* dalek 4.0
* cargo update
Moves to a version of Substrate which uses curve25519-dalek 4.0 (not a rc).
Doesn't yet update the repo to curve25519-dalek 4.0 (as a branch does) due
to the official schnorrkel using a conflicting curve25519-dalek. This would
prevent installation of frost-schnorrkel without a patch.
* use half-aggregation for tm messages
* fmt
* fix pr comments
* cargo update
Achieves three notable updates.
1) Resolves RUSTSEC-2022-0093 by updating libp2p-identity.
2) Removes 3 old rand crates via updating ed25519-dalek (a dependency of
libp2p-identity).
3) Sets serde_derive to 1.0.171 via updating to time 0.3.26 which pins at up to
1.0.171.
The last one is the most important. The former two are niceties.
serde_derive, since 1.0.171, ships a non-reproducible binary blob in what's a
complete compromise of supply chain security. This is done in order to reduce
compile times, yet also for the maintainer of serde (dtolnay) to leverage
serde's position as the 8th most downloaded crate to attempt to force changes
to the Rust build pipeline.
While dtolnay's contributions to Rust are respectable, being behind syn, quote,
and proc-macro2 (the top three crates by downloads), along with thiserror,
anyhow, async-trait, and more (I believe also being part of the Rust project),
they have unfortunately decided to refuse to listen to the community on this
issue (or even engage with counter-commentary). Given their political agenda
they seem to try to be accomplishing with force, I'd go as far as to call their
actions terroristic (as they're using the threat of the binary blob as
justification for cargo to ship 'proper' support for binary blobs).
This is arguably representative of dtolnay's past work on watt. watt was a wasm
interpreter to execute a pre-compiled proc macro. This would save the compile
time of proc macros, yet sandbox it so a full binary did not have to be run.
Unfortunately, watt (while decreasing compile times) fails to be a valid
solution to supply chain security (without massive ecosystem changes). It never
implemented reproducible builds for its wasm blobs, and a malicious wasm blob
could still fundamentally compromise a project. The only solution for an end
user to achieve a secure pipeline would be to locally build the project,
verifying the blob aligns, yet doing so would negate all advantages of the
blob.
dtolnay also seems to be giving up their role as a FOSS maintainer given that
serde no longer works in several environments. While FOSS maintainers are not
required to never implement breaking changes, the version number is still 1.0.
While FOSS maintainers are not required to follow semver, releasing a very
notable breaking change *without a new version number* in an ecosystem which
*does follow semver*, then refusing to acknowledge bugs as bugs with their work
does meet my personal definition of "not actively maintaining their existing
work". Maintenance would be to fix bugs, not introduce and ignore.
For now, serde > 1.0.171 has been banned. In the future, we may host a fork
without the blobs (yet with the patches). It may be necessary to ban all of
dtolnay's maintained crates, if they continue to force their agenda as such,
yet I hope this may be resolved within the next week or so.
Sources:
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538 - Binary blob discussion
This includes several reports of various workflows being broken.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2538#issuecomment-1682519944
dtolnay commenting that security should be resolved via Rust toolchain edits,
not via their own work being secure. This is why I say they're trying to
leverage serde in a political game.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2526 - Usage via git broken
dtolnay explicitly asks the submitting user if they'd be willing to advocate
for changes to Rust rather than actually fix the issue they created. This is
further political arm wrestling.
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2530 - Usage via Bazel broken
https://github.com/serde-rs/serde/issues/2575 - Unverifiable binary blob
https://github.com/dtolnay/watt - dtolnay's prior work on precompilation
* add Rs() api to SchnorrAggregate
* Correct serai-processor-tests to dalek 4
* fmt + deny
* Slash malevolent validators (#294)
* add slash tx
* ignore unsigned tx replays
* verify that provided evidence is valid
* fix clippy + fmt
* move application tx handling to another module
* partially handle the tendermint txs
* fix pr comments
* support unsigned app txs
* add slash target to the votes
* enforce provided, unsigned, signed tx ordering within a block
* bug fixes
* add unit test for tendermint txs
* bug fixes
* update tests for tendermint txs
* add tx ordering test
* tidy up tx ordering test
* cargo +nightly fmt
* Misc fixes from rebasing
* Finish resolving clippy
* Remove sha3 from tendermint-machine
* Resolve a DoS in SlashEvidence's read
Also moves Evidence from Vec<Message> to (Message, Option<Message>). That
should meet all requirements while being a bit safer.
