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research-lab/publications/standards/Ruffct.txt
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BOOTLE-RUFFING RINGCT SCHEME
----------------------------
Sublinear-sized ring signatures without trusted
set-ups or bilinear pairings. Summarized for
Monero Research Lab by B Goodell
We describe sublinear-sized ring signatures for use in cryptocurrency. This
scheme was first sent to MRL by Ruffing and co-authors. These results use
tools first described by Bootle, et al in the paper "Short Accountable Ring
Signatures Based on DDH," 2015 European Symposium on Research in Computer Sec-
urity, use a "vanilla" elliptic curve multisignature scheme first described by
Bellare and Neven in "Multi-signatures in the plain public-key model and a gen-\
eral forking lemma," 2006 Proceedings of the 13th, ACM conference on Computer and
Communications Security.
This is a living document and will be updated. In section I, the introduction,
we introduce the general idea of the scheme together with preliminary stuff.
We have a section on homomorphic commitments and encryption, a section on
ordinary multi-signatures, and a section on the NIZK proof systems presented
by Bootle et al. In section II, we present pseudocode describing Ruffing's
scheme. In section III, references.
I. INTRODUCTION
The scheme presented by Ruffing roughly works as follows, exploiting homo-
morphic commitments. Sender Sally uses L of her txnout keys to send some amount
stored in a commitment to receiver Roy. Sally wishes to implicate N-1 other
senders, so she constructs an LxN matrix of public keys (L = # key images used,
N = ring size) by picking random public keys from the anonymity set; she stores
her own pubkeys in some secret column i*. Sally demonstrates that the output
amount from her secret column and the input amount are the same without re-
vealing that column or the amounts by using a NIZK proof from the Bootle paper
to show that at least one commitment in a vector opens to zero. In the constru-
ction of this proof, she uses information from her secret keys, which binds the
index she can open to zero to the column of pubkeys in the matrix without re-
vealing which index. She uses her secret keys to construct a multisignature on
the Bootle proof that is verifiable with the key images only. This way, her
signature consists of some random information, a Bootle proof, and a multi-
signature on the Bootle proof. The multisignature is efficient in construction,
verification, and storage. The Bootle proof, for a vector of commitments of
length N = n^m, takes O(n*m) (roughly) for construction, verification, and sto-
rage. For a ring size N=n^m, for a fixed ring base n (say all ring sizes are
powers of n=16), the Ruffing scheme is approximately log(N).
The scheme consists of four algorithms, KEYGEN, SPEND, and VER, which we des-
cribe in the next section. The scheme uses multisignatures and Bootle proofs
as subroutines, and hammers on homomorphic commitment very hard, so we describe
these in this section as "pre-requisites". The Bootle method is an interactive
sigma protocol that uses another interactive sigma protocol as a subroutine. We
made these both non-interactive and present the pseudocode in PROVE1, VALID1,
PROVE2, VALID2 (the Ruffing scheme uses PROVE2, VALID2, which use PROVE1,
VALID1). The Ruffing scheme did not specify a multisignature scheme; we desc-
ribe here the pseudocode for the Bellare-Neven multisignature scheme, KEYGEN*,
SIG*, VER*.
a. Commitments and Encryption
To commit to a scalar x with some random mask r, we use the following options:
COMp(x; r) := rG + xHp(xG) # Unconditionally hiding Pedersen
COMeg(x; r) := (rG + xHp(xG), rG) # Computationally hiding El Gamal
We may extend these to a vector/array/matrix B=[b[j][i]; j=0...m-1,i=0..n-1]:
COMp(B; r) := rG + b[0][0]Hp(b[0][0]G) + ... + b[m-1][n-1]Hp(b[m-1][n-1]G)
and we can similarly lift this to an El Gamal commitment by appending rG. In
the first case, we refer to x or the matrix B as the "data under commitment"
and the value r as the "mask." Given a Pedersen commitment c, we open c by
revealing x and r, where a verifier checks that c == rG + xHp(xG). Given an
El Gamal commitment (C1, C2), we open by revealing r and x, a verifier
computes C2' = rG, C1' = rG + xHp(xG) from these, and lastly checks that
C1 == C1' and C2 == C2'.
