mirror of
https://github.com/monero-project/monero-site.git
synced 2024-11-16 15:58:16 +00:00
Add zh-tw preliminary translation
This commit is contained in:
Lafudoci
parent
e57313bf3e
commit
b7a6cc6c41
225 changed files with 10169 additions and 1 deletions
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ plugins:
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- jekyll-multiple-languages-plugin
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# jekyll-multiple-languages-plugin settings:
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languages: ["en", "es", "it", "pl", "fr", "ar", "ru", "de", "nl", "pt-br", "tr", "zh-cn"]
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languages: ["en", "es", "it", "pl", "fr", "ar", "ru", "de", "nl", "pt-br", "tr", "zh-cn", "zh-tw"]
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exclude_from_localizations: ["img", "css", "fonts", "media", "404", "feed.xml", "404", "meta", "forum-funding-system", "_posts", "legal"]
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52
_data/lang/zh-tw/footer-1.yml
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52
_data/lang/zh-tw/footer-1.yml
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
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- title: 相關資源
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subfolderitems:
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- name: 關於門羅幣
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url: resources/about/
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- name: 門羅幣百科
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url: resources/moneropedia/
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- name: 開發者指引
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url: resources/developer-guides/
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- name: 使用者指引
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url: resources/user-guides/
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- name: 圖書出版品
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url: library
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- name: RSS 摘要
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url: https://getmonero.org/feed.xml
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- title: IRC 頻道
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subfolderitems:
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- name: monero
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero
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- name: monero-dev
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-dev
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- name: monero-markets
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-markets
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- name: monero-pools
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-pools
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- name: monero-community
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-community
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- name: monero-translations
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-translations
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- name: monero-hardware
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url: irc://chat.freenode.net/#monero-hardware
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- title: 社群平台
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subfolderitems:
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- name: Reddit
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url: https://reddit.com/r/monero
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- name: Stack Exchange
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url: https://monero.stackexchange.com/
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- name: BitcoinTalk 討論串
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url: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=583449.0
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- name: Mattermost 聊天室
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url: https://mattermost.getmonero.org/
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- name: Telegram 聊天室
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url: https://telegram.me/bitmonero
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- title: 門羅幣專案
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subfolderitems:
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- name: Open Alias
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url: https://openalias.org/
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- name: Kovri
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url: https://kovri.io/
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- name: 門羅幣研究實驗室
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url: resources/research-lab/
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- name: 門羅幣新聞資料袋
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url: press-kit
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6
_data/lang/zh-tw/footer-2.yml
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6
_data/lang/zh-tw/footer-2.yml
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@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
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- name: 使用規定
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url: legal
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- name: 原始碼
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url: https://github.com/monero-project
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- name: 技術規格
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url: technical-specs/
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54
_data/lang/zh-tw/navigation.yml
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54
_data/lang/zh-tw/navigation.yml
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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- title: 開始使用
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subfolderitems:
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- page: 什麼是門羅幣？
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url: get-started/what-is-monero
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- page: 開始使用
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url: get-started/using
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- page: 接受支付
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url: get-started/accepting
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- page: 貢獻
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url: get-started/contributing
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- page: 挖礦
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url: get-started/mining
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- page: 常見問題
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url: get-started/faq
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- title: 下載
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url: downloads/
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- title: 最新消息
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subfolderitems:
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- page: 所有文章
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url: blog
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- page: 重大消息
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url: blog/tags/monero%20missives.html
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- page: 會議記錄
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url: blog/tags/dev%20diaries.html
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- page: 版本發佈
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url: blog/tags/releases.html
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- title: 社群
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subfolderitems:
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- page: 合作團隊
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url: community/team
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- page: 聊天室
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url: community/hangouts
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- page: 贊助單位
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url: community/sponsorships
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- page: 使用商家
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url: community/merchants
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- title: 相關資源
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subfolderitems:
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- page: 關於門羅幣
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url: resources/about
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- page: 發展規劃
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url: resources/roadmap
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- page: 研究實驗室
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url: resources/research-lab
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- page: 門羅幣百科
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url: resources/moneropedia
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- page: 使用者指引
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url: resources/user-guides
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- page: 開發者指引
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url: resources/developer-guides
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- page: 技術規格
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url: technical-specs
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- page: 圖書出版品
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url: library
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120
_data/lang/zh-tw/roadmap.yml
Normal file
120
_data/lang/zh-tw/roadmap.yml
Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
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- year: 2014
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accomplishments:
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- name: 在 Bitcointalk 上公開
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date: 2014-04-18
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status: completed
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- name: 從 Bitmonero 更名為 Monero
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date: 2014-04-23
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status: completed
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- name: 從垃圾交易攻擊中恢復
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date: 2014-09-04
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status: completed
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- name: 門羅幣研究實驗室論文編號 1 與編號 2 發表
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date: 2014-09-12
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status: completed
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- name: 門羅幣研究實驗室論文編號 3 發表
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date: 2014-09-25
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status: completed
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- name: 0.8.8.6 版本發佈
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date: 2014-12-08
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status: completed
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- year: 2015
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accomplishments:
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- name: 門羅幣研究實驗室論文編號 4 發表
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date: 2015-01-26
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status: completed
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- year: 2016
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accomplishments:
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- name: 0.9.0 Hydrogen Helix 版本發佈
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date: 2016-01-01
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status: completed
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- name: 門羅幣研究實驗室論文編號 5 發表
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date: 2016-02-10
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status: completed
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- name: 升級網路以調整最低環狀簽名大小至 3
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date: 2016-03-22
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status: completed
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- name: 0.10.0 Wolfram Warptangent 版本發佈
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date: 2016-09-18
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status: completed
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- name: Network Upgrade to split coinbase into denominations
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date: 2016-09-21
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status: completed
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- name: 0.10.1 Wolfram Warptangent 版本發佈
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date: 2016-12-14
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status: completed
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- name: 官方 GUI 錢包 Beta 1 版本發佈
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date: 2016-12-22
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status: completed
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- year: 2017
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accomplishments:
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- name: 交易網路升級啟動 RingCT 交易
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date: 2017-01-05
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status: completed
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- name: 0.10.2 版本發佈; 修補重大漏洞
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date: 2017-02-22
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status: completed
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- name: 0.10.3.1 Wolfram Warptangent 版本發佈
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date: 2017-03-27
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status: completed
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- name: 交易網路升級以調整最小區塊容量與動態手續費公式
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date: 2017-04-15
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status: completed
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- name: 重新設計官方網站
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date: 2017-07-04
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status: completed
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- name: 0.11.0.0 Helium Hydra 版本發佈
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date: 2017-09-07
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status: completed
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- name: Fluffy blocks
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date: 2017-09-07
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status: completed
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- name: GUI 錢包完成 Beta 測試
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date: 2017-09-10
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status: completed
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- name: 交易網路升級以提升最低環狀簽名大小至 5 及強制使用 RingCT 交易
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date: 2017-09-15
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status: completed
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- name: 0MQ/ZeroMQ
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date: September, 2017
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status: completed
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- name: 子地址（Subaddresses）
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date: October, 2017
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status: completed
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- name: 多重簽名（multisig）
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date: December, 2017
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status: completed
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- year: 2018
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accomplishments:
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- name: 新的工作量證明（PoW）演算法 CryptoNoteV7
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date: 2018-04-06
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status: completed
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- name: 交易網路升級以提升最低環狀簽名大小至 7 、加入多重簽名、子地址和 PoW 演算法微調
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date: 2018-04-06
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status: completed
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- name: Getmonero.org 網站加入法文及波蘭文語言翻譯
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date: 2018-04-24
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status: completed
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- name: Ledger 硬體錢包支援
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date: 2018-06-04
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status: completed
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- name: Kovri alpha 版本發佈
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date: 2018-08-01
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status: completed
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- name: 實作防彈協定（Bulletproofs）以減少交易所需容量
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date: 2018-10-18
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status: completed
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- name: 論壇募資系統重新設計
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date:
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status: ongoing
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- name: Kovri 整合
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date:
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status: upcoming
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- year: 2019
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accomplishments:
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- name: 第二層交易網路協定以提高交易速度與擴展性
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date:
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status: upcoming
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- name: 更多的門羅幣研究實驗室論文發表
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date:
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status: upcoming
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%d/%m/%Y'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%d/%m/%Y'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ langs:
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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649
_i18n/zh-tw.yml
Normal file
649
_i18n/zh-tw.yml
Normal file
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langs:
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en: English
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es: Español
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it: Italiano
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pl: Polski
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fr: Français
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ar: العربية
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ru: Русский
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de: Deutsch
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nl: Nederlands
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pt-br: Português do Brasil
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tr: Türkçe
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zh-cn: 简体中文
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zh-tw: 繁體中文 臺灣
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global:
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date: '%Y/%m/%d'
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monero: 門羅幣
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getting_started: 開始使用
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copyright: 版權
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monero_project: 門羅幣專案
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sitename: getmonero.org, 門羅幣專案
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wiki: 門羅幣百科
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tags: 以標籤列出文章
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wikimeta: 門羅幣百科，開放的門羅幣知識百科全書
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tagsmeta: 被標籤標註的所有文章
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titlemeta: 門羅幣專案，安全、保護隱私且完全匿蹤的數位貨幣
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terms: 條款
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privacy: 隱私
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copyright: 版權
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||||
untranslated: 這個頁面尚未被翻譯，如果您願意協助翻譯，請見
|
||||
outdatedMax: 這個頁面資訊已過時，我們不建議使用它，請移駕至
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outdatedVersion: 英文版本
|
||||
outdatedMin: 這個頁面資訊因未更新翻譯，資訊已過時。您仍可繼續使用這個頁面，但資料可能不完整。
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||||
upgrade: 若要繼續使用門羅幣，請務必確認您的軟體已更新相容於 3 月 9 號的交易網路協定升級。
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||||
moreinfo: 更多資訊
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||||
lang_tag: "@lang_tag_zh-tw"
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titles:
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||||
index: 首頁
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||||
whatismonero: 什麼是門羅幣 (XMR)?
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||||
using: 使用門羅幣
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||||
accepting: 收取門羅幣
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||||
contributing: 改善門羅幣
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||||
mining: 挖取門羅幣
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||||
faq: 常見問題
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||||
downloads: 下載
|
||||
allposts: 所有文章
|
||||
team: 門羅幣團隊
|
||||
hangouts: 聊天室
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||||
events: 事件
|
||||
sponsorships: 贊助單位
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||||
merchants: 商家 ＆ 服務
|
||||
about: 關於門羅幣
|
||||
roadmap: 發展規劃
|
||||
researchlab: 門羅幣研究實驗室
|
||||
moneropedia: 門羅幣百科
|
||||
userguides: 使用者指引
|
||||
developerguides: 開發者指引
|
||||
technicalspecs: 技術規格
|
||||
themoneroproject: 門羅幣專案
|
||||
presskit: 門羅幣新聞資料袋
|
||||
legal: 使用規定
|
||||
ffs: 論壇募資系統
|
||||
ffs-cp: 已完成的提案
|
||||
ffs-fr: 需要資助
|
||||
ffs-ideas: 構想
|
||||
ffs-ot: 尚未執行的專案
|
||||
ffs-wip: 進行中的專案
|
||||
blogbytag: 以標籤篩選文章
|
||||
library: 圖書出版品
|
||||
|
||||
index:
|
||||
page_title: "門羅幣 - 安全、保護隱私且完全匿蹤的加密貨幣"
|
||||
|
||||
home:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
heading2: 保護隱私的數位貨幣
|
||||
monero_is_cash: 門羅幣是網路世界的現金，快速、保護隱私且安全。使用門羅幣時，你就是你自己的銀行，你可以安全的交易，不用擔心別人會看到你的帳戶餘額或追蹤你的金融活動。
|
||||
get_started: 開始使用
|
||||
why_monero_is_different: 為什麼門羅幣如此特別
|
||||
monero_is_secure: 門羅幣很安全
|
||||
monero_is_secure_para: 門羅幣是去中心化的加密貨幣，意味著它是由使用者組成的網路所共同運作的安全數位現金。交易是由分散式共識與無法竄改的區塊鏈紀錄所確認。不需要信任特定的第三方就可以保護你的門羅幣安全。
|
||||
monero_is_private: 門羅幣保護隱私
|
||||
monero_is_private_para: 門羅幣使用環狀簽名、環狀保密交易和隱匿性地址以混淆所有交易的來源、金額與流向。門羅幣提供所有去中心化加密貨幣的好處，但不會對隱私疑慮做任何的妥協。
|
||||
monero_is_untraceable: 門羅幣是完全匿蹤
|
||||
monero_is_untraceable_para: 發送和接收門羅幣的地址和交易金額都是預設混淆過的。在門羅幣區塊鏈上的交易無法被連結到特定使用者或真實世界中的身份。
|
||||
monero_is_fungible: 門羅幣具有替代性
|
||||
monero_is_fungible_para1: 門羅幣具有
|
||||
monero_is_fungible_para2: 替代性
|
||||
monero_is_fungible_para3: 由於門羅幣預設都是保護隱私的，門羅幣的貨幣不會因為先前的交易紀錄而被商家或交易所列入黑名單。
|
||||
downloads: 下載
|
||||
downloads_windows: 適用 Windows 系統的門羅幣
|
||||
downloads_mac: 適用 Mac 系統的門羅幣
|
||||
downloads_linux: 適用 Linux 系統的門羅幣
|
||||
downloads_blockchain: 最新的區塊鏈檔案
|
||||
different_system: 需要其他作業系統的嗎？
|
||||
view_all_downloads: 這裡有全部的可用版本下載
|
||||
latest_news: 最新消息
|
||||
more_news: 更多消息
|
||||
moneropedia: 門羅幣百科
|
||||
moneropedia_para: 你想要找門羅幣的各種用詞和概念的解釋嗎？在這裡你可以找到用字母排序的字詞與其意義解釋，範圍包括門羅幣與 Kovri 專案。
|
||||
moneropedia_button: 閱讀門羅幣百科
|
||||
user_guides: 使用者指引
|
||||
user_guides_para: 依不同分類整理好的鉅細靡遺教學，內容囊括了從建立錢包到支持門羅幣網路，甚至還有如何編輯本網站的教學。
|
||||
user_guides_button: 閱讀使用者指引
|
||||
faq: 常見問題
|
||||
faq_para: 在過去數年常常聽到的許多疑問，我們把它編列成了一份方便閱讀的常見問題集。別擔心，如果你的問題不在這邊，永遠歡迎直接到社群發問。
|
||||
faq_button: 閱讀解答
|
||||
|
||||
hangouts:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro: 門羅幣的社群具有高度的多樣性，我們雖然來自世界各地，但還是常常會在幾個地方聚在一起交流，你可以在以下幾個地方找到我們，加入我們吧！
|
||||
resources: 協作群組資源
|
||||
resources_para: 為了支持有組織性的協作，門羅幣有幾種資源平台可以用聚會或是規劃專案，Mattermost 甚至有橋接了數個熱門的 Monero IRC 頻道。
|
||||
irc: IRC 頻道
|
||||
irc_para: 門羅幣社群利用了許多 IRC 頻道作為多種不同用途的溝通管道。有些是工作用，有些則是單純閒聊，你可以在下面找到幾個比較熱門的頻道。
|
||||
stack_exchange: Stack Exchange
|
||||
stack_exchange_para: 門羅幣的 Stack Exchange 是一個快速且容易提出問題與獲得解答的地方，在下面你可以看到一些高品質的常見問答。
|
||||
stack_exchange_link: 造訪 Stack Exchange
|
||||
irc_channels:
|
||||
- channel: monero
|
||||
description: 這頻道是用來討論所有與門羅幣相關的主題。
|
||||
- channel: monero-community
|
||||
description: 這頻道是門羅幣社群用來組織及討論想法的地方。
|
||||
- channel: monero-dev
|
||||
description: 許多貢獻者與開發者會在這裡討論開發相關的事情。
|
||||
- channel: monero-markets
|
||||
description: 我們用這頻道來討論門羅幣或其他幣種的價格資訊。
|
||||
- channel: monero-offtopic
|
||||
description: 在這裡可以與其他門羅幣使用者聊聊與門羅幣無關的事情。
|
||||
- channel: monero-otc
|
||||
description: 門羅幣的場外交易。可以來這裡與其他的門羅幣愛好者交易門羅幣。
|
||||
- channel: monero-pools
|
||||
description: 這是用來討論門羅幣挖礦與礦池的頻道。
|
||||
- channel: monero-research-lab
|
||||
description: 這頻道的主題是研究金融與加密貨幣的隱私。
|
||||
- channel: monero-translations
|
||||
description: 將門羅幣專案翻譯至當地語言的工作溝通頻道。
|
||||
- channel: monero-hardware
|
||||
description: 打造硬體錢包以保護你的門羅幣安全。
|
||||
- channel: kovri
|
||||
description: 這是用來討論與 Kovri 專案相關的頻道。
|
||||
- channel: kovri-dev
|
||||
description: 這是用來討論與 Kovri 專案開發的頻道。
|
||||
|
||||
merchants:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro1: 使用門羅幣的各類商家都可以獲得門羅幣帶來的金融隱私保護價值，以下是一些我們知道目前接受使用門羅幣購買商品或服務的商家。如果其中有商家已停止接受使用門羅幣，或是你想讓你所經營的事業被列在此表
|
||||
intro2: 請在 GitLab 上開一個新 issue 通知我們。
|
||||
disclaimer: |
|
||||
"請注意：這些連結只是提供便利的資訊，並不代表是由門羅幣社群認可的產品、服務或該單位所發表之個人或單位的意見。門羅幣社群不對其準確性，合法性或其網站內容負擔任何責任。請聯絡該單位以獲得與其內容相關的問題解答。 請謹記貨物售出概不退換的原則，你必須自己做功課並為其負責，永遠要在線上購物時發揮你的判斷力。
|
||||
|
||||
sponsorships:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro: 下列商家已用行動支持門羅幣專案其欲達成世界金融隱私的目標，我們由衷的感激他們的貢獻。如果你也想要贊助門羅幣專案並被列在本頁清單，請電郵至 dev@getmonero.org。
|
||||
|
||||
team:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
core: 核心開發團隊
|
||||
developers: 開發者們
|
||||
developers_para1: 門羅幣專案誕生以來，擁有來自世界各地超過 500 位的開發貢獻者，完整的清單請見
|
||||
developers_para2: OpenHub 上的貢獻者頁面。
|
||||
developers_para3: 以下是一些在門羅幣專案中有著特別傑出貢獻的開發者們。
|
||||
community: 社群
|
||||
mrl: 研究實驗室
|
||||
thanks: 特別感謝
|
||||
|
||||
downloads:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
choose: 選擇你的作業系統
|
||||
sourceblockchain: 原始碼 ＆ 區塊鏈
|
||||
mobilelight: 行動錢包 & 輕錢包
|
||||
hardware: 硬體錢包
|
||||
intro1: 如果你需要協助挑選適合的錢包請點
|
||||
intro2: 這裡
|
||||
intro3: 若要簡單快速的答案，那就在下面依你的作業系統選擇一個。
|
||||
note1: "請注意：列在下載連結旁的 SHA256 雜湊碼只是為了方便，完整的 GPG 簽署雜湊碼清單在此"
|
||||
note2: 並必須將其視為官方來源，這些雜湊碼是對應著原始碼中的 GPG 金鑰 (位於 /utils/gpg_keys)。
|
||||
currentversion: 目前版本
|
||||
sourcecode: 原始碼
|
||||
mirror: 鏡像下載點
|
||||
blockchain1: 如果你想要使用區塊鏈檔案起始同步，而不是重頭開始同步區塊鏈的話，你可以
|
||||
blockchain2: 用這個連結取得最近的區塊鏈起始檔案。
|
||||
blockchain3: 通常這會比重頭同步來得快，但是需要花費更多的電腦記憶體。
|
||||
hardware1: 門羅幣社群已經募資成立了一個
|
||||
hardware2: 專門的硬體錢包開發專案
|
||||
hardware3: 正在進行中。不過自從在版本 CLI 0.12.1 和 GUI 0.12.3 之後 Ledger 已成功
|
||||
hardware4: 整合門羅幣至他們的硬體錢包。
|
||||
mobilelight1: 以下是數個行動版錢包或輕錢包已被門羅幣社群認可為安全的選擇。如果有錢包沒有被列在上面的，你可以先到社群上請求大家來試用看看，可以到
|
||||
mobilelight2: 聊天室
|
||||
mobilelight3: 頁面找到社群所在。
|
||||
clionly: 指令介面工具
|
||||
installer: 安裝檔
|
||||
|
||||
monero-project:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
kovri: Kovri 專案使用點對點的加密技術，使得不論是門羅幣交易的發送者或接收者都不會向對方或第三方揭露他們的 IP 位址。這與暗網的所用到的是相同的技術：I2P (Invisible Internet Protocol)。這專案目前正在積極活躍的開發中，尚未整合到門羅幣中。
|
||||
kovri_button: 造訪 Kovri 專案網站
|
||||
openalias: OpenAlias 專案藉由 FQDNs (Fully Qualified Domain Names)， 像是 example.openalias.org 這樣的網址來簡化加密貨幣的支付。這功能可確保大家的門羅幣錢包地址的隱私安全。此專案的進展相當順利，並已在許多門羅幣錢包中完成實做。
|
||||
openalias_button: 造訪 OpenAlias 專案網站
|
||||
|
||||
press-kit:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro1: 你可以在這邊取得一些門羅幣的代表性圖案與標誌。你可以選擇想要的尺寸或是下載 .ai 檔案以自行編輯你想要的標示圖案。
|
||||
intro2: 請注意白色背景選項是只有在門羅幣圖案底下的白色背景，而非整張圖片的背景。
|
||||
intro3: 最後，你可以在這裡下載一個包含所有檔案的 zip 壓縮檔，請點擊
|
||||
intro4: 這裡。
|
||||
noback: 無背景
|
||||
whiteback: 白色背景
|
||||
symbol: 門羅幣代表性圖案
|
||||
logo: 門羅幣標誌
|
||||
small: 小
|
||||
medium: 中
|
||||
large: 大
|
||||
symbol_file: 圖案 .ai 原始圖檔
|
||||
logo_file: 標誌 .ai 原始圖檔
|
||||
documents:
|
||||
- category: 新聞稿文件
|
||||
publications:
|
||||
- name: "懶人包"
|
||||
url_file: "http://www.monerooutreach.org/pubs/2018/QuickFacts/QuickFacts.pdf"
|
||||
abstract: >
|
||||
一份可以快速全面了解門羅幣的讀物： 發展歷史、關鍵的獨特之處、技術的奠基與開發中的功能。<br>
|
||||
參訪 <a target="_blank" href="https://www.monerooutreach.org/index.php">Monero Outreach</a> 網站以查看更多資訊。
|
||||
|
||||
accepting:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
title: 指令界面工具的使用說明
|
||||
basics: 基本介紹
|
||||
basics_para1: 門羅幣與你過去曾接觸過其他的 @加密貨幣 稍微有點不同。以比特幣與其相同衍生類型的幣為例，通常商家的支付系統會為每一個使用者或每一筆交易產生全新的收款 @地址 。
|
||||
basics_para2: 但是，因為門羅幣有 @隱匿性地址 所以並不需要在每次交易中使用不同的收款地址，可以公開使用同一個 @帳戶 地址。取而代之的是商家將會提供一個「付款 ID」給付款者。
|
||||
basics_para3: " @付款ID 是一個十六進位制的64字元長的字串，通常是由商家隨機產生，一個付款ID的範例如下："
|
||||
checking: 在 monero-wallet-cli 中檢查一筆付款
|
||||
checking_para1: |
|
||||
如果你想要使用 monero-wallet-cli 檢查一筆付款，你可以使用「payments」指令搭配一或多組付款ID，譬如：
|
||||
checking_para2: 如果你想要透過程式化的方式檢查付款，其細節將在下一個部份解釋。
|
||||
receiving: 接收一筆付款的步驟
|
||||
