meta/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md

# The Monero Project Vulnerability Response Process

## Preamble (Monero/Kovri)

1. This Vulnerability Response Process and subsequent bounty reward apply to the following:
   - Code implementation as seen in the Monero Project GitHub repositories
   - Written research from the Monero Research Lab which dictates said code implementation

2. Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following:
   - Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the Monero/Kovri networks
   - Social Engineering of Monero/Kovri Project staff or contractors
   - Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero/Kovri community property and/or data centers

3. As a pro-privacy project we have volunteers running copies of the websites on hidden services on Tor and I2P, as well as on multiple public domains. **The live sites are NOT in the scope of this process; only the code is!**

4. Bounty will be released for all projects in Monero XMR only. For more information on how to use Monero, visit the [Monero website](https://getmonero.org)

## Preamble (Kovri)

1. While Kovri is in a pre-Alpha release state, do not use HackerOne for disclosure. All Kovri issues MUST be directed to either [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri) or Email
2. Bounty will not be available for Kovri until **Kovri Beta** is released

## I. Points of contact for security issues

### Monero (CLI/GUI/website)

```
ric [at] getmonero.org
PGP fingerprint = BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9  759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9

luigi1111 [at] getmonero.org
PGP fingerprint = 8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2  F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010
```

### Monero (CLI/GUI)

```
moneromooo on Freenode
PGP fingerprint = 48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD  FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3
If pasting GPG encrypted data, use fpaste.org or pastebin.mozilla.org
or paste.debian.net as these don't blackball Tor via Cloudflare.
OTR: 6C7966BB 72E42F33 E1A3F137 2133AC39 D343514A
```

### Kovri (CLI/Website)

```
anonimal [at] i2pmail.org
anonimal [at] mail.i2p
PGP fingerprint = 1218 6272 CD48 E253 9E2D  D29B 66A7 6ECF 9144 09F1
```

## II. Security response team

- fluffypony
- luigi1111
- moneromooo
- anonimal

## III. Incident response

1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods:
    - a. PGP encrypted Email (use the appropriate fingerprints [listed in section I](#i-points-of-contact-for-security-issues) or as included in the Monero repo in `utils/gpg_keys/`)
    - b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)

2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set

3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels

4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability
    - a. If submission proves to be vulnerable with PoC code / exploit, proceed to next step
    - b. If not vulnerable:
      - i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability
      - ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary

5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission

6. Establish severity of vulnerability:
    - a. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire monero/kovri network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe
    - b. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, routers, wallets, or must be carefully exploited
    - c. LOW: is not easily exploitable
    - d. If there are any disputes regarding bug severity, the Monero Response team will ultimately define bug severity

7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability:
    - a. HIGH severities must be notified on website and reddit /r/Monero (/r/Kovri for kovri) within 3 working days of classification
      - i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any
      - ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path
      - iii. The latter takes precedence over the former
    - b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release
    - c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release

8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es)
    - a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in
    - b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher
    - c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits
    - d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted
      - i. Include the severity of the vulnerability
      - ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code
      - iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied
    - e. Release date is discussed

9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update:
    - a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk
    - b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes
    - c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release

## IV. Post-release disclosure process

1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III

2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed:
    - a. Response Manager contacts researcher and asks if researcher wishes for credit
      - i. If bounty is applicable, release bounty to the researcher as defined in section "Bounty Distribution"
    - b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following:
      - i. Project name and URL
      - ii. Versions known to be affected
      - iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected)
      - iv. Versions not checked
      - v. Type of vulnerability and its impact
      - vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID
      - vii. The planned, coordinated release date
      - viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations)
      - ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability)
      - x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter
    - c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on website and reddit /r/Monero (/r/Kovri for kovri)
    - d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists:
      - i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com
      - ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com
    - e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID
      - i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID

3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed:
    - a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future
    - b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V
    - c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus
    - d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public

## V. Bounty distribution

- Total availability of XMR bounty can be tracked [here](https://forum.getmonero.org/8/funding-required/87597/monero-bounty-for-hackerone). XMR market values can be found at the various exchanges. See also [Cryptowatch](https://cryptowat.ch/) and [Live Coin Watch](https://www.livecoinwatch.com/).
- As reports come in and payouts are made, the total bounty supply shrinks. This gives incentive for bug hunters to report bugs a.s.a.p.
- The following percentages apply to available XMR bounty (severity is defined above in section III. 6.):
  1. 10% reserved for LOW severity bugs
  2. 30% reserved for MEDIUM severity bugs
  3. 60% for HIGH severity bugs
- Each bug will at most receive 10% of each category. Example: 10% of 60% for a HIGH severity bug.

## VI. Incident analysis

1. Isolate codebase
    - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
      - i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc.
      - ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc.
      - iii. Operator/config error, etc.

2. Auditing
    - a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
      - i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1
      - ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference
      - iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub

3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V

## VII. Resolutions

Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following:

- IRC on Freenode
  - `#monero-dev`
  - `#kovri-dev`
- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
  - [Monero (CLI)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
  - [Monero (GUI)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero-core/issues/)
  - [Monero (Website)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero-site/issues/)
  - [Kovri](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri/issues/)
  - [Kovri (Website)](https://github.com/monero-project/kovri-site/issues/)
- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/)
- [Reddit /r/Kovri](https://reddit.com/r/Kovri/)
- Email

## VIII. Continuous improvement

1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents

2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including:
    - a. Areas of Monero/Kovri affected by the incidents
    - b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents
    - c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any)
    - d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents

3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss:
    - a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents
    - b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses