Commit graph

150 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
moneromooo-monero
bacf0a1e2f
bulletproofs: add aggregated verification
Ported from sarang's java code
2018-09-11 13:37:32 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
e895c3def1
make straus cached mode thread safe, and add tests for it 2018-09-11 13:37:31 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
7f48bf05d7
multiexp: bos coster now works for just one point 2018-09-11 13:37:30 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
9ce9f8caf6
bulletproofs: add multi output bulletproofs to rct 2018-09-11 13:37:28 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
939bc22332
add Straus multiexp 2018-09-11 13:37:25 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
9ff6e6a0a7
ringct: add bos coster multiexp 2018-09-11 13:37:24 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
e9164bb38b
bulletproofs: misc optimizations
Use double mults where possible, avoid conversions, simplify
2018-09-11 13:37:23 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
aacfd6e370
bulletproofs: multi-output bulletproofs 2018-09-11 13:37:17 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
7c8f95d3e2
ringct: make conversion functions return const refs
This might avoid unnecessary copies.

Reported by stoffu
2018-09-04 18:28:20 +00:00
luigi1111
5f1bbe3bce
Merge pull request #4268
1f2409e Do memwipe for critical secret keys copied to rct::key (stoffu)
2018-09-04 13:16:04 -05:00
moneromooo-monero
d2e26c23f3
add and use constant time 32 byte equality function 2018-08-23 07:56:51 +00:00
luigi1111
a5d21be843
Merge pull request #4210
4616cf2 Fixed ZMQ-RPC for transactions and GET_BLOCKS_FAST (vtnerd)
2018-08-22 20:47:28 -05:00
stoffu
1f2409e9e2
Do memwipe for critical secret keys copied to rct::key 2018-08-16 22:26:30 +09:00
Lee Clagett
4616cf2641 Fixed ZMQ-RPC for transactions and GET_BLOCKS_FAST 2018-08-02 07:30:20 +00:00
luigi1111
3fde902394
Merge pull request #4097
61caab8 crypto: remove slight bias in key generation due to modulo (moneromooo-monero)
2018-07-27 14:23:54 -05:00
luigi1111
94ed562148
Merge pull request #4045
7cdd147 Changed URLs to HTTPS (einsteinsfool)
2018-07-19 13:56:38 -05:00
moneromooo-monero
61caab8a8c
crypto: remove slight bias in key generation due to modulo 2018-07-05 09:18:01 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
2771a18e85
threadpool: allow leaf functions to run concurrently
Decrease the number of worker threads by one to account
for the fact the calling thread acts as a worker thread now
2018-06-26 22:15:22 +01:00
einsteinsfool
7cdd147da5 Changed URLs to HTTPS 2018-06-23 21:15:29 +02:00
moneromooo-monero
01cc978722
ringct: remove an unnecessary scalarmultBase in zeroCommit 2018-06-06 10:14:36 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
5f19384729
ringct: do not show verification errors with default settings 2018-05-04 08:27:55 +01:00
Riccardo Spagni
cb72b85bbf
Merge pull request #3372
c3e23b2d ringct: 17% improvement in Borromean signature verification (moneromooo-monero)
2018-03-14 16:06:16 +02:00
stoffu
27a196b126
device: untangle cyclic depenency
When #3303 was merged, a cyclic dependency chain was generated:

    libdevice <- libcncrypto <- libringct <- libdevice

This was because libdevice needs access to a set of basic crypto operations
implemented in libringct such as scalarmultBase(), while libringct also needs
access to abstracted crypto operations implemented in libdevice such as
ecdhEncode(). To untangle this cyclic dependency chain, this patch splits libringct
into libringct_basic and libringct, where the basic crypto ops previously in
libringct are moved into libringct_basic. The cyclic dependency is now resolved
thanks to this separation:

    libcncrypto <- libringct_basic <- libdevice <- libcryptonote_basic <- libringct

This eliminates the need for crypto_device.cpp and rctOps_device.cpp.

