serai/processor/src/substrate_signer.rs

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use core::{marker::PhantomData, fmt};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use rand_core::OsRng;
use ciphersuite::group::GroupEncoding;
use frost::{
curve::Ristretto,
ThresholdKeys,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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algorithm::Algorithm,
sign::{
Writable, PreprocessMachine, SignMachine, SignatureMachine, AlgorithmMachine,
AlgorithmSignMachine, AlgorithmSignatureMachine,
},
};
use frost_schnorrkel::Schnorrkel;
use log::{info, debug, warn};
use scale::Encode;
use serai_client::{
primitives::NetworkId,
in_instructions::primitives::{Batch, SignedBatch, batch_message},
};
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use messages::coordinator::*;
use crate::{Get, DbTxn, Db};
// Generate an ID unique to a Batch
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fn batch_sign_id(network: NetworkId, id: u32) -> [u8; 5] {
(network, id).encode().try_into().unwrap()
}
#[derive(Debug)]
struct SubstrateSignerDb<D: Db>(D);
impl<D: Db> SubstrateSignerDb<D> {
fn sign_key(dst: &'static [u8], key: impl AsRef<[u8]>) -> Vec<u8> {
D::key(b"SUBSTRATE_SIGNER", dst, key)
}
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fn completed_key(id: [u8; 5]) -> Vec<u8> {
Self::sign_key(b"completed", id)
}
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fn complete(txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, id: [u8; 5]) {
txn.put(Self::completed_key(id), []);
}
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fn completed<G: Get>(getter: &G, id: [u8; 5]) -> bool {
getter.get(Self::completed_key(id)).is_some()
}
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fn attempt_key(id: &BatchSignId) -> Vec<u8> {
Self::sign_key(b"attempt", id.encode())
}
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fn attempt(txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, id: &BatchSignId) {
txn.put(Self::attempt_key(id), []);
}
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fn has_attempt<G: Get>(getter: &G, id: &BatchSignId) -> bool {
getter.get(Self::attempt_key(id)).is_some()
}
fn save_batch(txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, batch: &SignedBatch) {
txn.put(Self::sign_key(b"batch", batch.batch.block), batch.encode());
}
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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type Preprocess = <AlgorithmMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel> as PreprocessMachine>::Preprocess;
type SignatureShare = <AlgorithmSignMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel> as SignMachine<
<Schnorrkel as Algorithm<Ristretto>>::Signature,
>>::SignatureShare;
pub struct SubstrateSigner<D: Db> {
db: PhantomData<D>,
network: NetworkId,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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keys: Vec<ThresholdKeys<Ristretto>>,
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signable: HashMap<[u8; 5], Batch>,
attempt: HashMap<[u8; 5], u32>,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
preprocessing:
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HashMap<[u8; 5], (Vec<AlgorithmSignMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel>>, Vec<Preprocess>)>,
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
signing:
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HashMap<[u8; 5], (AlgorithmSignatureMachine<Ristretto, Schnorrkel>, Vec<SignatureShare>)>,
}
impl<D: Db> fmt::Debug for SubstrateSigner<D> {
fn fmt(&self, fmt: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
fmt
.debug_struct("SubstrateSigner")
.field("signable", &self.signable)
.field("attempt", &self.attempt)
.finish_non_exhaustive()
}
}
impl<D: Db> SubstrateSigner<D> {
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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pub fn new(network: NetworkId, keys: Vec<ThresholdKeys<Ristretto>>) -> SubstrateSigner<D> {
assert!(!keys.is_empty());
SubstrateSigner {
db: PhantomData,
network,
keys,
signable: HashMap::new(),
attempt: HashMap::new(),
preprocessing: HashMap::new(),
signing: HashMap::new(),
}
}
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fn verify_id(&self, id: &BatchSignId) -> Result<(), ()> {
// Check the attempt lines up
match self.attempt.get(&id.id) {
// If we don't have an attempt logged, it's because the coordinator is faulty OR because we
// rebooted OR we detected the signed batch on chain
// The latter is the expected flow for batches not actively being participated in
None => {
warn!("not attempting batch {} #{}", hex::encode(id.id), id.attempt);
Err(())?;
}
Some(attempt) => {
if attempt != &id.attempt {
warn!(
"sent signing data for batch {} #{} yet we have attempt #{}",
hex::encode(id.id),
id.attempt,
attempt
);
Err(())?;
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
#[must_use]
async fn attempt(
&mut self,
txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>,
id: [u8; 5],
attempt: u32,
) -> Option<ProcessorMessage> {
// See above commentary for why this doesn't emit SignedBatch
if SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::completed(txn, id) {
return None;
}
// Check if we're already working on this attempt
if let Some(curr_attempt) = self.attempt.get(&id) {
if curr_attempt >= &attempt {
warn!(
"told to attempt {} #{} yet we're already working on {}",