receiving_list1: 產生一組隨機的十六進位制 64 字元字串作為付款ID
|
||||
receiving_list2: 將這組付款ID與門羅幣地址提供給付款者
|
||||
receiving_list3: 在 monero-wallet-cli 中用「payments」檢查付款
|
||||
program: 透過程式化的方式檢查付款
|
||||
program_para1: 若要透過程式化的方式檢查付款，你可以透過 JSON RPC API 呼叫 get_payments 或 get_bulk_payments。
|
||||
program_para2: 這將需要一個付款ID作為 payment_id 的參數。
|
||||
program_para3: 這是較為適當的方式，需要兩個參數，一為 payment_ids (帶有付款ID的 JSON 陣列) 和可選的 min_block_height 參數 (指定掃描的區塊高度起始點)。
|
||||
program_para4: |
|
||||
一個回傳的資料範例如下：
|
||||
program_para5: 重要的一點是，回傳的金額是以基本門羅幣單位來呈現，而由於付款通常都是由多組交易輸出所組成，金額會是由 tx_hash 或是 payment_id 分群的多個結果組合而成。 此外，由於多個交易輸出可能有相同的金額，因此請不要嘗試從單一個 get_bulk_payments 指令回傳的資料中篩選交易。
|
||||
program_para6: 在掃瞄付款之前，最好先透過節點的 RPC API (呼叫 get_info) 來確認是否有收到新的區塊資料，通常你會想要只從這些新收到的區塊資料中掃描付款，可以透過指定 min_block_height 再呼叫 get_bulk_payments 來達成。
|
||||
scanning: 透過程式化的方式檢查付款
|
||||
scanning_list1: 從節點取得目前的區塊高度，僅在區塊高度增加時進行掃描。
|
||||
scanning_list2: 在我們系統上呼叫 get_bulk_payments RPC API 指令，並指定最後一次的掃描區塊高度以及付款 ID 清單。
|
||||
scanning_list3: 將目前的區塊高度儲存起來以作為最後一次的掃描高度。
|
||||
scanning_list4: 以交易雜湊碼來判斷並去除與先前已處理過的重複的交易紀錄。
|
||||
|
||||
contributing:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro: 門羅幣是一個開放原始碼、由社群推動的專案。以下列出了一些可以支持本專案的方法。
|
||||
network: 支持交易網路
|
||||
develop: 開發工作
|
||||
develop_para1: 門羅幣主要是以 C++ 語言撰寫，由於它是一個去中心化的專案，任何人都歡迎在現有的程式碼上進行新增或修改，拉取請求 (Pull requests) 將由社群共識決定是否可以被合併 (merge)，詳情請見
|
||||
develop_para2: 儲存庫
|
||||
develop_para3: 和一些重要的
|
||||
develop_para4: 議題 (issues)。
|
||||
full-node: 運行全節點
|
||||
full-node_para: 運作一個開啟連接埠 18080 的 monerod，運作一個全節點可以確保在交易門羅幣時可以獲得完整的隱私保護，同時也幫助將區塊鏈資料分配給新加入的使用者。
|
||||
mine: 挖礦
|
||||
mine_para1: 挖礦可以確保門羅幣維持去中心化與安全，在門羅幣的圖形化介面或指令介面錢包中，可以啟用背景挖礦，更多的挖礦資訊可以參考
|
||||
mine_para2: 這裡。
|
||||
ffs: 造訪論壇募資系統
|
||||
ffs_para1: 門羅幣專案利用一個
|
||||
ffs_para2: 論壇募資系統
|
||||
ffs_para3: 來進行社群資助的開發專案提案，募資的資金將會被託管，直到專案開發進度達到事先設定的里程碑，任何人都可以提出新的提案或是資助現有的提案。
|
||||
donate: 贊助
|
||||
donate_para1: 正在進行中的開發是由社群贊助與
|
||||
donate_para2: 贊助單位所贊助。
|
||||
donate-xmr: 以門羅幣贊助
|
||||
donate-xmr_para: 贊助款項可以發送至
|
||||
or: 或
|
||||
donate-btc: 以比特幣贊助
|
||||
donate-btc_para: 贊助款項可以發送至
|
||||
donate-other: 其他
|
||||
donate-other_para1: 發送電子郵件至
|
||||
donate-other_para2: 若你想要以其他的方式贊助或是想要成為門羅幣的贊助單位。
|
||||
|
||||
faq:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
q1: 門羅幣的價值是怎麼產生的？
|
||||
a1: 門羅幣之所以會有價值是因為人們願意購買它，若是沒有人願意購買門羅幣，他將不會有任何價值。而若是市場需求量提升，門羅幣的價格亦隨著上升，若是供過於求則會使價格下降。
|
||||
q2: 我要如何取得門羅幣？
|
||||
a2: 你可以從交易所或其他持有者購買門羅幣。此外，你也可以試著透過挖礦取得區塊中獎勵的門羅幣。
|
||||
q3: 什麼是助記種子碼？
|
||||
a3: 助記種子碼是可以用來回復錢包用的一組 25 個字詞，請保護好這些字詞，並不要與其他人透漏這些字詞，即使你的電腦損壞而無法使用，你還是可以 (在其他電腦) 回復你的帳戶。
|
||||
q4: 門羅幣的隱私保護與其他幣種有什麼差異？
|
||||
a4: |
|
||||
門羅幣使用三種不同的技術來保護隱私：環狀簽名、環簽保密交易 (RingCT) 與隱匿性地址。這些技術可以隱藏發送者與接收者在交易中的資訊。所有的交易在網路上都是強制保護的，你無法意外地發送一筆透明的交易，這是門羅幣獨特的功能，你不需要信任任何人來保護你的隱私。
|
||||
q5: 為什麼我的錢包要花這麼久的時間來完成同步？
|
||||
a5: 如果你是在本地端運作全節點，你需要將整個區塊鏈複製到你的電腦中。這可以花上不少時間，尤其是當你是使用舊硬碟或是較慢的網路速度更是如此。如果你是用遠端節點，你電腦將會需要請求獲得一份交易輸出，這過程有可能會需要數個小時完成。請保持耐心，若你為了較快地同步速度而改用輕錢包，將有可能犧牲一些隱私。
|
||||
q6: 普通錢包與輕錢包有什麼差異？
|
||||
a6: 以輕錢包來說，你將提供查看金鑰給節點以掃描你的帳戶在區塊鏈上的交易，節點會得知你在什麼時候接收到資金，但無法得知你接收到的金額或來源。根據你使用的錢包軟體差異，你可能可以使用你自己控制的節點以避免這類的隱私資訊洩漏。若需要完整的隱私保護，請使用普通錢包搭配你自己的節點。
|
||||
q7: 門羅幣與比特幣有什麼差異？
|
||||
a7: 門羅幣並不是基於比特幣所開發，它是基於 CryptoNote 協定所開發。比特幣是完全透明的系統，人們可以完整看見資金與金額是如何從一個使用者發送至另一個使用者。門羅幣在所有交易中都對這些隱私資訊提供了保護。它也擁有動態區塊與手續費系統、抵抗 ASIC 礦機的工作量證明 (proof of work) 演算法、尾發行與一些其他的改變。
|
||||
q8: 門羅幣有區塊容量限制嗎？
|
||||
a8: 沒有，門羅幣並沒有硬性固定的區塊容量限制。取而代之的是，區塊容量會隨著需求量增加或減少區塊容量。但區塊的成長速率有設定上限以避免沒有節制的暴增。
|
||||
q9: 什麼是區塊鏈？
|
||||
a9: 區塊鏈是一個可以儲存門羅幣所有交易歷史的系統，每隔兩分鐘，帶有最新交易紀錄的新區塊就會產生並被添加到區塊鏈上，這條鏈可以提供整個交易網路做驗證，使得其免於攻擊與中心化的干預。
|
||||
q10: 什麼是 Kovri ？
|
||||
a10: Kovri 是一個以 C++ 撰寫的 I2P 路由。I2P 是一個隱藏的網路，就像是一種 Tor 網路但有些許技術上差異。Kovri 是獨立於門羅幣的專案，但它將得以在門羅幣與一些其他專案上運作。Kovri 隱藏交易廣播時的資訊，所以其他節點將會無法得知是誰創建了該筆交易。若能一如預期的運作，Kovri 可以透過 I2P 隱藏所有的門羅幣網路流量，讓人們無從得知門羅幣的使用情形。Kovri 目前正在 alpha 階段，尚未完全整合至門羅幣中，若要獲得更多關於 Kovri 的資訊，請造訪其<a href="https://kovri.io">專案網站。</a>
|
||||
q11: 什麼是貨幣替代性與為什麼這是重要的特性？
|
||||
a11: 貨幣替代性 (Fungibility) 是錢幣的基本特性，代表兩個相同單位的錢幣之間沒有差異。如果兩個人交換了一個 10 與兩個 5，沒有人會有所損失。但是，若假設所有人都知道那筆 10 曾被用在一場勒索軟體的攻擊事件中，那其他人還會願意接受這筆交易嗎？很可能不會。即使該持有者與該勒索攻擊事件無關。這就產生了一個問題，接收錢幣的那方將必須持續檢查是否不小心收到了贓款。門羅幣是滿足貨幣替代性的，因此人們再也不需要擔心這個問題。
|
||||
q12: 如果門羅幣這麼保護隱私，那我們要如何知道這些錢幣不是從無中生有的？
|
||||
a12-1: 在門羅幣中，每一筆交易輸出都會帶有一個金鑰映像 (key image)，每個映像只能被該筆交易輸出組合所產生。重複出現的金鑰映像將會使得該筆交易被礦工視為雙重花費 (double-spends) 而拒絕加入區塊中，當每筆新的交易出現時，礦工將會驗證其金鑰映像不得出現在先前的交易中以確保該筆交易不是雙重花費。
|
||||
a12-2: 即使在交易中的金額是被加密隱藏 (僅有接收方能得知交易金額)，我們也可以驗證每筆交易金額是否有效，因為金額是透過 Pedersen commitments 進行加密表示，意思是沒有外部觀察者可以得知交易輸入與輸出的金額，但是他們可以透過計算 Pedersen commitments 以確認沒有門羅幣是被無中生有的產生。
|
||||
a12-3: 只要加密後的輸出金額相等於輸入金額總和 (包括發送給接收者的輸出、回到自己錢包的找零輸出、未加密的交易手續費)，那你就可以確認這是一筆有效的交易，沒有門羅幣在這之中被無中生有，Pedersen commitments 使得金額總和可以被驗證是否相等，但每筆交易輸出個別的金額仍然得以維持在未知的狀態。
|
||||
q13: 不論我怎麼做，門羅幣都可以很神奇的保護我的隱私嗎？
|
||||
a13: 門羅幣不是魔法。如果你在使用門羅幣時提供了對方你的姓名與地址，對方並不會很神奇的就忘記你的姓名和地址。如果你交出了你的私鑰，有心人將可得知你的過往交易紀錄。如果你的電腦被入侵，有心人將可以側錄你的行為。如果你使用了低強度的密碼，有心人將有機會暴力破解你的金鑰檔。如果你在雲端備份你的種子碼，你很快將會招致損失。
|
||||
q14: 門羅幣是百分之百匿名的嗎？
|
||||
a14: 沒有所謂的百分之百匿名。 正常情況下，門羅幣能提供的匿名程度就是相對於不使用門羅幣能提供的保護程度。門羅幣也有可能出現 bug，即使沒有，還是有可能存在著一些在門羅幣使用中推測出些許隱私資訊的方法，不論是現在或未來，對隱私的的攻擊力道只會越來越強。舉例來說，即使你有繫安全帶還是有可能在車禍中重傷致死。請使用常識思考，謹慎面對威脅並作出一定程度的防禦。
|
||||
|
||||
mining:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro1: 門羅幣是一種透過工作量證明達到分散式共識的加密貨幣。你可以在下面找到一些關於如何開始挖礦的資訊。
|
||||
intro2: 門羅幣專案並不為任何礦池、軟體、硬體做背書，以下提供之內容僅為教學使用的資訊分享。
|
||||
support: 技術支援
|
||||
support_para1: 詳見
|
||||
support_para2: 聊天室，
|
||||
support_para3: /r/moneromining (英文)
|
||||
support_para4: 和
|
||||
pools: 礦池
|
||||
pools_para1: 一些可信任的門羅幣礦池列表在
|
||||
pools_para2: 這裡。
|
||||
benchmarking: 硬體表現測試
|
||||
benchmarking_para1: 此處
|
||||
benchmarking_para2: 列出了一些 GPU/CPU 與它們的雜湊運算 (挖礦) 速度。
|
||||
software: 挖礦軟體
|
||||
software_para: 請注意有些挖礦工具可能會收取開發者手續費。
|
||||
|
||||
using:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro: 用門羅幣交易可以很簡單，本頁面將會引導使用者進行。
|
||||
learn: 1. 學習
|
||||
learn_para1: 門羅幣是安全、保護隱私且完全匿蹤的加密或幣。開發者與社群都致力於保護這些核心價值，欲瞭解更多請詳見
|
||||
learn_para2: 什麼是門羅幣
|
||||
learn_para3: 的頁面。
|
||||
learn_para4: 程式原始碼
|
||||
learn_para5: 也是完全開放審查與討論。
|
||||
support: 2. 請求技術支援
|
||||
support_para1: 如果你遇到困難，廣大熱心的社群將會提供你協助。詳見
|
||||
support_para2: 聊天室
|
||||
support_para3: 頁面以獲得更多資訊。
|
||||
generate: 3. 建立錢包
|
||||
generate_para1: 你將需要一個門羅幣錢包以保護你的資金。詳見
|
||||
generate_para2: 下載頁面
|
||||
generate_para3: 已獲得可用錢包的列表。
|
||||
generate_para4: 若要運作一個門羅幣節點，最簡單亦不會占用你的網路頻寬的方式是購買一個 VPS (Virtual Private Server) 服務。我們推薦
|
||||
generate_para5: 並使用
|
||||
generate_para6: 折扣碼以獲得比原本就很便宜的 6美金/每月 更優惠的 VPS 方案PS。使用這個折扣碼與/或
|
||||
generate_para7: 我們的推薦連結
|
||||
generate_para8: 將會同時幫助門羅幣的開發工作獲得資助。
|
||||
acquire: 4. 取得門羅幣
|
||||
acquire_para1: 門羅幣的取得可以在
|
||||
acquire_para2: 交易所
|
||||
acquire_para3: 用法幣或其他加密或幣兌換而得。另一個方式是藉由
|
||||
acquire_para4: 挖礦，
|
||||
acquire_para5: 取得，透過一些複雜的計算工作來確保在區塊鏈上紀錄的交易不會被竄改。
|
||||
send-receive: 5. 發送與接收門羅幣
|
||||
send-receive_para1: 學習如何發送與接收門羅幣，詳見
|
||||
send-receive_para2: 教學。
|
||||
transact: 6. 使用門羅幣交易
|
||||
transact_para1: 門羅幣可以用來購買許多商品與服務，列表詳見
|
||||
transact_para2: 商家頁面。
|
||||
|
||||
what-is-monero:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
need-to-know: 你需要知道的事情
|
||||
leading: 門羅幣是專注在保護隱私與對抗審查交易的領導加密貨幣。
|
||||
leading_para1: 大多數現行的加密或幣，包括比特幣與乙太幣都是透明的區塊鏈，意思是所有交易都是向全世界任何一個人開放驗證與查詢。此外，發送與接收這些交易的錢包地址有可能會被連結至某個人在真實世界中的身分。
|
||||
leading_para2: 門羅幣利用密碼學保護了發送與接收的錢包地址，也保護了交易金額。
|
||||
confidential: 門羅幣交易是機密且無法追蹤的。
|
||||
confidential_para1: 每一筆門羅幣的交易，在預設的狀況下，發送與接收的地址與交易金額都是被混淆過的資訊。這項永遠啟用的隱私保護代表著門羅幣的每個使用活動都是在提升其他人的隱私保護，這與其他選擇性透明的加密貨幣 (例如 Zcash) 不同。
|
||||
confidential_para2: 門羅幣是滿足貨幣替代性的。由於資訊都是被混淆過的，門羅幣無法被先前的交易汙染，這代表門羅幣永遠不會有被審查而拒絕收取的風險。
|
||||
confidential_para3: Kovri 專案，
|
||||
confidential_para4: 目前正在開發中
|
||||
confidential_para5: ，將會使用 I2P 將交易使用的網路連線在隱藏的網路節點進行加密，這將會隱藏交易者的 IP 位址，提供在網路審查環境中更好的保護效果。
|
||||
grassroots: 門羅幣是草根型的社群，吸引了全世界頂尖的加密貨幣研究員與工程師
|
||||
grassroots_para1: 已有超過
|
||||
grassroots_para2: 500 位開發者
|
||||
grassroots_para3: 在門羅幣專案中貢獻，包括 30 位核心開發者。論壇與聊天頻道都很開放且活躍。
|
||||
grassroots_para4: 門羅幣的研究實驗室成員、核心開發者、與社群開發者持續致力於將加密貨幣的隱私保護與安全性推向極限。
|
||||
grassroots_para5: 門羅幣不是一家公司。它是由世界各地的密碼學與分散式系統專家所發展，貢獻他們的時間或是由社群資助而進行的工作。這代表門羅幣無法被某個國家或執法機構所關閉。
|
||||
electronic: 門羅幣提供全世界一個交易快速，低負擔的電子現金。
|
||||
electronic_para1: 不存在著需時數日的等待期或是詐騙退款風險，不會有所謂的「資金管控」- 這些都是限制傳統貨幣流通的因素，時常發生於一些在極端狀況下，經濟狀況不穩定的國家。
|
||||
videos: 門羅幣影片 (英文)
|
||||
|
||||
about:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
history: 簡要歷史
|
||||
history_para1: 門羅幣專案創始於 2014 年 4 月。是一次公平、預先公告以 CryptoNote 程式碼作為基礎的發行。沒有預挖或瞬挖，也沒有給開發工作的抽成。詳見原始的 Bitcointalk 公告
|
||||
history_para2: 討論串。
|
||||
history_para3: 創立者 thankful_for_today 做了一些備受社群爭議的修改，結果門羅幣核心開發者跟著支持他們的社群們分叉了專案，這群核心開發者在那之後就持續負責看管著門羅幣專案的開發。
|
||||
history_para4: 門羅幣在創始之後做出了數個大程度的改進，區塊鏈檔案被移植到新的資料庫架構以提供更好的效率及彈性，環狀簽名也被設下了最低限制，使得所有交易預設都必須要是保護隱私的，環狀保密交易也加入以隱藏交易金額，幾乎所有的改進都是為了提升安全性與保護隱私，或是使其更易於使用，門羅幣將持續秉持以安全性優先，效率與易用性其次的目標進行開發。
|
||||
values: 我們的核心價值
|
||||
values_para: 門羅幣不僅僅是一項科技，它更是這項科技所想要呈現的。以下列出一些重要的發展哲學。
|
||||
security: 安全
|
||||
security_para: 使用者必須要能夠信任門羅幣的交易，不用擔心錯誤與攻擊的風險。門羅幣提供礦工全額的獎勵，以期待這個最關鍵的角色可以為交易網路提供安全性。交易在密碼學上使用最新的加密工具以保證安全性。
|
||||
privacy: 隱私
|
||||
privacy_para: 門羅幣相當重視隱私保護，門羅幣必須要能夠在法律上保護使用者，在更極端的例子中，是包括了生死交關的場合。這種隱私保護必須是所有使用者都可以完整獲得，不論他們是否了解這項科技或是了解門羅幣是如何運作。使用者必須要能信任門羅幣以期待不須擔心被其他人探查而改變其消費習慣。
|
||||
decentralization: 去中心化
|
||||
decentralization_para: 門羅幣致力於提供最大程度的去中心化。使用門羅幣時，你不需要去信任網路上的其他人，且門羅幣並不是由任何一個大型機構所運行。低使用門檻的工作量證明演算法使得門羅幣挖礦可以在一般的電腦中進行，這使得購買大量的挖礦算力變得更困難。透過 I2P 連線的節點可以降低揭露交易敏感資訊與通訊審查的風險，開發決策是非常透明化的公開討論，開發者會議紀錄也是完全公開在線上提供大家閱覽的。
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
developer-guides:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
outdated: "請注意：以下的教學已在近期由社群更新並保持在最新狀態。然而，方法函式常常會增加 / 移除 / 更新，因此教學中描述的資訊仍有可能不夠準確。"
|
||||
rpc: RPC 說明文件
|
||||
daemonrpc: 節點 RPC 說明文件
|
||||
walletrpc: 錢包 RPC 說明文件
|
||||
soon: 更多文件即將發布...
|
||||
|
||||
user-guides:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
general: 一般
|
||||
mining: 挖礦
|
||||
recovery: 回復
|
||||
wallets: 錢包
|
||||
offline-backup: 如何製作離線備份
|
||||
vps-node: 如何在 VPS 上運行節點
|
||||
import-blockchain: 匯入門羅幣區塊鏈檔案
|
||||
monero-tools: 門羅幣工具
|
||||
purchasing-storing: 安全地購買與儲存門羅幣
|
||||
verify-allos: 在 Linux, Mac, 或 Windows 系統上驗證執行檔 (進階)
|
||||
verify-windows: 在 windows 系統上驗證執行檔 (入門)
|
||||
mine-on-pool: 如何使用 xmr-stak-cpu 在礦池挖礦
|
||||
solo-mine: 如何使用 GUI 錢包進行 solo 挖礦
|
||||
mine-docker: 使用 Docker 與 XMRig 進行挖礦
|
||||
locked-funds: 如何修復被鎖定的資金
|
||||
restore-account: 如何回復你的帳戶
|
||||
qubes: 使用 Qubes 與 Whonix 隔離你的 CLI 錢包 / 節點
|
||||
cli-wallet: 開始使用 CLI 錢包
|
||||
remote-node-gui: 如何讓 GUI 錢包連接至遠端節點
|
||||
view-only: 如何製作唯讀錢包
|
||||
prove-payment: 如何證明付款
|
||||
restore-from-keys: 從金鑰回復錢包
|
||||
nicehash: 如何在不使用挖礦裝置的情況下挖取門羅幣
|
||||
ledger-wallet-cli: 如何使用 CLI 錢包產生 Ledger 錢包 (monero-wallet-cli)
|
||||
multisig-messaging-system: 如何使用 MMS 與 CLI 錢包進行多重簽名交易
|
||||
|
||||
roadmap:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
completed: 已完成的工作
|
||||
ongoing: 進行中的工作
|
||||
upcoming: 即將到來的工作
|
||||
future: 未來
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
research-lab:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
intro: 門羅幣不只是致力於打造一個滿足貨幣替代性的貨幣，更是持續研究著與加密貨幣相關的金融隱私。在以下你能看到一些來自門羅幣研究實驗室發表的研究論文，還有更多論文正在準備發表。
|
||||
mrl_papers: 門羅幣研究實驗室的論文 (英文)
|
||||
abstract: 摘要
|
||||
introduction: 前言
|
||||
read-paper: 閱讀全文
|
||||
mrl1: A Note on Chain Reactions in Traceability in CryptoNote 2.0
|
||||
mrl1_abstract: This research bulletin describes a plausible attack on a ring-signature based anonymity system. We use as motivation the cryptocurrency protocol CryptoNote 2.0 ostensibly published by Nicolas van Saberhagen in 2012. It has been previously demonstrated that the untraceability obscuring a one-time key pair can be dependent upon the untraceability of all of the keys used in composing that ring signature. This allows for the possibility of chain reactions in traceability between ring signatures, causing a critical loss in untraceability across the whole network if parameters are poorly chosen and if an attacker owns a sufficient percentage of the network. The signatures are still one-time, however, and any such attack will still not necessarily violate the anonymity of users. However, such an attack could plausibly weaken the resistance CryptoNote demonstrates against blockchain analysis. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
|
||||
mrl2: Counterfeiting via Merkle Tree Exploits within Virtual Currencies Employing the CryptoNote Protocol
|
||||
mrl2_abstract: On 4 September 2014, an unusual and novel attack was executed against the Monero cryptocurrency network. This attack partitioned the network into two distinct subsets which refused to accept the legitimacy of the other subset. This had myriad effects, not all of which are yet known. The attacker had a short window of time during which a sort of counterfeiting could occur, for example. This research bulletin describes deficiencies in the CryptoNote reference code allowing for this attack, describes the solution initially put forth by Rafal Freeman from Tigusoft.pl and subsequently by the CryptoNote team, describes the current fix in the Monero code base, and elaborates upon exactly what the offending block did to the network. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
|
||||
mrl3: Monero is Not That Mysterious
|
||||
mrl3_abstract: Recently, there have been some vague fears about the CryptoNote source code and protocol floating around the internet based on the fact that it is a more complicated protocol than, for instance, Bitcoin. The purpose of this note is to try and clear up some misconceptions, and hopefully remove some of the mystery surrounding Monero Ring Signatures. I will start by comparing the mathematics involved in CryptoNote ring signatures (as described in [CN]) to the mathematics in [FS], on which CryptoNote is based. After this, I will compare the mathematics of the ring signature to what is actually in the CryptoNote codebase.
|
||||
mrl4: Improving Obfuscation in the CryptoNote Protocol
|
||||
mrl4_abstract: We identify several blockchain analysis attacks available to degrade the untraceability of the CryptoNote 2.0 protocol. We analyze possible solutions, discuss the relative merits and drawbacks to those solutions, and recommend improvements to the Monero protocol that will hopefully provide long-term resistance of the cryptocurrency against blockchain analysis. Our recommended improvements to Monero include a protocol-level network-wide minimum mix-in policy of n = 2 foreign outputs per ring signature, a protocol-level increase of this value to n = 4 after two years, and a wallet-level default value of n = 4 in the interim. We also recommend a torrent-style method of sending Monero output. We also discuss a non-uniform, age-dependent mix-in selection method to mitigate the other forms of blockchain analysis identified herein, but we make no formal recommendations on implementation for a variety of reasons. The ramifications following these improvements are also discussed in some detail. This research bulletin has not undergone peer review, and reflects only the results of internal investigation.
|
||||
mrl5: Ring Signature Confidential Transactions
|
||||
mrl5_abstract: This article introduces a method of hiding transaction amounts in the strongly decentralized anonymous cryptocurrency Monero. Similar to Bitcoin, Monero is a cryptocurrency which is distributed through a proof of work “mining” process. The original Monero protocol was based on CryptoNote, which uses ring signatures and one-time keys to hide the destination and origin of transactions. Recently the technique of using a commitment scheme to hide the amount of a transaction has been discussed and implemented by Bitcoin Core Developer Gregory Maxwell. In this article, a new type of ring signature, A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature is described which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation. Some extensions of the protocol are provided, such as Aggregate Schnorr Range Proofs, and Ring Multisignature. The author would like to note that early drafts of this were publicized in the Monero Community and on the bitcoin research irc channel. Blockchain hashed drafts are available in [14] showing that this work was started in Summer 2015, and completed in early October 2015. An eprint is also available at http://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.
|
||||
mrl6: An Efficient Implementation of Monero Subadresses
|
||||
mrl6_abstract: Users of the Monero cryptocurrency who wish to reuse wallet addresses in an unlinkable way must maintain separate wallets, which necessitates scanning incoming transactions for each one. We document a new address scheme that allows a user to maintain a single master wallet address and generate an arbitary number of unlinkable subaddresses. Each transaction needs to be scanned only once to determine if it is destinated for any of the user’s subaddresses. The scheme additionally supports multiple outputs to other subaddresses, and is as efficient as traditional wallet transactions.
|
||||
mrl7: Sets of Spent Outputs
|
||||
mrl7_abstract: This technical note generalizes the concept of spend outputs using basic set theory. The definition captures a variety of earlier work on identifying such outputs. We quantify the effects of this analysis on the Monero blockchain and give a brief overview of mitigations.
|
||||
mrl8: Dual Linkable Ring Signatures
|
||||
mrl8_abstract: This bulletin describes a modification to Monero's linkable ring signature scheme that permits dual-key outputs as ring members. Key images are tied to both output one-time public keys in a dual, preventing both keys in that transaction from being spent separately. This method has applications to non-interactive refund transactions. We discuss the security implications of the scheme.
|
||||
mrl9: Thring Signatures and their Applications to Spender-Ambiguous Digital Currencies
|
||||
mrl9_abstract: We present threshold ring multi-signatures (thring signatures) for collaborative computation of ring signatures, present a game of existential forgery for thring signatures, and discuss uses of thring signatures in digital currencies that include spender-ambiguous cross-chain atomic swaps for confidential amounts without a trusted setup. We present an implementation of thring signatures that we call linkable spontaneous threshold anonymous group signatures, and prove the implementation existentially unforgeable.
|
||||
mrl10: Discrete Logarithm Equality Across Groups
|
||||
mrl10_abstract: This technical note describes an algorithm used to prove knowledge of the same discrete logarithm across different groups. The scheme expresses the common value as a scalar representation of bits, and uses a set of ring signatures to prove each bit is a valid value that is the same (up to an equivalence) across both scalar groups.
|
||||
cryptonote: Cryptonote 白皮書
|
||||
cryptonote-whitepaper: Cryptonote 白皮書
|
||||
cryptonote-whitepaper_para: 這是由 cryptonote 團隊所撰寫的原始 cryptonote 論文。閱讀此篇論文可以讓你對 cryptonote 演算法的運作有一些了解。
|
||||
annotated: 加上註解的白皮書
|
||||
annotated_para: 由門羅幣研究實驗室 (MRL) 加上註解後發布的 cryptonote 白皮書版本。這屬於非正式的逐行審查，同時也對一些艱難的概念進行了較容易理解的解釋。
|
||||
brandon: Brandon Goodell 對於白皮書的審查
|
||||
brandon_para: 這篇論文是由 MRL 研究員 Brandon Goodell 進行的正式審查。他對 cryptonote 白皮書內的理論與數學進行了深度的審查。
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
specs:
|
||||
translated: "yes"
|
||||
fair_title: 沒有預挖、沒有瞬挖、沒有代幣
|
||||
fair_premine: 門羅幣從未進行預挖或瞬挖
|
||||
fair_token: 門羅幣從未販售過任何代幣
|
||||
fair_presale: 門羅幣從未有任何形式的預售
|
||||
pow_title: 工作量證明
|
||||
pow_name: CryptoNight
|
||||
pow_disclaimer: 此機制在未來可能會調整
|
||||
diff_title: 難度重新調整
|
||||
diff_freq: 每個區塊
|
||||
diff_base: 基於最近 720 區塊，並排除 20% 的時間戳記離群值
|
||||
block_time_title: 區塊時間
|
||||
block_time_duration: 2 分鐘
|
||||
block_time_disclaimer: 此參數在未來可能因應保護發行曲線而調整
|
||||
block_reward_title: 區塊獎勵
|
||||
block_reward_amount: 緩慢的下降，並對容量超過最近 100 區塊容量中位數 (M100) 的區塊進行獎勵懲罰
|
||||
block_reward_example1: 觀看
|
||||
block_reward_example_link: 最新區塊
|
||||
block_reward_example2: 的 coinbase 交易即可了解目前的獎勵金額
|
||||
block_size_title: 區塊容量
|
||||
block_size: 動態的，最大值限制為 2 * M100
|
||||
block_emission_title: 發行曲線
|
||||
block_emission_main: "起始，主要發行曲線： 到 2022 年底將發行大約 1813.2 萬的門羅幣"
|
||||
block_emission_tail: "接著，尾發行曲線： 當主要發行曲線結束後，每 2 分鐘區塊固定產生 0.6 XMR 的機制將會啟動，長時間的運作下相當於 <1% 的通膨"
|
||||
block_emission_disclaimer1: 詳見
|
||||
block_emission_disclaimer_link: 圖表與細節
|
||||
supply_title: 最大發行量
|
||||
supply_amount: 無限制
|
||||
sender_privacy_title: 付款者隱私
|
||||
sender_privacy_mode: 環狀簽名
|
||||
recipient_privacy_title: 收款者隱私
|
||||
recipient_privacy_mode: 隱匿性地址
|
||||
amount_hidden_title: 金額混淆
|
||||
amount_hidden_mode: 環狀保密交易
|
||||
|
||||
library:
|
||||
translated: "no"
|
||||
description: "以下是一些出版物、書籍或雜誌提供下載。"
|
||||
books:
|
||||
- category: 書籍
|
||||
publications:
|
||||
- name: "Zero to Monero"
|
||||
file: "Zero-to-Monero-1-0-0.pdf"
|
||||
abstract: >
|
||||
A comprehensive conceptual (and technical) explanation of Monero.<br>
|
||||
We endeavor to teach anyone who knows basic algebra and simple computer science concepts like the ‘bit representation’ of a number not only how Monero works at a deep and comprehensive level, but also how useful and beautiful cryptography can be.
|
||||
- name: "Mastering Monero (Preview)"
|
||||
file: "Mastering-Monero-Preview.pdf"
|
||||
abstract: >
|
||||
A guide through the seemingly complex world of Monero.<br>
|
||||
It includes:
|
||||
<ul><li>A broad introduction to blockchains and the importance of privacy - ideal for non-technical users.</li>
|
||||
<li>Discussion of Bitcoin’s shortcomings and specific solutions provided by Monero.</li>
|
||||
<li>User stories (illustrating how Monero protects your privacy), analogies, examples, legal/ethical discussions, and code snippets illustrating key technical concepts.</li>
|
||||
<li>Details of the Monero decentralized network, peer-to-peer architecture, transaction lifecycle, and security principles.</li>
|
||||
<li>Introductions to technical foundations of Monero, intended for developers, engineers, software architects, and curious users.</li>
|
||||
<li>New developments such as Kovri, Bulletproofs, Multisignature, Hardware Wallets, etc.</li></ul>
|
||||
See <a href="https://masteringmonero.com/">Mastering Monero</a> website for info about full version.
|
||||
- category: 雜誌
|
||||
publications:
|
||||
- name: "Revuo Monero Q4 2017"
|
||||
file: "Revuo-2017-Q4.pdf"
|
||||
abstract: >
|
||||
Quarterly Monero magazine, Q4 2017 edition.<br>
|
||||
In this issue, updates about: development, Monero Research Lab, Kovri, and community.
|
||||
- name: "Revuo Monero Q3 2017"
|
||||
file: "Monero-Revuo-3Q-2017.pdf"
|
||||
abstract: >
|
||||
Quarterly Monero magazine, Q3 2017 edition.<br>
|
||||
In this issue, updates about: development, Monero Research Lab, Kovri, community, Hardware, and Monerujo.
|
||||
|
||||
moneropedia:
|
||||
translated: "no"
|
||||
add_new_button: 新增條目
|
||||
add_new_text1: 如果你有條目想要修改或新增，請
|
||||
add_new_link: 在本網站的 GitLab repository 新開一個 issue
|
||||
add_new_text2: 或是發送 pull request 以提交條目更動
|
||||
entries:
|
||||
account: Account
|
||||
address-book: Address Book
|
||||
address: Address
|
||||
airgap: Airgap
|
||||
atomic-units: Atomic Units
|
||||
base32-address: Base32 address
|
||||
base64-address: Base64 address
|
||||
blockchain: Blockchain
|
||||
block: Block
|
||||
bootstrap-node: Bootstrap-node
|
||||
bulletproofs: Bulletproofs
|
||||
canonically-unique-host: Canonically-unique host
|
||||
change: Change
|
||||
clearnet: Clearnet
|
||||
coinbase: Coinbase Transaction
|
||||
consensus: Consensus
|
||||
cryptocurrency: Cryptocurrency
|
||||
data-directory: Data Directory
|
||||
denominations: Denominations
|
||||
destination: Destination
|
||||
eepsite: Eepsite
|
||||
encryption: Encryption
|
||||
floodfill: Floodfill
|
||||
fluffyblocks: Fluffy Blocks
|
||||
fungibility: Fungibility
|
||||
garlic-encryption: Garlic-Encryption
|
||||
garlic-routing: Garlic Routing
|
||||
i2np: I2NP
|
||||
i2pcontrol: I2PControl
|
||||
i2p: I2P
|
||||
in-net: In-net
|
||||
java-i2p: Java I2P
|
||||
jump-service: Jump Service
|
||||
kovri: Kovri
|
||||
lease: Lease
|
||||
lease-set: Lease-Set
|
||||
locally-unique-host: Locally-unique host
|
||||
message: Message
|
||||
mining: Mining
|
||||
mnemonicseed: Mnemonic Seed
|
||||
network-database: Network Database
|
||||
node: Node
|
||||
ntcp: NTCP
|
||||
openalias: OpenAlias
|
||||
paperwallet: Paper Wallet
|
||||
paymentid: Payment ID
|
||||
pedersen-commitment: Pedersen Commitment
|
||||
reseed: Reseed
|
||||
ringCT: Ring CT
|
||||
ringsignatures: Ring Signature
|
||||
ring-size: Ring Size
|
||||
router-info: Router-Info
|
||||
scalability: Scalability
|
||||
signature: Cryptographic Signature
|
||||
smartmining: Smart Mining
|
||||
spendkey: Spend Key
|
||||
ssu: SSU
|
||||
stealthaddress: Stealth Address
|
||||
subscription: Subscription
|
||||
tail-emission: Tail Emission
|
||||
transaction: Transactions
|
||||
transports: Transports
|
||||
tunnel: Tunnel
|
||||
unlocktime: Transaction Unlock Time
|
||||
viewkey: View Key
|
||||
wallet: Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
blog:
|
||||
title_1: 全部
|
||||
title_2: 部落格
|
||||
title_3: 文章
|
||||
tagged: 標籤
|
||||
author: 作者
|
||||
date: 發表時間於
|
||||
forum: 點這裡以加入關於此項條目的討論
|
||||
|
||||
tags:
|
||||
all: 由標籤分類文章
|
||||
notags: 此標籤下沒有找到文章。
|
||||
2377
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/developer-guides/daemon-rpc.md
Normal file
2377
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/developer-guides/daemon-rpc.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
2734
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/developer-guides/wallet-rpc.md
Normal file
2734
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/developer-guides/wallet-rpc.md
Normal file
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load diff
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/00-base-00
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/00-base-00
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["", ""]
|
||||
summary: ""
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
<Re-write summary here>
|
||||
80
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/account.md
Normal file
80
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/account.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["account", "accounts", "wallet", "wallets"]
|
||||
summary: "similar in function to a bank account, contains all of your sent and received transactions"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Those familiar with Monero's predecessors will be more familiar with the term *wallet* to describe this. In Monero we call this an account, and it is a private account owned and operated by a Monero user.
|
||||
|
||||
Your account contains all of the Monero @transactions you have sent and received. Your account balance is a sum of all the Monero you've received, less the Monero you've sent. When using Monero you may notice that your account has two balances, a locked and an unlocked balance. The unlocked balance contains funds that can be spent immediately, and the locked balance contains funds that you can't spend right now. You may receive a transaction that has an @unlock-time set, or you may have sent some Monero and are waiting for the @change to come back to your wallet, both situations that could lead to those funds being locked for a time.
|
||||
|
||||
A key difference between traditional electronic currency and Monero is that your account resides only under your control, normally on your computer, and cannot be accessed by anyone else if you [practice good security](#practicing-good-security).
|
||||
|
||||
### Multiple Accounts
|
||||
|
||||
There are no costs attached to creating a Monero account, and there are no fees charged except for individual @transaction fees that go to @miners.
|
||||
|
||||
This means that individuals can easily create a Monero account for themselves as well as a joint account to share with their partner, and individual accounts for their children. Similarly, a business could create separate accounts for each division or group. Since Monero's @transaction fees are quite low, moving funds between accounts is not an expensive exercise.
|
||||
|
||||
### Cryptographic Keys
|
||||
|
||||
Monero relies heavily on a cryptography principle known as *public/private key cryptography* or *asymmetric cryptography*, which is thoroughly detailed in [this Wikipedia article](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography).
|
||||
|
||||
Your account is based on two keys, a @spend-key and a @view-key. The @spend-key is special in that it is the single key required to spend your Monero funds, whereas the @view-key allows you to reveal your @transactions to a third party, for example for auditing or accounting purposes. These keys in your account also play an important role in Monero's @transaction's privacy.
|
||||
|
||||
The private keys for both of these must be protected by you in order to retain your account privacy. On the other hand, the public keys are obviously public (they are part of your Monero account address). For normal public/private key cryptography someone could send you a private message by encrypting it with either of your public keys, and you would then be the only one able to decrypt it with your private keys.
|
||||
|
||||
### Backing Up Your Account
|
||||
|
||||
When you manage your own Monero Account with the private @spend-key, you are solely responsible for the security of your funds. Thankfully, Monero makes it very easy to backup your account. When creating a Monero account for the first time you will be given a unique @mnemonic-seed for your account that consists of 13 or 25 words in the language of your choosing. **This seed is the only thing you need to backup for your account**, and so it is imperative that it is written down and stored securely. Never store this seed in a form or location that would allow someone else to see it!