* Make lazy_static a dev-depend for tributary
* Various small tweaks
One use of sort was inefficient, sorting unsigned || signed when unsigned was
already properly sorted. Given how the unsigned TXs were given a nonce of 0, an
unstable sort may swap places with an unsigned TX and a signed TX with a nonce
of 0 (leading to a faulty block).
The extra protection added here sorts signed, then concats.
* Fix Tributary tests I broke, start review on tendermint/tx.rs
* Finish reviewing everything outside tests and empty_signature
* Remove empty_signature
empty_signature led to corrupted local state histories. Unfortunately, the API
is only sane with a signature.
We now use the actual signature, which risks creating a signature over a
malicious message if we have ever have an invariant producing malicious
messages. Prior, we only signed the message after the local machine confirmed
it was okay per the local view of consensus.
This is tolerated/preferred over a corrupt state history since production of
such messages is already an invariant. TODOs are added to make handling of this
theoretical invariant further robust.
* Remove async_sequential for tokio::test
There was no competition for resources forcing them to be run sequentially.
* Modify block order test to be statistically significant without multiple runs
* Clean tests
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
* Add DSTs to Tributary TX sig_hash functions
Prevents conflicts with other systems/other parts of the Tributary.
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
This will effectively add msrv protections to the entire project as almost
everything grabs from these.
Doesn't add msrv to coins as coins/bitcoin is still frozen.
Doesn't add msrv to services since cargo msrv doesn't play nice with anything
importing the runtime.
This is intended to be a reliable transport between the processors and
coordinator. Since it'll be intranet only, it's written as never fail.
Primarily needs testing and a proper ID.
Provides a DST, and associated metadata as beneficial.
Also utilizes MuSig's context to session-bind. Since set_keys_messages also
binds to set, this is semi-redundant, yet that's appreciated.
Isn't spec compliant due to the lack of a spec to be compliant too.
Slight deviation from the paper by using a unique list instead of a multiset.
Closes#186, progresses #277.
Achieves feasible performance in the ed448 which makes it potentially viable
for real world usage.
Accordingly prepares a new release, updating the README.
* Partial move to ff 0.13
It turns out the newly released k256 0.12 isn't on ff 0.13, preventing further
work at this time.
* Update all crates to work on ff 0.13
The provided curves still need to be expanded to fit the new API.
* Finish adding dalek-ff-group ff 0.13 constants
* Correct FieldElement::product definition
Also stops exporting macros.
* Test most new parts of ff 0.13
* Additionally test ff-group-tests with BLS12-381 and the pasta curves
We only tested curves from RustCrypto. Now we test a curve offered by zk-crypto,
the group behind ff/group, and the pasta curves, which is by Zcash (though
Zcash developers are also behind zk-crypto).
* Finish Ed448
Fully specifies all constants, passes all tests in ff-group-tests, and finishes moving to ff-0.13.
* Add RustCrypto/elliptic-curves to allowed git repos
Needed due to k256/p256 incorrectly defining product.
* Finish writing ff 0.13 tests
* Add additional comments to dalek
* Further comments
* Update ethereum-serai to ff 0.13
* Initial work on a message box
* Finish message-box (untested)
* Expand documentation
* Embed the recipient in the signature challenge
Prevents a message from A -> B from being read as from A -> C.
* Update documentation by bifurcating sender/receiver
* Panic on receiving an invalid signature
If we've received an invalid signature in an authenticated system, a
service is malicious, critically faulty (equivalent to malicious), or
the message layer has been compromised (or is otherwise critically
faulty).
Please note a receiver who handles a message they shouldn't will trigger
this. That falls under being critically faulty.
* Documentation and helper methods
SecureMessage::new and SecureMessage::serialize.
Secure Debug for MessageBox.
* Have SecureMessage not be serialized by default
Allows passing around in-memory, if desired, and moves the error from
decrypt to new (which performs deserialization).
Decrypt no longer has an error since it panics if given an invalid
signature, due to this being intranet code.
* Explain and improve nonce handling
Includes a missing zeroize call.