These commitments are additive under the following definition:
COMp(x; r) + COMp(x'; r') := COMp(x+x'; r+r')
COMeg(x; r) + COMeg(x'; r') := COMeg(x+x'; r+r')
b. Ordinary Multi-signature
The Ruffing scheme utilizes as a subroutine an efficient multisignature scheme,
consisting of three algorithms (KEYGEN*, SIG*, VER*). We present a scheme based
on the scheme described by Bellare and Neven in 2006 [3] (which is, in turn,
based on Schnorr signatures). Our variation of the B&N scheme is that it is
executed only by one party holding all the keys, so interaction is unnecessary.
We use a group of prime order q. Ruffing's scheme assumes that the Decisional
Diffie-Hellman assumption holds, so there is no harm in making this assumption
for the ordinary multi-signature scheme. Let G be a commonly known generator of
the group. Let Hs be a hash function that produces a scalar in Zq. Let Zq denote
the integers modulo q.
KEYGEN*: Each user selects x at random from Zq. The secret key is x. The
public key is X=xG. Output (sk,pk) = (x,X).
SIG*: Take as input a message M and a list of private keys L = x[0], x[1],
..., x[n-1]. Let L' be the associated list of public keys X[0], ..., X[n-1],
and assume L' is lexicographically ordered.
1) Compute L* = H(L').
2) For each i=0,1,...,n-1, select r[i] at random from Zq.
3) Compute r=r[0]+r[1]+...+r[n-1] and R=rG.
4) For each i=0,1,...,n-1:
i) Compute c[i] := Hs(X[i], R, L*, M)
ii) Compute s[i] := r[i] + x[i]*c[i]
5) Compute s = s[0] + ... + s[n-1].
6) Output the signature sigma = (R, s)
VER*: Take as input a message M, a set of keys L' = X[0], ..., X[n-1], and a
signature sigma = (R,s).
1) Compute L* = H(L')
2) For each i=0,1,...,n-1, compute c[i] = Hs(X[i], R, L*, M)
3) Accept if and only if sG = R + c[0]*X[0] + ... + c[n-1]*X[n-1]
c. NIZK Proofs
====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====|====
Lastly, the scheme also utilizes the following algorithms, (PROVE1, VALID1),
and (PROVE2, VALID2), which are NIZK prove-and-verify algorithm pairs. These
use the Fiat-Shamir transformation to make the zero-knowledge sigma protocols
presented by Bootle non-interactive under the random oracle model. The second
algorithm requires the usage of a helper algorithm, COEFs, which computes
coefficients of certain polynomials.
The pair (PROVE1, VALID1) allows a prover to demonstrate that each row of a
matrix is a set of commitments to bits that open to exactly one 1 (the rest
open to 0). The implementation works like this:
PROVE1: Take as input ([[b[0][0], b[0][1], ..., b[m-1][n-1]] ], r).
1) Select r[A], r[C], r[D] at random from Zq.
2) For each j=0, 1,..., m-1 and for each i=1,2,...,n-1, select a[j][i]
from Zq at random.
3) For each j, compute a[j][0] = -a[j][1] - a[j][2] - ... - a[j][n-1].
4) Compute A:=COMp(a[0][0], ..., a[m-1][n-1]; r[A])
5) For each j=0,...,m-1 and i=0,...,n-1, compute the values
c[j][i] := a[j][i]*(1-2*b[j][i])
d[j][i] := -a[j][i]^2
6) Compute the commitments C:=COMp(c[0][0], ..., c[m-1][n-1]; r[C]) and
D:=COMp(d[0][0],...,d[m-1][n-1]; r[D]).
7) Compute x := Hs(A,C,D)
8) For each j=0,...,m-1, i=0,...,n-1, compute f[j][i]:=b[j][i]*x + a[j][i]
9) Compute z[A]:= r*x + r[A], z[C]:=r[C]*x+r[D]
10) Output proof P:=A,C,D, f[0][1],f[0][2], ..., f[0][n-1], f[1][1],
f[1][2], ..., f[1][n-1], ..., f[m-1][1], ..., f[m-1][n-1], z[A], z[C].
When PROVE1 is run as a subroutine for PROVE2, the prover will also output the
values of each a[j][i]; these are not part of the formal proof, but they are
used elsewhere. Note that we do not output the first column of the matrix F
whose (ji)^th entry is f[j][i]. Essentially here, we are taking a matrix, we
are showing each row sums to 1 and each element satisfies the equation
b[j][i]*(1-b[j][i]) = 0.