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
List of available languages for your wallet's seed:
|
||||
0 : Deutsch
|
||||
1 : English
|
||||
2 : Español
|
||||
3 : Français
|
||||
4 : Italiano
|
||||
5 : Nederlands
|
||||
6 : Português
|
||||
7 : русский язык
|
||||
8 : 日本語
|
||||
9 : 简体中文 (中国)
|
||||
10 : Esperanto
|
||||
Enter the number corresponding to the language of your choice: 1
|
||||
Generated new wallet: 4B15ZjveuttEaTmfZjLVioPVw7bfSmRLpSgB33CJbuC6BoGtZrug9TDAmhZEWD6XoFDGz55bgzisT9Dnv61sbsA6Sa47TYu
|
||||
view key: 4130fa26463d9451781771a8baa5d0b8085c47c4500cefe4746bab48f1d15903
|
||||
**********************************************************************
|
||||
Your wallet has been generated.
|
||||
To start synchronizing with the daemon, use "refresh" command.
|
||||
Use "help" command to see the list of available commands.
|
||||
Always use "exit" command when closing monero-wallet-cli to save your
|
||||
current session's state. Otherwise, you might need to synchronize
|
||||
your wallet again (your wallet keys are NOT at risk in any case).
|
||||
|
||||
PLEASE NOTE: the following 25 words can be used to recover access to your wallet. Please write them down and store them somewhere safe and secure. Please do not store them in your email or on file storage services outside of your immediate control.
|
||||
|
||||
aunt knuckle italics moisture hawk thorn iris abort
|
||||
chlorine smog uphill glass aptitude nowhere sewage plywood
|
||||
dual relic fierce divers anvil nodes bubble cabin abort
|
||||
**********************************************************************
|
||||
Starting refresh...
|
||||
Refresh done, blocks received: 21939
|
||||
Balance: 0.000000000000, unlocked balance: 0.000000000000
|
||||
Background refresh thread started
|
||||
[wallet 4B15Zj]: █
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
As the example above indicates, it is incredibly important to store these words in safe locations. If you are concerned about the risk of critical loss at your home, for instance, you may want to store a second copy of your seed with your attorney or in a safety deposit box. It is also recommended that it is stored in a way that does not make it obvious that it is your seed, so writing it into a letter or as part of other notes is advisable.
|
||||
|
||||
### Practicing Good Security
|
||||
|
||||
Over and above backing up your @mnemonic-seed so that you have access to your account in the event of critical data loss, it is also important to practice good security. Use a secure password when creating a local Monero account (not used on [MyMonero](https://mymonero.com) or other web-based account systems).
|
||||
|
||||
Don't ever give your Monero account password to anyone, as this can be used to access the Monero on your computer without knowing your @mnemonic-seed. Similarly, make sure you have running and up-to-date antivirus, especially on Windows computers. Finally, be careful when clicking links in emails or on unknown and untrusted websites, as malware installed on your computer can sit and wait for you to access your Monero account before taking the funds from it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Leaving Your Account to Next of Kin
|
||||
|
||||
Providing access to your Monero account to your next of kin is just as easy as it is to backup your Monero account. Simply leave your @mnemonic-seed to them in your will, or store it somewhere safe where it will be given to them upon the execution of your will. A key advantage to this is that your next of kin won't have to wait for months for a third party to release the funds to them.
|
||||
33
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/address-book.md
Normal file
33
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/address-book.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Address-Book"]
|
||||
summary: "Allows you to visit I2P websites/services that have the .i2p domain"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
In order to browse @I2P sites or services with @Kovri, you'll need an address book. An address book will allow you to translate @I2P websites/services that use the `.i2p` [top-level domain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top_level_domain) into an address that @I2P network will understand.
|
||||
|
||||
Without an address book, you would be stuck using a @base32-address every time you visit an @I2P website/service - and that's not fun!
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Since [DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS) does not exist on the @I2P network, @Kovri also does **not** use DNS or any sort of @canonically-unique-host resolution. Instead, Kovri pairs a @locally-unique-host to a @base64-address @destination in a @subscription. Once your address book is filled with a @subscription, you can resolve your favorite `.i2p` domain site into a usable @I2P destination.
|
||||
|
||||
### Creating an Address Book
|
||||
|
||||
By default, your installation will come with a default public @subscription called `hosts.txt` in your @data-directory. When @Kovri starts, it loads this subscription and fetches any other subscriptions you've specified. Once loaded, your address book will be appropriately filled. For details on how to manage subscriptions, see @subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
### Updating the Address Book
|
||||
|
||||
Currently, there are several ways to update your address book:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Use a @jump-service to insert I2P addresses into your address book
|
||||
2. Use a @jump-service to copy/paste an address into your private @subscription
|
||||
3. Manually add or subtract from a private @subscription
|
||||
|
||||
**Note: Kovri is in heavy development. In the future there *will* be easier ways to update the address book**
|
||||
|
||||
### Address Book / Naming specification
|
||||
|
||||
For specification details and more, visit the [Address Book and Naming Specification](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/naming)
|
||||
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/address.md
Normal file
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/address.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["address", "addresses"]
|
||||
summary: "either an alias, such as donate.getmonero.org, or a set of 95 characters starting with a 4"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
When you send Monero to someone you only need one piece of information, and that is their Monero address. A *raw* Monero address is a set of 95 characters starting with a '4'. The Monero donation address, for instance, is <span class="long-term">44AFFq5kSiGBoZ4NMDwYtN18obc8AemS33DBLWs3H7otXft3XjrpDtQGv7SqSsaBYBb98uNbr2VBBEt7f2wfn3RVGQBEP3A</span>.
|
||||
|
||||
Because those addresses are long and complex, you will often encounter an @OpenAlias address instead. For example, Monero donations can be sent to <span class="long-term">donate@getmonero.org</span> or <span class="long-term">donate.getmonero.org</span>.
|
||||
|
||||
If you would like to get an @OpenAlias address of your own then there is some information on the [OpenAlias page](/the-monero-project/).
|
||||
|
||||
### Integrated address
|
||||
|
||||
An integrated address is an address combined with an encrypted 64-bit @payment-ID. A raw integrated address is 106 characters long.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
The address is actually the concatenation, in Base58 format, of the *public* @spend-key and the *public* @view-key, prefixed with the network byte (the number 18 for Monero) and suffixed with the first four bytes of the Keccac-256 hash of the whole string (used as a checksum).
|
||||
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/airgap.md
Normal file
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/airgap.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["airgap"]
|
||||
summary: "An airgap is a security measure to physically separate a computer or device from all other networks, such as the Internet."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
"An air gap, air wall or air gapping is a network security measure employed on one or more computers to ensure that a secure computer network is physically isolated from unsecured networks, such as the public Internet or an unsecured local area network.[2] The name arises from the technique of creating a network that is physically separated (with a conceptual air gap) from all other networks. The air gap may not be completely literal, as networks employing the use of dedicated cryptographic devices that can tunnel packets over untrusted networks while avoiding packet rate or size variation can be considered air gapped, as there is no ability for computers on opposite sides of the gap to communicate."
|
||||
|
||||
Taken from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Air_gap_(networking)
|
||||
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/atomic-units.md
Normal file
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/atomic-units.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["atomic-units", "atomic-unit"]
|
||||
summary: "Atomic Units refer to the smallest fraction of 1 XMR."
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Atomic Units refer to the smallest fraction of 1 XMR.
|
||||
One atomic unit is currently 1e-12 XMR (0.000000000001 XMR, or one @piconero).
|
||||
It may be changed in the future.
|
||||
25
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/base32-address.md
Normal file
25
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/base32-address.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Base32-address", "Base32-addresses"]
|
||||
summary: "Base32 encoded hash of a Base64 address"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A Base32 address is a shortened, encoded version of an @I2P address. The Base32 address is the first part in a `.b32.i2p` hostname.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
`i35yftyyb22xhcvghmev46t5knefur5v66qzekkajatwfwhyklvq.b32.i2p`
|
||||
|
||||
where
|
||||
|
||||
`i35yftyyb22xhcvghmev46t5knefur5v66qzekkajatwfwhyklvq` is the Base32 address.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
Ultimately, a Base32 address is a 52 character [Base32 encoded representation](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base32) of the full SHA-256 hash of an @I2P @base64-address.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
**Note: `.b32` is not a sub-domain of `.i2p`**
|
||||
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/base64-address.md
Normal file
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/base64-address.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Base64-address", "Base64-addresses"]
|
||||
summary: "Base64 encoded I2P destination"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A @base64-address is a 516-character [Base64 encoded](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Base64) @I2P @destination. @base64-addresses are primarily used for @address-book, @jump-service, and also internally.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
AQZGLAMpI9Q0l0kmMj1vpJJYK3CjLp~fE3MfvE-e7KMKjI5cPOH6EN8m794uHJ6b09qM8mb9VEv1lVLEov~usVliTSXCSHuRBOCIwIOuDNU0AbVa4BpIx~2sU4TxKhoaA3zQ6VzINoduTdR2IJhPvI5xzezp7dR21CEQGGTbenDslXeQ4iLHFA2~bzp1f7etSl9T2W9RID-KH78sRQmzWnv7dbhNodMbpO6xsf1vENf6bMRzqD5vgHEHZu2aSoNuPyYxDU1eM6--61b2xp9mt1k3ud-5WvPVg89RaU9ugU5cxaHgR927lHMCAEU2Ax~zUb3DbrvgQBOTHnJEx2Fp7pOK~PnP6ylkYKQMfLROosLDXinxOoSKP0UYCh2WgIUPwE7WzJH3PiJVF0~WZ1dZ9mg00c~gzLgmkOxe1NpFRNg6XzoARivNVB5NuWqNxr5WKWMLBGQ9YHvHO1OHhUJTowb9X90BhtHnLK2AHwO6fV-iHWxRJyDabhSMj1kuYpVUBQAEAAcAAA==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
See @destination for details behind @base64-address
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/block.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/block.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["block", "blocks"]
|
||||
summary: "a container of transactions, a sequence of which forms a blockchain"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A block is a container of @transactions, with a new block being added to the @blockchain once every 2 minutes (see constant `DIFFICULTY_TARGET_V2` defined as 120 seconds), on average.
|
||||
|
||||
Blocks also contain a special type of transaction, the @coinbase-transaction, which add newly created Monero to the network.
|
||||
|
||||
Blocks are created through the process of @mining, and the @node that successfully mines the block then broadcasts it to each of the @nodes connected to it, who subsequently re-broadcast the block until the entire Monero network has received it.
|
||||
|
||||
Fake or bad blocks generally cannot be created, as @nodes that receive blocks always verify the @transactions they contain against a set of consensus rules that all nodes adhere to, including validating the cryptographic @signatures on each transaction.
|
||||
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/blockchain.md
Normal file
10
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/blockchain.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["blockchain", "blockchains"]
|
||||
summary: "a distributed ledger of all transactions both past and present, without revealing who the funds came from or went to"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
A @blockchain is a distributed database that continuously grows with a record of all of the transactions that have occurred with a given cryptocurrency. This database is often referred to as a ledger because the data contains a large list of transactions that have taken place. In Monero, these transactions are packaged together into 'blocks' every 2 minutes (on average), and all miners and nodes on the network have copies of these blocks.
|
||||
|
||||
### Monero's @Blockchain
|
||||
Unlike Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, transactions in the Monero @blockchain do not reveal where funds came from or went to, providing anonymity and making the currency completely @fungible. Additionally, the amounts of all transactions are hidden by @RingCT, a feature of Monero. For auditing or other transparency purposes a user can share a @view-key to prove they control certain amounts of Moneroj.
|
||||
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/bootstrap-node.md
Normal file
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/bootstrap-node.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["bootstrap-node", "bootstrap-nodes"]
|
||||
summary: "A node to which a daemon connects to give immediate usability to wallets while syncing"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
The daemon running on a local @node has to sync with other (remote) @nodes. While it is not fully synced, @wallet may still be connected to the local node. Therefore, the @wallet cannot access the @blocks that are bot yet synced on the local @node.
|
||||
|
||||
To allow the @wallet to be immediately usable, the daemon on the local @node uses a bootstrap node to which the RPC request are proxying to, giving access to the missing @blocks.
|
||||
|
||||
Note: the replies from the bootstrap node may be untrustworthy.
|
||||
30
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.md
Normal file
30
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/bulletproofs.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["bulletproofs", "bulletproof"]
|
||||
summary: "a new kind of range proofs replacing RingCT in transactions to obfuscate the amounts sent"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
@RingCT was introduced to obfuscate transaction amounts. One goal of @RingCT was to prove the sum of inputs - outputs in the @transaction was equal to 0, and all outputs were positive numbers.
|
||||
To accomplish this, two kind of ring signatures were constructed: One ring signature for the whole transaction (to prove the sum is 0), and a set of ring signatures for the subsets of transaction bits (to prove the outputs are positive numbers), then combined together using originally Schnorr signatures (and later replaced by Borromean ring signature).
|
||||
While it was doing the job, a big drawback was the huge size of such a ringCT transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
### Where it comes to bulletproofs
|
||||
Back in 2017, a [Standford applied crypto group](https://crypto.stanford.edu/bulletproofs/) wrote a [paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/1066.pdf) presenting a new kind of range proofs, called bulletproofs.
|
||||
|
||||
> Bulletproofs are short non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs that require no trusted setup.
|
||||
|
||||
Bulletproofs, unlike Borromean or Schnorr signatures, are very efficient as range proofs. Proving a big set of data only generates a small proof, and the size of this proofs grows logarithmically with the size of the data being proved.
|
||||
It means that increasing the number of outputs in a transaction will, with bulletproofs only slightly increase the size of the proof.
|
||||
Bulletproofs also have the advantage to allow to prove that multiple committed amounts are in the desired range at once. No need to prove each output to each destination in separate proofs; the whole transaction amounts could be proven in one bigger (but still very small) bulletproof.
|
||||
|
||||
### Thorough audit process and implementation
|
||||
As bulletproofs were really new, and the initial implementation made by the group, while thoroughly done, needed a rewrite focused on our specific use-case, implementing bulletproof in Monero was not a simple thing.
|
||||
The code has been written and rewritten to follow the new version of bulletproofs which was still being developed, but once this Monero implementation was finalized, the resulting deployment should be taken with extreme care.
|
||||
Therefore, the community started an auditing process. Researchers reached out to Benedikt Bünz, lead author of the Bulletproofs paper, and to [OSTIF](https://ostif.org/) an organization which helps open source technologies to improve and secure themselves.
|
||||
OSTIF directed the group to several organizations with the skills required to perform the audit. While one of them asked to be kept unnamed and was therefore put away from the process that needed to be public, two others (QuarksLab & Kudelski Security) were choosen to conduct the audit.
|
||||
Our 3 auditors were funded by the community to check out the if the implementation did not did not contain critical bugs, and if it did not have any exploits.
|
||||
The final reports were released during the summer of 2018, with several useful corrections and fixes suggested, and the final bulletproof implementation has been added first to Monero Stagenet, and then to the main Monero network during the October 2018 network upgrade.
|
||||
|
||||
Since the bulletproofs deployment, the size of an average transaction has dropped by at least 80%, as well as the transaction fees.
|
||||
|
||||
More explanations on Monero's implementation of bulletproofs could be found on youtube fondajo channel in a [conversation with Sarang Noether](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6lEWqIMLzUU).
|
||||
21
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/canonically-unique-host.md
Normal file
21
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/canonically-unique-host.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Canonically-unique-host"]
|
||||
summary: "A host that is canonically resolved to an address or set of addresses"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A Canonically-unique host is a [FQDN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FQDN) that will canonically resolve to a designated address or set of addresses. Not to be confused with a @locally-unique-host.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
A Canonically-unique host is defined by remote authoritative sources; usually through [DNS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS). When resolving a peer's hostname, you will most likely use an external source for resolution unless you have the following implemented:
|
||||
|
||||
- a database file similar to a [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file))
|
||||
- an internal-network resolver (which eventually pulls from external sources)
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- Monero primarily uses @canonically-unique-host resolution while @I2P only uses @locally-unique-host resolution.
|
||||
- @I2P's and @Kovri's self-assigned top-level domain is currently `.i2p` and @Kovri intends to only process/use the `.i2p` [top-level domain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top_level_domain)
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/change.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/change.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["change"]
|
||||
summary: "Monero sent as part of a transaction, that returns to your account instead of going to another recipient"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Monero sent as part of a transaction, that returns to your account instead of going to another recipient.
|
||||
|
||||
### More Information
|
||||
|
||||
The @wallet in the Monero software makes change automatically, but when you send a transaction, you are taking an input that you control and telling the Monero network what to do with it. The input is a "deposit" to your account that you are able to spend. Outputs are the part of the transaction that tells the Monero network where to send the funds.
|
||||
|
||||
You might have multiple inputs in your account, in many different denominations (For example: you deposited 0.5 XMR on Friday, and 0.75 XMR on Saturday). So, when have a transaction with an input of 0.5 XMR, but you only want to send 0.1 XMR, your transaction will include a fee to pay the @miner, an output for 0.1 XMR to send to the recipient, and the rest that you want to send back to yourself will be an output back to you (this is called "change"). Once the transaction is completed, the change becomes available to you as an input that you can again split and send with a new transaction.
|
||||
31
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/clearnet.md
Normal file
31
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/clearnet.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Clearnet"]
|
||||
summary: "The Internet in which anonymous overlay networks are built upon"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
When you use the Internet for things like news, email, social media, and even Monero, you are most likely using a clearnet connection. This means that *all* of your connections can be tracked, traced, and monitored by:
|
||||
|
||||
- your [ISP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISP)
|
||||
- the website/service/person you're communicating with
|
||||
- possibly a [Five Eyes](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/5_Eyes) capable entity
|
||||
|
||||
and even if you use [HTTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTPS) or similar (which *encrypts* your transmission), your route is not hidden nor is it anonymous, thus; it is in the *clear*.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Since a traditional [VPN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/VPN) cannot save you from clearnet (as you are still using *clearnet* (though you are more proxied than without a VPN)), you should use an *anonymous overlay network* to avoid using clearnet directly:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Kovri
|
||||
- @Java-I2P
|
||||
- [Tor](https://torproject.org/)
|
||||
|
||||
These technologies protect you from clearnet by building an anonymous network **over** clearnet to keep your transmissions both encrypted **and** anonymous.
|
||||
|
||||
Here is an accurate, [interactive diagram](https://www.eff.org/pages/tor-and-https) provided by the [EFF](https://www.eff.org/) which describes *clearnet* as it relates to **Tor**. The concept also (somewhat) applies to @Kovri and @I2P in terms of anonymity with the exception that:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Kovri does not use exit nodes when connecting to an @eepsite
|
||||
- Your traffic never need to leave the @I2P network
|
||||
- You do not need HTTPS to use @Kovri (with the exception of @reseed)
|
||||
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/coinbase.md
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/coinbase.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["coinbase-transaction"]
|
||||
summary: "a special type of transaction included in each block, which contains a small amount of Monero sent to the miner as a reward for their mining work"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A special type of transaction included in each block, which contains a small amount of Monero sent to the miner as a reward for their mining work.
|
||||
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/consensus.md
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/consensus.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["consensus", "consensus-network"]
|
||||
summary: "consensus describes a property of distributed networks like Monero where most of the participants follow the rules, and thus reject bad participants"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Consensus describes a property of distributed networks like Monero where most of the participants follow the rules, and thus reject bad participants.
|
||||
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/cryptocurrency.md
Normal file
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/cryptocurrency.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["cryptocurrency", "cryptocurrencies", "altcoin", "altcoins"]
|
||||
summary: "a digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, usually operating independently of a central bank"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A digital currency in which encryption techniques are used to regulate the generation of units of currency and verify the transfer of funds, usually operating independently of a central bank.
|
||||
|
||||
### More Information
|
||||
|
||||
Cryptocurrency is the generic term for a large set of digital assets that use encryption techniques to generate units of currency, verify the transactions, and transfer value. Generally, cryptocurrencies are considered to be decentralized. Cryptocurrency should not be confused with virtual currency which is a type of digital money that is usually controlled by its creators or developers. Some examples of virtual currency are gametime in World of Warcraft, ROBUX in Roblox, reward points programs, or Ripple, all of which can be exchanged for currency or cash value, but are not considered cryptocurrency because they are centalized and controlled/issued by a single entity.
|
||||
|
||||
Monero is one of many cryptocurrencies currently available. Other examples are Bitcoin, Litecoin, Dogecoin, Dash, Zcash, etc, but nearly all other cryptocurrencies lack features that make them a true money (most importantly @fungibility which is a requirement for it to be a store-of-value).
|
||||
|
||||
Not all cryptocurrencies operate the same, but they usually share the properties of decentralization, encryption, and the ability to send and receive transactions. Most are irreversible, pseudonymous, global, and permissionless. Most aim to be a store-of-value or be digital cash that allows you to transact.
|
||||
|
||||
Most cryptocurrencies (including Monero) use a distributed ledger (called a @blockchain) to keep track of previous transactions. The blockchain serves to tell other users on the network that transactions have happened. There are many different ways for cryptocurrencies to create their blockchain, and not all are the same. Monero uses proof-of-work to craft blocks, where other cryptocurrencies may use proof-of-stake or other consolidated methods.
|
||||
|
||||
Ultimately, cryptocurrency is an attempt to create trustless value; that is free from borders, governments, and banks. Whether that be to transact or to be digital gold is up to the users of each.
|
||||
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/data-directory.md
Normal file
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/data-directory.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Data-Directory"]
|
||||
summary: "Where essential kovri data for runtime is stored"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Depending on your OS, @Kovri currently stores all run-time data in the following directory:
|
||||
|
||||
- Linux/FreeBSD:
|
||||
- `$HOME/.kovri`
|
||||
|
||||
- OSX:
|
||||
- `$HOME/Library/Application\ Support/Kovri`
|
||||
|
||||
- Windows:
|
||||
- `"$APPDATA"\\Kovri`
|
||||
|
||||
This includes all configuration files, @address-book, certificates, and resources.
|
||||
38
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/denominations.md
Normal file
38
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/denominations.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["denominations", "subunits", "tacoshi", "piconero", "nanonero", "micronero", "millinero", "centinero", "decinero","decanero","hectonero","kilonero","meganero","giganero"]
|
||||
summary: "A denomination is a proper description of a currency amount. It is oftentimes a sub-unit of the currency. For example, traditionally a cent is 1/100th of a particular unit of currency.)"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A denomination is a proper description of a currency amount. It is oftentimes a sub-unit of the currency. For example, traditionally a cent is 1/100th of a particular unit of currency.).
|
||||
|
||||
Monero denomination names add SI prefixes after dropping the initial "mo" for ease of use. Actually, the smallest unit of Monero is 1 piconero (0.000000000001 XMR).
|
||||
|
||||
### Denominations of Monero
|
||||
|
||||
|------------+----------+-------------------|
|
||||
| Name | Base 10 | Amount |
|
||||
|-----------:|:--------:| -----------------:|
|
||||
| piconero | 10^-12 | 0.000000000001 |
|
||||
| nanonero | 10^-9 | 0.000000001 |
|
||||
| micronero | 10^-6 | 0.000001 |
|
||||
| millinero | 10^-3 | 0.001 |
|
||||
| centinero | 10^-2 | 0.01 |
|
||||
| decinero | 10^-1 | 0.1 |
|
||||
|============+==========+===================|
|
||||
| **monero** | **10^0** | **1** |
|
||||
|============+==========+===================|
|
||||
| decanero | 10^1 | 10 |
|
||||
| hectonero | 10^2 | 100 |
|
||||
| kilonero | 10^3 | 1,000 |
|
||||
| meganero | 10^6 | 1,000,000 |
|
||||
|------------+----------+-------------------|
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
Support for input using SI prefixes was [added to the Monero codebase](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/1826) on March 3, 2017 by [Moneromooo](https://github.com/moneromooo-monero). The smallest unit of Monero (10^-12 XMR) was originally called a tacoshi in honor of user [Tacotime](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?action=profile;u=19270), an early Monero contributor and was later renamed for ease of use and consistancy.
|
||||
|
||||
### Monerod Implementation
|
||||
|
||||
The smallest fraction of Monero in the current monerod implementation is also known as the @atomic-unit, which is currently one piconero.
|
||||
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/destination.md
Normal file
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/destination.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Destination", "Destinations"]
|
||||
summary: "A in-net address that serves as a final endpoint (either local or remote)"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A @destination is the @I2P @in-net address of the final endpoint you are trying to connect to (example: an @I2P website, service, or Monero node). This can also include a *local destination* of which *other* peers need to connect to in order to make contact for communication (similar to how, in @clearnet, your IP address is given to a website when you connect so it knows *where* to send the information back to).
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
An @I2P destination can be encoded into a @base32-address or @base64-address. Most users will only care about @base32-addresses or a `.i2p` hostname while, internally, @Kovri / @I2P @address-book uses @base64-addresses. Ultimately, all @destinations in @I2P are 516-byte (or longer) keys:
|
||||
|
||||
`256-byte public key + 128-byte signing key + a null certificate = 516 bytes in Base64 representation`
|
||||
|
||||
Note: certificates are not used now but, if they were, the keys would be longer.
|
||||
28
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/eepsite.md
Normal file
28
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/eepsite.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Eepsite", "Hidden-Service", "Garlic-Site", "Garlic-Service"]
|
||||
summary: "A website or service hosted within the I2P network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Is it [**EEP!** *(in response to the site's content)*](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onomatopoeia), or **end-to-end protocol**, or something else entirely different?
|
||||
|
||||
While the original definition of eepsite has been lost with time, its use-case remains: an eepsite is a website or service that is hosted within (and only accessible by) the @I2P network.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
Alternate names include:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Hidden Service*
|
||||
- because the site/service is *hidden* within the @I2P network and can only be visited within the network
|
||||
2. *Garlic Site*
|
||||
- because the website utilizes @I2P's @garlic-routing technology as a means of communicating with a client
|
||||
- because the service is hosted as a website and not any other type of service
|
||||
3. *Garlic Service*
|
||||
- because the service utilizes @I2P's @garlic-routing technology as a means of communicating with a client
|
||||
- because the service is specific to services like IRC, email, or a Monero peer (but may also include websites)
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
To learn how to setup an Eepsite (Hidden Service, Garlic Site, Garlic Service) visit the @Kovri [user-guide](https://gitlab.com/kovri-project/kovri-docs/blob/master/i18n/en/user_guide.md).
|
||||
33
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/encryption.md
Normal file
33
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/encryption.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["encryption", "encrypted", "encrypting", "decryption", "decrypted", "decrypting"]
|
||||
summary: "The process of encoding messages or information in a way that only authorized parties can decode and read"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
From [Encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption):
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
In cryptography, encryption is the process of encoding messages or information in such a way that only authorized parties can decode and read what is sent. Encryption does not of itself prevent interception, but denies the message content to the interceptor.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
From [Encryption](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption):
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
In an encryption scheme, the intended communication information or message (referred to as *plaintext*), is encrypted using an encryption algorithm, generating ciphertext that can only be read if decrypted. For technical reasons, an encryption scheme usually uses a pseudo-random encryption key generated by an algorithm. It is in principle possible to decrypt the message without possessing the key, but, for a well-designed encryption scheme, large computational resources and skill are required. An authorized recipient can easily decrypt the message with the key provided by the originator to recipients, but not to unauthorized interceptors.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
The purpose of encryption is to ensure that only somebody who is authorized to access data (e.g. a text message or a file), will be able to read it, using the decryption key. Somebody who is not authorized can be excluded, because he or she does not have the required key, without which it is impossible to read the encrypted information.
|
||||
|
||||
### Kovri
|
||||
|
||||
@Kovri implements various types of encryption in *at least* 4 essential capacities:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Reseed for bootstrapping
|
||||
- @Garlic-routing: three layers of encryption (@garlic-encryption) are used to verify the secure delivery of @messages to the recipient/peer/@destination
|
||||
- @Tunnel encryption: garlic messages are passed through a @tunnel and encrypted by the @tunnel gateway to the @tunnel endpoint
|
||||
- @Transport layer encryption prevents the ability to decrypt @messages at the [media layer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model)
|
||||
|
||||
For details on the types of encryption and cryptographic @signatures used in @Kovri and @I2P, visit @Java-I2P's [Cryptography](https://geti2p.net/spec/cryptography)
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/floodfill.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/floodfill.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Floodfill"]
|
||||
summary: "An I2P router which maintains a distributed network-database"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
By actively managing a distributed network-database, a router with *floodfill* capability has the ability to help maintain network stability and resiliancy while also being decentralized and trust-less.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Though floodfill itself is a simple storage system, the technical underpinnings of floodfill as it relates to @network-database and other protocols within @I2P are much more complex. Visit the [Network Database](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/network-database) page for details.
|
||||
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/fluffyblocks.md
Normal file
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/fluffyblocks.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["fluffy blocks", "fluffyblocks"]
|
||||
summary: "a way of saving bandwidth when sending new blocks around the network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A @block is made up of a header and @transactions. Fluffy Blocks only contain
|
||||
a header, a list of transaction indices, and any transactions that the node
|
||||
recieving the block may be missing. This saves bandwidth because nodes might
|
||||
already know about most or all of the transactions in the block and they don't
|
||||
need to be sent them again.
|
||||
|
||||
### See Also
|
||||
|
||||
* [BIP152 "Compact Block Relay"](https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0152.mediawiki)
|
||||
* [Xthin](https://github.com/BitcoinUnlimited/BitcoinUnlimited/blob/release/doc/bu-xthin-protocol.md)
|
||||
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/fungibility.md
Normal file
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/fungibility.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["fungibility", "fungible"]
|
||||
summary: "property of a currency whereby two units can be substituted in place of one another"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Property of a currency whereby two units can be substituted in place of one another.
|
||||
|
||||
Fungibility means that two units of a currency can be mutually substituted and the substituted currency is equal to another unit of the same size. For example, two $10 bills can be exchanged and they are functionally identical to any other $10 bill in circulation (although $10 bills have unique ID numbers and are therefore not completely fungible). Gold is probably a closer example of true fungibility, where any 1 oz. of gold of the same grade is worth the same as another 1 oz. of gold. Monero is fungible due to the nature of the currency which provides no way to link transactions together nor trace the history of any particular XMR. 1 XMR is functionally identical to any other 1 XMR.