Also, many abstracted interfaces of hw::device such as encrypt_payment_id() and
get_subaddress_secret_key() were previously implemented in libcryptonote_basic
(cryptonote_format_utils.cpp) and were then called from hw::core::device_default,
which is odd because libdevice is supposed to be independent of libcryptonote_basic.
Therefore, those functions were moved to device_default.cpp.
2018-03-14 21:00:15 +09:00
moneromooo-monero
c3e23b2dce
ringct: 17% improvement in Borromean signature verification 2018-03-08 00:41:54 +00:00
Riccardo Spagni
98acbe83fc
Merge pull request #3348
c95dddd2 remove unused function keyImageV (h908714124)
2018-03-05 19:13:52 +02:00
Riccardo Spagni
5950d356b6
Merge pull request #3301
34a2a085 rctSigs - loop invariant code removed from the loop (Dusan Klinec)
2018-03-05 19:11:35 +02:00
h908714124
c95dddd2d2 remove unused function keyImageV 2018-03-05 09:21:44 +01:00
cslashm
e745c1e38d Code modifications to integrate Ledger HW device into monero-wallet-cli.
The basic approach it to delegate all sensitive data (master key, secret
ephemeral key, key derivation, ....) and related operations to the device.
As device has low memory, it does not keep itself the values
(except for view/spend keys) but once computed there are encrypted (with AES
are equivalent) and return back to monero-wallet-cli. When they need to be
manipulated by the device, they are decrypted on receive.

Moreover, using the client for storing the value in encrypted form limits
the modification in the client code. Those values are transfered from one
C-structure to another one as previously.

The code modification has been done with the wishes to be open to any
other hardware wallet. To achieve that a C++ class hw::Device has been
introduced. Two initial implementations are provided: the "default", which
remaps all calls to initial Monero code, and  the "Ledger", which delegates
all calls to Ledger device.
2018-03-04 12:54:53 +01:00
Dusan Klinec
34a2a08530 rctSigs - loop invariant code removed from the loop 2018-02-21 16:35:06 +01:00
Riccardo Spagni
f4a6bc79d9
Merge pull request #3226
e4646379 keccak: fix mdlen bounds sanity checking (moneromooo-monero)
2e3e90ac pass large parameters by const ref, not value (moneromooo-monero)
61defd89 blockchain: sanity check number of precomputed hash of hash blocks (moneromooo-monero)
9af6b2d1 ringct: fix infinite loop in unused h2b function (moneromooo-monero)
8cea8d0c simplewallet: double check a new multisig wallet is multisig (moneromooo-monero)
9b98a6ac threadpool: catch exceptions in dtor, to avoid terminate (moneromooo-monero)
24803ed9 blockchain_export: fix buffer overflow in exporter (moneromooo-monero)
f3f7da62 perf_timer: rewrite to make it clear there is no division by zero (moneromooo-monero)
c6ea3df0 performance_tests: remove add_arg call stray extra param (moneromooo-monero)
fa6b4566 fuzz_tests: fix an uninitialized var in setup (moneromooo-monero)
03887f11 keccak: fix sanity check bounds test (moneromooo-monero)
ad11db91 blockchain_db: initialize m_open in base class ctor (moneromooo-monero)
bece67f9 miner: restore std::cout precision after modification (moneromooo-monero)
1aabd14c db_lmdb: check hard fork info drop succeeded (moneromooo-monero)
2018-02-16 14:26:58 +01:00
Riccardo Spagni
589a53f479
Merge pull request #2959
3f1a3fac bulletproofs: more robust challenge computation (moneromooo-monero)
2018-02-14 12:08:52 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
9af6b2d1b8
ringct: fix infinite loop in unused h2b function
Coverity 146775
2018-02-02 16:44:28 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
3f1a3fac00
bulletproofs: more robust challenge computation
Changes from sarang, from a recommendation by an anonymous reviewer
2018-01-31 15:57:01 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
b809058993
ringct: pseudoOuts moved to prunable in the simple bulletproof case
Saves 64 bytes non prunable data per typical tx

