If a crate has std set, it should enable std for all dependencies in order to
let them properly select which algorithms to use. Some crates fallback to
slower/worse algorithms on no-std.
Also more aggressively sets default-features = false leading to a *10%*
reduction in the amount of crates coordinator builds.
* dalek 4.0
* cargo update
Moves to a version of Substrate which uses curve25519-dalek 4.0 (not a rc).
Doesn't yet update the repo to curve25519-dalek 4.0 (as a branch does) due
to the official schnorrkel using a conflicting curve25519-dalek. This would
prevent installation of frost-schnorrkel without a patch.
* use half-aggregation for tm messages
* fmt
* fix pr comments
* cargo update
Achieves three notable updates.
1) Resolves RUSTSEC-2022-0093 by updating libp2p-identity.
2) Removes 3 old rand crates via updating ed25519-dalek (a dependency of
libp2p-identity).
3) Sets serde_derive to 1.0.171 via updating to time 0.3.26 which pins at up to
1.0.171.
The last one is the most important. The former two are niceties.
serde_derive, since 1.0.171, ships a non-reproducible binary blob in what's a
complete compromise of supply chain security. This is done in order to reduce
compile times, yet also for the maintainer of serde (dtolnay) to leverage
serde's position as the 8th most downloaded crate to attempt to force changes
to the Rust build pipeline.
While dtolnay's contributions to Rust are respectable, being behind syn, quote,
and proc-macro2 (the top three crates by downloads), along with thiserror,
anyhow, async-trait, and more (I believe also being part of the Rust project),
they have unfortunately decided to refuse to listen to the community on this
issue (or even engage with counter-commentary). Given their political agenda
they seem to try to be accomplishing with force, I'd go as far as to call their
actions terroristic (as they're using the threat of the binary blob as
justification for cargo to ship 'proper' support for binary blobs).
This is arguably representative of dtolnay's past work on watt. watt was a wasm
interpreter to execute a pre-compiled proc macro. This would save the compile
time of proc macros, yet sandbox it so a full binary did not have to be run.
Unfortunately, watt (while decreasing compile times) fails to be a valid
solution to supply chain security (without massive ecosystem changes). It never
implemented reproducible builds for its wasm blobs, and a malicious wasm blob
could still fundamentally compromise a project. The only solution for an end
user to achieve a secure pipeline would be to locally build the project,
verifying the blob aligns, yet doing so would negate all advantages of the
blob.
dtolnay also seems to be giving up their role as a FOSS maintainer given that
serde no longer works in several environments. While FOSS maintainers are not
required to never implement breaking changes, the version number is still 1.0.
While FOSS maintainers are not required to follow semver, releasing a very
notable breaking change *without a new version number* in an ecosystem which
*does follow semver*, then refusing to acknowledge bugs as bugs with their work
does meet my personal definition of "not actively maintaining their existing
work". Maintenance would be to fix bugs, not introduce and ignore.
For now, serde > 1.0.171 has been banned. In the future, we may host a fork
without the blobs (yet with the patches). It may be necessary to ban all of
dtolnay's maintained crates, if they continue to force their agenda as such,
yet I hope this may be resolved within the next week or so.
Sources:
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538 - Binary blob discussion
This includes several reports of various workflows being broken.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538#issuecomment-1682519944
dtolnay commenting that security should be resolved via Rust toolchain edits,
not via their own work being secure. This is why I say they're trying to
leverage serde in a political game.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2526 - Usage via git broken
dtolnay explicitly asks the submitting user if they'd be willing to advocate
for changes to Rust rather than actually fix the issue they created. This is
further political arm wrestling.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2530 - Usage via Bazel broken
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2575 - Unverifiable binary blob
https://github.com/dtolnay/watt - dtolnay's prior work on precompilation
* add Rs() api to SchnorrAggregate
* Correct serai-processor-tests to dalek 4
* fmt + deny
* Slash malevolent validators (#294)
* add slash tx
* ignore unsigned tx replays
* verify that provided evidence is valid
* fix clippy + fmt
* move application tx handling to another module
* partially handle the tendermint txs
* fix pr comments
* support unsigned app txs
* add slash target to the votes
* enforce provided, unsigned, signed tx ordering within a block
* bug fixes
* add unit test for tendermint txs
* bug fixes
* update tests for tendermint txs
* add tx ordering test
* tidy up tx ordering test
* cargo +nightly fmt
* Misc fixes from rebasing
* Finish resolving clippy
* Remove sha3 from tendermint-machine
* Resolve a DoS in SlashEvidence's read
Also moves Evidence from Vec<Message> to (Message, Option<Message>). That
should meet all requirements while being a bit safer.