hex::encode(id),
attempt,
curr_attempt
);
return None;
}
}
// Start this attempt
let block = if let Some(batch) = self.signable.get(&id) {
batch.block
} else {
warn!("told to attempt signing a batch we aren't currently signing for");
return None;
};
// Delete any existing machines
self.preprocessing.remove(&id);
self.signing.remove(&id);
// Update the attempt number
self.attempt.insert(id, attempt);
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let id = BatchSignId { key: self.keys[0].group_key().to_bytes(), id, attempt };
info!("signing batch {} #{}", hex::encode(id.id), id.attempt);
// If we reboot mid-sign, the current design has us abort all signs and wait for latter
// attempts/new signing protocols
// This is distinct from the DKG which will continue DKG sessions, even on reboot
// This is because signing is tolerant of failures of up to 1/3rd of the group
// The DKG requires 100% participation
// While we could apply similar tricks as the DKG (a seeded RNG) to achieve support for
// reboots, it's not worth the complexity when messing up here leaks our secret share
//
// Despite this, on reboot, we'll get told of active signing items, and may be in this
// branch again for something we've already attempted
//
// Only run if this hasn't already been attempted
// TODO: This isn't complete as this txn may not be committed with the expected timing
if SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::has_attempt(txn, &id) {
warn!(
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"already attempted batch {}, attempt #{}. this is an error if we didn't reboot",
hex::encode(id.id),
id.attempt
);
return None;
}
SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::attempt(txn, &id);
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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let mut machines = vec![];
let mut preprocesses = vec![];
let mut serialized_preprocesses = vec![];
for keys in &self.keys {
// b"substrate" is a literal from sp-core
let machine = AlgorithmMachine::new(Schnorrkel::new(b"substrate"), keys.clone());
let (machine, preprocess) = machine.preprocess(&mut OsRng);
machines.push(machine);
serialized_preprocesses.push(preprocess.serialize());
preprocesses.push(preprocess);
}
self.preprocessing.insert(id.id, (machines, preprocesses));
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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// Broadcast our preprocesses
Some(ProcessorMessage::BatchPreprocess { id, block, preprocesses: serialized_preprocesses })
}
#[must_use]
pub async fn sign(
&mut self,
txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>,
batch: Batch,
) -> Option<ProcessorMessage> {
debug_assert_eq!(self.network, batch.network);
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let id = batch_sign_id(batch.network, batch.id);
if SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::completed(txn, id) {
debug!("Sign batch order for ID we've already completed signing");
// See batch_signed for commentary on why this simply returns
return None;
}
self.signable.insert(id, batch);
self.attempt(txn, id, 0).await
}
#[must_use]
pub async fn handle(
&mut self,
txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>,
msg: CoordinatorMessage,
) -> Option<messages::ProcessorMessage> {
match msg {
CoordinatorMessage::BatchPreprocesses { id, mut preprocesses } => {
if self.verify_id(&id).is_err() {
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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let (machines, our_preprocesses) = match self.preprocessing.remove(&id.id) {
// Either rebooted or RPC error, or some invariant
None => {
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warn!(
"not preprocessing for {}. this is an error if we didn't reboot",
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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hex::encode(id.id),
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);
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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Some(preprocess) => preprocess,
};
let preprocesses = match preprocesses
.drain()
.map(|(l, preprocess)| {
let mut preprocess_ref = preprocess.as_ref();
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
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let res = machines[0]
.read_preprocess::<&[u8]>(&mut preprocess_ref)
.map(|preprocess| (l, preprocess));
if !preprocess_ref.is_empty() {
todo!("malicious signer: extra bytes");
}
res
})
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
.collect::<Result<HashMap<_, _>, _>>()
{
Ok(preprocesses) => preprocesses,
Err(e) => todo!("malicious signer: {:?}", e),
};
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
// Only keep a single machine as we only need one to get the signature
let mut signature_machine = None;
let mut shares = vec![];
let mut serialized_shares = vec![];
for (m, machine) in machines.into_iter().enumerate() {
let mut preprocesses = preprocesses.clone();
for (i, our_preprocess) in our_preprocesses.clone().into_iter().enumerate() {
if i != m {
assert!(preprocesses.insert(self.keys[i].params().i(), our_preprocess).is_none());
}
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
let (machine, share) =
match machine.sign(preprocesses, &batch_message(&self.signable[&id.id])) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => todo!("malicious signer: {:?}", e),
};