VALID1: Take as input B (the prover wishes to demonstrate B is a commitment to
the values b[j][i] as described in PROVE1) and proof P.
1) If A,B,C,D are each elliptic curve points, both z[A] and z[C] are ele-
ments of Zq, and each f[j][i] are elements of Zq, compute the value
x := Hs(A,C,D). Else, output FAIL and terminate.
2) For each j=0, ..., m-1, compute f[j][0] = x-f[j][1] - ... - f[j][n-1].
3) For each j=0, ..., m-1, i=0,...,n-1, compute each of the values
f'[j][i] := f[j][i]*(x-f[j][i])
4) Return 1 if and only if all of the conditions hold true:
i) For each j=0, ..., m-1, f[j][0]=x-f[j][1]-f[j][2]- ... -f[j][n-1]
ii) xB + A = COMp(f[0][0], ..., f[m-1][n-1]; z[A])
iii) xC + D = COMp(f'[0][0], ..., f'[m-1][n-1]; z[C])
(otherwise return 0).
The pair (PROVE2, VALID2) allows a prover to demonstrate that a sequence of
commitments contains at least one commitment to 1. The implementation works
like this:
PROVE2: Take as input a sequence of values c[0], c[1], ... c[N-1] for
some N= n^m, a secret index i* in this list corresponding to a commitment that
opens to 1, and a random scalar r in Zq. For all integers j, i, define the
Kronecker delta function as DELTA(j,i) := 1 if j=i and 0 otherwise.
1) For k=0, 1, ..., m-1, select random coefficient u[k] at random from Zq.
2) Select r[B] at random from Zq.
3) Write i* in n-ary i* = i*[0] + i*[1]*(n) + i*[2]*(n^2) + ...
... + i*[m-1]*(n^(m-1)), and represent i* as the sequence i*[j].
4) For each j=0, 1, ..., m-1 and i=0, 1, ..., n-1, define the values
d[j][i] := DELTA(i*[j],i).
5) Compute B:=COMp(d[0][0], ..., d[m-1][n-1]; r[B]).
6) Prover runs PROVE1 and stores the output as the list of data
P <- PROVE1(B, (d[0][0], ..., d[m-1][n-1], r[B])) and stores the values
a[j][i] for use in the next step. Note the prover receives A, C, D from
PROVE1, all the values f[j][i], and the values z[A], z[C].
7) coefs <- COEFS(a[0][0], ..., a[m-1][n-1], i*)
8) For k=0, ..., m-1:
i) G[k] := ENCeg(0, u[k]) # = (rHp(G), rG)
ii) For i=0, ..., N-1, update G[k] by multiplying:
G[k]=G[k]*(co[i]^coefs[i][k])
=(G[k][1]+coefs[i][k]*co[i][1], G[k][2]+coefs[i][k]*co[i][2])
The final value for each G[k] from step 8 can be written explicitly:
G[k]=(rHp(G)+coefs[0][k]*co[0][1] + ... +coefs[n-1][k]*co[n-1][1],
rG+coefs[0][k]*co[0][2] + ... +coefs[n-1][k]*co[n-1][2])
9) Compute x' = Hs(A,B,C,D, G[0], ..., G[m-1]).
10) Compute z:= r*(x')^m - u[m-1]*(x')^(m-1) - ... - u[1]*(x')^1 - u[0]
11) Output proof P':=P, B, G[0], ..., G[m-1], z.
VALID2: Take as input a list of N El Gamal commitments co[0], ..., co[N-1] and a
proof P' parsed as P, B, G[0],...,G[m-1], where P is a proof parsed as
P = A,C,D, f[0][1],f[0][2], ..., f[m-1][n-1], z[A], z[C].
1) If A,B,C,D, each G[k] are all elliptic curve points, and if z[A], z[C],
and z are elements of Zq, and if each f[j][i] are elements of Zq, and
if VALID1(B,P)=1, then compute the value
x' := Hs(A, B, C,D,G[0],...,G[m-1]).
Else, output FAIL and terminate.
2) Compute c := ENCeg(0,z).
3) For each k=0,...,m-1, compute
G[k]^(-x^k) := (-x^k*G[k][1],-x^k*G[k][2]).