|
||||
|
||||
Fungibility is an advantage Monero has over Bitcoin and almost every other cryptocurrency, due to the privacy inherent in the Monero @blockchain and the permanently traceable nature of the Bitcoin blockchain. With Bitcoin, any BTC can be tracked by anyone back to its creation @coinbase-transaction. Therefore, if a coin has been used for an illegal purpose in the past, this history will be contained in the @blockchain in perpetuity. This lack of fungibility means that certain businesses will be obligated to avoid accepting BTC that have been previously used for purposes which are illegal, or simply run afoul of their Terms of Service. Currently some large Bitcoin companies are blocking, suspending, or closing accounts that have received Bitcoin used in online gambling or other purposes deemed unsavory by said companies.
|
||||
|
||||
Monero has been built specifically to address the problem of traceability and non-fungibility inherent in other cryptocurrencies. By having completely private transactions Monero is truly fungible and there can be no blacklisting of certain XMR, while at the same time providing all the benefits of a secure, decentralized, permanent blockchain.
|
||||
|
||||
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/garlic-encryption.md
Normal file
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/garlic-encryption.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Garlic-Encryption", "Layered-Encryption"]
|
||||
summary: "Layered encryption as implemented in Kovri / I2P"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
@garlic-encryption is @I2P's implementation of @message based @layered-encryption (similar to flow-based [Onion-Routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing)).
|
||||
|
||||
By @encrypting @messages in layers, this allows a @message to be routed through a sequence of proxies without allowing the proxies (or any intermediaries) to read the contents of the @message. @Layered-Encryption is a fundamental feature in @Kovri, @I2P, and [Tor](https://torproject.org) and is the cornerstone for securing anonymity within these overlay-networks.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
For @garlic-encryption, the primary difference between @Kovri/@I2P and Tor is:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Kovri/@I2P bundles multiple @messages together to form garlic "cloves"
|
||||
- any number of messages can be contained in a "clove" instead of *only* a single message
|
||||
- @Kovri/@I2P uses [ElGamal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ElGamal)/[AES](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard) @encryption for @messages and @transports
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
For details, see @garlic-routing.
|
||||
43
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/garlic-routing.md
Normal file
43
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/garlic-routing.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Garlic-Routing"]
|
||||
summary: "Routing technology as implemented in Kovri"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
The term *@garlic-routing* has a diverse history of varying interpretations. As it currently stands, Monero defines *@garlic-routing* as the method in which @Kovri and @I2P create a @message-based anonymous overlay network of Internet peers.
|
||||
|
||||
The @Garlic-Encryption of @Garlic-Routing is similar to the @Layered-Encryption of [Onion Routing](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Onion_routing) and effectively conceals the IP address of the sender and secures information sent from the sender to its @destination (and vice-versa).
|
||||
|
||||
### History
|
||||
|
||||
In written form, the term *@garlic-routing* can be seen as early as June of 2000 in Roger Dingledine's [Free Haven Master's thesis](http://www.freehaven.net/papers.html) (Section 8.1.1) as derived from the term Onion Routing.
|
||||
|
||||
As recent as October of 2016, [#tor-dev](https://oftc.net/WebChat/) has offered insight into the creation of the term *@garlic-routing*:
|
||||
|
||||
[Nick Mathewson](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Tor_Project,_Inc):
|
||||
>[I think that there was some attempt to come up with a plant whose structure resembled the 'leaky-pipe' topology of tor, but I don't believe we ever settled on one.]
|
||||
|
||||
[Roger Dingledine](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roger_Dingledine):
|
||||
>during the free haven brainstorming, there was a moment where we described a routing mechanism, and somebody said "garlic routing!", and everybody laughed.
|
||||
so we for sure thought we had invented the name, at the time.
|
||||
|
||||
*Note: permission to use the aforementioned quotes was granted by Nick Mathewson and Roger Dingledine*
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
In technical terms, for @Kovri and @I2P, *@garlic-routing* translates to any/all of the following:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Layered-Encryption (similar to the @layered-encryption in Onion Routing)
|
||||
- Bundling multiple @messages together (garlic cloves)
|
||||
- ElGamal/AES @encryption
|
||||
|
||||
*Note: though [Tor](https://torproject.org/) uses @layered-encryption, Tor does not use ElGamal and is not message-based.*
|
||||
|
||||
**Read more in @garlic-encryption.**
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- In terms of Onion/Garlic Routing, another way to envision layered @encryption is by replacing the onion/garlic with a [Matryoshka doll](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matryoshka_doll) - with each outer/inner doll having a lock and public key to the next/previous doll
|
||||
- For more technical details on Garlic Routing, read the @Java-I2P entry on [Garlic Routing](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/garlic-routing)
|
||||
26
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2np.md
Normal file
26
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2np.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["I2NP"]
|
||||
summary: "The I2P Network Protocol: the mechanism in which I2NP messages are sent over the I2P network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
@I2NP manages the routing and mixing of messages between routers, as well as the selection of what transports to use when communicating with a peer for which there are multiple common transports supported
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
@I2NP (@I2P Network Protocol) @messages can be used for one-hop, router-to-router, point-to-point @messages. By @encrypting and wrapping @messages in other @messages, they can be sent in a secure way through multiple hops to the ultimate @destination. @I2NP does not specify nor require any particular @transport layer but does require at least one @transport in use.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
Whenever a @destination wants to send a message to to another @destination, it provides its local router with both the @destination structure and the raw bytes of the message to be sent. The router then determines where to send it, delivers it through outbound @tunnels, instructing the end point to pass it along to the appropriate inbound @tunnel, where it is passed along again to that @tunnel's end point and made available to the target for reception.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
Read more about the @I2NP [protocol](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/protocol/i2np) and [specification](https://geti2p.net/spec/i2np).
|
||||
29
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2p.md
Normal file
29
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2p.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["I2P"]
|
||||
summary: "The Invisible Internet Project: an anonymizing overlay network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### Monero
|
||||
|
||||
For Monero's implementation of @I2P, see @Kovri. For a comparison of @I2P to [Tor](https://torproject.org/), read the [Comparison](https://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor) page.
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>The I2P network provides strong privacy protections for communication over the Internet. Many activities that would risk your privacy on the public Internet can be conducted anonymously inside I2P.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>I2P is an anonymous overlay network - a network within a network. It is intended to protect communication from dragnet surveillance and monitoring by third parties such as ISPs.
|
||||
|
||||
>I2P is used by many people who care about their privacy: activists, oppressed people, journalists and whistleblowers, as well as the average person.
|
||||
|
||||
>No network can be "perfectly anonymous". The continued goal of I2P is to make attacks more and more difficult to mount. Its anonymity will get stronger as the size of the network increases and with ongoing academic review.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
@I2P documentation and specifications are available [here](https://geti2p.net/docs/).
|
||||
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2pcontrol.md
Normal file
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/i2pcontrol.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["I2PControl"]
|
||||
summary: "An API inteface for Kovri and Java-I2P that allows simple remote control"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
@I2Pcontrol is a [JSONRPC2](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JSON-RPC) [API](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Application_programming_interface) for @Kovri and @Java-I2P which allows an @I2PControl client to remote control/monitor a running instance.
|
||||
|
||||
Two available @I2PControl clients are: [qtoopie](https://github.com/EinMByte/qtoopie) (C++ client) and [itoopie](https://github.com/i2p/i2p.itoopie) (Java client). Read `kovri.conf` to configure @I2PControl for @Kovri.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Details and specification available on the [I2PControl](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/api/i2pcontrol) page.
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/in-net.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/in-net.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["In-net"]
|
||||
summary: "Within the I2P network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
**In-net** is a [colloquial](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colloquial) term of which describes activities, protocols, or functionality that exist *only* within the @I2P network.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Example: *in-net download* would be defined as downloading *only* within @I2P.
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/java-i2p.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/java-i2p.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Java-I2P"]
|
||||
summary: "The original implementation of I2P - written in Java"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
The term "Java I2P" is often used to describe the original @I2P implementation currently most known and used today. There are various other @I2P implementations, including @Kovri; all of which look up to the original Java implementation.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
To download/learn more about the Java implementation, visit their [website](https://geti2p.net/).
|
||||
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/jump-service.md
Normal file
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/jump-service.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Jump-Service"]
|
||||
summary: "An I2P website service that adds addresses to your address book"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
In your @I2P configured web browser, you can use a Jump Service to *jump* to an @I2P address that you don't have in your @address-book. Once you've *jumped* to the address, the address will be saved into your @address-book.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
In an @I2P configured browser, visit: http://stats.i2p/i2p/lookup.html (courtesy of @Java-I2P's lead developer *zzz*)
|
||||
|
||||
Then, you'll have two options:
|
||||
|
||||
1. *Hostname lookup* the address you wish to visit and then manually copy/paste the result
|
||||
2. *Jump* to the @I2P website by entering the @I2P hostname (**recommended**)
|
||||
|
||||
### Using hostname lookup
|
||||
|
||||
For example, entering `pinkpaste.i2p` into the *Hostname lookup* box (and then submitting) will return:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
pinkpaste.i2p=m-HrPrIAsdxts0WM~P4mE8mt9P7g-QTaBvu7Gc6Nl0UX7Vwck-i~RvOPfK6W~kfdRvwhNTqevkBL2UF5l36We02Aiywu7kB2xOHRkze68h-Tg2ewvRVwokohguCD2G3wwAEz~7FVda2avYDCb9-N6TfuzxKLnmhPMvbNSjGL7ZsD2p-h207R3-2kvuMV9bfu-K~w9NI9XJhIyufvUnFYc2jnTVg8PbaR4UP57cNaOO2YIMPkbr6~yTcIu9B1sUfHK6-N~6virQDOxW4M-62rjnZkLpaCtkOsXslmCwZI--TkZ6hKi1kXZvNmJRE1rYfffYRFn38zhaqszeETX8HiIvahZhXF5fNumBziYdmLdw8hkuN1A~emU6Xz9g~a1Ixfsq1Qr~guYoOtaw-0rOFxNRS9yMehE-2LCb8c-cAg6z5OdlN4qJDl~ZHgru4d~EHp~BpAK3v7u2Gi-8l1ygVW-1CHVna~fwnbOPN3ANPwh6~~yUit0Cx1f54XiNRn6-nPBQAEAAcAAA==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Copy/paste this host=@base64-address pairing into your **private** @subscription.
|
||||
|
||||
### Directly jumping
|
||||
|
||||
For example, entering `pinkpaste.i2p` into the *Jump* box (and then submitting) will automatically redirect you to the website **and** insert the @locally-unique-host into @address-book.
|
||||
60
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/kovri.md
Normal file
60
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/kovri.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Kovri"]
|
||||
summary: "Monero's C++ router implementation of the I2P network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
[Kovri](https://gitlab.com/kovri-project/kovri/) is a C++ implementation of the @I2P network. @Kovri is currently in heavy, active development and not yet integrated with Monero. When Kovri is integrated into your Monero @node, your transactions will be more secure than ever before.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Kovri will protect you and Monero from:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Node partitioning attacks
|
||||
- Associations between a particular txid and your IP address
|
||||
- Mining and/or running a node in highly adversarial environments
|
||||
- Metadata leakage (e.g., @OpenAlias lookups)
|
||||
|
||||
...and much more.
|
||||
|
||||
Read [anonimal's FFS proposal](https://forum.getmonero.org/9/work-in-progress/86967/anonimal-s-kovri-full-time-development-funding-thread) for more details and for reasoning behind the project. Also read the FAQ and User Guide in the [Kovri repository](https://gitlab.com/kovri-project/kovri/).
|
||||
|
||||
### @Kovri / @I2P Terminology
|
||||
|
||||
#### Client + API
|
||||
|
||||
- @Address-Book
|
||||
- @Base32-address
|
||||
- @Base64-address
|
||||
- @Canonically-unique-host
|
||||
- @Eepsite (@Hidden-Service, @Garlic-Site, @Garlic-Service)
|
||||
- @I2PControl
|
||||
- @Jump-Service
|
||||
- @Locally-unique-host
|
||||
- @Reseed
|
||||
- @Subscription
|
||||
|
||||
#### Core + Router
|
||||
|
||||
- @Clearnet
|
||||
- @Data-Directory
|
||||
- @Destination
|
||||
- @Encryption
|
||||
- @Floodfill
|
||||
- @Garlic-Encryption
|
||||
- @Garlic-Routing
|
||||
- @I2NP
|
||||
- @In-net
|
||||
- @Java-I2P
|
||||
- @Layered-Encryption
|
||||
- @Lease
|
||||
- @LeaseSet
|
||||
- @Message @Messages
|
||||
- @NTCP
|
||||
- @Network-Database
|
||||
- @Router-Info
|
||||
- @SSU
|
||||
- @Transports
|
||||
- @Tunnel
|
||||
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/lease-set.md
Normal file
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/lease-set.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["LeaseSet", "LeaseSets"]
|
||||
summary: "Contains all currently authorized Leases for a particular I2P Destination"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A Lease-Set contains a set of authorized @leases (and other related information) for a particular @destination.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
A Lease-Set contains:
|
||||
|
||||
- all of the currently authorized @leases for a particular @destination
|
||||
- the public key to which garlic messages can be encrypted (see @garlic-routing)
|
||||
- the signing public key that can be used to revoke this particular version of the structure
|
||||
|
||||
The Lease-Set is one of the two structures stored in the @network-database (the other being @router-info), and is keyed under the SHA256 of the contained @destination.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
For further details, read @Java-I2P's [LeaseSet](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/network-database#leaseSet)
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/lease.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/lease.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Lease", "Leases"]
|
||||
summary: "Authorizes an I2P tunnel to receive messages targeting a destination"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A lease defines the authorization for a particular @I2P @tunnel to receive a @messages targeting a @destination.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
For further details, read @Java-I2P's [Lease](https://geti2p.net/spec/common-structures#lease)
|
||||
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/locally-unique-host.md
Normal file
20
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/locally-unique-host.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Locally-unique-host"]
|
||||
summary: "A host defined by you and resolved only by you"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A locally-unique host is a [FQDN](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FQDN) defined by **you** and resolved only by you; similar to how a [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) is implemented. Not to be confused with @canonically-unique-host.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
You have the option to share your interpretation of how the host is resolved (e.g., `localhost` always resolves to `127.0.0.1`) but the resolution is not canonically enforced (e.g., someone else can map `localhost` to any arbitrary IP address).
|
||||
|
||||
Hosts in a public subscription can be considered @canonically-unique-host's within the @I2P network but, ultimately, you are free to re-define them as you wish.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- Monero primarily uses @canonically-unique-host resolution while @I2P only uses @locally-unique-host resolution.
|
||||
- @I2P's and @Kovri's assigned top-level domain is currently `.i2p` and @Kovri intends to only process/use the `.i2p` [top-level domain](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Top_level_domain)
|
||||
31
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/message.md
Normal file
31
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/message.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Message", "Messages"]
|
||||
summary: "The mechanisms in which information travels within I2P"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
*Messages* (which exist on top of the @transports layer), contain varying types of information that are needed for the network but, most importantly, everything you see, do, send, or receive, will come and go in the form of *messages*.
|
||||
|
||||
There are 2 essential types of *messages* in @I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
- @Tunnel messages
|
||||
- @I2NP messages
|
||||
|
||||
Essentially: *@tunnel messages* **contain** @I2NP **message fragments** which are then [reassembled](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/tunnels/implementation) at certain points within a @tunnel's path.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
@I2NP messages have a close relationship with @tunnel @messages so it is easy to get the term *messages* confused when reading @Java-I2P specifications:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
1. First, the tunnel gateway accumulates a number of I2NP messages and preprocesses them into tunnel messages for delivery.
|
||||
2. Next, that gateway encrypts that preprocessed data, then forwards it to the first hop.
|
||||
3. That peer, and subsequent tunnel participants, unwrap a layer of the encryption, verifying that it isn't a duplicate, then forward it on to the next peer.
|
||||
4. Eventually, the tunnel messages arrive at the endpoint where the I2NP messages originally bundled by the gateway are reassembled and forwarded on as requested.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- @I2NP @messages need to be fragmented because they are variable in size (from 0 to almost 64 KB) and @tunnel @messages are fixed-size (approximately 1 KB).
|
||||
- For details and specifications, visit the [I2NP spec](https://geti2p.net/spec/i2np) and [Tunnel Message spec](https://geti2p.net/spec/tunnel-message)
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/mining.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/mining.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["mining", "miner", "miners"]
|
||||
summary: "the process of cryptographically computing a mathematical proof for a block, containing a number of transactions, which is then added to the blockchain"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
The process of cryptographically computing a mathematical proof for a block, containing a number of transactions, which is then added to the blockchain.
|
||||
|
||||
Mining is the distributed process of confirming transactions on the public ledger of all transactions, aka @blockchain. Monero nodes use the blockchain to distinguish legitimate transactions from attempts to re-spend coins that have already been spent elsewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
Monero is powered strictly by Proof of Work. It employs a mining algorithm that has the potential to be efficiently tasked to billions of existing devices (any modern x86 CPU and many GPUs). Monero uses a variant of CryptoNight Proof of Work (PoW) algorithm, which is designed for use in ordinary CPUs and GPUs.
|
||||
|
||||
The smart mining feature allows transparent CPU mining on the user's computer, far from the de facto centralization of mining farms and pool mining, pursuing Satoshi Nakamoto's original vision of a true P2P currency.
|
||||
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/mnemonicseed.md
Normal file
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/mnemonicseed.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["mnemonic-seed", "mnemonic"]
|
||||
summary: "a 13 or 25 word phrase used to backup a Monero account, available in a number of languages"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A 13 or 25 word phrase used to backup a Monero account, available in a number of languages. This 25-word phrase (13 words in the case of MyMonero) has all the information needed to view and spend funds from a Monero @account.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
In the official wallet, the mnemonic seed comprises 25 words with the last word being used as a checksum. Those words correspond to a 256-bit integer, which is the account's *private* @spend-key. The *private* @view-key is derived by hashing the private spend key with Keccak-256, producing a second 256-bit integer. The corresponding *public* keys are then derived from the private keys.
|
||||
|
||||
By storing the 25 word mnemonic key in a secure location, you have a backup of your private keys and hence all of your Moneroj. Sharing this 25 word key is the equivalent of allowing another person complete access to your funds.
|
||||
|
||||
It's not a good idea to store more than you want to lose in a "hot wallet" aka a wallet which is currently or has ever been connected to the internet or loaded onto any device that has or may in the future be connected to the internet or any untrusted source!
|
||||
|
||||
By creating a cold, or @paper-wallet you can safely store Moneroj.
|
||||
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/network-database.md
Normal file
23
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/network-database.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Network-Database"]
|
||||
summary: "A distributed database which contains needed router information so the network can stay intact"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
@network-database is a [distributed database](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distributed_database) which contains router information that peers must use so the network can stay intact.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
@I2P's @network-database is a specialized distributed database, containing just two types of data - router contact information (@Router-Infos) and @destination contact information (@LeaseSets). Each piece of data is signed by the appropriate party and verified by anyone who uses or stores it. In addition, the data has liveliness information within it, allowing irrelevant entries to be dropped, newer entries to replace older ones, and protection against certain classes of attack.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
The @network-database is distributed with a simple technique called "@floodfill", where a subset of all routers, called "@floodfill routers", maintains the distributed database.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
Read [Network-Database](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/network-database) for details.
|
||||
24
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/node.md
Normal file
24
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/node.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["node", "nodes", "full-node", "full-nodes"]
|
||||
summary: "a device on the Internet running the Monero software, with a full copy of the Monero blockchain, actively assisting the Monero network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A device on the Internet running the Monero software, with a full copy of the Monero blockchain, actively assisting the Monero network.
|
||||
|
||||
### More Information
|
||||
|
||||
Nodes participate in the Monero network and secure @transactions by enforcing the rules of the network. Nodes download the entire @blockchain to know what transactions have taken place. Nodes assist the network by relaying transactions to other nodes on the network. Nodes may also choose to contribute to the Monero network by participating in crafting @blocks (this is called @mining).
|
||||
|
||||
Mining is the process by which nodes create a block from the previously accepted block, transactions that are waiting to be processed in the transaction pool, and the @coinbase-transaction. When a node believes it has crafted a valid block it will transmit the completed block to other nodes on the network and those nodes signal agreement by working on the next block in the chain.
|
||||
|
||||
The rules that nodes follow are built into the Monero software; When all nodes agree about the rules to follow this is called @consensus. Consensus is necessary for a cryptocurrency because it is how the blockchain is built; If nodes don't agree about which blocks are valid, for example people who have not updated their Monero software, those nodes that don't agree will no longer be able to participate in the Monero network.
|
||||
|
||||
The Monero Core Team plans for a network upgrade every 6 months, to occur in October and April of each year. At that time, if you are running a node it must be updated to the most recent version of the Monero software or it will no longer be able to participate in the network.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
##### Other Resources
|
||||
<sub>1. *Fluffypony gives a great explanation of why mandatory network upgrades are good for Monero.* ([Monero Missives for the Week of 2016-06-20](https://getmonero.org/2016/06/20/monero-missive-for-the-week-of-2016-06-20.html))</sub>
|
||||
|
||||
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ntcp.md
Normal file
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ntcp.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["NTCP"]
|
||||
summary: "NIO-Based TCP (Non-blocking I/O based TCP): one of two Kovri transports"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
*NIO-Based TCP (Non-blocking I/O based TCP)* is one of two encrypted @transports for @Kovri.
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to @SSU, @NTCP's *primary* purpose is to securely transmit @in-net @I2NP messages through @tunnels but, unlike @SSU, @NTCP functions solely over encrypted [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol).
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
- Passes along individual @I2NP messages (both Standard and Time Sync) after:
|
||||
- TCP has been established
|
||||
- Establishment Sequence has been completed
|
||||
- Uses the following @encryption:
|
||||
- 2048-bit [Diffie-Hellman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diffie-hellman)
|
||||
- [AES-256](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard)/[CBC](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Block_cipher_modes_of_operation)
|
||||
- Establishment Sequence has the following *states*:
|
||||
- Pre-establishment
|
||||
- Establishment
|
||||
- Post-establishment or "Established"
|
||||
- Uses the following from the @network-database:
|
||||
- Transport name: NTCP
|
||||
- Host: IP (IPv4 or IPv6) or host name (shortened IPv6 address (with "::") is allowed)
|
||||
- Port: 1024 - 65535
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
For further details, read @Java-I2P's [NTCP](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/transport/ntcp)
|
||||
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/openalias.md
Normal file
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/openalias.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["OpenAlias"]
|
||||
summary: "a standard that allows you to use an email or domain syntax to pay someone instead of an address, eg. donate@getmonero.org or donate.getmonero.org"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
The Monero Core Team released a standard called OpenAlias which permits much more human-readable addresses and "squares" the Zooko's triangle. OpenAlias can be used for any cryptocurrency and is already implemented in Monero, Bitcoin (in latest Electrum versions) and HyperStake.
|
||||
|
||||
OpenAlias seeks to provide a way to simplify aliasing amidst a rapidly shifting technology climate. Users are trying to cross the bridge to private and cryptographically secure infrastructure and systems, but many of them have just barely started remembering the email addresses of their friends and family.
|
||||
|
||||
As part of the ongoing development of the Monero cryptocurrency project, we asked ourselves: how can we simplify payments for users unfamiliar with cryptocurrency? Monero stealth addresses are at least 95 characters long - memorizing them is not an option, and asking someone to send a payment to <95-character-string> is only going to lead to confusion.
|
||||
|
||||
At its most basic, OpenAlias is a TXT DNS record on a FQDN (fully qualified domain name). By combining this with DNS-related technologies we have created an aliasing standard that is extensible for developers, intuitive and familiar for users, and can interoperate with both centralized and decentralized domain systems.
|
||||
|
||||
A standard that allows you to use an email or domain syntax to pay someone instead of an address, eg. donate@getmonero.org or donate.getmonero.org.
|
||||
|
||||
More information can be found on the [OpenAlias page](/the-monero-project/) or on the [OpenAlias website](https://openalias.org)
|
||||
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/paperwallet.md
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/paperwallet.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["paperwallet", "paperwallets", "paper-wallet", "paper-wallets"]
|
||||
summary: "A paper wallet stores the information necessary to send and receive Monero"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A paper wallet stores the information necessary to send and receive Monero.
|
||||
25
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/paymentid.md
Normal file
25
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/paymentid.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["payment-ID", "payment-IDs"]
|
||||
summary: "an optional flag that is added to identify transactions to merchants, consisting of 64 hexadecimal characters"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Payment ID is an **arbitrary** and **optional** transaction attachment that consists of 32 bytes (64 hexadecimal characters) or 8 bytes (in the case of integrated addresses).
|
||||
|
||||
The Payment ID is usually used to identify transactions to merchants and exchanges: Given the intrinsic privacy features built into Monero, where a single public address is usually used for incoming transactions, the Payment ID is especially useful to tie incoming payments with user accounts.
|
||||
|
||||
### Compact Payment IDs and Integrated Addresses
|
||||
|
||||
Since the 0.9 Hydrogen Helix version, Payment IDs can be encrypted and embedded in a payment address. The Payment IDs of this type should be 64-bits and are encrypted with a random one-time key known only to the sender and receiver.
|
||||
|
||||
### Creating a Payment ID
|
||||
It is recommended to use the official wallet's `integrated_address` command to automatically generate Integrated Addresses that contain Compact Payment IDs. If you want to use the command line, you can generate Payment IDs as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
Creating a compact Payment ID for an Integrated Address:
|
||||
|
||||
```# openssl rand -hex 8```
|
||||
|
||||
Creating an old-style Payment ID:
|
||||
|
||||
```# openssl rand -hex 32```
|
||||
22
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/pedersen-commitment.md
Normal file
22
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/pedersen-commitment.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["commitments", "commitment", "pedersen", "pedersen-commitment", "pedersen-commitments"]
|
||||
summary: "Pedersen commitments are cryptographic algorythms that allow a prover to commit to a certain value without revealing it or being able to change it"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Pedersen commitments are cryptographic algorythms that allow a prover to commit to a certain value without revealing it or being able to change it.
|
||||
|
||||
When you spend Monero, the value of the inputs that you are spending and the value of the outputs you are sending are encrypted and opaque to everyone except the recipient of each of those outputs. Pedersen commitments allow you to send Monero without revealing the value of the transactions. Pedersen commitments also make it possible for people to verify that transactions on the blockchain are valid and not creating Monero out of thin air.
|
||||
|
||||
### What It Means
|
||||
|
||||
As long as the encrypted output amounts created, which include an output for the recipient and a change output back to the sender, and the unencrypted transaction fee is equal to the sum of the inputs that are being spent, it is a legitimate transaction and can be confirmed to not be creating Monero out of thin air.
|
||||
|
||||
Pedersen commitments mean that the sums can be verified as being equal, but the Monero value of each of the sums and the Monero value of the inputs and outputs individually are undeterminable. Pedersen commitments also mean that even the ratio of one input to another, or one output to another is undeterminable.
|
||||
|
||||
It is unclear which inputs are really being spent as the ring signature lists both the real inputs being spent and decoy inputs, therefore you don't actually know which input Pedersen commitments need to be summed. That's okay, because the @RingCT ring signature only has to prove that for one combination of the inputs the outputs are equal to the sum of the inputs. For mathematical reasons, this is impossible to forge.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
See information in [Ring Confidential Transactions paper](https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098.pdf) by Shen Noether of the Monero Research Lab.
|
||||
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/reseed.md
Normal file
15
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/reseed.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Reseed"]
|
||||
summary: "The method of which Kovri uses to bootstrap into the I2P network"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
When you start @Kovri for the first time (or if it's been offline for a long time), @Kovri will need a list of peers to connect to so it can [bootstrap](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootstrap) into the @I2P network. @Kovri gets these peers from a special file stored on a reseed server. On this file are all the various pieces of information @Kovri needs in order to connect with @I2P peers.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
@Kovri has a list of [hard-coded](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard-coded) reseed servers available to fetch from. These servers securely serve an [SU3](https://geti2p.net/spec/updates#su3) file (signed with a cryptographic @signature) over @clearnet with [HTTPS](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HTTPS). This SU3 file contains information that's used to verify both the integrity of the file and its content.
|
||||
|
||||
Aside from the technical elements needed to verify and process the file, the file's main contents consist of a series of @router-info files which @Kovri and @I2P routers use to locate and communicate with other @I2P peers. These peers are then stored into a @network-database.
|
||||
9
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ring-size.md
Normal file
9
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ring-size.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["ring-size"]
|
||||
summary: "total number of possible signers in a ring signature"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
Ring size refers to the total number of possible signers in a @ring-signature. If a ring size of 4 is selected for a given @transaction, this means that there are 3 foreign outputs in addition to your “real” output. A higher ring size number will typically provide more privacy than a lower number. However, reusing an odd, recognizable ring size number for transactions could possibly make transactions stand out.
|
||||
|
||||
`Ring size = foreign outputs + 1 (your output)`
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ringCT.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ringCT.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["ringCT", "ring-CT"]
|
||||
summary: "a way to hide the amount sent in a Monero transaction"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
RingCT, short for Ring Confidential Transactions, is how transaction amounts are hidden in Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
Ring CT was implemented in block #1220516 in January 2017. After September 2017, this feature became mandatory for all transactions on the network.
|
||||
|
||||
RingCT introduces an improved version of @ring-signatures called "A Multi-layered Linkable Spontaneous Anonymous Group signature", which allows for hidden amounts, origins and destinations of transactions with reasonable efficiency and verifiable, trustless coin generation.
|
||||
|
||||
For more information, please read the creator Shen Noether's paper [here](https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098).
|
||||
16
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ringsignatures.md
Normal file
16
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ringsignatures.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["ring-signature", "ring-signatures"]
|
||||
summary: "a group of cryptographic signatures with at least one real participant, but no way to tell which in the group is the real one as they all appear valid"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
In cryptography, a ring signature is a type of digital signature that can be performed by any member of a group of users that each have keys. Therefore, a message signed with a ring signature is endorsed by someone in a particular group of people. One of the security properties of a ring signature is that it should be computationally infeasible to determine *which* of the group members' keys was used to produce the signature.
|
||||
|
||||
For instance, a ring signature could be used to provide an anonymous signature from "a high-ranking White House official", without revealing which official signed the message. Ring signatures are right for this application because the anonymity of a ring signature cannot be revoked, and because the group for a ring signature can be improvised (requires no prior setup).
|
||||
|
||||
### Application to Monero
|
||||
|
||||
A ring signature makes use of your @account keys and a number of public keys (also known as outputs) pulled from the @blockchain using a triangular distribution method. Over the course of time, past outputs could be used multiple times to form possible signer participants. In a "ring" of possible signers, all ring members are equal and valid. There is no way an outside observer can tell which of the possible signers in a signature group belongs to your @account. So, ring signatures ensure that transaction outputs are untraceable. Moreover, there are no @fungibility issues with Monero given that every transaction output has plausible deniability (e.g. the network can not tell which outputs are spent or unspent).
|
||||
|
||||
To read how Monero gives you privacy by default (unlinkability), see @stealth-addresses.
|
||||
66
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/router-info.md
Normal file
66
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/router-info.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Router-Info", "Router-infos"]
|
||||
summary: "A data structure or file which contains an I2P peer's needed network information"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
@Router-Info is a data structure (periodically written to a [binary file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary_file)) which contains all needed information to locate, identify, and communicate with an @I2P peer. @Router-Info includes IP address, router identity, other misc. technical details; is needed for @network-database and is published to @floodfill routers.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
In human-readable form, Router-Info may look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
Identity: [RouterIdentity:
|
||||
Hash: nYZ5Qe7gQ-~QgfgJVRUG4c0JnVeVqzM~duUX1EGT1ek=
|
||||
Certificate: [Certificate: type: Key certificate
|
||||
Crypto type: 0
|
||||
Sig type: 7 (EdDSA_SHA512_Ed25519)]
|
||||
PublicKey: [PublicKey: size: 256]
|
||||
SigningPublicKey: [SigningPublicKey EdDSA_SHA512_Ed25519: size: 32]
|
||||
Padding: 96 bytes]
|
||||
Signature: [Signature EdDSA_SHA512_Ed25519: size: 64]
|
||||
Published: Sun Oct 09 01:34:59 UTC 2016
|
||||
Options (5):
|
||||
[caps] = [LfR]
|
||||
[netId] = [2]
|
||||
[netdb.knownLeaseSets] = [37]
|
||||
[netdb.knownRouters] = [2435]
|
||||
[router.version] = [0.9.26]
|
||||
Addresses (4):
|
||||
[RouterAddress:
|
||||
Type: SSU
|
||||
Cost: 4
|
||||
Options (5):
|
||||
[caps] = [BC]
|
||||
[host] = [2a01:e35:8b5c:b240:71a2:6750:8d4:47fa]
|
||||
[key] = [nYZ5Qe7gQ-~QgfgJVRUG4c0JnVeVqzM~duUX1EGT1ek=]
|
||||
[mtu] = [1472]
|
||||
[port] = [22244]]
|
||||
[RouterAddress:
|
||||
Type: NTCP
|
||||
Cost: 9
|
||||
Options (2):
|
||||
[host] = [2a01:e35:8b5c:b240:71a2:6750:8d4:47fa]
|
||||
[port] = [22244]]
|
||||
[RouterAddress:
|
||||
Type: SSU
|
||||
Cost: 6
|
||||
Options (4):
|
||||
[caps] = [BC]
|
||||
[host] = [88.181.203.36]
|
||||
[key] = [nYZ5Qe7gQ-~QgfgJVRUG4c0JnVeVqzM~duUX1EGT1ek=]
|
||||
[port] = [22244]]
|
||||
[RouterAddress:
|
||||
Type: NTCP
|
||||
Cost: 11
|
||||
Options (2):
|
||||
[host] = [88.181.203.36]
|
||||
[port] = [22244]]]
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
For details and specification, visit @Java-I2P [Network Database](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/network-database) page.
|
||||
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/scalability.md
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/scalability.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["scalability"]
|
||||
summary: "Growth potential of Monero, resources required, and methods of increasing efficiency"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Monero has no hardcoded maximum block size, which means that unlike Bitcoin it does not have a 1 MB block size limit preventing scaling. However, a block reward penalty mechanism is built into the protocol to avoid a too excessive block size increase: The new block's size (NBS) is compared to the median size M100 of the last 100 blocks. If NBS>M100, the block reward gets reduced in quadratic dependency of how much NBS exceeds M100. E.g. if NBS is [10%, 50%, 80%, 100%] greater than M100, the nominal block reward gets reduced by [1%, 25%, 64%, 100%]. Generally, blocks greater than 2*M100 are not allowed, and blocks <= 60kB are always free of any block reward penalties.
|
||||
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/signature.md
Normal file
8
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/signature.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["signature", "signatures"]
|
||||
summary: "a cryptographic method for proving ownership of a piece of information, as well as proving that the information has not been modified after being signed"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A cryptographic method for proving ownership of a piece of information, as well as proving that the information has not been modified after being signed.
|
||||
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/smartmining.md
Normal file
13
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/smartmining.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["smart-mining"]
|
||||
summary: "a process of having a throttled miner mine when it otherwise does not cause drawbacks"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Smart mining is the process of having a throttled @miner mine when it otherwise does not cause drawbacks.
|
||||
Drawbacks include increases heat, slower machine, depleting battery, etc. The intent of smart mining is to increase network security by allowing as many people as possible to let the smart miner on all the time. For this to work, the miner must prove unobtrusive, or it will be turned off, depriving the Monero network from a little bit of security. As such, it is likely that a smart miner will mine slower than a normal miner on the same hardware.
|
||||
|
||||
Smart mining is available in the official CLI and GUI wallet, which are available in the [downloads page](https://getmonero.org/downloads/).
|
||||
|
||||
It is hoped that the relative slowness of a smart miner (especially on low-power machines) will be offset by the large amount of people running a miner for a possible "lottery win", and thus increase the Monero network security by a non trivial amount. The increased hash rate from many different sources helps keep the Monero network decentralized.
