update disclosure post with scan note

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Riccardo Spagni 2017-05-18 10:26:34 +02:00
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@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ author: luigi1111 and Riccardo "fluffypony" Spagni
In Monero we've discovered and patched a critical bug that affects all CryptoNote-based cryptocurrencies, and allows for the creation of an unlimited number of coins in a way that is undetectable to an observer unless they know about the fatal flaw and can search for it.
We patched it quite some time ago, but until the hard fork that we had a few weeks ago we were unsure as to whether or not the entire network had updated.
We patched it quite some time ago, and confirmed that the Monero blockchain had NEVER been exploited using this, but until the hard fork that we had a few weeks ago we were unsure as to whether or not the entire network had updated.
Once we were certain that the network had updated, we notified all active and affected CryptoNote coins, including CryptoNote themselves, Bytecoin, Forknote, Boolberry, DashCoin, and DigitalNote.
@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ Once we were certain that the network had updated, we notified all active and af
# Timeline
2017-02-19: A member of the Monero Research Lab discovers the exploit, triggered by a detailed discussion of the [XEdDSA signature schemes](https://whispersystems.org/docs/specifications/xeddsa/) on the [Curves mailing list](https://moderncrypto.org/mail-archive/curves/2017/000846.html)
2017-02-20: The Monero blockchain is scanned to see if this had ever been exploited; thankfully it had not and the blockchain is intact.
2017-02-21: The patch is surreptitiously snuck into the Monero codebase in [pull request #1744](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/pull/1744). It is kept secret to prevent it being used to attack other CryptoNote coins.
2017-02-22: A [point release of Monero is rushed out](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/releases/tag/v0.10.2) so that exchanges and mining pools can update, under the guise of it preventing a RingCT DoS attack (such attack did not exist, but it seemed a fair explanation).
2017-03-15: The hash of the details of the problem is precommitted to the Monero blockchain in tx dff7a79e44f9392e19fe5205c389d3e799f89c62d90d624219618d754b806e04