This breaks v7 consensus, will require a testnet reorg from v6
2018-01-31 15:56:26 +00:00
xmr-eric
84a7f6a482 Readd copyright starting date 2018-01-26 10:03:20 -05:00
xmr-eric
18216f19dd Update 2018 copyright 2018-01-26 10:03:20 -05:00
moneromooo-monero
ff5626d785
ringct: handle exceptions verifying bulletproofs in worker threads 2018-01-15 11:48:23 +00:00
Riccardo Spagni
f9c66ba67c
Merge pull request #2990
2d17feb0 factor STL container serialization (moneromooo-monero)
2018-01-10 11:53:05 +01:00
moneromooo-monero
2d17feb060
factor STL container serialization 2017-12-22 19:47:12 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
b49ddc766d
check accessing an element past the end of a container 2017-12-18 15:15:49 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
f4eda44ce3
N-1/N multisig 2017-12-17 16:12:12 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
4c313324b1
Add N/N multisig tx generation and signing
Scheme by luigi1111:

    Multisig for RingCT on Monero

    2 of 2

    User A (coordinator):
    Spendkey b,B
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    User B:
    Spendkey c,C
    Viewkey a,A (shared)

    Public Address: C+B, A

    Both have their own watch only wallet via C+B, a

    A will coordinate spending process (though B could easily as well, coordinator is more needed for more participants)

    A and B watch for incoming outputs

    B creates "half" key images for discovered output D:
    I2_D = (Hs(aR)+c) * Hp(D)

    B also creates 1.5 random keypairs (one scalar and 2 pubkeys; one on base G and one on base Hp(D)) for each output, storing the scalar(k) (linked to D),
    and sending the pubkeys with I2_D.

    A also creates "half" key images:
    I1_D = (Hs(aR)+b) * Hp(D)

    Then I_D = I1_D + I2_D

    Having I_D allows A to check spent status of course, but more importantly allows A to actually build a transaction prefix (and thus transaction).

    A builds the transaction until most of the way through MLSAG_Gen, adding the 2 pubkeys (per input) provided with I2_D
    to his own generated ones where they are needed (secret row L, R).

    At this point, A has a mostly completed transaction (but with an invalid/incomplete signature). A sends over the tx and includes r,
    which allows B (with the recipient's address) to verify the destination and amount (by reconstructing the stealth address and decoding ecdhInfo).

    B then finishes the signature by computing ss[secret_index][0] = ss[secret_index][0] + k - cc[secret_index]*c (secret indices need to be passed as well).

    B can then broadcast the tx, or send it back to A for broadcasting. Once B has completed the signing (and verified the tx to be valid), he can add the full I_D
    to his cache, allowing him to verify spent status as well.

    NOTE:
    A and B *must* present key A and B to each other with a valid signature proving they know a and b respectively.
    Otherwise, trickery like the following becomes possible:
    A creates viewkey a,A, spendkey b,B, and sends a,A,B to B.
    B creates a fake key C = zG - B. B sends C back to A.
    The combined spendkey C+B then equals zG, allowing B to spend funds at any time!
    The signature fixes this, because B does not know a c corresponding to C (and thus can't produce a signature).

    2 of 3

    User A (coordinator)
    Shared viewkey a,A
    "spendkey" j,J

    User B
    "spendkey" k,K

    User C
    "spendkey" m,M

    A collects K and M from B and C
    B collects J and M from A and C
    C collects J and K from A and B

    A computes N = nG, n = Hs(jK)
    A computes O = oG, o = Hs(jM)

    B anc C compute P = pG, p = Hs(kM) || Hs(mK)
    B and C can also compute N and O respectively if they wish to be able to coordinate

    Address: N+O+P, A

    The rest follows as above. The coordinator possesses 2 of 3 needed keys; he can get the other
    needed part of the signature/key images from either of the other two.