* Rebase to latest develop
Updates to transcript 0.2.0.
* Add a test for the MessageBox
* Export PrivateKey and PublicKey
* Also test serialization
* Add a key_gen binary to message_box
* Have SecureMessage support Serde
* Add encrypt_to_bytes and decrypt_from_bytes
* Support String ser via base64
* Rename encrypt/decrypt to encrypt_bytes/decrypt_to_bytes
* Directly operate with values supporting Borsh
* Use bincode instead of Borsh
By staying inside of serde, we'll support many more structs. While
bincode isn't canonical, we don't need canonicity on an authenticated,
internal system.
* Turn PrivateKey, PublicKey into structs
Uses Zeroizing for the PrivateKey per #150.
* from_string functions intended for loading from an env
* Use &str for PublicKey from_string (now from_str)
The PrivateKey takes the String to take ownership of its memory and
zeroize it. That isn't needed with PublicKeys.
* Finish updating from develop
* Resolve warning
* Use ZeroizingAlloc on the key_gen binary
* Move message-box from crypto/ to common/
* Move key serialization functions to ser
* add/remove functions in MessageBox
* Implement Hash on dalek_ff_group Points
* Make MessageBox generic to its key
Exposes a &'static str variant for internal use and a RistrettoPoint
variant for external use.
* Add Private to_string as deprecated
Stub before more competent tooling is deployed.
* Private to_public
* Test both Internal and External MessageBox, only use PublicKey in the pub API
* Remove panics on invalid signatures
Leftover from when this was solely internal which is now unsafe.
* Chicken scratch a Scanner task
* Add a write function to the DKG library
Enables writing directly to a file.
Also modifies serialize to return Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> instead of just Vec<u8>.
* Make dkg::encryption pub
* Remove encryption from MessageBox
* Use a 64-bit block number in Substrate
We use a 64-bit block number in general since u32 only works for 120 years
(with a 1 second block time). As some chains even push the 1 second threshold,
especially ones based on DAG consensus, this becomes potentially as low as 60
years.
While that should still be plenty, it's not worth wondering/debating. Since
Serai uses 64-bit block numbers elsewhere, this ensures consistency.
* Misc crypto lints
* Get the scanner scratch to compile
* Initial scanner test
* First few lines of scheduler
* Further work on scheduler, solidify API
* Define Scheduler TX format
* Branch creation algorithm
* Document when the branch algorithm isn't perfect
* Only scanned confirmed blocks
* Document Coin
* Remove Canonical/ChainNumber from processor
The processor should be abstracted from canonical numbers thanks to the
coordinator, making this unnecessary.
* Add README documenting processor flow
* Use Zeroize on substrate primitives
* Define messages from/to the processor
* Correct over-specified versioning
* Correct build re: in_instructions::primitives
* Debug/some serde in crypto/
* Use a struct for ValidatorSetInstance
* Add a processor key_gen task
Redos DB handling code.
* Replace trait + impl with wrapper struct
* Add a key confirmation flow to the key gen task
* Document concerns on key_gen
* Start on a signer task
* Add Send to FROST traits
* Move processor lib.rs to main.rs
Adds a dummy main to reduce clippy dead_code warnings.
* Further flesh out main.rs
* Move the DB trait to AsRef<[u8]>
* Signer task
* Remove a panic in bitcoin when there's insufficient funds
Unchecked underflow.
* Have Monero's mine_block mine one block, not 10
It was initially a nicety to deal with the 10 block lock. C::CONFIRMATIONS
should be used for that instead.
* Test signer
* Replace channel expects with log statements
The expects weren't problematic and had nicer code. They just clutter test
output.
* Remove the old wallet file
It predates the coordinator design and shouldn't be used.
* Rename tests/scan.rs to tests/scanner.rs
* Add a wallet test
Complements the recently removed wallet file by adding a test for the scanner,
scheduler, and signer together.
* Work on a run function
Triggers a clippy ICE.
* Resolve clippy ICE
The issue was the non-fully specified lambda in signer.
* Add KeyGenEvent and KeyGenOrder
Needed so we get KeyConfirmed messages from the key gen task.
While we could've read the CoordinatorMessage to see that, routing through the
key gen tasks ensures we only handle it once it's been successfully saved to
disk.