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/spendkey.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/spendkey.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["spend-key", "spend-keys"]
|
||||
summary: "one of the two pairs of private and public cryptographic keys that each account has, with the *private* spend key used to spend any funds in the account"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
One of the two pairs of private and public cryptographic keys that each account has, with the *private* spend key used to spend any funds in the account.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
|
||||
The *private* spend key is a 256-bit integer that is used to sign Monero transactions. With the current deterministic key derivation method of the official wallet, the private spend key is also an alternate representation of the @mnemonic-seed. It can be used to derive all other account keys.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
24
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ssu.md
Normal file
24
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/ssu.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["SSU"]
|
||||
summary: "Secure Semi-reliable UDP: one of two Kovri transports"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
*Secure Semi-reliable UDP* is one of two encrypted @transports for @Kovri.
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to @NTCP, @SSU's *primary* purpose is to securely transmit @in-net @I2NP messages through @tunnels but, unlike @NTCP, @SSU functions solely over encrypted [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol).
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
- Like @NTCP, @SSU is a connection-oriented, point-to-point data transport
|
||||
- Termed *semi-reliable* because @SSU will repeatedly retransmit *unacknowledged* messages (up to maximum number then dropped)
|
||||
- @SSU also provides several unique services (in addition to its function as a @transport layer):
|
||||
- IP detection (local inspection or with [peer testing](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/transport/ssu#peerTesting))
|
||||
- [NAT](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network_address_translation) traversal (using [introducers](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/transport/ssu#introduction))
|
||||
- [Firewall](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firewall_%28computing%29) status and, if implemented, @SSU can notify @NTCP if the external address or firewall status changes
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
For further details, read @Java-I2P's [SSU](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/transport/ssu)
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/stealthaddress.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/stealthaddress.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["stealth-address", "stealth-addresses"]
|
||||
summary: "automatic one-time addresses for every transaction"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Stealth addresses are an important part of Monero's inherent privacy. They allow and require the sender to create random one-time addresses for every @transaction on behalf of the recipient. The recipient can publish just one address, yet have all of his/her incoming payments go to unique addresses on the @blockchain, where they cannot be linked back to either the recipient's published address or any other transactions' addresses. By using stealth addresses, only the sender and receiver can determine where a payment was sent.
|
||||
|
||||
When you create a Monero account you’ll have a private @view-key, a private @spend-key, and a Public Address. The @spend-key is used to send payments, the @view-key is used to display incoming transactions destined for your account, and the Public Address is for receiving payments. Both the @spend-key and @view-key are used to build your Monero address. You can have a “watch only” wallet that only uses the @view-key. This feature can be used for accounting or auditing purposes but is currently unreliable due to the inability to track outgoing transactions. You can decide who can see your Monero balance by sharing your @view-key. Monero is private by default and optionally semi-transparent!
|
||||
|
||||
When using the Monero Wallet all this is handled by the software. Sending Monero is as easy as entering the destination address, the amount, and pressing Send. To recieve Monero, simply provide the sender your Public Address.
|
||||
|
||||
To learn how Monero prevents tracking history (untraceability), see @ring-signatures.
|
||||
45
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/subscription.md
Normal file
45
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/subscription.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Subscription"]
|
||||
summary: "A file used by address book which contains I2P hosts paired with I2P destinations"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A subscription is a file which contains a list of `.i2p` hosts paired with their respective @destination. Subscriptions are used by the @address-book.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
Similar to how a [hosts file](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hosts_(file)) can map an internet hostname to a specified address, a subscription matches a `.i2p` address to @base64-address by using the following format (no spaces allowed): `host=address`
|
||||
|
||||
More specifically, a subscription pairs a @locally-unique-host to @base64-address.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
anonimal.i2p=AQZGLAMpI9Q0l0kmMj1vpJJYK3CjLp~fE3MfvE-e7KMKjI5cPOH6EN8m794uHJ6b09qM8mb9VEv1lVLEov~usVliTSXCSHuRBOCIwIOuDNU0AbVa4BpIx~2sU4TxKhoaA3zQ6VzINoduTdR2IJhPvI5xzezp7dR21CEQGGTbenDslXeQ4iLHFA2~bzp1f7etSl9T2W9RID-KH78sRQmzWnv7dbhNodMbpO6xsf1vENf6bMRzqD5vgHEHZu2aSoNuPyYxDU1eM6--61b2xp9mt1k3ud-5WvPVg89RaU9ugU5cxaHgR927lHMCAEU2Ax~zUb3DbrvgQBOTHnJEx2Fp7pOK~PnP6ylkYKQMfLROosLDXinxOoSKP0UYCh2WgIUPwE7WzJH3PiJVF0~WZ1dZ9mg00c~gzLgmkOxe1NpFRNg6XzoARivNVB5NuWqNxr5WKWMLBGQ9YHvHO1OHhUJTowb9X90BhtHnLK2AHwO6fV-iHWxRJyDabhSMj1kuYpVUBQAEAAcAAA==
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
1. `anonimal.i2p` is the @locally-unique-host
|
||||
2. `=` is the separator
|
||||
3. Everything that remains is the @base64-address
|
||||
|
||||
### Subscription types
|
||||
|
||||
For @Kovri, there are two types of subscription files: *public* and *private*.
|
||||
|
||||
A *public* subscription:
|
||||
- is used when bootstrapping to use essential services (IRC, email, Monero, etc.)
|
||||
- is static and is refreshed every 12 hours from Monero's @address-book server
|
||||
- allows you to safely share the subscription with everyone as it is publically available (anyone who shares the same public subscription will also be able to resolve the same hostname to the same destination as you)
|
||||
|
||||
A *private* subscription:
|
||||
- is used exclusively by you and is not shared with others unless you explicitly choose to share the file
|
||||
- default file is `private_hosts.txt` in your @data-directory
|
||||
|
||||
### Updating a private subscription
|
||||
|
||||
You can use a @jump-service to manually update your private subscription. The updated subscription will then be fed into the @address-book for you to use.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
To learn how to subscribe to multiple subscriptions, see the [user-guide](https://gitlab.com/kovri-project/kovri-docs/blob/master/i18n/en/user_guide.md).
|
||||
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.md
Normal file
14
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/tail-emission.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["Tail-Emission"]
|
||||
summary: "the block reward at the end of the emission curve"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
Monero block rewards will never drop to zero. Block rewards will gradually drop until tail emission commences at the end of May 2022. At this point, rewards will be fixed at 0.6 XMR per block.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why
|
||||
|
||||
Miners need an incentive to mine. Because of the dynamic blocksize, competition between @miners will cause fees to decrease. If mining is not profitable due to a high cost and low reward, miners lose their incentive and will stop mining, reducing the security of the network.
|
||||
|
||||
Tail emission ensures that a dynamic block size and fee market can develop.
|
||||
21
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/transaction.md
Normal file
21
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/transaction.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["transaction", "transactions"]
|
||||
summary: "a cryptographically signed container that details the transfer of Monero to a recipient (or recipients)"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A cryptographically signed container that details the transfer of Monero to a recipient (or recipients).
|
||||
|
||||
The parameters of a transaction contain one or more recipient addresses with corresponding amounts of funds and a @ring-size parameter that specifies the number outputs bound to the transaction. The more outputs that are used, a higher degree of obfuscation is possible, but that comes with a cost. Since a transaction gets larger with more outputs, the transaction fee will be higher.
|
||||
|
||||
It is possible to form a transaction offline, which offers additional privacy benefits.
|
||||
|
||||
A transaction can be uniquely identified with the use of an optional Transaction ID, which is usually represented by a 32-byte string (64 hexadecimal characters).
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth Information
|
||||
Every transaction involves two keys: a public @spend-key, and a public @view-key. The destination for an output in a transaction is actually a one-time public key computed from these two keys.
|
||||
|
||||
When a wallet is scanning for incoming transactions, every transaction is scanned to see if it is for "you". This only requires your private view key and your public spend key, and this check is immutable and cannot be faked. You cannot receive transactions and identify them without a corresponding private view key.
|
||||
|
||||
In order to spend the funds you have to compute a one-time private spend key for that output. This is almost always done automatically by the Monero Wallet software.
|
||||
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/transports.md
Normal file
18
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/transports.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Transports", "Transport"]
|
||||
summary: "The two encrypted transport layers for Kovri"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
@I2P comes with two encrypted transport layer technologies that allow @Kovri to securely use [TCP/IP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tcp/ip) connections. These technologies (@SSU and @NTCP) are called *@transports*.
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
@SSU is encrypted [UDP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/User_Datagram_Protocol) and @NTCP is encrypted [TCP](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmission_Control_Protocol). They provide @encryption at the [transport layer](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_layer) so higher level @messages can be sent through @tunnels across the @I2P network.
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
- Read about @I2P's transports on the [Transport](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/transport) page
|
||||
- Read about the transports layer within the [OSI model](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model)
|
||||
35
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/tunnel.md
Normal file
35
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/tunnel.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
tags: ["kovri"]
|
||||
terms: ["Tunnel", "Tunnels"]
|
||||
summary: "Uni-directional virtual paths that pass messages through a defined sequence of I2P routers"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
When you communicate over @I2P (visit an @eepsite / use a @garlic-service), you'll first need to connect to a peer by using @transports and then build virtual *tunnels*. These virtual tunnels are temporary, uni-directional paths that pass information through a defined sequence of @I2P routers to your @destination. Tunnels are built, and then used, with layered @garlic-encryption and are a general-purpose mechanism to transport all @I2NP @messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Each peer builds, at a minimum, *two* uni-directional tunnels: one for **outbound traffic**, and one for **inbound traffic**. These tunnels are classified as either **inbound tunnels** (where @messages come toward the creator of the tunnel) or **outbound tunnels** (where the tunnel creator sends @messages away from the creator of the tunnel). Thus, *four* tunnels are required for a single round-trip @message and reply to your @destination (two for your, two for your destination).
|
||||
|
||||
### In-depth information
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
Within I2P, @messages are passed in one direction through a virtual tunnel of peers, using whatever means are available to pass the @message on to the next hop. Messages arrive at the tunnel's gateway, get bundled up and/or fragmented into fixed-size @tunnel @messages, and are forwarded on to the next hop in the tunnel, which processes and verifies the validity of the @message and sends it on to the next hop, and so on, until it reaches the @tunnel endpoint. That endpoint takes the messages bundled up by the gateway and forwards them as instructed - either to another router, to another tunnel on another router, or locally.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
Tunnels all work the same, but can be segmented into two different groups - inbound tunnels and outbound tunnels. The inbound tunnels have an untrusted gateway which passes messages down towards the tunnel creator, which serves as the tunnel endpoint. For outbound tunnels, the tunnel creator serves as the gateway, passing messages out to the remote endpoint.
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
The tunnel's creator selects exactly which peers will participate in the tunnel, and provides each with the necessary configuration data. They may have any number of hops. It is the intent to make it hard for either participants or third parties to determine the length of a tunnel, or even for colluding participants to determine whether they are a part of the same tunnel at all (barring the situation where colluding peers are next to each other in the tunnel).
|
||||
|
||||
### Notes
|
||||
|
||||
From @Java-I2P:
|
||||
|
||||
>
|
||||
@I2P is an inherently packet switched network, even with these tunnels, allowing it to take advantage of multiple tunnels running in parallel, increasing resilience and balancing load. Even though the tunnels within I2P bear a resemblance to a circuit switched network, everything within I2P is strictly message based - tunnels are merely accounting tricks to help organize the delivery of messages. No assumptions are made regarding reliability or ordering of messages, and retransmissions are left to higher levels (e.g. I2P's client layer streaming library).
|
||||
|
||||
### Documentation
|
||||
|
||||
For specification and detailed documentation, visit the [Tunnel-Routing](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/how/tunnel-routing) and [Tunnel-Implementation](https://geti2p.net/en/docs/tunnels/implementation) page.
|
||||
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/unlocktime.md
Normal file
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/unlocktime.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["unlock-time"]
|
||||
summary: "a special transaction where the recipient can only spend the funds after a future date, as set by the sender"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A special transaction where the recipient can only spend the funds after a future date, as set by the sender.
|
||||
|
||||
Unlock time allows you to send a transaction to someone, such that they can not spend it until after a certain number of blocks, or until a certain time.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this works differently than Bitcoin's [nLockTime](https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/NLockTime), in which the transaction is not valid until the given time.
|
||||
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.md
Normal file
12
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/viewkey.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["view-key", "view-keys"]
|
||||
summary: "one of two sets of private and public cryptographic keys that each account has, with the private view key required to view all transactions related to the account"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
One of two sets of private and public cryptographic keys that each account has, with the private view key required to view all transactions related to the account.
|
||||
|
||||
Monero features an opaque blockchain (with an explicit allowance system called the @view-key), in sharp contrast with transparent blockchains used by any other cryptocurrency not based on CryptoNote. Thus, Monero is said to be "private, optionally transparent".
|
||||
|
||||
Every Monero address has a private viewkey which can be shared. By sharing a viewkey, a person is allowing access to view every incoming transaction for that address. However, outgoing transactions cannot be reliably viewed as of June 2017. Therefore, the balance of a Monero address as shown via a viewkey should not be relied upon.
|
||||
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/wallet.md
Normal file
17
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/moneropedia/wallet.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
|||
---
|
||||
terms: ["wallet", "wallets"]
|
||||
summary: "A wallet stores the information necessary to send and receive Monero"
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
### The Basics
|
||||
|
||||
A Monero account, or wallet, stores the information necessary to send and receive Moneroj. In addition to sending and receiving, the Monero Wallet software keeps a private history of your transactions and allows you to cryptographically sign messages. It also includes Monero mining software and an address book.
|
||||
|
||||
The term "hot wallet" describes a Monero @account which is connected to the Internet. You can send funds easily but security is much lower than a cold wallet. Never store large amounts of cryptocurrency in a hot wallet!
|
||||
|
||||
A cold wallet is generated on a trusted device or computer via an @airgap. If the device is to be reused, the data storage should be securely overwritten. As soon as a cold wallet is connected to the Internet or its mnemonic phrase or @spend-key is entered on an Internet-connected device, it's no longer "cold" and should be considered "hot".
|
||||
|
||||
A Monero @paper-wallet can be generated by downloading the source code of https://moneroaddress.org/. Verify the signature of the code on a trusted airgapped device. Create the wallet and print or store it on the media of your choice.
|
||||
|
||||
Monero accounts and paper-wallets can be stored on any media - paper, USB drive, CD/DVD, or a hardware wallet device (Ledger available since June 2018).
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '3.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
## How to mine Monero (XMR) without a mining equipment?
|
||||
|
||||
If you don’t have a profitable mining equipment, nor time or
|
||||
money to invest into building it, you can still mine Monero with NiceHash.
|
||||
|
||||
NiceHash is a hashing power marketplace. Sellers of hashing
|
||||
power, i.e. miners, provide the hashing power for buyers (those who want to buy
|
||||
a service of mining a certain coin). Hence, NiceHash can provide you a massive
|
||||
hashing power in short amount of time. You won’t have to wait for years to see
|
||||
if you will make a profit or not and you can control which coin, at which pool,
|
||||
and for how long you want to mine.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Step 1:** Create new account at NiceHash
|
||||
|
||||
Visit [registration
|
||||
page](https://www.nicehash.com/?p=register) and register with your e-mail address.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Step 2:** Deposit some Bitcoins to your account
|
||||
|
||||
You will mine Monero, but you can buy hashing power at
|
||||
NiceHash only with Bitcoins. You can always withdraw unspent Bitcoins from your
|
||||
account back to any Bitcoin wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
Visit your [wallet
|
||||
page](https://www.nicehash.com/?p=wallet) and make a deposit. Note that the minimum price for placing an order
|
||||
equals 0.01 BTC.
|
||||
|
||||
### **Step 3:** Find a suitable pool for mining and add it to your pool list
|
||||
|
||||
Selection of the pool plays a big role in the final amount
|
||||
of mined cryptocurrency. Make sure the pool you have selected can handle
|
||||
massive hashing rate and loads of shares, especially from a single connection.
|
||||
You can find a list of Monero pools [here](https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=583449.0).
|
||||
|
||||
Note that you will probably have to register an account at
|
||||
selected pool as well. The pool will provide you with all the information you need.
|
||||
You can save your favorite pools at [this page](https://www.nicehash.com/?p=managepools).
|
||||
|
||||
### **Step 4:** Create new order and start mining
|
||||
|
||||
When creating a [new order](https://www.nicehash.com/?p=orders&new), make sure you
|
||||
select CryptoNightR algorithm for mining Monero (New algorithm variant since 2019 March the 9th). If you want to first learn more
|
||||
about placing an order with NiceHash, we recommend you to read this [frequently asked question](https://www.nicehash.com/help/buyers).
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to bid on
|
||||
hashing power select Standard (bidding) order type and if you want a fixed
|
||||
order that cannot be outbid, select Fixed order type. The status of marketplace
|
||||
and approximate prices of mining can be checked at [live marketplace](https://www.nicehash.com/index.jsp?p=orders).
|
||||
38
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/Offline_Backup.md
Normal file
38
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/Offline_Backup.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
## Operating Systems: Various versions of Linux and Windows 7, 8
|
||||
|
||||
### Wallet Software: Simplewallet
|
||||
|
||||
#### Resource for Creating Bootable Disks: [Linux](http://www.pendrivelinux.com/), [Windows](https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/download/windows-usb-dvd-download-tool)
|
||||
|
||||
#### Resource for Monero Binaries: [Monero Binaries](https://getmonero.org/downloads/)
|
||||
|
||||
- Take any computer you have lying around, even your normal workstation. You may find it easier to use an older computer that has no wifi or bluetooth if you're particularly paranoid
|
||||
|
||||
- Create a Linux or Windows bootable disk, and make sure you have the Monero binaries on the same disk or on a second disk (for Linux make sure you have also downloaded copies of the dependencies you will need, libboost1.55 and miniupnpc for instance)
|
||||
|
||||
- Disconnect the network and/or Internet cables from your computer, physically remove the wifi card or switch the wifi/bluetooth off on a laptop if possible
|
||||
|
||||
- Boot into your bootable OS, install the dependencies if necessary
|
||||
|
||||
- Copy the Monero binaries to a RAM disk (/dev/shm in Linux, Windows bootable ISOs normally have a Z: drive or something)
|
||||
|
||||
- Don't run the Monero daemon. Instead, using the command line, use monero-wallet-cli to create a new Monero @account
|
||||
|
||||
- When prompted for a name, give it any name, it doesn't really matter
|
||||
|
||||
- When prompted for a password, type in like 50 - 100 random characters. Don't worry that you don't know the password, just make it LONG
|
||||
|
||||
- **CRITICAL STEP**: Write down (on paper) your 25 word @mnemonic-seed
|
||||
**WARNING**: If you forget to write down this information your funds may be lost forever
|
||||
|
||||
- Write down (on your phone, on paper, on another computer, wherever you want) your address and view key
|
||||
|
||||
- Switch off the computer, remove the battery if there is one, and leave it physically off for a few hours
|
||||
|
||||
The account you've created was created in RAM, and the digital files are now inaccessible. If some adversary manages to somehow obtain the data, they will lack the long password to open it. If you need to receive payments, you have your public address, and you have the view key if needed. If you need access to it, you have your 25 word @mnemonic-seed, and you can now write out several copies of it, including an offsite copy (e.g. a bank deposit box).
|
||||
|
||||
Credit: Riccardo Spagni
|
||||
|
||||
Related: [Offline Account Generator](http://moneroaddress.org/)
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# CLI Wallet/Daemon Isolation with Qubes + Whonix
|
||||
|
||||
With [Qubes](https://qubes-os.org) + [Whonix](https://whonix.org) you can have a Monero wallet that is without networking and running on a virtually isolated system from the Monero daemon which has all of its traffic forced over [Tor](https://torproject.org).
|
||||
|
||||
Qubes gives the flexibility to easily create separate VMs for different purposes. First you will create a Whonix workstation for the wallet with no networking. Next, another Whonix workstation for the daemon which will use your Whonix gateway as it's NetVM. For communication between the wallet and daemon you can make use of Qubes [qrexec](https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec3/).
|
||||
|
||||
This is safer than other approaches which route the wallets rpc over a Tor hidden service, or that use physical isolation but still have networking to connect to the daemon. In this way you don't need any network connection on the wallet, you preserve resources of the Tor network, and there is less latency.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. [Create Whonix AppVMs](https://www.whonix.org/wiki/Qubes/Install):
|
||||
|
||||
+ Using a Whonix workstation template, create two workstations as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
- The first workstation will be used for your wallet, it will referred to as `monero-wallet-ws`. You will have `NetVM` set to `none`.
|
||||
|
||||
- The second workstation will be for the `monerod` daemon, it will be referred to as `monerod-ws`. You will have `NetVM` set to the Whonix gateway `sys-whonix`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. In the AppVM `monerod-ws`:
|
||||
|
||||
+ Download, verify, and install Monero software.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ curl -O "https://downloads.getmonero.org/cli/monero-linux-x64-v0.11.1.0.tar.bz2" -O "https://getmonero.org/downloads/hashes.txt"
|
||||
user@host:~$ gpg --recv-keys BDA6BD7042B721C467A9759D7455C5E3C0CDCEB9
|
||||
user@host:~$ gpg --verify hashes.txt
|
||||
gpg: Signature made Wed 01 Nov 2017 10:01:41 AM UTC
|
||||
gpg: using RSA key 0x55432DF31CCD4FCD
|
||||
gpg: Good signature from "Riccardo Spagni <ric@spagni.net>" [unknown]
|
||||
gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
|
||||
gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
|
||||
Primary key fingerprint: BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9 759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9
|
||||
Subkey fingerprint: 94B7 38DD 3501 32F5 ACBE EA1D 5543 2DF3 1CCD 4FCD
|
||||
user@host:~$ echo '6581506f8a030d8d50b38744ba7144f2765c9028d18d990beb316e13655ab248 monero-linux-x64-v0.11.1.0.tar.bz2' | shasum -c
|
||||
monero-linux-x64-v0.11.1.0.tar.bz2: OK
|
||||
user@host:~$ tar xf monero-linux-x64-v0.11.1.0.tar.bz2
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo cp monero-v0.11.1.0/monerod /usr/local/bin/
|
||||
```
|
||||
+ Create a `systemd` file.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo gedit /home/user/monerod.service
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Paste the following contents:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[Unit]
|
||||
Description=Monero Full Node
|
||||
After=network.target
|
||||
|
||||
[Service]
|
||||
User=user
|
||||
Group=user
|
||||
|
||||
Type=forking
|
||||
PIDFile=/home/user/.bitmonero/monerod.pid
|
||||
|
||||
ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/monerod --detach --data-dir=/home/user/.bitmonero \
|
||||
--no-igd --pidfile=/home/user/.bitmonero/monerod.pid \
|
||||
--log-file=/home/user/.bitmonero/bitmonero.log --p2p-bind-ip=127.0.0.1
|
||||
|
||||
Restart=always
|
||||
PrivateTmp=true
|
||||
|
||||
[Install]
|
||||
WantedBy=multi-user.target
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Copy `monero-wallet-cli` executable to the `monero-wallet-ws` VM.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ qvm-copy-to-vm monero-wallet-ws monero-v0.11.1.0/monero-wallet-cli
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Make `monerod` daemon run on startup by editing the file `/rw/config/rc.local`.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo gedit /rw/config/rc.local
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add these lines to the bottom:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
cp /home/user/monerod.service /lib/systemd/system/
|
||||
systemctl start monerod.service
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Make file executable.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Create rpc action file.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo mkdir /rw/usrlocal/etc/qubes-rpc
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo gedit /rw/usrlocal/etc/qubes-rpc/user.monerod
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add this line:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
socat STDIO TCP:localhost:18081
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Shutdown `monerod-ws`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. In the AppVM `monero-wallet-ws`:
|
||||
|
||||
+ Move the `monero-wallet-cli` executable.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo mv QubesIncoming/monerod-ws/monero-wallet-cli /usr/local/bin/
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Edit the file `/rw/config/rc.local`.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo gedit /rw/config/rc.local
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add the following line to the bottom:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
socat TCP-LISTEN:18081,fork,bind=127.0.0.1 EXEC:"qrexec-client-vm monerod-ws user.monerod"
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Make file executable.
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
user@host:~$ sudo chmod +x /rw/config/rc.local
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
+ Shutdown `monero-wallet-ws`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. In `dom0`:
|
||||
|
||||
+ Create the file `/etc/qubes-rpc/policy/user.monerod`:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
[user@dom0 ~]$ sudo nano /etc/qubes-rpc/policy/user.monerod
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Add the following line:
|
||||
|
||||
```
|
||||
monero-wallet-ws monerod-ws allow
|
||||
```
|
||||
62
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/create_wallet.md
Normal file
62
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/create_wallet.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
### Operating Systems: Ubuntu
|
||||
|
||||
- Download the [official binaries](https://getmonero.org/downloads/) or compile the last source available on [Github](https://github.com/monero-project/bitmonero)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Extract the files with the archive manager (same as Winzip on Windows). Note the path where the files "monerod" and "monero-wallet-cli" are
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- You only need to do this step once : open a terminal (ctrl+alt+t) and install the required dependencies by typing : "*sudo apt-get install libboost-all-dev libssl-dev libevent-dev libdb++-dev*". When asked, press the Y key and then Enter to continue
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Open a terminal and load the path where your binaries are extracted (cf. step 2) by typing : "*cd yourPathFromStep2*"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Load monerod by typing in your terminal : "*./monerod*". Wait for the synchronization with the network (monerod is updating the blockchain you have downloaded in step 4 or is downloading it from scratch). This can take a lot of time the first time, so be patient
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Once monerod is synchronized with the network, open a new terminal, change the directory (cf. step 5), and launch monero-wallet-cli by typing "*./monero-wallet-cli*"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- Enter the name you want for your portfolio and follow the instructions from the terminal
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*This is your private key. Write it down and keep it in a safe place!*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*This is your view key. You need it to create a view only wallet (cf. associated user guide)*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
*This is the address of your wallet*
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
- To exit monerod or monero-wallet-cli just type "*exit*" in the associated terminal
|
||||
|
||||
Now to access the portfolio you have just created you will have to launch monerod, wait for it to be synchronized with the network, launch monero-wallet-cli, and type the name of your portfolio and your password.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
66
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/easiest_buy.md
Normal file
66
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/easiest_buy.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
## How to obtain Monero
|
||||
|
||||
This is a guide to obtain your own Monero as of 20150919. This is perhaps the easiest way to purchase and hold Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
####Step 1: Buy Bitcoin
|
||||
|
||||
There are many ways to buy Bitcoin. Perhaps the easiest way is through circle.com. Once you have purchased some Bitcoin, you are ready to buy some Monero! Buying Bitcoin is straightforward. Please goto circle.com and just follow the instructions there.
|
||||
|
||||
####Step 2: Set up a mymonero.com account
|
||||
|
||||
MyMonero.com is an online wallet for Monero, maintained by Monero Core Developer Ricardo Spagni (fluffpony). It is the easiest wallet to use. Simply go to MyMonero.com and click on the "Create an Account" button.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
After clicking the button, you will see your private key. This key is what gives you access to your funds. Never share this key with anyone!
|
||||
|
||||
### WRITE DOWN THIS KEY IMMEDIATELY!
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Type in your private key in the box below, and click the button.
|
||||
|
||||
On the next page, you will see your address.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Copy your address to the clipboard by highlighting the whole thing and hitting ctrl+c (or edit menu, copy), or clicking the little icon next to your address. Save your address somewhere. This is how others will send Monero to you, and what you will use to deposit Monero into your account!