    Alternatively, if secure communication exists between parties:
    A gives j to B
    B gives k to C
    C gives m to A

    Address: J+K+M, A

    3 of 3

    Identical to 2 of 2, except the coordinator must collect the key images from both of the others.
    The transaction must also be passed an additional hop: A -> B -> C (or A -> C -> B), who can then broadcast it
    or send it back to A.

    N-1 of N

    Generally the same as 2 of 3, except participants need to be arranged in a ring to pass their keys around
    (using either the secure or insecure method).
    For example (ignoring viewkey so letters line up):
    [4 of 5]
    User: spendkey
    A: a
    B: b
    C: c
    D: d
    E: e

    a -> B, b -> C, c -> D, d -> E, e -> A

    Order of signing does not matter, it just must reach n-1 users. A "remaining keys" list must be passed around with
    the transaction so the signers know if they should use 1 or both keys.
    Collecting key image parts becomes a little messy, but basically every wallet sends over both of their parts with a tag for each.
    Thia way the coordinating wallet can keep track of which images have been added and which wallet they come from. Reasoning:
    1. The key images must be added only once (coordinator will get key images for key a from both A and B, he must add only one to get the proper key actual key image)
    2. The coordinator must keep track of which helper pubkeys came from which wallet (discussed in 2 of 2 section). The coordinator
    must choose only one set to use, then include his choice in the "remaining keys" list so the other wallets know which of their keys to use.

    You can generalize it further to N-2 of N or even M of N, but I'm not sure there's legitimate demand to justify the complexity. It might
    also be straightforward enough to support with minimal changes from N-1 format.
    You basically just give each user additional keys for each additional "-1" you desire. N-2 would be 3 keys per user, N-3 4 keys, etc.

The process is somewhat cumbersome:

To create a N/N multisig wallet:

 - each participant creates a normal wallet
 - each participant runs "prepare_multisig", and sends the resulting string to every other participant
 - each participant runs "make_multisig N A B C D...", with N being the threshold and A B C D... being the strings received from other participants (the threshold must currently equal N)

As txes are received, participants' wallets will need to synchronize so that those new outputs may be spent:

 - each participant runs "export_multisig FILENAME", and sends the FILENAME file to every other participant
 - each participant runs "import_multisig A B C D...", with A B C D... being the filenames received from other participants

Then, a transaction may be initiated:

 - one of the participants runs "transfer ADDRESS AMOUNT"
 - this partly signed transaction will be written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file
 - the initiator sends this file to another participant
 - that other participant runs "sign_multisig multisig_monero_tx"
 - the resulting transaction is written to the "multisig_monero_tx" file again
 - if the threshold was not reached, the file must be sent to another participant, until enough have signed
 - the last participant to sign runs "submit_multisig multisig_monero_tx" to relay the transaction to the Monero network
2017-12-17 16:11:57 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
09ce03d612
move includes around to lessen overall load 2017-12-16 22:46:38 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
46eaaae79b
ringct: always use outPk.mask to decode amounts 2017-12-09 18:02:55 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
8d4469a0ac
ringct: do not include bulletproof commitments in signed message
Those are not serialized, but are restored from the outPk masks,
so depending on what tries to validate the tx, those commitments
may or may not be filled with valid data at the time. The outPk
masks are already hashed as part of the rctSigBase field.
2017-12-09 15:30:15 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
c83d0b3ee2
add bulletproofs from v7 on testnet 2017-12-08 13:50:45 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
8620ef0a0d
bulletproofs: switch H/G in Pedersen commitments to match rct
Changes from sarang
2017-12-08 13:48:18 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
d58835b2f6
integrate bulletproofs into monero 2017-12-08 13:48:15 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
90b8d9f271
add bulletproofs to the build, with basic unit tests
Based on Java code from Sarang Noether
2017-12-08 13:41:13 +00:00
moneromooo-monero
ada4291469
add a version of ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime with A precomp 2017-12-07 19:23:10 +00:00