* Expand scanner test
* Clarify processor documentation
* Have the Scanner load keys on boot/save outputs to disk
* Use Vec<u8> for Block ID
Much more flexible.
* Panic if we see the same output multiple times
* Have the Scanner DB mark itself as corrupt when doing a multi-put
This REALLY should be a TX. Since we don't have a TX API right now, this at
least offers detection.
* Have DST'd DB keys accept AsRef<[u8]>
* Restore polling all signers
Writes a custom future to do so.
Also loads signers on boot using what the scanner claims are active keys.
* Schedule OutInstructions
Adds a data field to Payment.
Also cleans some dead code.
* Panic if we create an invalid transaction
Saves the TX once it's successfully signed so if we do panic, we have a copy.
* Route coordinator messages to their respective signer
Requires adding key to the SignId.
* Send SignTransaction orders for all plans
* Add a timer to retry sign_plans when prepare_send fails
* Minor fmt'ing
* Basic Fee API
* Move the change key into Plan
* Properly route activation_number
* Remove ScannerEvent::Block
It's not used under current designs
* Nicen logs
* Add utilities to get a block's number
* Have main issue AckBlock
Also has a few misc lints.
* Parse instructions out of outputs
* Tweak TODOs and remove an unwrap
* Update Bitcoin max input/output quantity
* Only read one piece of data from Monero
Due to output randomization, it's infeasible.
* Embed plan IDs into the TXs they create
We need to stop attempting signing if we've already signed a protocol. Ideally,
any one of the participating signers should be able to provide a proof the TX
was successfully signed. We can't just run a second signing protocol though as
a single malicious signer could complete the TX signature, and publish it,
yet not complete the secondary signature.
The TX itself has to be sufficient to show that the TX matches the plan. This
is done by embedding the ID, so matching addresses/amounts plans are
distinguished, and by allowing verification a TX actually matches a set of
addresses/amounts.
For Monero, this will need augmenting with the ephemeral keys (or usage of a
static seed for them).
* Don't use OP_RETURN to encode the plan ID on Bitcoin
We can use the inputs to distinguih identical-output plans without issue.
* Update OP_RETURN data access
It's not required to be the last output.
* Add Eventualities to Monero
An Eventuality is an effective equivalent to a SignableTransaction. That is
declared not by the inputs it spends, yet the outputs it creates.
Eventualities are also bound to a 32-byte RNG seed, enabling usage of a
hash-based identifier in a SignableTransaction, allowing multiple
SignableTransactions with the same output set to have different Eventualities.
In order to prevent triggering the burning bug, the RNG seed is hashed with
the planned-to-be-used inputs' output keys. While this does bind to them, it's
only loosely bound. The TX actually created may use different inputs entirely
if a forgery is crafted (which requires no brute forcing).
Binding to the key images would provide a strong binding, yet would require
knowing the key images, which requires active communication with the spend
key.
The purpose of this is so a multisig can identify if a Transaction the entire
group planned has been executed by a subset of the group or not. Once a plan
is created, it can have an Eventuality made. The Eventuality's extra is able
to be inserted into a HashMap, so all new on-chain transactions can be
trivially checked as potential candidates. Once a potential candidate is found,
a check involving ECC ops can be performed.
While this is arguably a DoS vector, the underlying Monero blockchain would
need to be spammed with transactions to trigger it. Accordingly, it becomes
a Monero blockchain DoS vector, when this code is written on the premise
of the Monero blockchain functioning. Accordingly, it is considered handled.
If a forgery does match, it must have created the exact same outputs the
multisig would've. Accordingly, it's argued the multisig shouldn't mind.
This entire suite of code is only necessary due to the lack of outgoing
view keys, yet it's able to avoid an interactive protocol to communicate
key images on every single received output.
While this could be locked to the multisig feature, there's no practical
benefit to doing so.
* Add support for encoding Monero address to instructions
* Move Serai's Monero address encoding into serai-client
serai-client is meant to be a single library enabling using Serai. While it was
originally written as an RPC client for Serai, apps actually using Serai will
primarily be sending transactions on connected networks. Sending those
transactions require proper {In, Out}Instructions, including proper address
encoding.
Not only has address encoding been moved, yet the subxt client is now behind
a feature. coin integrations have their own features, which are on by default.
primitives are always exposed.