4) Compute (G[0]^(-(x')^0))*(G[1]^(-(x')^1))*...*(G[m-1]^(-(x')^(m-1))
which explicitly is the ordered pair (G*[1], G*[2]):
(-G[0][1] - (x')G[1][1] - ... - (x')^(m-1)G[m-1][1],
-G[0][2] - (x')G[1][2] - ... - (x')^(m-1)G[m-1][2] )
5) For each j=0, ..., m-1, i=0,...,n-1, compute each of the values
f[j][0] := x' - f[j][1] - f[j][2] - ... - f[j][n-1].
6) For each i=0,...,N-1, write i in n-ary arithmetic as usual as
i = i[0] + i[1]*n + i[2]*(n^2) + ... + i[m-1]*(n^(m-1)). Compute the
values g[i] := f[0][i[0]]*f[1][i[1]]*...*f[m-1][i[m-1] and the
commitments co*[i] := co[i]^g[i] = (g[i]*co[i][1], g[i]*co[i][2]).
7) Compute (co*[0])*(co*[1])*...*(co*[N-1]) which ends up as the ordered
pair (c**[1], c**[2])
(c*[0][1] + c*[1][1] + ... c*[N-1][1], c*[0][2] + ... c*[N-1][2])
8) Compute c'=(c**[1],c**[2])*(G*[1],G*[2])=(c**[1]+G*[1], c**[2] + G*[2]).
9) Return 1 if and only if c' == c and 0 otherwise.
COEFS: We split this into two algorithms. The outer layer, COEFS, is specific
to the Ruffing scheme. The inner layer, COEFPROD, takes two sequences of coef-
ficients as input, representing polynomials, and outputs a sequence of coef-
ficients of the resulting product of those two polynomials. We denote the
Discrete Fourier Transform as DFT, and the inverse IDFT.
COEFS takes as input a matrix A = a[0][0], ..., a[m-1][n-1] and index i* such
that 0 <= i* < n^m. We decompose 0 <= i* < N into the n-ary representation
i* = i*[0] + i*[1]*n + ... + i*[m-1]*n^(m-1)
In this decomposition, for each 0 <= j < m, we have the constraint
0 <= i*[j] < n (otherwise we could include the "runoff" above n into the co-
efficient one index higher). For index 0 <= k < N we again decompose into
the n-ary representation
k = k[0] + k[1]*n + ... + k[m-1]*n^(m-1)
where for each index 0 <= j < m (where N=n^m), we have 0 <= k[j] < n. We rep-
resent the polynomial defined by DELTA(i*[j],k[j])*x + a[j][k[j]] as an array
q[j][k] = [a[j][k[j]], DELTA(i*[j],k[j])]
We then do the following:
1) For each k = 0, ..., N-1:
i) Compute coefList[k] : = q[0][k]
ii) For 1<=j<m update coefList[k] = COEFPROD(coefList[k], q[j][k[j]])
2) Output coefList[0], coefList[1], ..., coefList[N-1].
COEFPROD: Take as input lists c[0],...,c[n-1] and d[0],...,d[n-1]. If these are
not the same length, the shorter one may be padded with zeros at the end. We
can parse the polynomial p(x) = c[0] + c[1]*x + ... + c[n-1]*x^(n-1) and the
polynomial q(x) = d[0] + d[1]*x + ... + d[n-1]*x^(n-1). Let m = 2n-1.
1) Compute P := DFT(p), Q := DFT(q). Both P and Q should have length m and
This should take O(n*log(n)) time.
2) Compute PQ := [P[0]*Q[0], P[1]*Q[1], ...]. This should take O(n) time.
3) Compute t:= IDFT(PQ) = t[0], t[1], ..., t[m]. This should take
O(n*log(n)).
4) Output t as the coefficients of p(x)*q(x).
II. BOOTLE-RUFFING RINGCT SCHEME
We are now in a position to present Ruffing's scheme in its entirety. We select
a group of prime order q under which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption
holds. Let G be a commonly known generator of the group. Let Hp be a hash func-
tion that produces an elliptic curve point. Let Hs be a hash function that prod-
uces a scalar in Zq. Let Zq denote the integers modulo q.
KEYGEN:
1) Select r,r' randomly from Zq.
2) Set sk := (r,r')
3) Set ki := r'G
4) Set pk := ENCeg(ki,r)
5) Output (sk,ki,pk).