* Make lazy_static a dev-depend for tributary
* Various small tweaks
One use of sort was inefficient, sorting unsigned || signed when unsigned was
already properly sorted. Given how the unsigned TXs were given a nonce of 0, an
unstable sort may swap places with an unsigned TX and a signed TX with a nonce
of 0 (leading to a faulty block).
The extra protection added here sorts signed, then concats.
* Fix Tributary tests I broke, start review on tendermint/tx.rs
* Finish reviewing everything outside tests and empty_signature
* Remove empty_signature
empty_signature led to corrupted local state histories. Unfortunately, the API
is only sane with a signature.
We now use the actual signature, which risks creating a signature over a
malicious message if we have ever have an invariant producing malicious
messages. Prior, we only signed the message after the local machine confirmed
it was okay per the local view of consensus.
This is tolerated/preferred over a corrupt state history since production of
such messages is already an invariant. TODOs are added to make handling of this
theoretical invariant further robust.
* Remove async_sequential for tokio::test
There was no competition for resources forcing them to be run sequentially.
* Modify block order test to be statistically significant without multiple runs
* Clean tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
* Add DSTs to Tributary TX sig_hash functions
Prevents conflicts with other systems/other parts of the Tributary.
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
This will effectively add msrv protections to the entire project as almost
everything grabs from these.
Doesn't add msrv to coins as coins/bitcoin is still frozen.
Doesn't add msrv to services since cargo msrv doesn't play nice with anything
importing the runtime.
This is intended to be a reliable transport between the processors and
coordinator. Since it'll be intranet only, it's written as never fail.
Primarily needs testing and a proper ID.
* Partial move to ff 0.13
It turns out the newly released k256 0.12 isn't on ff 0.13, preventing further
work at this time.
* Update all crates to work on ff 0.13
The provided curves still need to be expanded to fit the new API.
* Finish adding dalek-ff-group ff 0.13 constants
* Correct FieldElement::product definition
Also stops exporting macros.
* Test most new parts of ff 0.13
* Additionally test ff-group-tests with BLS12-381 and the pasta curves
We only tested curves from RustCrypto. Now we test a curve offered by zk-crypto,
the group behind ff/group, and the pasta curves, which is by Zcash (though
Zcash developers are also behind zk-crypto).
* Finish Ed448
Fully specifies all constants, passes all tests in ff-group-tests, and finishes moving to ff-0.13.
* Add RustCrypto/elliptic-curves to allowed git repos
Needed due to k256/p256 incorrectly defining product.
* Finish writing ff 0.13 tests
* Add additional comments to dalek
* Further comments
* Update ethereum-serai to ff 0.13
Also moves the aggregator over to Digest. While a bit verbose for this context,
as all appended items were fixed length, it's length prefixing is solid and
the API is pleasant. The downside is the additional dependency which is
in tree and quite compact.
While the previous construction achieved n/2 average detection,
this will run in log2(n). Unfortunately, the need to keep entropy
around (or take in an RNG here) remains.
* Add dkg crate
* Remove F_len and G_len
They're generally no longer used.
* Replace hash_to_vec with a provided method around associated type H: Digest
Part of trying to minimize this trait so it can be moved elsewhere. Vec,
which isn't std, may have been a blocker.
* Encrypt secret shares within the FROST library
Reduces requirements on callers in order to be correct.
* Update usage of Zeroize within FROST
* Inline functions in key_gen
There was no reason to have them separated as they were. sign probably
has the same statement available, yet that isn't the focus right now.
* Add a ciphersuite package which provides hash_to_F
* Set the Ciphersuite version to something valid
* Have ed448 export Scalar/FieldElement/Point at the top level
* Move FROST over to Ciphersuite
* Correct usage of ff in ciphersuite
* Correct documentation handling
* Move Schnorr signatures to their own crate
* Remove unused feature from schnorr
* Fix Schnorr tests
* Split DKG into a separate crate
* Add serialize to Commitments and SecretShare
Helper for buf = vec![]; .write(buf).unwrap(); buf
* Move FROST over to the new dkg crate
* Update Monero lib to latest FROST
* Correct ethereum's usage of features
* Add serialize to GeneratorProof
* Add serialize helper function to FROST
* Rename AddendumSerialize to WriteAddendum
* Update processor
* Slight fix to processor