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 3: Buy Monero and transfer the Monero to your new address
|
||||
|
||||
Go to www.shapeshift.io . On the righthand side, of the screen, click icon under "Receive" to select Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Paste your address into the field under the Monero logo. Select the "agree to terms" button, then hit "Start"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
In the new screen that pops up, copy the Deposit Address into your clipboard (select and hit ctrl+c or edit-copy)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Go back to your circle.com page, hit the "transfer" button, and paste the Bitcoin address into the field
|
||||
Enter the amount of Bitcoin you would like to spend.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You will get a text message verification code. Enter code and hit send.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
You will see the shapeshift change to "awaiting exchange"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Then it will change to COMPLETE!
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
After a while you will see it in your Monero account
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/howto_fix_stuck_funds.md
Normal file
32
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/howto_fix_stuck_funds.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
Sometimes, your funds will become stuck - you will have some locked funds that never become unlocked. This is how you fix it.
|
||||
|
||||
- Load your wallet in monero-wallet-cli.
|
||||
|
||||
- Type
|
||||
|
||||
> seed
|
||||
|
||||
into the command prompt. Write down your 25 word seed, if you haven't already. This is the best way to make sure you don't loose access to your funds.
|
||||
|
||||
- Close monero-wallet-cli by typing
|
||||
|
||||
> exit
|
||||
|
||||
- Backup all of your wallet related files. These include:
|
||||
|
||||
> yourwalletname.bin
|
||||
> yourwalletname.bin.keys
|
||||
> yourwalletname.bin.address.txt
|
||||
|
||||
This can be done by copying the files to a new folder.
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes, when creating your wallet, you might have named it something without the .bin part. In that case, the wallet file will be called yourwalletname without the .bin at the end.
|
||||
|
||||
- Delete yourwallet.bin
|
||||
|
||||
- Load monero-wallet-cli, type in the name of the wallet you just deleted
|
||||
|
||||
- Enter password. The wallet will now refresh and hopefully your locked funds will now become unlocked.
|
||||
|
||||
58
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/importing_blockchain.md
Normal file
58
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/importing_blockchain.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# Importing the Blockchain to Monero GUI wallet (Windows)
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 1
|
||||
|
||||
Download the Current bootstrap from https://downloads.getmonero.org/blockchain.raw; you can skip this step if you are importing the Blockchain from another source.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 2
|
||||
|
||||
Find the path of your Monero wallet (the folder where you extracted your wallet). For example mine is:
|
||||
|
||||
`D:\monero-gui-0.10.3.1`
|
||||
|
||||
Your path may be different depending on where you decided to download your wallet and what version of the Monero wallet you have.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 3
|
||||
|
||||
Find the path of your downloaded Blockchain for example mine was:
|
||||
|
||||
`C:\Users\KeeJef\Downloads\blockchain.raw`
|
||||
|
||||
Yours might be different depending on where you downloaded the Blockchain to.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 4
|
||||
|
||||
Open a Command Prompt window. You can do this by pressing the Windows key + R, and then typing in the popup box `CMD`
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 5
|
||||
|
||||
Now you need to navigate using the CMD window to the path of your Monero wallet. You can do this by typing:
|
||||
|
||||
`cd C:\YOUR\MONERO\WALLET\FILE\PATH\HERE`
|
||||
|
||||
It should look something like:
|
||||
|
||||
`cd D:\monero-gui-0.10.3.1`
|
||||
|
||||
If your Monero wallet is on another drive you can use `DriveLetter:` for example if your Monero wallet was on your D drive then before using the cd command you would do `D:`
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 6
|
||||
|
||||
Now type in your command prompt window:
|
||||
|
||||
`monero-blockchain-import --input-file C:\YOUR\BLOCKCHAIN\FILE\PATH\HERE`
|
||||
|
||||
For example I would type :
|
||||
|
||||
`monero-blockchain-import --input-file C:\Users\KeeJef\Downloads\blockchain.raw`
|
||||
|
||||
If you downloaded the Blockchain from a trusted, reputable source you may set `verify 0` this will reduce the amount of time to sync the Blockchain.
|
||||
|
||||
### Step 7
|
||||
|
||||
After the the Blockchain has finished syncing up you can open your Monero wallet normally. Your downloaded blockchain.raw can be deleted.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Author: Kee Jefferys
|
||||
165
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/ledger-wallet-cli.md
Normal file
165
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/ledger-wallet-cli.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
## How to generate a Ledger Monero wallet with the CLI (monero-wallet-cli)
|
||||
|
||||
### Table of Content
|
||||
|
||||
* [1. Windows](#1-windows)
|
||||
* [2. Mac OS X](#2-mac-os-x)
|
||||
* [3. Linux](#3-linux)
|
||||
* [4. Final notes](#4-a-few-final-notes)
|
||||
|
||||
### 1. Windows
|
||||
|
||||
We first have to ensure that we're sufficiently prepared. This entails the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1. This guide assumes you have already initialized your Ledger wallet and thus generated a 24 word mnemonic seed.
|
||||
|
||||
2. You need to run / use CLI v0.12.2.0, which can be found <a href="{{site.baseurl}}/downloads/">here</a>.
|
||||
|
||||
3. You need to install the Ledger Monero app and configure your system. Instructions can be found [here](https://github.com/LedgerHQ/blue-app-monero/blob/master/doc/user/bolos-app-monero.pdf) (sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.3 in particular). In addition, make sure to set the network to `Mainnet`
|
||||
|
||||
4. Your Ledger needs to be plugged in and the Ledger Monero app should be running.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Either your daemon (`monerod.exe`) should be running and preferably be fully synced or you should connect to a remote node.
|
||||
|
||||
Now that we're sufficiently prepared, let's start!
|
||||
|
||||
1. Go to the directory / folder monerod.exe and monero-wallet-cli.exe are located.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Open a new command prompt / powershell. This is done by first making sure your cursor isn't located on any of the files and subsequently doing SHIFT + right click. It will give you an option to "Open command window here". If you're using Windows 10 in latest version, it'll give you an option to "open the PowerShell window here".
|
||||
|
||||
3. Now type:
|
||||
|
||||
`monero-wallet-cli.exe --generate-from-device <new-wallet-name> --subaddress-lookahead 3:200` (Win 7 + 8)
|
||||
|
||||
`.\monero-wallet-cli.exe --generate-from-device <new-wallet-name> --subaddress-lookahead 3:200` (Win 10)
|
||||
|
||||
Note that is simply a placeholder for the actual wallet name. If you, for instance, want to name your wallet `MoneroWallet`, the command would be as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
`monero-wallet-cli.exe --generate-from-device MoneroWallet --subaddress-lookahead 3:200` (Win 7 + 8)
|
||||
|
||||
`.\monero-wallet-cli.exe --generate-from-device MoneroWallet --subaddress-lookahead 3:200` (Win 10)
|
||||
|
||||
4. The CLI will, after executing aforementioned command, prompt your for a password. Make sure to set a strong password and confirm it thereafter.
|
||||
|
||||
5. The Ledger will ask whether you want to export the private view key or not. First and foremost, your funds cannot be compromised with merely the private view key. Exporting the private view key enables the client (on the computer - Monero v0.12.2.0) to scan blocks looking for transactions that belong to your wallet / address. If this option is not utilized, the device (Ledger) will scan blocks, which will be significantly slower. There is, however, one caveat. That is, if your system gets compromised, the adversary will potentially be able to compromise your private view key as well, which is detrimental to privacy. This is virtually impossible when the private view key is not exported.
|
||||
|
||||
6. You may have to hit confirm twice before it proceeds.
|
||||
|
||||
7. Your Ledger Monero wallet will now be generated. Note that this may take up to 5-10 minutes. Furthermore, there will be no immediate feedback in the CLI nor on the Ledger.
|
||||
|
||||
8. `monero-wallet-cli` will start refreshing. Wait until it has fully refreshed.
|
||||
|
||||
Congratulations, you can now use your Ledger Monero wallet in conjunction with the CLI.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2. Mac OS X
|
||||
We first have to ensure that we're sufficiently prepared. This entails the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1. This guide assumes you have already initialized your Ledger wallet and thus generated a 24 word mnemonic seed.
|
||||
|
||||
2. You need to run / use CLI v0.12.2.0, which can be found <a href="{{site.baseurl}}/downloads/">here</a>.
|
||||
|
||||
3. You need to install the Ledger Monero app and configure your system. Instructions can be found [here](https://github.com/LedgerHQ/blue-app-monero/blob/master/doc/user/bolos-app-monero.pdf) (sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.2 in particular). In addition, make sure to set the network to `Mainnet`
|
||||
|
||||
4. Note that the instructions for system configuration (section 3.2.2) on Mac OS X are quite elaborate and can be perceived as slightly convoluted. Fortunately, tficharmers has created a guide [here](https://monero.stackexchange.com/questions/8438/how-do-i-make-my-macos-detect-my-ledger-nano-s-when-plugged-in) that you can use for assistance.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Your Ledger needs to be plugged in and the Ledger Monero app should be running.
|
||||
|
||||
6. Either your daemon (`monerod`) should be running and preferably be fully synced or you should connect to a remote node.
|
||||
|
||||
Now that we're sufficiently prepared, let's start!
|
||||
|
||||
1. Use Finder to browse to the directory / folder `monero-wallet-cli` (CLI v0.12.2.0) is located.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Go to your desktop.
|
||||
|
||||
3. Open a new terminal (if don't know how to open a terminal, see [here](https://apple.stackexchange.com/a/256263)).
|
||||
|
||||
4. Drag `monero-wallet-cli` in the terminal. It should add the full path to the terminal. Do not hit enter.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Now type:
|
||||
|
||||
`--generate-from-device <new-wallet-name> --subaddress-lookahead 3:200`
|
||||
|
||||
Note that is simply a placeholder for the actual wallet name. If you, for instance, want to name your wallet `MoneroWallet`, the command would be as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
`--generate-from-device MoneroWallet --subaddress-lookahead 3:200`
|
||||
|
||||
Note that aforementioned text will be appended to the path of `monero-wallet-cli`. Thus, before you hit enter, your terminal should look like:
|
||||
|
||||
`/full/path/to/monero-wallet-cli --generate-from-device <new-wallet-name> --subaddress-lookahead 3:200`
|
||||
|
||||
Where the full path is, intuitively, the actual path on your Mac OS X.
|
||||
|
||||
7. The CLI will, after executing aforementioned command, prompt you for a password. Make sure to set a strong password and confirm it thereafter.
|
||||
|
||||
8. The Ledger will ask whether you want to export the private view key or not. First and foremost, your funds cannot be compromised with merely the private view key. Exporting the private view key enables the client (on the computer - Monero v0.12.2.0) to scan blocks looking for transactions that belong to your wallet / address. If this option is not utilized, the device (Ledger) will scan blocks, which will be significantly slower. There is, however, one caveat. That is, if your system gets compromised, the adversary will potentially be able to compromise your private view key as well, which is detrimental to privacy. This is virtually impossible when the private view key is not exported.
|
||||
|
||||
9. You may have to hit confirm twice before it proceeds.
|
||||
|
||||
10. Your Ledger Monero wallet will now be generated. Note that this may take up to 5-10 minutes. Furthermore, there will be no immediate feedback in the CLI nor on the Ledger.
|
||||
|
||||
11. `monero-wallet-cli` will start refreshing. Wait until it has fully refreshed.
|
||||
|
||||
12. Congratulations, you can now use your Ledger Monero wallet in conjunction with the CLI.
|
||||
|
||||
### 3. Linux
|
||||
We first have to ensure that we're sufficiently prepared. This entails the following:
|
||||
|
||||
1. This guide assumes you have already initialized your Ledger wallet and thus generated a 24 word mnemonic seed.
|
||||
|
||||
2. You need to run / use CLI v0.12.2.0, which can be found <a href="{{site.baseurl}}/downloads/">here</a>.
|
||||
|
||||
3. You need to install the Ledger Monero app and configure your system. Instructions can be found [here](https://github.com/LedgerHQ/blue-app-monero/blob/master/doc/user/bolos-app-monero.pdf) (sections 3.1.1 and 3.2.1 in particular). In addition, make sure to set the network to `Mainnet`
|
||||
|
||||
4. Your Ledger needs to be plugged in and the Ledger Monero app should be running.
|
||||
|
||||
5. Either your daemon (`monerod`) should be running and preferably be fully synced or you should connect to a remote node.
|
||||
|
||||
Now that we're sufficiently prepared, let's start!
|
||||
|
||||
1. Go to the directory / folder monero-wallet-cli and monerod are located.
|
||||
|
||||
2. Open a new terminal
|
||||
|
||||
3. Now type:
|
||||
|
||||
`./monero-wallet-cli --generate-from-device <new-wallet-name> --subaddress-lookahead 3:200`
|
||||
|
||||
Note that is simply a placeholder for the actual wallet name. If you, for instance, want to name your wallet `MoneroWallet`, the command would be as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
`./monero-wallet-cli --generate-from-device MoneroWallet --subaddress-lookahead 3:200`
|
||||
|
||||
4. The CLI will, after executing aforementioned command, prompt your for a password. Make sure to set a strong password and confirm it thereafter.
|
||||
|
||||
5. The Ledger will ask whether you want to export the private view key or not. First and foremost, your funds cannot be compromised with merely the private view key. Exporting the private view key enables the client (on the computer - Monero v0.12.2.0) to scan blocks looking for transactions that belong to your wallet / address. If this option is not utilized, the device (Ledger) will scan blocks, which will be significantly slower. There is, however, one caveat. That is, if your system gets compromised, the adversary will potentially be able to compromise your private view key as well, which is detrimental to privacy. This is virtually impossible when the private view key is not exported.
|
||||
|
||||
6. You may have to hit confirm twice before it proceeds.
|
||||
|
||||
7. Your Ledger Monero wallet will now be generated. Note that this may take up to 5-10 minutes. Furthermore, there will be no immediate feedback in the CLI nor on the Ledger.
|
||||
|
||||
8. `monero-wallet-cli` will start refreshing. Wait until it has fully refreshed.
|
||||
|
||||
Congratulations, you can now use your Ledger Monero wallet in conjunction with the CLI.
|
||||
|
||||
### 4. A few final notes
|
||||
|
||||
1. We'd strongly advise to test the full process first. That is, send a small amount to the wallet and subsequently restore it (using aforementioned guide) to verify that you can recover the wallet. Note that, upon recreating / restoring the wallet, you ought to append the `--restore-height` flag (with a block height before the height of your first transaction to the wallet) to the command in step 3 (Windows), step 5 (Mac OS X), or step 3 (Linux). More information about the restore height and how to approximate it can be found [here](https://monero.stackexchange.com/questions/7581/what-is-the-relevance-of-the-restore-height).
|
||||
|
||||
2. If you use a remote node, append the `--daemon-address host:port` flag to the command in step 3 (Windows), step 5 (Mac OS X), or step 3 (Linux).
|
||||
|
||||
3. If desired, you can manually tweak the `--subaddress-lookahead` value. The first value is the number of accounts and the second value is the number of subaddresses per account. Thus, if you, for instance, want to pregenerate 5 accounts with 100 subaddresses each, use `--subaddress-lookahead 5:100`. Bear in mind that, the more subaddresses you pregenerate, the longer it takes for the Ledger to create your wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
4. You only have to use the `--generate-from-device` flag once (i.e. upon wallet creation). Thereafter, you'd basically use it similar to how you normally use the CLI. That is:
|
||||
1. Make sure your Ledger is plugged in and the Monero app is running.
|
||||
2. Open `monero-wallet-cli`.
|
||||
3. Enter the wallet name of your Ledger Monero wallet.
|
||||
4. Enter the password to open the wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
If the Ledger wallet files are not in the same directory as `monero-wallet-cli`, you ought to open `monero-wallet-cli` with the `--wallet-file /path/to/wallet.keys/file` flag. Alternatively, you can copy the Ledger wallet files to the same directory as `monero-wallet-cli`.
|
||||
|
||||
5. If you have any further questions or need assistance, please leave a comment to the original [StackExchange](https://monero.stackexchange.com/questions/8503/how-do-i-generate-a-ledger-monero-wallet-with-the-cli-monero-wallet-cli) answer.
|
||||
|
||||
Author: dEBRUYNE
|
||||
Secondary scribe: el00ruobuob
|
||||
115
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.md
Normal file
115
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/mine-to-pool.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# Selecting a pool
|
||||
|
||||
There are many pools to choose from, a list is available at
|
||||
[moneropools.com](https://moneropools.com). Mining on a larger pool could mean
|
||||
more frequent payouts, but mining on a smaller pool helps to keep the network
|
||||
decentralized.
|
||||
|
||||
# Selecting a CPU miner
|
||||
|
||||
Just like pools, there are a lot of miners to choose from. The one that you
|
||||
should pick depends on the hardware you want to mine on. This guide will only
|
||||
use a CPU miner, and will be using
|
||||
[xmr-stak-cpu](https://github.com/fireice-uk/xmr-stak-cpu). Alternatives include
|
||||
[wolf's CPUMiner](https://github.com/wolf9466/cpuminer-multi) and
|
||||
[sgminer-gm](https://github.com/genesismining/sgminer-gm). However, their
|
||||
configuration is slightly different and will not be covered in this guide.
|
||||
|
||||
## For Windows Systems
|
||||
|
||||
If you are using a Windows system, the developer of xmr-stak-cpu provides
|
||||
binaries to download on the
|
||||
[GitHub release page](https://github.com/fireice-uk/xmr-stak-cpu/releases).
|
||||
|
||||
Download `xmr-stak-cpu-win64.zip` and extract it somewhere you'll be able to
|
||||
find it again.
|
||||
|
||||
## For Other Operating Systems
|
||||
|
||||
If you're not using Windows, you will have to compile xmr-stak-cpu for yourself,
|
||||
luckily this isn't as hard as it sounds. Before you can compile the miner, you
|
||||
will need to install some of its prerequisites.
|
||||
|
||||
For Debian-based distros:
|
||||
|
||||
sudo apt-get install libmicrohttpd-dev libssl-dev cmake build-essential
|
||||
|
||||
For Red Hat based distros:
|
||||
|
||||
sudo yum install openssl-devel cmake gcc-c++ libmicrohttpd-devel
|
||||
|
||||
<!-- TODO: Add dependencies for other operating systems? -->
|
||||
|
||||
Following this, you just need to use cmake to generate the build files, run
|
||||
make and copy the config file:
|
||||
|
||||
mkdir build-$(gcc -dumpmachine)
|
||||
cd $_
|
||||
cmake ../
|
||||
make -j$(nproc)
|
||||
cp ../config.txt bin/
|
||||
cd bin
|
||||
|
||||
Don't celebrate just yet, as the miner needs to be configured. Running the miner
|
||||
now should give you a block of text to copy and paste:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Open `config.txt` and *replace* the two `"cpu_threads_conf"` lines with the text
|
||||
you just copied. It should look something like this afterwards:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Scroll down in the file until you see the lines containing `"pool_address"`.
|
||||
*Replace* the contents of the second set of quotes with the address and port of
|
||||
the pool you chose earlier. You can find this information on the pool's website.
|
||||
|
||||
Put your wallet address between the quotes on the wallet address. You may leave
|
||||
the password blank unless the pool specifies otherwise.
|
||||
|
||||
After this, your config should look something like this:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Running the miner
|
||||
|
||||
**Save the config** file and run the miner!
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Some pools allow you to monitor your hashrate by pasting your address into their
|
||||
website. You can also monitor your hashrate by pressing the `h` key.
|
||||
|
||||
# Tuning the miner
|
||||
|
||||
You might see nasty messages like this:
|
||||
|
||||
[2017-07-09 12:04:02] : MEMORY ALLOC FAILED: mmap failed
|
||||
|
||||
This means that you can get around a 20% hashrate boost by enabling large pages.
|
||||
|
||||
## Large pages on Linux
|
||||
|
||||
Firstly stop the miner (if it's running), run the following commands to enable
|
||||
large pages and then start the miner as root:
|
||||
|
||||
sudo sysctl -w vm.nr_hugepages=128
|
||||
sudo ./xmr-stak-cpu
|
||||
|
||||
## Large pages on Windows
|
||||
|
||||
Taken from `config.txt`:
|
||||
|
||||
>By default we will try to allocate large pages. This means you need to "Run As Administrator" on Windows
|
||||
You need to edit your system's group policies to enable locking large pages. Here are the steps from MSDN
|
||||
1. On the Start menu, click Run. In the Open box, type gpedit.msc.
|
||||
2. On the Local Group Policy Editor console, expand Computer Configuration, and then expand Windows Settings.
|
||||
3. Expand Security Settings, and then expand Local Policies.
|
||||
4. Select the User Rights Assignment folder.
|
||||
5. The policies will be displayed in the details pane.
|
||||
6. In the pane, double-click Lock pages in memory.
|
||||
7. In the Local Security Setting – Lock pages in memory dialog box, click Add User or Group.
|
||||
8. In the Select Users, Service Accounts, or Groups dialog box, add an account that you will run the miner on
|
||||
9. Reboot for change to take effect.
|
||||
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
## Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
This guide is two fold, ease of use for mining on Linux distributions and some extra security around mining as most of these miners have not had security auditing.
|
||||
|
||||
At the end of this guide you will be able to sleep a little easier knowing that if the miner gets exploited it will not migrate to your OS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why Docker
|
||||
|
||||
[Docker](https://www.docker.com/) is being used as it is the most well known and has the biggest chance to be already installed.
|
||||
|
||||
The container I am using is [alpine-xmrig](https://hub.docker.com/r/bitnn/alpine-xmrig/) as per the name it is built on the [Alpine Linux](https://www.alpinelinux.org/) image.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are interested in getting started with Docker, here are some really good starting references.
|
||||
* Arch Linux Wiki [Docker Page](https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/Docker)
|
||||
* Container Solutions [Security Cheat Sheet](http://container-solutions.com/content/uploads/2015/06/15.06.15_DockerCheatSheet_A2.pdf)
|
||||
* Digital Oceans [Dockerfile Howto](https://www.digitalocean.com/community/tutorials/docker-explained-using-dockerfiles-to-automate-building-of-images).
|
||||
|
||||
For distribution specific installation please refer to the [Docker Docs](https://docs.docker.com/engine/installation/) website.
|
||||
|
||||
### Why XMRig
|
||||
|
||||
[XMRig](https://github.com/xmrig/xmrig) is just a really solid miner to me. Nice output and statistics, no flashy web-ui's or dependencies. The XMRig container is only ~4MB what makes it extremely portable.
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 1: Mining with XMRig
|
||||
|
||||
Run the following
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# docker run --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M -c 512 bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o POOL01 -o POOL02 -u WALLET -p PASSWORD -k
|
||||
# docker run --restart unless-stopped --read-only -m 50M -c 512 bitnn/alpine-xmrig -o pool.supportxmr.com:7777 -u 45CJVagd6WwQAQfAkS91EHiTyfVaJn12uM4Su8iz6S2SHZ3QthmFM9BSPHVZY388ASWx8G9Wbz4BA24RQZUpGczb35fnnJz -p docker:secret -k
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
#### Step 2: There is no Step 2
|
||||
|
||||
You have already done everything you need to do. You are now mining in a docker container with XMRig `ctrl+c` to exit the miner or add `-d` just after `docker run` to background the miner.
|
||||
|
||||
147
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/monero-wallet-cli.md
Normal file
147
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/monero-wallet-cli.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# monero-wallet-cli
|
||||
|
||||
`monero-wallet-cli` is the wallet software that ships with the Monero tree. It is a console program,
|
||||
and manages an account. While a bitcoin wallet manages both an account and the blockchain,
|
||||
Monero separates these: `monerod` handles the blockchain, and `monero-wallet-cli` handles the account.
|
||||
|
||||
This guide will show how to perform various operations from the `monero-wallet-cli` UI. The guide assumes you are using the most recent version of Monero and have already created an account according to the other guides.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Checking your balance
|
||||
|
||||
Since the blockchain handling and the wallet are separate programs, many uses of `monero-wallet-cli`
|
||||
need to work with the daemon. This includes looking for incoming transactions to your address.
|
||||
Once you are running both `monero-wallet-cli` and `monerod`, enter `balance`.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
This will pull blocks from the daemon the wallet did not yet see, and update your balance
|
||||
to match. This process will normally be done in the background every minute or so. To see the
|
||||
balance without refreshing:
|
||||
|
||||
balance
|
||||
Balance: 64.526198850000, unlocked balance: 44.526198850000, including unlocked dust: 0.006198850000
|
||||
|
||||
In this example, `Balance` is your total balance. The `unlocked balance` is the amount currently available to spend. Newly received transactions require 10 confirmations on the blockchain before being unlocked. `unlocked dust` refers to very small amounts of unspent outputs that may have accumulated in your account.
|
||||
|
||||
## Sending monero
|
||||
|
||||
You will need the standard address you want to send to (a long string starting with '4'), and
|
||||
possibly a payment ID, if the receiving party requires one. In that latter case, that party
|
||||
may instead give you an integrated address, which is both of these packed into a single address.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sending to a standard address:
|
||||
|
||||
transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT PAYMENTID
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `ADDRESS` with the address you want to send to, `AMOUNT` with how many monero you want to send,
|
||||
and `PAYMENTID` with the payment ID you were given. Payment ID's are optional. If the receiving party doesn't need one, just
|
||||
omit it.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sending to an integrated address:
|
||||
|
||||
transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT
|
||||
|
||||
The payment ID is implicit in the integrated address in that case.
|
||||
|
||||
### Specify the number of outputs for a transaction:
|
||||
|
||||
transfer RINGSIZE ADDRESS AMOUNT
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `RINGSIZE` with the number of outputs you wish to use. **If not specified, the default is 11.** It's a good idea to use the default, but you can increase the number if you want to include more outputs. The higher the number, the larger the transaction, and higher fees are needed.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Receiving monero
|
||||
|
||||
If you have your own Monero address, you just need to give your standard address to someone.
|
||||
|
||||
You can find out your address with:
|
||||
|
||||
address
|
||||
|
||||
Since Monero is anonymous, you won't see the origin address the funds you receive came from. If you
|
||||
want to know, for instance to credit a particular customer, you'll have to tell the sender to use
|
||||
a payment ID, which is an arbitrary optional tag which gets attached to a transaction. To make life
|
||||
easier, you can generate an address that already includes a random payment ID:
|
||||
|
||||
integrated_address
|
||||
|
||||
This will generate a random payment ID, and give you the address that includes your own account
|
||||
and that payment ID. If you want to select a particular payment ID, you can do that too:
|
||||
|
||||
integrated_address 12346780abcdef00
|
||||
|
||||
Payments made to an integrated address generated from your account will go to your account,
|
||||
with that payment id attached, so you can tell payments apart.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Proving to a third party you paid someone
|
||||
|
||||
If you pay a merchant, and the merchant claims to not have received the funds, you may need
|
||||
to prove to a third party you did send the funds - or even to the merchant, if it is a honest
|
||||
mistake. Monero is private, so you can't just point to your transaction in the blockchain,
|
||||
as you can't tell who sent it, and who received it. However, by supplying the per-transaction
|
||||
private key to a party, that party can tell whether that transaction sent monero to that
|
||||
particular address. Note that storing these per-transaction keys is disabled by default, and
|
||||
you will have to enable it before sending, if you think you may need it:
|
||||
|
||||
set store-tx-info 1
|
||||
|
||||
You can retrieve the tx key from an earlier transaction:
|
||||
|
||||
get_tx_key 1234567890123456789012345678901212345678901234567890123456789012
|
||||
|
||||
Pass in the transaction ID you want the key for. Remember that a payment might have been
|
||||
split in more than one transaction, so you may need several keys. You can then send that key,
|
||||
or these keys, to whoever you want to provide proof of your transaction, along with the
|
||||
transaction id and the address you sent to. Note that this third party, if knowing your
|
||||
own address, will be able to see how much change was returned to you as well.
|
||||
|
||||
If you are the third party (that is, someone wants to prove to you that they sent monero
|
||||
to an address), then you can check this way:
|
||||
|
||||
check_tx_key TXID TXKEY ADDRESS
|
||||
|
||||
Replace `TXID`, `TXKEY` and `ADDRESS` with the transaction ID, per-transaction key, and destination
|
||||
address which were supplied to you, respectively. monero-wallet-cli will check that transaction
|
||||
and let you know how much monero this transaction paid to the given address.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## Getting a chance to confirm/cancel payments
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to get a last chance confirmation when sending a payment:
|
||||
|
||||
set always-confirm-transfers 1
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
## How to find a payment to you
|
||||
|
||||
If you received a payment using a particular payment ID, you can look it up:
|
||||
|
||||
payments PAYMENTID
|
||||
|
||||
You can give more than one payment ID too.
|
||||
|
||||
More generally, you can review incoming and outgoing payments:
|
||||
|
||||
show_transfers
|
||||
|
||||
You can give an optional height to list only recent transactions, and request
|
||||
only incoming or outgoing transactions. For example,
|
||||
|
||||
show_transfers in 650000
|
||||
|
||||
will only show incoming transfers after block 650000. You can also give a height
|
||||
range.