SPEND: Take as input an (L x N) matrix of public keys PK written as
PK = [pk[j][i]; j=0,1,...,L-1, i=0,1,...,N-1], such that the signer knows the
associated secret keys of the column with (secret) index i*, a commitment for
each column co = co[0], co[1], ...., co[N-1] such that co[i*] opens to zero, a
set of secret keys sk = sk[0],sk[1],...,sk[L-1], a set of key images ki, a
message M, and a random scalar s from Zq. Write each secret key as
sk[i]=(r[i],r'[i]).
1) Compute co' := sG.
2) Set f := (ki, PK, co, co', M)
3) Compute (c, f') := SUB(f)
4) Compute s' := s + r[0]*f'[0] + r[1]*f'[1] + ... + r[L-1]*f'[L-1]
5) Compute sigma[1] := PROVE2(c, i*,s')
6) Compute sigma[2] := SIG*((r'[0], r'[1], ..., r'[L-1]), (sigma[1], f))
7) Output signature = (co', sigma[1], sigma[2])
SUB: Take as input key images ki = ki[0], ki[1], ..., ki[L-1], a matrix of
public keys PK = [pk[j][i]; j=1,2,...,L, i=1,2,...,N], a set of Pedersen com-
mitments co = co[1], ..., co[N], an elliptic curve point co', and message M.
1) For j=0, 1, ..., L-1:
i) Compute pkz[j] := (ki[j],0)
ii) Compute f[j] := Hs(ki[j],f,j)
2) For i=0, 1, ..., N-1 do:
i) Set c[i] := (co[i], co')
ii) For j=0,1, ..., L-1, update c[i] = c[i]*(pk[j][i]/pkz[j])^(f[j])
3) Output (c,f) where c = c[0], ..., c[N-1], f=f[0], ..., f[L-1].
Note that due to commitment arithmetic the result c[i] is written explicitly as:
(co[i]+f[0]*(pk[0][i][1]-pkz[0][1])+ ... +f[L-1]*(pk[L-1][i][1]-pkz[L-1][1]),
co'+f[0]*(pk[0][i][2]-pkz[0][2])+ ... +f[L-1]*(pk[L-1][i][2]-pkz[L-1][2]))
VER: This verifies a ring signature. Take as input a set of key images
ki = ki[0], ki[1], ..., ki[L-1], a matrix of public keys PK, commitments
co = co[0], ..., co[N-1], an elliptic curve point co', a message M, and a sig-
nature from SPEND, signature = (co', sigma[1], sigma[2]).
1) Set f := (ki, PK, co, co', M).
2) Compute (c, f') := SUB(f) (we only use c for verification)
3) Return 1 iff
(i) the signature sigma[2] on message (sigma[1], f) passes VER* with
keys ki, i.e. VER*((sigma[1],f), ki, sigma[2])==1
(ii) the proof sigma[1] is a valid NIZK proof that one of the commit-
ments in co open to 0, i.e. VALID2(sigma[1], co) == 1.
Return 0 otherwise.
III. Specific Example
Here is a quick concrete example using integer scalars of the Bootle NIZK
proof that a commitment opens appropriately* as in PROVE1/VALID1 above.
We start with random data we wish to commit to. Each entry must be
a bit and each row must sum to 1 if VALID1 is to validate the proof. We
may as well go with the identity matrix:
[ [b[0][0], b[0][1] ], = [ [1, 0],
[b[1][0], b[1][1] ] ] [0, 1] ]
We compute the commitment B = COMp([b[j][i]], rB):
B = rB*G + 1*H[0,0] + 0*H[0,1] + 0*H[1,0] + 1*H[1,1]
We pick random a[0][1], say 7, and a random a[1][1], say -5. We compute a[j][0]
as -sum(a[j][i]):
[ [a[0][0], a[0][1] ], = [ [-7, 7],
[a[1][0], a[1][1] ] ] [ 5, -5] ]
We compute commitment A = COMp( [a[j][i]], rA):
A = rA*G - 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] - 5*H[1,1]
We compute c[j][i] = a[j][i]*(1-2b[j][i]), d[j][i] = -a[j][i]^2:
[ [c[0][0], c[0][1] ], = [ [7, 7],
[c[1][0], c[1][1] ] ] [5, 5] ]
[ [d[0][0], d[0][1] ], = [ [-49, -49],
[d[1][0], d[1][1] ] ] [-25, -25] ]
We compute commitments C and D:
