is gebaseerd op ring-handtekeningen. Als aanleiding gebruiken we het cryptovaluta-protocol CryptoNote 2.0, dat onder de naam Nicolas van Saberhagen is gepubliceerd, waarbij 2012 als jaar van publicatie is vermeld. Eerder is aangetoond dat de onvolgbaarheid waarmee een eenmalig sleutelpaar wordt verborgen kan afhangen van de onvolgbaarheid van alle sleutels waarmee die ring-handtekening wordt gemaakt. Hierdoor zou er een kettingreactie van volgbaarheid tussen ring-handtekeningen kunnen optreden, met als gevolg een gevaarlijk verminderde onvolgbaarheid in het hele netwerk als parameters slecht zijn gekozen en een aanvaller een bepaald percentage van het netwerk bezit. De handtekeningen zijn echter nog steeds eenmalig, dus een dergelijke aanval is niet per se schadelijk voor de anonimiteit van gebruikers. Maar zo'n aanval zou CryptoNote wel minder bestendig tegen blockchain-analyse kunnen maken. Dit onderzoeksbulletin is niet onderworpen aan peer review en geeft alleen de resultaten van intern onderzoek weer.
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

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_i18n/pl.yml
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@ -509,6 +509,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Abstrakt
introduction: Wstęp
read-paper: Przeczytaj całość
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: O reakcji łańcuchowej w identyfikowalności w CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: Ten biuletyn badawczy opisuje ewentualny atak na system anonimowości oparty na podpisie pierścieniowym. Do argumentacji użyliśmy protokołu o kryptowalutach CryptoNote 2.0 opublikowanego przez Nicolasa van Saberhagena w 2012 roku. Zostało już uprzednio zaprezentowane, że nieidentyfikowalność maskująca parę jednorazowych kluczy może być uzależniona od ieidentyfikowalności wszystkich kluczy użytych w danym podpisie pierścieniowym. Pozwala to na możliwą reakcję łańcuchową w identyfikowalności pomiędzy podpisami pierścieniowymi, powodując krytyczną utratę nieidentyfikowalności całej sieci, jeśli parametry będą źle dobrane oraz jeśli atakujący będzie w posiadaniu wystarczającego procentu sieci. Podpisy jednak nadal są jednorazowe i jakikolwiek taki atak niekoniecznie naruszy anonimowość użytkowników. Mimo to, taki atak mógłby przypuszczalnie osłabić wytrzymałość, którą CryptoNote demonstruje przeciwko analizie łańcuchu bloków. Ten biuletyn badawczy nie uległ rewizji i jedynie odzwierciedla wyniki wewnętrznego dochodzenia.
mrl2: Fałszowanie walut wirtualnych używających protokołu CryptoNote, za pomocą drzewa skrótów

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_i18n/pt-br.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Abstrato
introduction: Introdução
read-paper: Ler Artigo
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

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_i18n/ru.yml
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@ -512,6 +512,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Аннотация
introduction: Вступление
read-paper: Читать статью
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: Возможная цепная реакция, связанная с отслеживаемостью, в рамках протокола CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: В этом исследовательском бюллетене описаны вероятные способы атаки на систему анонимности, основанную на использовании кольцевых подписей. В качестве примера нами рассматривается протокол CryptoNote 2.0, используемый криптовалютой и якобы опубликованный Николасом ван Саберхагеном (Nicolas van Saberhagen) в 2012 году. Ранее уже было продемонстрировано, что неотслеживаемость, позволяющая скрыть пару одноразовых ключей, может зависеть от неотслеживаемости всех ключей, используемых при составлении кольцевой подписи. Это может стать причиной цепной реакции, которая будет выражаться в отслеживаемости кольцевых подписей, что грозит критической утратой свойства неотслеживаемости всей сети при условии неправильно выбранных параметров, а также если злоумышленник контролирует достаточный процент сети. Тем не менее подписи так и останутся одноразовыми, поэтому совсем необязательно такая атака поставит под угрозу анонимность пользователей. Однако подобная атака, вероятно, сможет ослабить защиту блокчейна, которую обеспечивает CryptoNote, от анализа. Этот бюллетень не проходил независимой технической экспертизы и отражает исключительно результаты внутренних исследований.
mrl2: Подделка виртуальных валют, использующих протокол CryptoNote, посредством эксплойтов дерева Меркла

3
_i18n/tr.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: Özet
introduction: Giriş
read-paper: Makaleyi Oku
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: CryptoNote 2.0’da Zincir Reaksiyonlarda Takip Edilebilirlik Üzerine Bir Not
mrl1_abstract: Bu araştırma bülteni anonim sisteme dayalı bir halka imza üzerinde makul bir saldırıyı betimler. Görünürde 2012’de Nicolas van Saberhagen tarafından yayınlanan kriptopara protokolü CryptoNote 2.0’ı motivasyon olarak kullanıyoruz. Daha önce tek kullanımlık anahtar çiftini karartan takip edilemezliğin o halka imzayı oluşturmakta kullanılan anahtarların tümünün takip edilemezliğine dayanabileceği gösterilmişti. Bu, halka imzalar arasındaki takip edilebilirlikte zincir reaksiyonların olasılığına izin vererek parametreler yetersiz seçildiğinde ve bir saldırganın ağın yeterli yüzdesine sahip olduğunda tüm ağ çapında takip edilemezlikte kritik bir kayba sebep olur. İmzalar hâlâ tek kullanımlık olsa da böyle bir saldırı zorunlu şekilde kullanıcıların anonimliğini ihlal etmez. Ancak böyle bir saldırı, CryptoNote’un blokzincir analizine karşı gösterdiği direnci makul şekilde zayıflatabilir. Bu araştırma bülteni akran değerlendirmesinden geçmemiştir ve sadece dahili araştırma sonuçlarını yansıtır.
mrl2: CryptoNote Protokolünü Barındıran Sanal Paralar İçerisinde Merkle Ağacı Suistimalleri Aracılığıyla Sahtecilik