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to mine, you can do so from the wallet:
|
||||
|
||||
start_mining 2
|
||||
|
||||
This will start mining on the daemon usin two threads. Note that this is solo mining,
|
||||
and may take a while before you find a block. To stop mining:
|
||||
|
||||
stop_mining
|
||||
|
||||
19
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/monero_tools.md
Normal file
19
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/monero_tools.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.0' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# Monero tools
|
||||
|
||||
These tools can be used to gain information about the Monero network or your transaction data in the blockchain.
|
||||
|
||||
### [Check that a recipient has received your funds](http://xmrtests.llcoins.net/checktx.html)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Tools for monero address generation](https://xmr.llcoins.net/)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Monero node count](http://moneronodes.i2p.xyz/)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Monero node map](https://monerohash.com/nodes-distribution.html)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Monero offline wallet generator](http://moneroaddress.org/)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Monero network statistics](http://moneroblocks.info/stats)
|
||||
|
||||
### [Monero.how statistics](https://www.monero.how/)
|
||||
810
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/multisig-messaging-system.md
Normal file
810
_i18n/zh-tw/resources/user-guides/multisig-messaging-system.md
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,810 @@
|
|||
{% assign version = '1.1.1' | split: '.' %}
|
||||
{% include disclaimer.html translated="true" version=page.version %}
|
||||
# Multisig Transactions with MMS and CLI Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
## Introduction
|
||||
|
||||
This manual describes the *Multisig Messaging System*, abbreviated as *MMS*. It's a system that aims to **simplify multisig transactions** for Monero and similar CrypoNote-based cryptocurrencies by making it easy to exchange info like key sets and sync data between wallets and by offering some "workflow support" guiding you through the various steps.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS so far presents itself to the user as a set of new commands in the CLI wallet. This is not surprising, as currently the CLI wallet is the only way to do multisig transactions interactively anyway. Hopefully this will be extended in the future; the MMS was designed with other wallets like e.g. the Monero GUI wallet in mind.
|
||||
|
||||
This manual has some tutorial-like aspects and is intended to be read in sequential fashion, best without skipping any chapter before chapter *The Commands in Detail*.
|
||||
|
||||
If you have high requirements regarding security and are not sure whether using the MMS is acceptable for you in the first place, you may read the chapter *Security* first.
|
||||
|
||||
This first version of the manual was written around year-end 2018 by René Brunner (*rbrunner7*), the original author of the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
## Monero Multisig in a Nutshell
|
||||
|
||||
Probably it will be pretty hard to understand the MMS without at least a basic grasp of how Monero multisig transactions work in principle. Here a short overview together with info about the *terminology* that this manual uses; for more details and more *technical* explanations you will have to look elsewhere.
|
||||
|
||||
*Multisig* means that a transaction needs multiple signatures before it can be submitted to the Monero network and executed. Instead of one Monero wallet creating, signing, and submitting transactions all on its own, you will have a whole group of wallets and collaboration between them to transact.
|
||||
|
||||
In this manual those wallets, or if you prefer, the people controlling them, are called *authorized signers*. Depending on the type of multisig used, not **all** authorized signers need to sign before a transaction becomes valid, but only a subset of them. The corresponding number (which is equal to or smaller than the number of authorized signers) is called *required signers*.
|
||||
|
||||
The usual notation in use here is *M/N*, with *M* standing for the number of required signers, and *N* standing for the total number of authorized signers. For example, probably the most useful and most popular type of multisig is written as *2/3*: Out of a total of **three** authorized signers, any **two** are needed to make a transaction valid.
|
||||
|
||||
For technically "simple" coins like Bitcoin and its forks doing multisig transactions consists of the following steps:
|
||||
|
||||
* Configure the multisig wallets and establish the multisig address
|
||||
* Fund the multisig wallets / the multisig address so there is something to spend in the first place
|
||||
* Do as many multisig transactions as you like
|
||||
|
||||
Monero adds one more type of step, necessary for internal bookkeeping so to speak. Simply told all the mechanisms that make Monero transactions truly private complicate things and lead to a necessity to exchange information between wallets to enable them to correctly process transactions, both incoming and outgoing.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS uses the term *syncing* for the process to making wallets ready to transact again after sending or receiving transactions, and *multisig sync data* or simply *sync data* for the information that has to be exchanged to achieve that.
|
||||
|
||||
So the steps for Monero multisig look like that:
|
||||
|
||||
* Configure the multisig wallets and establish the multisig address
|
||||
* Fund the multisig wallets / the multisig address so there is something to spend in the first place
|
||||
* Sync the wallets for a first time
|
||||
* Do 1 multisig transaction
|
||||
* Sync the wallets again
|
||||
* Do another multisig transaction and/or receive more funds
|
||||
* Sync the wallets yet again
|
||||
* ...
|
||||
|
||||
The "value" of the MMS is making it easy and painless to exchange all those data packets between the wallets, and telling the signers at which point of the "workflow" they currently are and what has to be the next action in order to proceed.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Architecture of the MMS
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS basically has 3 parts:
|
||||
|
||||
* A set of new commands in the CLI wallet
|
||||
* A running instance of PyBitmessage reachable from the computer running the CLI wallet, doing message transport on behalf of the wallet
|
||||
* Internal code extensions to wallet code managing a new `.mms` file per wallet with the messages in it and interfacing with PyBitmessage
|
||||
|
||||
[PyBitmessage](https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page) is currently the only supported program for message transport, the MMS won't "speak" to any other system. You can't use e-mail nor any other of the myriad of communication programs out there. If you don't like PyBitmessage or can't run it for any reason you won't be able to use the current version of the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
The author of the MMS hopes that you will give it a try: PyBitmessage is fully open source, is under continued development, has enough users to almost assure message transport at any time, and takes privacy very seriously - just like Monero.
|
||||
|
||||
Hopefully a future MMS will build on Monero's "native" private communication system, [Kovri](https://kovri.io/), but we are probably still quite some time away from a Kovri release ready for broad use.
|
||||
|
||||
MMS communications should be **safe**: The Bitmessage system is considered safe as it's completely invisible who sends messages to whom, and all traffic is encrypted. For additional safety the MMS encrypts any message contents itself as well: Nobody except the receiver of an MMS message can decrypt and use its content, and the messages are signed, meaning the receiver can be sure they come from the right sender.
|
||||
|
||||
## The MMS User Experience
|
||||
|
||||
To see the "user experience" of multisig in the CLI wallet **without** MMS you can e.g. check [here](https://taiga.getmonero.org/project/rbrunner7-really-simple-multisig-transactions/wiki/22-multisig-in-cli-wallet) and [here](https://taiga.getmonero.org/project/rbrunner7-really-simple-multisig-transactions/wiki/23-multisig-in-cli-wallet).
|
||||
|
||||
Those pages are also useful to familiarize yourself with the steps for multisig transactions in general, as the MMS will not change the order of the steps or make any of them superfluous, but will just make execution considerably easier, and the MMS will be able to tell you the next step in order automatically in most cases.
|
||||
|
||||
### A Messaging System
|
||||
|
||||
The general approach of the MMS is very **similar to e-mail**: You send messages around, with the MMS command set in the CLI wallet playing the part of your e-mail client, allowing you to send messages, receive messages and manage a list of stored messages, something like a combined inbox and outbox.
|
||||
|
||||
The contents of those messages are of course all those things that must be transported between the wallets of the signers: key sets, wallet sync data, transactions to sign and/or submit to the network.
|
||||
|
||||
PyBitmessage is used for the actual message transport and thus plays the part of your e-mail server. Once configuration is done sending and receiving messages is fully automatic i.e. needs no manual intervention.
|
||||
|
||||
You don't use e-mail addresses, but Monero addresses to tell where messages should go, and you only ever send messages to other authorized signers: E.g. with 2/3 multisig you only have 2 partners to send something to.
|
||||
|
||||
Like with e-mail people don't have to be online at the same time for message transport to work: PyBitmessage will keep messages for up to 2 days, giving you time to fetch them.
|
||||
|
||||
The approach is in general quite flexbile and robust: If you need messages from several signers to proceed the MMS will wait until it finds all of them in the list of received messages, and the order of reception does not matter either, which results in a quite unstressed experience.
|
||||
|
||||
If another signer tells you that a particular message did not arrive or was lost somehow you can send it again anytime, picking it from the message list, like you would re-send an e-mail in a similar situation.
|
||||
|
||||
### Signers and Messages
|
||||
|
||||
So, where a "normal" Monero wallet without MMS simply told manages three types of data (addresses, accounts and transactions), the MMS adds two more: Signers and messages.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS manages, for each multisig wallet separately, a list of *authorized signers*. With 2/3 multisig that list has **three** entries. On a technical level, each entry represents a Monero wallet containing keys that can be used to sign multisig transactions. On a conceptual level it's easier to imagine a group of 3 people, i.e. yourself and 2 partners, as those "authorized signers". (Often there will be indeed 3 distinct people controlling the 3 wallets, but not always of course.)
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS also manages a single list of *messages* per wallet: All messages you send, plus all messages you receive. While the list of authorized signers is the same in all involved wallets, those messages of course differ. The more authorized signers there are to send you messages, and the longer you transact, the more messages will accumulate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Getting the MMS
|
||||
|
||||
Right now, at the time of writing this manual (year-end 2018), the MMS is only available as part of the latest Monero code (`master` branch on Monero's [GitHub repository](https://github.com/monero-project/monero)). To use it, you have to check out that source code and compile it yourself. Doing so is easiest on a Linux system.
|
||||
|
||||
With the next hardfork in Spring 2019 the MMS will become an integral standard part of the Monero software: You install Monero, you have it.
|
||||
|
||||
A word of caution: At the time of writing using the latest development Monero version does not lead to conflicts and complications with any regular Monero release software and downloaded blockchain on the same system, but that may change between now and the hardfork, especially near the hardfork.
|
||||
|
||||
## Installing and Configuring PyBitmessage
|
||||
|
||||
Installing PyBitmessage is easy enough: You find links to downloads and install instructions from the [Bitmessage Wiki homepage](https://bitmessage.org/wiki/Main_Page). There are versions for all the major OS that Monero also supports: Linux, Windows, and macOS.
|
||||
|
||||
After installing run it, configure a Bitmessage address for you and note it, as you will later need it to configure your multisig wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
Don't worry right away if PyBitmessage does not seem to connect to the Bitmessage network when you run it the first time: Due to the decentral nature of that network it can take quite some time for your initial connect. It seems this often takes **half an hour**.
|
||||
|
||||
Likewise sending the very first message to a brand-new Bitmessage address can take time because there is a key exchange involved, sometimes another half of an hour. Once the key exchange is done messages are typically delivered within a few minutes however, sometimes within seconds.
|
||||
|
||||
You don't need to configure more than one Bitmessage address for you. You can run several multisig wallets over a **single** address without any problems because the MMS will be able to pick the right messages for the right wallets. You can even continue to use the same address for "normal" messages; those won't disturb the MMS, it will simply ignore any messages not intended for it.
|
||||
|
||||
Out of the box your PyBitmessage installation is not yet ready for use with the MMS because it does not allow other programs to use its API per default, you have to enable this explicitely (which makes sense, of course, for security reasons).
|
||||
|
||||
You find instructions how to **enable the API** on the [Bitmessage wiki API reference page](https://bitmessage.org/wiki/API_Reference). You will use the user name and the password you choose here later as command-line parameters for the CLI wallet so that the MMS will be able to log in to PyBitmessage.
|
||||
|
||||
## Further PyBitmessage Tweaks
|
||||
|
||||
The current official release version 0.6.3.2 has a [Dandelion++ protocol extension](https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.11060) built-in that hardens the network further against attacks that try to track message flow to find out who sends messages to whom. Unfortunately it seems that it has still a bug somewhere that can lead to wildly differing and very long message transmission times which is quite unfortunate when using the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a way to switch off Dandelion++ which, in general, is not recommended of course, but useful for using the MMS as of now:
|
||||
|
||||
* Locate PyBitmessage's config file `keys.dat`
|
||||
* Make a new section there named `[network]`
|
||||
* Add the following line to this new section: `dandelion = 0`
|
||||
* Restart PyBitmessage
|
||||
|
||||
As a "good citizen" you may consider to open your PC for access from other Bitmessage nodes to your node from the outside by opening port 8444. You find background info about that in their [FAQ](https://bitmessage.org/wiki/FAQ). It's not strictly necessary however for your client to function.
|
||||
|
||||
## MMS Command Overview
|
||||
|
||||
There is only **one** new command in the CLI wallet that gives access to the MMS, sensibly called `mms`. That command has however quite a number of subcommands to handle all the various functions of the MMS. Here a list of the commands; for details each command has its own chapter later in the manual:
|
||||
|
||||
init Initialize and configure the MMS
|
||||
info Display current MMS configuration
|
||||
signer Define a signer by giving a single-word label, a transport address, and a Monero address, or list all defined signers
|
||||
list List all messages
|
||||
next Evaluate the next possible multisig-related action(s) according to wallet state, and execute or offer for choice
|
||||
sync Force generation of multisig sync data regardless of wallet state, to recover from special situations like "stale data" errors
|
||||
transfer Initiate transfer with MMS support; arguments identical to normal 'transfer' command arguments, for info see there
|
||||
delete Delete a single message by giving its id, or delete all messages by using 'all'
|
||||
send Send a single message by giving its id, or send all waiting messages
|
||||
receive Check right away for new messages to receive
|
||||
note Send a one-line note message to a signer, identified by its label, or show all unread notes
|
||||
show Show detailed info about a single message
|
||||
export Export the content of a message to file
|
||||
set Set options, 'auto-send' being the only one so far
|
||||
|
||||
start_auto_config Start the auto-config process at the auto-config manager's wallet by creating new tokens
|
||||
auto_config Start auto-config by using the token received from the auto-config manager
|
||||
stop_auto_config Delete any tokens and abort an auto-config process
|
||||
send_signer_config Send your complete signer configuration to all other signers
|
||||
|
||||
You get the list of commands by issuing `help mms`, and help for a particular subcommand by using `help mms <subcommand>`, e.g. `help mms next`. You can alternatively use `mms help <subcommand>` if that feels more natural.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuring a Wallet for Use with the MMS
|
||||
|
||||
### Addresses and Labels
|
||||
|
||||
First for better understanding some basic facts about addressing and referring to signers (or their wallets respectively) in the MMS:
|
||||
|
||||
If you create a new wallet it gets (of course) its own, unique public Monero address. If you later configure the wallet for multisig, the wallet **changes** its public address to the common multisig address that you share with all the other authorized signers.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS uses the first, "original" public Monero address over the whole wallet lifetime for addressing, before **and** after "going multisig". It may be a little confusing that a wallet should have **two** public addresses somehow, but once you got the original address into your signer configuration you can more or less forget about it.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS uses *labels* that allow you to name yourself and the other signers, and that the MMS commands use when referring to signers. (Using Monero addresses or Bitmessage addresses in such commands would be quite cumbersome.)
|
||||
|
||||
Labels must be one word, and they must be unique within a single wallet. The example later on in this manual uses the labels `alice` and `bob` for a case of 2/2 multisig.
|
||||
|
||||
### Running CLI Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
When you start the CLI wallet for use with the MMS there are the following two new (optional) command line parameters for connecting to PyBitmessage:
|
||||
|
||||
--bitmessage-address Use PyBitmessage instance at URL <arg>
|
||||
--bitmessage-login Specify <arg> as username:password for PyBitmessage API
|
||||
|
||||
If you have PyBitmessage running on the same machine as the CLI wallet the default for the first parameter will do, and you should not need to set anything different. If it does not seem to find it despite running locally try to use `http://localhost` or `http://127.0.0.1` as argument for the first parameter.
|
||||
|
||||
Beside that, you need of course either `--testnet` or `--stagenet` to connect to the right network. Also using `--log-level 0` could be useful: This instructs the wallet to write detailed info into its logfile that might help to find bugs or problems with the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
So a complete command line for the CLI wallet could look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
./monero-wallet-cli --testnet --bitmessage-login mmstest:p4ssw0rd --log-level 0
|
||||
|
||||
### Initializing the MMS
|
||||
|
||||
After creating a new wallet you have to initialize it for use with the MMS; without that crucial first step you won't be able to use any MMS features. The command to do so is `mms init`:
|
||||
|
||||
mms init <required_signers>/<authorized_signers> <own_label> <own_transport_address>
|
||||
|
||||
`own_transport_address` is the Bitmessage address that you configured in your own PyBitmessage program. A full `init` command could look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
mms init 2/2 alice BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
|
||||
Use that `init` command **only once**: Executing it a second time will completely re-initialize the MMS by deleting any signer info and any messages, which you don't want except in special circumstances.
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to go through a MMS test as fast as possible you can instruct the wallet to ask for the password only when strictly necessary for technical reasons, and tell the MMS to send any generated message right away instead of prompting before doing so:
|
||||
|
||||
set ask-password 0
|
||||
mms set auto-send 1
|
||||
|
||||
(Both those settings are active during the 2/2 multisig example shown in this manual.)
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuring Signers
|
||||
|
||||
About each signer the MMS needs to know three things:
|
||||
|
||||
* The one-word *label* that you will use to refer to that signer
|
||||
* The *transport address* which currently means their Bitmessage address as long as this is the only supported message transport system
|
||||
* The *Monero address* i.e. the "original" Monero address of their wallet
|
||||
|
||||
(See also above chapter *Addresses and Labels*.)
|
||||
|
||||
You don't have to create signers; after the `mms init` command they are already all "there", although without any info yet with the exception of yourself. The commands for setting signer information refer to them by number, 1 up to the total number of authorized signers, so 1 and 2 in the following 2/2 multisig example with signers named *Alice* and *Bob* and thus with the labels *alice* and *bob*.
|
||||
|
||||
After the above sample `init` command the list of signers looks like that:
|
||||
|
||||
# Label Transport Address
|
||||
Auto-Config Token Monero Address
|
||||
1 alice BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
A1VRwm8HT8CgA5bSULDZKggR9Enc9enhWHNJuDXDK4wDD6Rwha3W7UG5Wu3YGwARTXdPw1AvFSzoNPBdiKfpEYEQP1b5cCH
|
||||
|
||||
2 <not set> <not set>
|
||||
<not set>
|
||||
|
||||
Note that signer #1 is always "me" i.e. your own label, transport address and Monero address. So in Alice's signer list #1 will be Alice and #2 will be Bob, while in Bob's wallet it will be exactly the other way round.
|
||||
|
||||
There are **three ways** to complete signer information: You can enter it manually, or you can use the auto-config mechanism that the MMS offers, which has a second, "semi-automatic" variant. With 2/2 there is hardly a difference in effort, but with higher numbers of signers auto-config is easier and more reliable. In any case, one advantage of auto-config is a secure transport of addresses because PyBitmessage is used.
|
||||
|
||||
So pick **one** method from the three following chapters *Manually Configuring Signers*, *Auto-Config* and *Sending Signer Information*:
|
||||
|
||||
### Manually Configuring Signers
|
||||
|
||||
The command to manually enter signer info and display the list of signers is `mms signer`:
|
||||
|
||||
mms signer [<number> <label> [<transport_address> [<monero_address>]]]
|
||||
|
||||
Without any argument the command displays the list of signers. With at least a number and a label you can set or change info about a particular signer. A full command to set everything about signer #2 could look like this:
|
||||
|
||||
mms signer 2 bob BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZYZcF4csKcQT2pa 9yXKZ6UUdd8NnNN5UyK34oXV7zp7gjgZ4WTKHk8KzWsAAuyksfqoeRMLLkdWur85vnc1YL5E2rrMdPMHunA8WzUS9EL3Uoj
|
||||
|
||||
A command to later change only the label of signer #2 could be:
|
||||
|
||||
mms signer 2 bob-the-builder
|
||||
|
||||
With this manual method it's up to the signers *how* they all get to know each other's addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
Be careful while entering signer information: Any mistakes like wrong Bitmessage addresses will probably make it impossible to correctly transact later on.
|
||||
|
||||
Before you go out and start to exchange signer information over insecure channels like IRC or plain unencrypted e-mail, please note that there are certain dangers in doing so. If somebody can e.g. intercept your e-mails and get hold of your addresses that you send to a signer that person can then impersonate the signer.
|
||||
|
||||
There is also the danger that in a 2/3 multisig scenario for *escrow* signer Bob can set up a second wallet for the trusted third-party Trent beside his own and trick Alice into sending everything to that wallet instead of Trent's. After this Bob will be able to transact alone and steal coins from Alice.
|
||||
|
||||
You find a more detailed explanation of this second danger in chapter *Security* towards the end of the manual or [here](https://taiga.getmonero.org/project/rbrunner7-really-simple-multisig-transactions/wiki/multisig-and-insecure-communication-channels). Auto-config mitigates this danger to quite some extent.
|
||||
|
||||
Alice's complete signer list looks like this:
|
||||
|
||||
# Label Transport Address
|
||||
Auto-Config Token Monero Address
|
||||
1 alice BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
A1VRwm8HT8CgA5bSULDZKggR9Enc9enhWHNJuDXDK4wDD6Rwha3W7UG5Wu3YGwARTXdPw1AvFSzoNPBdiKfpEYEQP1b5cCH
|
||||
|
||||
2 bob BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZYZcF4csKcQT2pa
|
||||
9yXKZ6UUdd8NnNN5UyK34oXV7zp7gjgZ4WTKHk8KzWsAAuyksfqoeRMLLkdWur85vnc1YL5E2rrMdPMHunA8WzUS9EL3Uoj
|
||||
|
||||
### Auto-Config
|
||||
|
||||
MMS auto-config is based on so-called *auto-config tokens*. Such tokens are always 11 characters long, the fixed string "mms" followed by 8 hexadecimal digits. Examples for such tokens are `mms561832e3eb` and `mms62cb2b87e2`.
|
||||
|
||||
The basic trick: Unlike Bitmessage addresses and Monero addresses those tokens are short enough to type them easily and e.g. use reasonably safe smartphone messenger apps or SMS to transmit them, or dictate them over the phone, again not perfectly safe, but still much safer than plain e-mail or IRC.
|
||||
|
||||
The workflow is as follows - it's simpler than it looks at first sight, go once through it in practice and it makes sense:
|
||||
|
||||
* One signer takes on the job to lead and organize configuration, furthermore called *manager*
|
||||
* The manager assigns a label to each signer and enters all labels into the signer configuration, either using `mms signer` commands or giving them as arguments of the `mms start_auto_config` command in the next step
|
||||
* The manager uses the command `mms start_auto_config` to generate auto-config tokens for all other signers, one distinct token per signer
|
||||
* The manager transmits the tokens to their respective signers outside of the MMS
|
||||
* All other signers enter their token with `mms auto_config <token>`
|
||||
* Their wallets will generate messages that send their addresses to the manager's wallet, already using PyBitmessage
|
||||
* As soon as all those messages arrive there the manager can in turn send messages to all other signers containing the complete signer information by doing `mms next`
|
||||
* The other signers process those messages to complete their signer information with `mms next`
|
||||
|
||||
Several points are noteworthy here. Manual configuration with e.g. 5 signers could mean 5 times 4 = 20 initial manual information transfers, if each of the 5 signers sends addresses to 4 others. Even a more clever approach with someone collecting all addresses first and sending the complete list to all others then would take 4 plus 4 = 8 information transfers. With auto-config there are only **4** such manual transfers - 4 tokens from the manager out to the other signers; after that point it's already messages over PyBitmessage.
|
||||
|
||||
You may wonder how the other signers' wallets can send their Bitmessage addresses back to the manager by using PyBitmessage. Doesn't this snake bite its own tail? The solution: A temporary, "throw-away" Bitmessage address is derived from each token and used just for this transfer, and temporary keys are derived as well for encrypting message content.
|
||||
|
||||
Part of the increased safety of the auto-config process is the fact that each signer gets its own, distinct token. In 2/3 multisig, just make sure Bob cannot get hold of Trent's own token, and already Bob has no way to "play" Trent and set up a second wallet to be able to sign transactions all on his own.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sending Signer Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Beside full auto-config there is a second, alternative way to make configuration easier, based on a command called `send_signer_config`. It's less "automatic", but you may prefer it because it's more transparent what happens.
|
||||
|
||||
Here the workflow is as follows:
|
||||
|
||||
* One signer takes on the job to lead and organize configuration, furthermore called *manager*
|
||||
* The manager receives from all other signers their addresses over channels outside the MMS, e.g. encrypted and signed e-mail
|
||||
* The manager enters complete signer information into their wallet, using `mms member` commands
|
||||
* The manager uses the `mms send_signer_config` command to send the completed information to all other signers
|
||||
* The other signers process the messages containing signer information with `mms next`
|
||||
|
||||
For all signers except the manager this is nearly as comfortable as auto-config. Note however that the security of the scheme depends on securing the sending of info to the manager: If some signer can posit as not only themselves, but as other signers as well, they will be able to control several wallets and undermine the whole signing process. (See also chapter *Manually Configuring Signers* for more about such dangers.)
|
||||
|
||||
## Establishing the Multisig Address
|
||||
|
||||
In general, there are no MMS commands to execute particular steps regarding multisig transactions (with the exception of starting a transfer using `mms transfer` and force sync with `mms sync`). You just use the `mms next` command, and the MMS will do whatever is next in the "multisig workflow", and if nothing is ready, e.g. because some messages are still missing, will tell you the reason why nothing is "next" yet.
|
||||
|
||||
So, after you completed the info about all signers, either manually or through auto-config, you just issue a `mms next` command, and the MMS will start with the first step needed to establish the multisig address: Calculate *key sets* for all coalition members and set up messages to send those to them. The whole scene might look like this for Alice:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet A1VRwm]: mms next
|
||||
prepare_multisig
|
||||
MultisigV18uEUr5L7EvFDqKWvbnK2ys395ddRPuG6zaxNTwbDq3WoUNJtkPUPbRAEQKBaCC52g5iJXi8XUF4aUP9984hdFrHsP1y3W8yQkm
|
||||
YUSDYXzouhzd479tMmpL4LJKUoW5e54bubEg5E4J3BZtJQiGNzvVsiBKGAKgT7J4bcNN66Xq7hpL4V
|
||||
Send this multisig info to all other participants, then use make_multisig <threshold> <info1> [<info2>...] with others' multisig info
|
||||
This includes the PRIVATE view key, so needs to be disclosed only to that multisig wallet's participants
|
||||
Id I/O Authorized Signer Message Type Height R Message State Since
|
||||
1 out bob: BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZ.. key set 0 0 ready to send 2018-12-26 07:46:21, 1 seconds ago
|
||||
Queued for sending.
|
||||
|
||||
The `prepare_multisig` output there is a hint that the MMS works by putting something like a "wrapper" about the CLI wallet `pepare_multisig` command, it even displays the `MultisigV1` string for confirmation. Now you don't have to send that manually to the other signer somehow: The MMS prepares a message for that and sends it in a fully automatic way.
|
||||
|
||||
After Alice receives Bob's key set, another `mms next` command will process it and establish the multisig address:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet A1VRwm]: mms next
|
||||
make_multisig
|
||||
Wallet password:
|
||||
2/2 multisig address: 9uWY5Kq6XocGGqUByp22ty4HYxj4CfjCXdRrZ24EKvYW2U7fudSzCvTRRT35tMNx5heQfqKmVmFjahWUZ1BENnzH8UvyVF7
|
||||
|
||||
The wallet may be "out of sync" after this step; if yes, just do a quick `refresh`.
|
||||
|
||||
In the case of non-symmetrical M/N multisig, with M different from N, like e.g. in 2/3, it's not enough that each signer sends one key set to every other signer: There will be several *rounds* of key set exchanges. However the MMS knows about this and will automatically take care of almost everything: For a particular wallet it waits until the key sets of all other signers have arrived before going on. If there is another key exchange round necessary, `mms next` will then start a new one. If not, the command will process the last key set(s) and establish the multisig address.
|
||||
|
||||
It's possible that a future enhanced version of the MMS will do this in a fully automatic way, i.e. sending all necessary key sets around without further intervention until the multisig address is configured. For now however you have to push things along yourself by issuing `mms next` commands.
|
||||
|
||||
## Funding the Multisig Wallet
|
||||
|
||||
With the multisig address established the wallet is now ready to receive funds. Here the MMS plays no role, nor does multisig in general: Just transfer some coins to the address, to have something to transfer out later, and wait until they arrive.
|
||||
|
||||
## Syncing Wallets
|
||||
|
||||
Every time after receiving or sending coins multisig wallets must exchange some info with each other to get "into sync" again. That's the case whenever the CLI wallet tells you about *partial key images* like in this `balance` command output:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: balance
|
||||
Currently selected account: [0] Primary account
|
||||
Tag: (No tag assigned)
|
||||
Balance: 7.000000000000, unlocked balance: 7.000000000000 (Some owned outputs have partial key images - import_multisig_info needed)
|
||||
|
||||
That "import_multisig_info needed" thing is perhaps the single most tiresome aspect of CryptoNote multisig transactions and quite some work e.g. in the case of 3/3 or 2/3 multisig where already a total of **six** pieces of information must be passed around each time, only to finalize reception of some coins and/or being able to transfer again after a transfer.
|
||||
|
||||
At least, with the MMS, it's only a case of issuing `mms next` commands until all sync data is sent and received and the wallets get into sync again: It guides you automatically through the necessary `export_multisig_info` and `import_multisig_info` commands. Here again how Alice sees this:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms next
|
||||
export_multisig_info
|
||||
Multisig info exported to MMS
|
||||
Id I/O Authorized Signer Message Type Height R Message State Since
|
||||
5 out bob: BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZ.. multisig sync data 1 0 ready to send 2018-12-26 08:58:14, 0 seconds ago
|
||||
Queued for sending.
|
||||
MMS received new message
|
||||
Id I/O Authorized Signer Message Type Height R Message State Since
|
||||
6 in bob: BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZ.. multisig sync data 1 0 waiting 2018-12-26 08:59:45, 0 seconds ago
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms next
|
||||
import_multisig_info
|
||||
Height 1117984, txid <b515082063a6242f1b62f21c80f95c90801f14ce3f48f51094d069e3580a78aa>, 7.000000000000, idx 0/0
|
||||
Multisig info imported03
|
||||
|
||||
Don't worry if you receive such sync messages from other signers already before you are able to start sending yours: The MMS will handle this situation quite fine and send first, process afterwards.
|
||||
|
||||
Check the chapter *Troubleshooting* if you ever get stuck somehow: E.g. there is a way to force sync even if `mms next` gets confused and thinks that syncing is not necessary or not possible.
|
||||
|
||||
## Making Multisig Transactions
|
||||
|
||||
For initiating multisig transactions there is the command `mms transfer` instead of the normal `transfer` command. The MMS variant supports all the parameter variations of the normal command; thus to get help use `help transfer`.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS does not care about subaddresses and accounts; whatever address you use for sending (and receiving) transactions, the MMS only cares about the data that the particular event creates, about the right moment to process that and about sending it to the right recipient(s).
|
||||
|
||||
If you don't like your transaction data to become part of the `.mms` file in the form of stored message content, you can use the normal `transfer` command, but then it's of course your problem to send the partially signed transaction to the next signer.
|
||||
|
||||
With multisig the `mms transfer` command does of course not yet transfer, but produces a partially-signed transaction instead. This stretches the concept of messages a bit because `mms transfer` produces a message to "me" i.e. the owner of the wallet itself, with the partially-signed transaction as content. Check message #7 below to Alice:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms transfer 9zo5QDV9YivQ8Fdygt7BNdGo1c98yfAWxAz6HMwsf15Vf1Gkme9pjQG2Typ9JnBKv5goziC2MT93o3YDUfoWdU9XUinX5kS 5
|
||||
No payment id is included with this transaction. Is this okay? (Y/Yes/N/No): y
|
||||
|
||||
Transaction 1/1:
|
||||
Spending from address index 0
|
||||
Sending 5.000000000000. The transaction fee is 0.000094300000
|
||||
Is this okay? (Y/Yes/N/No): y
|
||||
Unsigned transaction(s) successfully written to MMS
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms list
|
||||
Id I/O Authorized Signer Message Type Height R Message State Since
|
||||
...
|
||||
7 in alice: BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQz.. partially signed tx 1 0 waiting 2018-12-26 09:10:42, 40 seconds ago
|
||||
|
||||
The idea behind this: In this state, with the transaction waiting, and depending on the number of required signers, `mms next` will result in a question what to do with it: Especially in the case of 2/3 multisig, it's central to be able to decide **where** to send the transaction for the second signature that will make it valid, i.e. to **which** of the two possible signers.
|
||||
|
||||
This could look like in this case of 2/4 multisig:
|
||||
|
||||
Unsigned transaction(s) successfully written to MMS
|
||||
[wallet 9vAbBk]: mms next
|
||||
Choose processing:
|
||||
1: Send the tx for signing to two: BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
2: Send the tx for signing to three: BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZYZcF4csKcQT2pa
|
||||
3: Send the tx for signing to four: BM-2cUjNoSxPkUY7ho4sPcEA6Rr26jqcasKiE
|
||||
|
||||
In the case of the 2/2 multisig example in this manual, there is no choice however: The transaction started by Alice has to go to Bob as the only other authorized and required signer:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms next
|
||||
Send tx
|
||||
Id I/O Authorized Signer Message Type Height R Message State Since
|
||||
8 out bob: BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZ.. partially signed tx 1 0 ready to send 2018-12-26 09:29:30, 0 seconds ago
|
||||
Queued for sending.