C = rC*G + 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] + 5*H[1,1]
D = rD*G - 49*H[0,0] - 49*H[0,1] - 25*H[1,0] - 25*H[1,1]
We compute x = Hs(A,C,D). We compute f[j][i] = b[j][i]*x + a[j][i]:
[ [f[0][0], f[0][1] ], = [ [x-7, 7],
[f[1][0], f[1][1] ] ] [ 5, x-5] ]
We compute zA = rB*x + rA, zC = rC*x + rD and send [A,B,C,D, zA, zC] together
with all columns except the first column of [f[j][i]] as our NIZK proof that B
is a well-formed Bootle commitment*. Now a verifier receives the left hand side
of the following system of equations
A = rA*G - 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] - 5*H[1,1]
B = rB*G + 1*H[0,0] + 0*H[0,1] + 0*H[1,0] + 1*H[1,1]
C = rC*G + 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] + 5*H[1,1]
D = rD*G - 49*H[0,0] - 49*H[0,1] - 25*H[1,0] - 25*H[1,1]
f[0][1] = 7
f[1][1] = x-5
zA = rB*x + rA
zC = rC*x + rD
Using the left hand side only, the verifier computes:
x := H(A,C,D)
f[0][0] := x - f[0][1]
f[1][0] := x - f[1][1]
Now the verifier computes the matrix [f'[j][i]] = [f[j][i]*(x-f[j][i])]:
[ [f'[0][0], f'[0][1] ], = [ [f[0][0]*(x-f[0][0]), f[0][1]*(x-f[0][1])],
[f'[1][0], f'[1][1] ] ] [ f[1][0]*(x-f[1][0]), f[1][1]*(x-f[1][1])] ]
and computes the commitments COM(f[j][i], zA), COM(f'[j][i], zC):
COM( f[j][i], zA) := zA*G + f[0][0]*H[0,0] + f[0][1]*H[0,1] + ...
COM(f'[j][i], zC) := zC*G + f'[0][0]*H[0,0] + f'[0][1]*H[0,1] + ...
The verifier can now check whether
i) xB + A =? COM(f[j][i], zA)
ii) xC + D =? COM(f'[j][i], zC)
Note that if the verifier received the values as specified above, she computes
the same f[0][0], f[1][0] as the prover used, x-7 and 5, so the verifier
obtains the matrix
[ [f[0][0], f[0][1] ], = [ [x-7, 7],
[f[1][0], f[1][1] ] ] [ 5, x-5] ]
and computes
[ [f'[0][0], f'[0][1] ], = [ [7(x-7), 7(x-7)],
[f'[1][0], f'[1][1] ] ] [5(x-5), 5(x-5)] ]
And thus computes the commitments
COM([ f[j][i]], zA) = zA*G + (x-7)*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] + (x-5)*H[1,1]
COM([f'[j][i]], zC) = zC*G + 7(x-7)*H[0,0] + 7(x-7)*H[0,1] + 5*(x-5)*H[1,0]
+ 5(x-5)*H[1,1]
On the other hand, she is given B and A, and with her x, she can compute xB+A:
xB + A = x(rB*G + 1*H[0,0] + 0*H[0,1] + 0*H[1,0] + 1*H[1,1])
+ (rA*G - 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] - 5*H[1,1])
= (rB*x + rA)*G + (x-7)*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] + (x-5)*H[1,1]
Lo and behold, this matches COM([ f[j][i]], zA). She can do the same with C,D:
xC + D = x(rC*G + 7*H[0,0] + 7*H[0,1] + 5*H[1,0] + 5*H[1,1])
+ (rD*G - 49*H[0,0] - 49*H[0,1] - 25*H[1,0] - 25*H[1,1])
= (rC*x + rD)*G + 7(x-7)*H[0,0] + 7(x-7)*H[0,1] + 5(x-5)*H[1,0]
+ 5*(x-5)*H[1,1]
Voila!
IV. REFERENCES
[1] Ruffing, Thyagarajan, Ronge, Schröder. "Boosting Private Payments in
Monero: New Attacks, Exact Cryptographic Definitions, and Sublinear
Ring Signatures." In preparation.
[2] Bootle, Cerulli, Chaidos, Ghadafi, Groth, Petit. "Short accountable
ring signatures based on DDH." European Symposium on Research in
Computer Security. Springer, Cham, 2015.
[3] Bellare, Mihir, and Gregory Neven. "Multi-signatures in the plain
public-key model and a general forking lemma." Proceedings of the 13th
ACM conference on Computer and communications security. ACM, 2006.
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