3
_i18n/zh-cn.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: 摘要
introduction: 介绍
read-paper: 阅读论文
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

3
_i18n/zh-tw.yml
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@ -508,6 +508,9 @@ research-lab:
abstract: 摘要
introduction: 前言
read-paper: 閱讀全文
summary: Summary
mrlhtp: Understanding ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime
mrlhtp_summary: Monero uses a unique hash function that transforms scalars into elliptic curve points. It is useful for creating key images, in particular. This document, authored by Shen Noether, translates its code implementation (the ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime() function) into mathematical expressions.
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
mrl1_abstract: This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol

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resources/research-lab/index.md
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@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-11" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-11" class="accordion">MRL-0011: {% t research-lab.mrl11 %}</label>
<input id="tab-12" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-12" class="accordion">MRL-0011: {% t research-lab.mrl11 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl11_abstract %}
<br>
@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-10" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-10" class="accordion">MRL-0010: {% t research-lab.mrl10 %}</label>
<input id="tab-11" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-11" class="accordion">MRL-0010: {% t research-lab.mrl10 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl10_abstract %}
<br>
@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-9" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-9" class="accordion">MRL-0009: {% t research-lab.mrl9 %}</label>
<input id="tab-10" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-10" class="accordion">MRL-0009: {% t research-lab.mrl9 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl9_abstract %}
<br>
@ -56,8 +56,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-8" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-8" class="accordion">MRL-0008: {% t research-lab.mrl8 %}</label>
<input id="tab-9" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-9" class="accordion">MRL-0008: {% t research-lab.mrl8 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl8_abstract %}
<br>
@ -66,8 +66,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-7" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-7" class="accordion">MRL-0007: {% t research-lab.mrl7 %}</label>
<input id="tab-8" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-8" class="accordion">MRL-0007: {% t research-lab.mrl7 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl7_abstract %}
<br>
@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-6" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-6" class="accordion">MRL-0006: {% t research-lab.mrl6 %}</label>
<input id="tab-7" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-7" class="accordion">MRL-0006: {% t research-lab.mrl6 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl6_abstract %}
<br>
@ -86,27 +86,28 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-5" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-5" class="accordion">MRL-0005: {% t research-lab.mrl5 %}</label>
<input id="tab-6" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-6" class="accordion">MRL-0005: {% t research-lab.mrl5 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl5_abstract %}
<a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" href="{{site.baseurl}}/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf">{% t research-lab.read-paper %}</a>
<br>
<a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" href="{{site.baseurl}}/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0005.pdf">{% t research-lab.read-paper %}</a>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-5" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-5" class="accordion">MRL-0004: {% t research-lab.mrl4 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl4_abstract %}
<br>
<a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" href="{{site.baseurl}}/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf">{% t research-lab.read-paper %}</a>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-4" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-4" class="accordion">MRL-0004: {% t research-lab.mrl4 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl4_abstract %}
<br>
<a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" href="{{site.baseurl}}/resources/research-lab/pubs/MRL-0004.pdf">{% t research-lab.read-paper %}</a>
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-3" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-3" class="accordion">MRL-0003: {% t research-lab.mrl3 %}</label>
<label for="tab-4" class="accordion">MRL-0003: {% t research-lab.mrl3 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl3_abstract %}
<br>
@ -115,8 +116,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-2" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-2" class="accordion">MRL-0002: {% t research-lab.mrl2 %}</label>
<input id="tab-3" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-3" class="accordion">MRL-0002: {% t research-lab.mrl2 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl2_abstract %}
<br>
@ -125,8 +126,8 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-1" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-1" class="accordion">MRL-0001: {% t research-lab.mrl1 %}</label>
<input id="tab-2" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-2" class="accordion">MRL-0001: {% t research-lab.mrl1 %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.abstract %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrl1_abstract %}
<br>
@ -134,6 +135,16 @@ permalink: /resources/research-lab/index.html
</p>
</div>
</div>
<div class="tab">
<input id="tab-1" type="checkbox" name="tabs" class="accordion">
<label for="tab-1" class="accordion">UNPUBLISHED: {% t research-lab.mrlhtp %}</label>
<div class="tab-content">
<p><strong>{% t research-lab.summary %}:</strong> {% t research-lab.mrlhtp_summary %}
<br>
<a target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" href="{{site.baseurl}}/resources/research-lab/pubs/ge_fromfe.pdf">{% t research-lab.read-paper %}</a>
</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
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