* Reorganize file layout a bit, add feature flags to processor
* Tidy up ETH Dockerfile
* Add Bitcoin address encoding
* Move Bitcoin::Address to serai-client's
* Comment where tweaking needs to happen
* Add an API to check if a plan was completed in a specific TX
This allows any participating signer to submit the TX ID to prevent further
signing attempts.
Also performs some API cleanup.
* Minimize FROST dependencies
* Use a seeded RNG for key gen
* Tweak keys from Key gen
* Test proper usage of Branch/Change addresses
Adds a more descriptive error to an error case in decoys, and pads Monero
payments as needed.
* Also test spending the change output
* Add queued_plans to the Scheduler
queued_plans is for payments to be issued when an amount appears, yet the
amount is currently pre-fee. One the output is actually created, the
Scheduler should be notified of the amount it was created with, moving from
queued_plans to plans under the actual amount.
Also tightens debug_asserts to asserts for invariants which may are at risk of
being exclusive to prod.
* Add missing tweak_keys call
* Correct decoy selection height handling
* Add a few log statements to the scheduler
* Simplify test's get_block_number
* Simplify, while making more robust, branch address handling in Scheduler
* Have fees deducted from payments
Corrects Monero's handling of fees when there's no change address.
Adds a DUST variable, as needed due to 1_00_000_000 not being enough to pay
its fee on Monero.
* Add comment to Monero
* Consolidate BTC/XMR prepare_send code
These aren't fully consolidated. We'd need a SignableTransaction trait for
that. This is a lot cleaner though.
* Ban integrated addresses
The reasoning why is accordingly documented.
* Tidy TODOs/dust handling
* Update README TODO
* Use a determinisitic protocol version in Monero
* Test rebuilt KeyGen machines function as expected
* Use a more robust KeyGen entropy system
* Add DB TXNs
Also load entropy from env
* Add a loop for processing messages from substrate
Allows detecting if we're behind, and if so, waiting to handle the message
* Set Monero MAX_INPUTS properly
The previous number was based on an old hard fork. With the ring size having
increased, transactions have since got larger.
* Distinguish TODOs into TODO and TODO2s
TODO2s are for after protonet
* Zeroize secret share repr in ThresholdCore write
* Work on Eventualities
Adds serialization and stops signing when an eventuality is proven.
* Use a more robust DB key schema
* Update to {k, p}256 0.12
* cargo +nightly clippy
* cargo update
* Slight message-box tweaks
* Update to recent Monero merge
* Add a Coordinator trait for communication with coordinator
* Remove KeyGenHandle for just KeyGen
While KeyGen previously accepted instructions over a channel, this breaks the
ack flow needed for coordinator communication. Now, KeyGen is the direct object
with a handle() function for messages.
Thankfully, this ended up being rather trivial for KeyGen as it has no
background tasks.
* Add a handle function to Signer
Enables determining when it's finished handling a CoordinatorMessage and
therefore creating an acknowledgement.
* Save transactions used to complete eventualities
* Use a more intelligent sleep in the signer
* Emit SignedTransaction with the first ID *we can still get from our node*
* Move Substrate message handling into the new coordinator recv loop
* Add handle function to Scanner
* Remove the plans timer
Enables ensuring the ordring on the handling of plans.
* Remove the outputs function which panicked if a precondition wasn't met
The new API only returns outputs upon satisfaction of the precondition.
* Convert SignerOrder::SignTransaction to a function
* Remove the key_gen object from sign_plans
* Refactor out get_fee/prepare_send into dedicated functions
* Save plans being signed to the DB
* Reload transactions being signed on boot
* Stop reloading TXs being signed (and report it to peers)
* Remove message-box from the processor branch
We don't use it here yet.
* cargo +nightly fmt
* Move back common/zalloc
* Update subxt to 0.27
* Zeroize ^1.5, not 1
* Update GitHub workflow
* Remove usage of SignId in completed
This commit greatly expands the usage of black_box/zeroize on bits, as it
originally should have. It is likely overkill, leading to less efficient
code generation, yet does its best to be comprehensive where comprehensiveness
is extremely annoying to achieve.
In the future, this usage of black_box may be desirable to move to its own
crate.
Credit to @AaronFeickert for identifying the original commit was incomplete.
