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Update 2017-04-19-an-unofficial-response-to-an-empirical-analysis-of-linkability.md
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@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ The Monero community would like to list several concerns with this research pape
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1. We believe that a large proportion of 0-mixin transactions are pool payouts. These transactions should come to no one's surprise that they are traceable, since the pools themselves publish the payment amount to each transaction hash. Thus, we believe that the claims stemming from the traceability of transactions before 0-mixin transactions were banned to be misplaced. If, for example, 50% of non-pool payouts used a positive mixin and 0% of pool payouts did, then the traceability is less for the transactions that use these mixins and greater for pool payouts. We recommend that this is acknowledged in a later iteration of the paper. Ideally, the proportion of pool payouts can be found and compared to the proportion of non-pool payouts, with different traceability proportions for each. There are several reasons why these transactions neither reduce the anonymity of the transaction itself or other users. In regards to the former, coinbase transactions (ie: new rewards given to the pool) are 0-mixin, since having mixins is useless if the input is brand new and seen for the first time. Anyone who mines understands that the source of thier money is clear. In regards to other transactions, the pool payouts occur within the day, reducing the negative impact spending these transactions has on other users who may have borrowed the input for their transaction. Thus, pool payouts should include additional mixins, but excluding them has relatively minimal harm. The larger threat is the opportunity cost, where the additional mixins could provide greater levels of privacy for other users. Furthermore, all transactions are still unlinkable by the MRL definition of the word (see "Other Information" point 4) ([source](https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/65dj7u/an_empirical_analysis_of_linkability_in_the/dga1rza/?context=1)).
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1. We believe that a large proportion of 0-mixin transactions are pool payouts. These transactions should come to no one's surprise that they are traceable, since the pools themselves publish the payment amount to each transaction hash. Thus, we believe that the claims stemming from the traceability of transactions before 0-mixin transactions were banned to be misplaced. If, for example, 50% of non-pool payouts used a positive mixin and 0% of pool payouts did, then the traceability is less for the transactions that use these mixins and greater for pool payouts. We recommend that this is acknowledged in a later iteration of the paper. Ideally, the proportion of pool payouts can be found and compared to the proportion of non-pool payouts, with different traceability proportions for each. There are several reasons why these transactions neither reduce the anonymity of the transaction itself or other users. In regards to the former, coinbase transactions (ie: new rewards given to the pool) are 0-mixin, since having mixins is useless if the input is brand new and seen for the first time. Anyone who mines understands that the source of thier money is clear. In regards to other transactions, the pool payouts occur within the day, reducing the negative impact spending these transactions has on other users who may have borrowed the input for their transaction. Thus, pool payouts should include additional mixins, but excluding them has relatively minimal harm. The larger threat is the opportunity cost, where the additional mixins could provide greater levels of privacy for other users. Furthermore, all transactions are still unlinkable by the MRL definition of the word (see "Other Information" point 4) ([source](https://www.reddit.com/r/Monero/comments/65dj7u/an_empirical_analysis_of_linkability_in_the/dga1rza/?context=1)).
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2. We think further emphasis should have been placed in the paper to explain that the claims are only minimally applicable with the state of Monero transactions since March 2016, with the relevance decreasing over time. Though it is mentioned that their first analysis method has little if any current or future relevance, the claims still include these transactions. Furthermore, the report incorrectly states that most transactions in 2016 are traceable with the 0-mixin method. This is largely untrue, since these were prohibited in March, and most transaction volume for the year occurred during and after August. Nevertheless, many of these post-March transactions have inputs that can be deducible, but the traceability typically is not as severe as with 0-mixin transactions. The transactions that are most vulnerable are those in 2014 and 2015.
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2. We think further emphasis should have been placed in the paper to explain that the claims are only minimally applicable with the state of Monero transactions since March 2016, with the relevance decreasing over time. Though it is mentioned that their first analysis method has little if any current or future relevance, the claims still include these transactions. 0-mixin transatctions were prohibited in March 2016, and most transaction volume for the year occurred during and after August. Nevertheless, many of these post-March transactions have inputs that can be deducible, but the traceability typically is not as severe as with 0-mixin transactions. The transactions that are most vulnerable are those in 2014 and 2015, as well as some time needed for the network to recover.
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3. Under the "ethics" section, they state that the paper was published immediately before countermeasures could be deployed. While this is understandable from the given perspective that the blockchain history is not going away anytime soon (or ever), we wish that they had given us an advance copy of the finished draft so that we could have discussed our concerns with the report itself. We wish not to censor any of the research (instead, we encourage research!); however, we hope that future care can be taken before the release of misleading assertions.
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3. Under the "ethics" section, they state that the paper was published immediately before countermeasures could be deployed. While this is understandable from the given perspective that the blockchain history is not going away anytime soon (or ever), we wish that they had given us an advance copy of the finished draft so that we could have discussed our concerns with the report itself. We wish not to censor any of the research (instead, we encourage research!); however, we hope that future care can be taken before the release of misleading assertions.
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