|
||||
|
||||
After receiving Bob signs, as usual not with a dedicated signing command that does not exist, but by simply using `mms next`:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms next
|
||||
sign_multisig
|
||||
Loaded 1 transactions, for 7.000000000000, fee 0.000094300000, sending 5.000000000000 to
|
||||
9zo5QDV9YivQ8Fdygt7BNdGo1c98yfAWxAz6HMwsf15Vf1Gkme9pjQG2Typ9JnBKv5goziC2MT93o3YDUfoWdU9XUinX5kS, 1.999905700000 change to
|
||||
9uWY5Kq6XocGGqUByp22ty4HYxj4CfjCXdRrZ24EKvYW2U7fudSzCvTRRT35tMNx5heQfqKmVmFjahWUZ1BENnzH8UvyVF7, with min ring size 11,
|
||||
no payment ID. Is this okay? (Y/Yes/N/No): y
|
||||
Transaction successfully signed to file MMS, txid c1f603a9045f28b28f221eddf55be41e95f2ac7213384a32d35cadc0a8be3026
|
||||
It may be relayed to the network with submit_multisig
|
||||
|
||||
Yet another `mms next` does result in a choice for Bob, because he can either submit the transaction to the network himself, **or** send it back to Alice for doing so:
|
||||
|
||||
[wallet 9uWY5K]: mms next
|
||||
Choose processing:
|
||||
1: Submit tx
|
||||
2: Send the tx for submission to alice: BM-2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
Choice:
|
||||
|
||||
As already mentioned elsewhere after the transaction is submitted to the network and processed you have to sync the wallets before you can do another transfer. Also note that regardless of any syncing needs it's a restriction of Monero multisig that you must do **strictly one transaction after the other**. For example you can't put away fully-signed transactions for submitting them later and already start a new one to submit that first. (For some such scenarious the MMS is not smart enough to prevent you from trying; see chapter *Troubleshooting* about how you can recover by deleting messages containing unprocessable transactions and forcing sync.)
|
||||
|
||||
As already mentioned you can keep out your transaction data out of the `.mms` file in the form of stored message content and use the normal `transfer` command, but then it's of course your problem to send the partially signed transaction to the next signer. Note also that the MMS does not support cold signing; that would be another reason to directly use `transfer` instead of `mms transfer`. You can, however, export transaction data contained in a message with the `mms export` command.
|
||||
|
||||
## The Commands in Detail
|
||||
|
||||
### mms init
|
||||
|
||||
mms init <required_signers>/<authorized_signers> <own_label> <own_transport_address>
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
mms init 2/2 alice 2cUVEbbb3H6ojddYQziK3RafJ5GPcFQv7e
|
||||
|
||||
Prepare a wallet for use with the MMS. You can later change your own label and your own transport address using `mms signer`, but the two numbers, required signers and authorized signers, cannot be changed without issuing `mms init` again which will erase all signer information and all messages. The command will lead to the creation of an additional file with an extension of `.mms` for the wallet.
|
||||
|
||||
For wallets created in "pre-MMS times" (before the MMS code was included in Monero) it's only possible to initialize the MMS if the wallet is not yet multisig. For wallets created with Monero code already present it's possible to initialize even with the wallet multisig already: When the wallet switched to multisig the "original" Monero address needed by the MMS was saved before it got replaced by the common multisig address.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no command to deactivate the MMS. If you no longer want to use it for a particular wallet, just delete the `.mms` file or at least move it out of the way.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms info
|
||||
|
||||
mms [info]
|
||||
|
||||
Display whether the MMS is active or not, and if yes, show the number of required signers and number of authorized signers. This is the only MMS command allowed with the MMS inactive.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms signer
|
||||
|
||||
mms signer [<number> <label> [<transport_address> [<monero_address>]]]
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
|
||||
mms signer
|
||||
mms signer 2 bob BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZYZcF4csKcQT2pa 9yXKZ6UUdd8NnNN5UyK34oXV7zp7gjgZ4WTKHk8KzWsAAuyksfqoeRMLLkdWur85vnc1YL5E2rrMdPMHunA8WzUS9EL3Uoj
|
||||
mms signer 2 bob-the-builder
|
||||
|
||||
Without argument, show the list of signers and their info, as far as known. Things never set and therefore still unknown are displayed as `<not set>`. Note that you don't have to and can't create signers: After `mms init` they already all "exist", although without any information set, with the exception of signer #1 which is always "me" i.e. the current wallet itself. Their number is fixed, it's the number of authorized signers as specified with `mms init`.
|
||||
|
||||
With at least a number and a label as argument, set information about a signer, or change any information already set. You can always freely change labels and transport addresses, but for technical reasons Monero addresses can only be changed as long as there are no messages. In the worst case do `mms init` again and start from scratch.
|
||||
|
||||
Numbers start with 1 and go up to the number of authorized signers.
|
||||
|
||||
A *label* must be a single word. Use characters like minus "-" or underscore "_" to write more complex labels like e.g. `alice_in_wonderland`. Labels must be unique for all signers. There is no fixed maximal length for labels but some output will look strange or become hard to read with very long labels.
|
||||
|
||||
A *transport address* can currently only be a Bitmessage address like e.g. `BM-2cStcTfCx8D3McrMcmGZYZcF4csKcQT2pa`, PyBitmessage being the only supported program for actual message transport. Transport addresses are not checked for syntax or validity by the MMS; if you enter a malformed address you will get an error message from PyBitmessage only later at first (attempted) use.
|
||||
|
||||
If you enter a wrong address i.e. not the correct address for the respective signer most probably nothing will happen, the messages will just not reach the intended recipient; if nobody holds the key for that address, with a Bitmessage client configured to receive messages to it, the message will just "float around" the Bitmessage network for a while and finally expire.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms list
|
||||
|
||||
mms list
|
||||
|
||||
List all stored messages. There are no separate inbox and outbox; all messages are contained in a single chronological list. The columns in detail:
|
||||
|
||||
* `Id`: The unique id of the message that you can use to refer to the message in commands like `mms show` and `mms send`. Message ids count strictly upwards from 1. Ids of deleted messages won't get "recycled".
|
||||
* `I/O`: Message direction. `in` denotes a message that you received, `out` a message that you sent. Note than for some message types you can receive a message from yourself, e.g. a partially signed transaction that you started yourself.
|
||||
* `Authorized Signer`: In case of a received message, the sender, in case of a sent message, the recipient. Listed are the label and, within the width limit of the column, the transport address of the signer.
|
||||
* `Message Type`: The type of the message telling what kind of data it contains. For a complete list of possible message types see below.
|
||||
* `Height`: The number of transfers contained in the wallet at the time of message construction or reception. Used to group the "right" sync data messages which all must be from the same "height" for all other signers before sync can be successful. This height is unimportant for you except in cases where something went wrong; for more see chapter *Troubleshooting*.
|
||||
* `R`: The number of the key exchange round a key set belongs to, if the type of multisig requires more than one round in the first place, like e.g. 2/3. 0 for all other message types.
|
||||
* `Message State`: The current state of the message. `waiting` or `sent` for outgoing messages, `waiting` or `processed` for incoming messages. You can't directly change this state, it's always the result of the execution of commands.
|
||||
* `Since`: Point in time and time span since the message got its current message state. Times are in UTC, not local time. If you re-send a message, this timestamp is not adjusted and continues to display the time of the first sending.
|
||||
|
||||
The complete list of message types:
|
||||
|
||||
* `key_set`: Data about keys that wallets must exchange with each other for establishing multisig addresses
|
||||
* `additional_key_set`: A key set for an additional key exchange round, after the original one, as necessary for non-symmetric multisig types like e.g. 2/3
|
||||
* `multisig_sync_data`: Data that wallets must exchange with each other to correctly and completely interpret incoming and outgoing transactions; see also chapter *Syncing Wallets*
|
||||
* `partially_signed_tx`: A transaction that has not yet the necessary number of signatures (= number of required signers) to commit it
|
||||
* `fully_signed_tx`: A transaction with a full set of required signatures, ready for submission to the Monero network; any signer could submit this
|
||||
* `note`: A message containing a note; see command `mms note`
|
||||
* `signer_config`: Full information about all signers, to be sent as part of an auto-config process or as a result of a `mms send_signer_config` command
|
||||
* `auto_config_data`: Address data from a signer to send back to the auto-config manager after entering a token with `mms auto_config`
|
||||
|
||||
### mms next
|
||||
|
||||
mms next [sync]
|
||||
|
||||
*The* central and probably most useful command of the MMS: Check the state of the wallet plus the received and sent messages and their message state, and decide which action is the next one to execute, and then actually execute it.
|
||||
|
||||
When in doubt, just issue a `mms next` command; the MMS will either execute the proper next command according to Monero's "multisig workflow rules", or tell you what it's waiting for before it can proceed. For "dangerous" things you can count on confirming prompts before the real action happens. Worst case a `mms next` can execute something earlier than you might have intended, but otherwise can hardly do any harm.
|
||||
|
||||
Note how for many actions there is **no** dedicated command, and `mms next` the **only** way to move things forward. Don't look e.g. for commands to selectively process certain messages: If it's time to process some received messages in state *waiting*, the command will do so.
|
||||
|
||||
Interestingly and maybe surprisingly, in Monero it's **always** clear what has to happen next regarding multisig, except in the case of partially signed transactions where you can decide **which** signer sending them to, and in the case of fully signed transactions that you can submit yourself to the network or send them to another signer for submission by them.
|
||||
|
||||
The special command form `mms next sync` is for cases where sync data is waiting that the MMS on its own would not process because it "thinks" the wallet is in a state needing no new sync - which might be wrong. More about this in chapter *Troubleshooting*.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms sync
|
||||
|
||||
mms sync
|
||||
|
||||
Manually start a round of syncing forcibly i.e. even if the MMS is of the opinion that no exchange of sync data is currently necessary. More about this in chapter *Troubleshooting*.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms transfer
|
||||
|
||||
mms transfer <transfer_command_arguments>
|
||||
|
||||
Start a transfer under the control of the MMS, the difference to the standard `transfer` command being that the resulting partially signed transaction won't be written to a file that you have to handle further yourself, but that a message containing the transaction will result. Use `mms next` after `mms transfer` to ask the MMS to actually process the message which in effect means deciding which signer send it to for the next signature and create another message for that.
|
||||
|
||||
The arguments of the `mms transfer` command are exactly the same of those of the standard `transfer` command. Check the info about that command with `help transfer` to learn about all the various possible parameters and parameter combinations.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that quite in general the MMS does not care about addresses, subaddresses and acccounts. Regardless of what you specify in this regard for a `mms transfer` command afterwards there will always be a single new message containing the partially signed transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
Even with MMS active you can still use the standard `transfer` command; you are then simply on your own regarding handling the transaction. Try to use the right command variant; `transfer` won't ask for confirmation whether you really intend to use it instead of `mms transfer`. If you issued `transfer` but really wanted the MMS variant, ignore the written transaction file and simply go on with `mms transfer`.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS does not, or at least not yet, keep track how many signatures a transaction actually has and who signed already and who not yet. Because of this weakness it can include choices that do not make sense, e.g. a choice to send a partially signed transaction to somebody who signed already.
|
||||
|
||||
This hardly matters with multisig types like 2/2 or 2/3, but of course the higher the number of authorized signers, the more acute this can become. Some attention by the signers is needed to do the right thing. You can't go wrong in an absolute sense however: The CLI wallet, or more exactly the CLI commands called internally by the MMS, will reject any attempts to do invalid actions.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms delete
|
||||
|
||||
mms delete (<message_id> | all)
|
||||
|
||||
Delete a single message given its message id, or delete all messages by using the `all` parameter. Single messages will be deleted without confirmation even if not yet sent or not yet processed. A deleted message is gone for good, there is no undo, and it's gone from PyBitmessage's store as well. (If you loose a message you can ask the sender to re-send it to you.)
|
||||
|
||||
There are situations where you have to clear by deleting messages that did not get processed, got unprocessable and now "disturb the workflow"; more see chapter *Troubleshooting*. Deleting is also useful when somebody re-sends you a message and the original message finally reaches you as well later on.
|
||||
|
||||
You could say that the value of a sent or processed message itself is not very high as in most cases you won't ever need it again, and for many messages there are no commands to process them again on demand anyway. But of course the list of messages itself can be quite valuable to see what happened, and when, so better not delete messages without a good reason.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms send
|
||||
|
||||
mms send [<message_id>]
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
mms send 14
|
||||
|
||||
Without parameter send any messages in status *ready to send*. With a message id as parameter send or re-send that particular message. To be able to re-send a message is part of the "messaging system UX" and makes for a quite robust processing because there are very few situations that you can't recover from: The Bitmessage network ate your message? No problem, re-send. PyBitmessage crashed? No problem, restart PyBitmessage and re-send your message.
|
||||
|
||||
Whether messages are immediately sent or whether the MMS asks for confirmation to do so first depends on the value of the `auto-send` parameter; see `mms set` command. Getting each message to send presented that way may be useful for beginners because it's clearer to see what happens; on the other hand it hardly ever makes sense to postpone sending because something else has to be sent first.
|
||||
|
||||
"Sending" does not mean really send; the MMS just submits the message to PyBitmessage and *that* program will actually send. The MMS cannot give any feedback whether a message is still waiting to go out to the Bitmessage network or went out already. When in doubt, check in PyBitmessage itself.
|
||||
|
||||
Any mistakes in Bitmessage addresses will only be detected at the moment of sending; the MMS itself does not check those addresses.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms receive
|
||||
|
||||
mms receive
|
||||
|
||||
Force an immediate check for received messages, or more exactly force an immediate query of the MMS to PyBitmessage whether there are any new messages.
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS checks for new incoming messages with the same frequence the CLI wallet checks for incoming transactions: Once very 90 seconds. And the setting to decide whether checking automatically or not is the same as well, `auto-refresh`.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms note
|
||||
|
||||
mms note [<label> <text>]
|
||||
|
||||
Examples:
|
||||
|
||||
mms note
|
||||
mms note bob Did you already submit the last transaction?
|
||||
mms note alice Yes, just waiting for the next block :)
|
||||
|
||||
Without parameters display any notes not yet read. With a label and further text as parameters send the text as a message of type `note` to the signer with the label.
|
||||
|
||||
Sending notes to each other directly from one Monero wallet to the next might be a fun way to avoid having to use additional communication channels for talking to signers.
|
||||
|
||||
If you want to read or re-read a particular note use the `mms show` command and look at the last line with the message content, in this case the text of the note.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms show
|
||||
|
||||
mms show <message_id>
|
||||
|
||||
Show detailed information about the message with the id used as command parameter. Useful to read or re-read notes. Binary message content is not displayed; use the `mms export` command and inspect the resulting file if you need to check such a message content.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms export
|
||||
|
||||
mms export <message_id>
|
||||
|
||||
Export the content of the message with the given id into a file with the fixed name `mms_message_content` in the current directory. An already existing file will be silently overwritten.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no `mms import` counterpart command yet.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms set
|
||||
|
||||
mms set <option_name> [<option_value>]
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
mms set auto-send 1
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS equivalent of the general `set` command. With only the name of an option show the current value of that option. With option name and option value set that option to the given value.
|
||||
|
||||
The only MMS-specific setting so far that this command handles is the `auto-send` setting. If set messages are not sent out automatically right after they are created but the MMS asks for confirmation first. See also `mms send` command. As soon as you are familiar with the MMS and comfortable using it it may be a good idea to set `auto-send` to 1 for less prompts and speedier progressing.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms start\_auto\_config
|
||||
|
||||
mms start_auto_config [<label> <label> ...]
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
mms start_auto_config bob trent
|
||||
|
||||
Start an auto-config process at the wallet of the "config manager" by creating auto-config tokens for every signer expect "me" i.e. the first one and do a `mms signer` command to display the tokens. Asks for confirmation if auto-config is seemingly already running because there are already tokens for signers in the signer configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
The manager has to transmit the auto-config tokens to the respective signers outside the MMS. Note that those tokens are sensitive information: A token in the hand of a non-signer or in the hand of the wrong signer will enable that person to impersonate the rightful signer i.e. take part in all transactions in stead of that signer.
|
||||
|
||||
Precondition for starting auto-config is *all* signers having a label assigned. The idea is that auto-config establishes the **same** labels in the wallets of all signers to make it clear to everybody who is who. (Only the order of the signers in each wallet will be different, because the owner of the wallet will always be signer #1.) Later the signers are free to change labels they don't like, as long as there is no danger to confound signers of course.
|
||||
|
||||
You can establish labels for all signers using the `mms signer` command beforehand, or more comfortably right with the `mms start_auto_config` command itself, by listing all labels except the label for "me" in the correct order as command arguments.
|
||||
|
||||
The command can be issued at basically any time, although of course it makes most sense at the beginning where for the wallets of all signers only `mms init` commands were executed yet.
|
||||
|
||||
Check chapter *Auto-Config* for a description of the following steps after this command.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms auto\_config
|
||||
|
||||
mms auto_config <auto_config_token>
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
|
||||
mms auto_config mms561832e3eb
|
||||
|
||||
Process an auto-config token that you received from the "config manager" during an auto-config process through some reasonably secure communication channel outside of the MMS, e.g. SMS, smartphone messenger app, encrypted e-mail or phone call. Each signer gets their own distinct token. Treat any MMS auto-config tokens as confidential information.
|
||||
|
||||
This will result in a message of type `auto-config data` to send your Bitmessage address and your Monero address to the manager. (Transmission of that message is already as secure as any later MMS message, as long as nobody else knows your token.)
|
||||
|
||||
There is some tolerance in the way the MMS interprets entered tokens (e.g. they are not case-sensitive), and any typo will result in an invalid token with a high degree of probability and will be detected.
|
||||
|
||||
If it was decided to do auto-config best refrain from entering any signer information yourself manually with `mms signer`. (The MMS won't prevent it however.)
|
||||
|
||||
Check chapter *Auto-Config* for a complete list of all steps of an auto-config process.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms stop\_auto\_config
|
||||
|
||||
mms stop_auto_config
|
||||
|
||||
Delete any auto-config tokens from signer configuration and stop any running auto-config process that way.
|
||||
|
||||
Deleted tokens cannot be recoverd or reconstructed, as they are random. If you are the "config manager" and delete tokens you will never become able again to receive auto-config messages that other signers send to you using those deleted tokens. (Nobody else will receive them either, however.) Everybody will need new tokens issued by you.
|
||||
|
||||
### mms send\_signer\_config
|
||||
|
||||
mms send_signer_config
|
||||
|
||||
Manually send your complete signer configuration to all other signers as messages of type `signer config`. After receiving your message they will be able to replace their signer configuration by yours with a `mms next` command. There will be a security prompt before that happens.
|
||||
|
||||
Each signer will get their label overwritten with the label you entered for them, but their own Bitmessage address and Monero address will be preserved.
|
||||
|
||||
This command and its capability to "broadcast" a particular signer configuration can serve as a building block for something like a "semi-auto-config". See also chapter *Sending Signer Configuration*. Sending out a complete signer configuration is also part of fully-automatic config, although without needing a separate `mms send_signer_config` command.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS was carefully designed and implemented as a system offering a high degree of security.
|
||||
|
||||
Which was not particularly easy: Monero multisig itself is already a multi-faceted if not to say complex process and thus not trivial to secure, and the MMS is a powerful if not to say complex system on top of that, so it's no wonder that there are various possible security issues.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that this the very **first** version of the MMS, and it may well be that people using it in different circumstances will uncover new security problems beyond those mentioned here, or let some of them appear in a different light. There is reasonable hope however that the MMS does not have any deep and basically "unrepairable" conceptual flaws.
|
||||
|
||||
TL;DR: If in doubt, start to use the MMS only after you have configured your multisig wallets yourself on your own, presumably in more secure ways than the MMS could provide (not trivial, but doable). If in even more doubt, don't use the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
### Use of Encryption and Signatures
|
||||
|
||||
All message content is encrypted either using the Monero viewkeys of the signers' Monero wallets, or with randomly generated keys of the same strength in the case of auto-config message contents. This may seem a little excessive given that PyBitmessage encrypts all messages itself already, but first PyBitmessage is a third-party software that you may not want to trust, and second with this feature the MMS is already prepared to some degree for less secure communication systems that don't encrypt themselves.
|
||||
|
||||
Messages are signed by the sender using their view private key. This is used for authentication: The MMS will reject a message from a signer that does not carry a valid signature that only that signer, and nobody else, could have made. Furthermore, a hash secures the message content against any changes. Lastly only messages from signers are accepted: A message from a Monero address that is not listed in the signer configuration gets rejected, even if it carries a valid signature.
|
||||
|
||||
The viewkey is also used to encrypt the content of the `.mms` file that contains signer configuration and all sent and received messages.
|
||||
|
||||
Still, regarding data transmission security requirements one should probably stay realistic: Of course you don't want the various data packets that get shuttled back and forth between the signers' wallets to get into the wrong hands, but it would not be easy to cause real harm for an attacker holding some of that data. After all, the whole point of multisig is that only a group of people **cooperating** can sign off and submit a transaction. An attacker that gets hold of a partially signed transaction won't be able to do much with it.
|
||||
|
||||
(An attacker eavesdropping on **all communication** from the very start probably could, if data was not encrypted, collect all keys and build a fully working Monero "single-sig" wallet for the multisig address and steal coins, but that's a pretty drastic scenario, and data sent by the MMS **is** encrypted.)
|
||||
|
||||
### Communication MMS to PyBitmessage
|
||||
|
||||
Communication between the MMS and PyBitmessage is, unfortunately, not encrypted. Here, HTTP is used, not its encrypted counterpart HTTPS. Message content is of course encrypted **before** the MMS transmits a message to PyBitmessage, and any content changes would be detected when receiving messages, but somebody listening there could learn things from the "metadata": Who sends what to whom at which point in time.
|
||||
|
||||
As long as your Monero wallet with the MMS and PyBitmessage run on the same machine, that's not a big danger in itself, because anybody who can listen on such strictly local communication `localhost` to `localhost` already sits inside your computer, in which case you have probably lost anyway, with the trojan listening to the traffic between MMS and PyBitmessage being the least of your worries.
|
||||
|
||||
But because of this it's not a good idea to set up a PyBitmessage instance reachable over the Internet, as some kind of "public node".
|
||||
|
||||
There is a second problem: The PyBitmessage API is only secured by a username and a password that has to be transmitted in cleartext with every HTTP request. It would be not very hard for an attacker to pick up username and password and starting DOS-type attacks, e.g. by deleting all messages in 10-second intervals.
|
||||
|
||||
(In PyBitmessage's defense one must say that is was **not** designed as a server that can face the big wide bad Internet, but as a program to run locally; it's hardly surprising that running it outside its intended use case leads to problems.)
|
||||
|
||||
### Impersonation
|
||||
|
||||
If Alice the buyer and Bob the seller use 2/3 multisig for *escrow* there will be Trent as a trusted third person that can arbitrate in case of problems and either help Alice get her money back if Bob does not deliver by signing a transaction started by Alice, or helping Bob getting his money if Alice likely got her wares but pretends otherwise and refuses to sign the payment to Bob.
|
||||
|
||||
In this *escrow* situation you really want **three** distinct persons in play. If Bob somehow can *impersonate* Trent by posing as him, by pretending to Alice to be two persons Bob plus Trent, and set up **two** different wallets with two sets of keys, Bob will be able to make those 2/3 multisig transactions valid all on his own and cheat.
|
||||
|
||||
How big this danger of impersonation is depends on how secure the initial exchange of key sets is at the very beginning of the whole process, when configuring the wallets and finally "going multisig": If you can assure that only the right people get the right key sets, and nobody can pose somehow as somebody else, everything is alright. If not, you may loose.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use the full capabilities of the MMS you don't use it only to transact, but already before that, to exchange key sets between all signers. Especially for higher forms of multisig like 2/4 with multiple key exchange rounds this is very helpful and less error-prone than some manual process. So, the task to prevent impersonation shifts from securing the exchange of keys to securely setting up signer addresses in the MMS: If Bob can somehow trick Alice into accepting one of **his** Monero and Bitmessage addresses in stead of those of Trent, he has won.
|
||||
|
||||
The three methods of setting up signer addresses that the MMS supports, manually configuring signers, auto-config and the "semi-automatic" sending of completed signer information, all have different risks associated with them regarding impersonation. Check the respective chapters *Manually Configuring Signers*, *Auto-Config* and *Sending Signer Information* for some more info about this.
|
||||
|
||||
Auto-config is by far the easiest to secure: You only have a tiny bit of information, an 11-character auto-config token, to transmit securely to each signer, and if you can do that, you have already won. (The "config manager" is of course assumed as trustworthy here.)
|
||||
|
||||
If this all sounds too complicated and therefore not trustworthy to you, you do have the option to configure wallets and establishing the multisig address leaving the MMS completely out of the picture and only later using it to comfortably send partially signed transactions around and relieve you from the tedious manual syncing of wallets after each transaction.
|
||||
|
||||
### Attacker-Controlled Data
|
||||
|
||||
There are two situations where your MMS-using wallet receives data from another signer where that other signer, if acting in bad faith, could try to deceive you or trick you into doing something harmful:
|
||||
|
||||
Notes as transmitted by the `mms note` command can be used for "social engineering". An attacker could e.g. try to formulate a note that looks like an error message in an attempt to deceive. The technical possibilities here are quite limited however: Notes are strictly textual only, and when displaying them the MMS filters out characters with ASCII codes less than 32 and the two characters "<" and ">" that could be used to build HTML or XML that might get interpreted somehow (very unlikely in the CLI wallet, but somewhat more likely in GUI-based wallets.) There is also a length limit for notes.
|
||||
|
||||
The second way is an attempt to deceive with labels that are sent through `mms send_signer_config`. Bob could label Alice as *trent* and Trent as *alice*, send that signer configuration to Alice and somehow convince her to use that. This is the reason why a message of type `singer config` if sent outside of auto-config with an explicit `mms send_signer_config` is not processed right away, but displayed first together with a confirmation prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
## Troubleshooting
|
||||
|
||||
### Solving Syncing Troubles
|
||||
|
||||
As explained in the chapter *Syncing Wallets* Monero multisig requires the exchange of some data between wallets after sending as well as receiving transactions, called *multisig sync data* in the MMS.
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes things get out of sync somehow. There are four possible signs that this may have happened:
|
||||
|
||||
* The `balance` command shows a message *Some owned outputs have partial key images - import\_multisig\_info needed* that "refuses go away"
|
||||
* The wallet tells you *That signature was made with stale data* and refuses to process a transaction further
|
||||
* The wallet tells you about missing keys when you try to sign a transaction
|
||||
* The wallet accuses you of a double-spending attempt with you probably trying nothing like that
|
||||
|
||||
In some such cases the MMS fails to become aware of the problem and simply tells you after `mms next` that there is nothing to do instead of starting a sync round.
|
||||
|
||||
Because of this there is a way to **force sync** at basically any time:
|
||||
|
||||
* All signers issue a `mms sync` command instead of simply `mms next` to send sync info to each other
|
||||
* After receiving those messages all signers issue a `mms next sync` command - note the extra argument `sync`
|
||||
|
||||
For syncing to work all information must be from the same "height" i.e. produced with the same number of transfers recorded in the wallets of all signers: If for example one signer somehow does not receive a transaction and sends out sync information in this state, it will be of no value to other signers with complete wallets.
|
||||
|
||||
If the MMS seems to ignore not yet processed sync data messages in state `waiting` most probably it does so because of this reason. When in doubt check the column `Height` in a list of messages that you get with `mms list`.
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes such not yet processed messages that became unprocessable trip up the `mms next` command. If that happens use `mms delete` to delete any message with a too-low height.
|
||||
|
||||
### Redirecting a Transaction to Another Signer
|
||||
|
||||
If in cases like 2/3 multisig you sent a partially-signed tx to somebody, but later change your mind and want to send it to somebody else, there is a little trick to do so: Locate the message of type `partially signed tx` addressed **to yourself** and issue a `mms send` command for that message. After reception, do `mms next`. You will be given choice again what to do with it.
|
||||
|
||||
Of course you are free to ignore that transaction and start a new one. Just consider that this new transaction might run into a roadblock later on if the first one gets fully signed and submitted to the network **earlier** than this second one.
|
||||
|
||||
### Ignoring Uncooperative Signers when Syncing
|
||||
|
||||
The normal MMS wallet syncing process assumes that all signers are cooperative and send out sync data messages after sending or receiving a transaction. `mms next` will therefore wait until it holds sync data messages (for the same "height") from **all** other signers before usually processing them.
|
||||
|
||||
However, with *M* being smaller than *N* in configurations like 2/3 multisig you can successfully sync with only (number of required signers minus 1) sync messages. `mms next` will tell you when you have reached this lower threshold and give a hint how to override and go ahead early: Use `mms next sync`.
|
||||
|
||||
If later you receive more sync data messages nevertheless just delete them with `mms delete`: They are unneeded, unprocessable for you and worst case will mess up the the next sync round.
|
||||
|
||||
Usually if you initiate sync the MMS will create messages to *all* other signers. If you want to prevent that to make it as hard as possible for other signers to transact further, make sure to set `auto-send` to false, answer "No" when first being asked to send, and manually delete any unwanted messages before sending the rest out with `mms send`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Recovering from Lost or Duplicate Messages
|
||||
|
||||
If you miss a message for any reason, because PyBitmessage failed to deliver it or because you deleted it too early, ask the sender of the message to send it again using the `mms send` command.
|
||||
|
||||
Note that messages sent multiple times do *not* automatically cancel out each other on the receiving end. If you resend e.g. just because somebody is impatient the addressed signer may end up receiving *two* messages of the same type with the same content.
|
||||
|
||||
If later the missing message belatedly shows up, that's not good, but you can solve this easily by using a `mms delete` command and get rid of one of the two copies.
|
||||
|
||||
### Correcting / Updating Signer Information
|
||||
|
||||
You can use the `mms signer` command to change a label `bob` that you don't like anymore:
|
||||
|
||||
mms member 2 bob-the-builder
|
||||
|
||||
With one more argument you can change Bitmessage addresses if needed:
|
||||
|
||||
mms member 2 bob BM-2cSrgmut9AD6bdU8b8GXd36iUYDjCS9xJb
|
||||
|
||||
You can even change Monero addresses in the same way (with the exception of your own of course), but with a limitation, only as long as there are no received messages. As soon as wallets are multisig it does not make sense anymore to change any Monero addresses anymore anyway.
|
||||
|
||||
### Starting from Scratch
|
||||
|
||||
If the state of the MMS for a wallet is messed-up beyond repair and you want to start from scratch, or if you want to stop using the MMS for a particular wallet, locate the wallet files in the file system and just delete the file with the `.mms` extension.
|
||||
|
||||
### MMS / PyBitmessage Interactions
|
||||
|
||||
Here some details about the interaction between the MMS and PyBitmessage to better understand any problems that may occur there:
|
||||
|
||||
The MMS tries to limit the number of messages that pile up in PyBitmessage's store and deletes them. However, for enhanced reliability it does not delete right after receiving already but only after a message changes its state from `waiting` to `processed`, or if you delete it from the message store. Sometimes messages get orphaned and the MMS has no chance to delete; you can safely delete such messages interactively in PyBitmessage itself.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use auto-config new addresses / identities will be created in PyBitmessage automatically for the MMS. It tries to delete those after finishing config, but note that the current version of PyBitmessage continues to display deleted addresses until next program restart: Harmless in principle, but somewhat confusing.
|
||||
|
||||
If such dynamic auto-config addresses don't get deleted at all e.g. because you delete a wallet beforehand unfortunately it seems there is no simple way in the current PyBitmessage version to get rid of them: You will have to manually locate and edit the `keys.dat` file and delete the corresponding lines (while hopefully not damaging anything else in there...)
|
||||
|
||||
Sometimes messages seem to get stuck and not sent out; try to restart PyBitmessage in such cases.
|
||||
|
||||
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