if m == 0 {
signature_machine = Some(machine);
}
let mut share_bytes = [0; 32];
share_bytes.copy_from_slice(&share.serialize());
serialized_shares.push(share_bytes);
shares.push(share);
}
self.signing.insert(id.id, (signature_machine.unwrap(), shares));
// Broadcast our shares
Some((ProcessorMessage::BatchShare { id, shares: serialized_shares }).into())
}
CoordinatorMessage::BatchShares { id, mut shares } => {
if self.verify_id(&id).is_err() {
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
let (machine, our_shares) = match self.signing.remove(&id.id) {
// Rebooted, RPC error, or some invariant
None => {
// If preprocessing has this ID, it means we were never sent the preprocess by the
// coordinator
if self.preprocessing.contains_key(&id.id) {
panic!("never preprocessed yet signing?");
}
2023-04-11 10:06:17 +00:00
warn!(
"not preprocessing for {}. this is an error if we didn't reboot",
hex::encode(id.id)
);
return None;
}
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
Some(signing) => signing,
};
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
let mut shares = match shares
.drain()
.map(|(l, share)| {
let mut share_ref = share.as_ref();
let res = machine.read_share::<&[u8]>(&mut share_ref).map(|share| (l, share));
if !share_ref.is_empty() {
todo!("malicious signer: extra bytes");
}
res
})
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
.collect::<Result<HashMap<_, _>, _>>()
{
Ok(shares) => shares,
Err(e) => todo!("malicious signer: {:?}", e),
};
Support multiple key shares per validator (#416) * Update the coordinator to give key shares based on weight, not based on existence Participants are now identified by their starting index. While this compiles, the following is unimplemented: 1) A conversion for DKG `i` values. It assumes the threshold `i` values used will be identical for the MuSig signature used to confirm the DKG. 2) Expansion from compressed values to full values before forwarding to the processor. * Add a fn to the DkgConfirmer to convert `i` values as needed Also removes TODOs regarding Serai ensuring validator key uniqueness + validity. The current infra achieves both. * Have the Tributary DB track participation by shares, not by count * Prevent a node from obtaining 34% of the maximum amount of key shares This is actually mainly intended to set a bound on message sizes in the coordinator. Message sizes are amplified by the amount of key shares held, so setting an upper bound on said amount lets it determine constants. While that upper bound could be 150, that'd be unreasonable and increase the potential for DoS attacks. * Correct the mechanism to detect if sufficient accumulation has occured It used to check if the latest accumulation hit the required threshold. Now, accumulations may jump past the required threshold. The required mechanism is to check the threshold wasn't prior met and is now met. * Finish updating the coordinator to handle a multiple key share per validator environment * Adjust stategy re: preventing noce reuse in DKG Confirmer * Add TODOs regarding dropped transactions, add possible TODO fix * Update tests/coordinator This doesn't add new multi-key-share tests, it solely updates the existing single key-share tests to compile and run, with the necessary fixes to the coordinator. * Update processor key_gen to handle generating multiple key shares at once * Update SubstrateSigner * Update signer, clippy * Update processor tests * Update processor docker tests
2023-11-04 23:26:13 +00:00
for (i, our_share) in our_shares.into_iter().enumerate().skip(1) {
assert!(shares.insert(self.keys[i].params().i(), our_share).is_none());
}
let sig = match machine.complete(shares) {
Ok(res) => res,
Err(e) => todo!("malicious signer: {:?}", e),
};
info!("signed batch {} with attempt #{}", hex::encode(id.id), id.attempt);
let batch =
SignedBatch { batch: self.signable.remove(&id.id).unwrap(), signature: sig.into() };
// Save the batch in case it's needed for recovery
SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::save_batch(txn, &batch);
SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::complete(txn, id.id);
// Stop trying to sign for this batch
assert!(self.attempt.remove(&id.id).is_some());
assert!(self.preprocessing.remove(&id.id).is_none());
assert!(self.signing.remove(&id.id).is_none());
Some((messages::substrate::ProcessorMessage::SignedBatch { batch }).into())
}
CoordinatorMessage::BatchReattempt { id } => {
self.attempt(txn, id.id, id.attempt).await.map(Into::into)
}
}
}
pub fn batch_signed(&mut self, txn: &mut D::Transaction<'_>, id: u32) {
2023-11-07 00:50:32 +00:00
let sign_id = batch_sign_id(self.network, id);
// Stop trying to sign for this batch
SubstrateSignerDb::<D>::complete(txn, sign_id);
self.signable.remove(&sign_id);
self.attempt.remove(&sign_id);
self.preprocessing.remove(&sign_id);
self.signing.remove(&sign_id);
// This doesn't emit SignedBatch because it doesn't have access to the SignedBatch
// This function is expected to only be called once Substrate acknowledges this block,
// which means its batch must have been signed
// While a successive batch's signing would also cause this block to be acknowledged, Substrate
// guarantees a batch's ordered inclusion
// This also doesn't return any messages since all mutation from the Batch being signed happens
// on the substrate::CoordinatorMessage::SubstrateBlock message (which SignedBatch is meant to
// end up triggering)
}
}