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MLSAG speedup and additional checks
This commit is contained in:
parent
6335509727
commit
3a0451a8be
7 changed files with 75 additions and 101 deletions
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@ -101,7 +101,10 @@ static rct::key get_exponent(const rct::key &base, size_t idx)
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{
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static const std::string salt("bulletproof");
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std::string hashed = std::string((const char*)base.bytes, sizeof(base)) + salt + tools::get_varint_data(idx);
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const rct::key e = rct::hashToPoint(rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size())));
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rct::key e;
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ge_p3 e_p3;
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rct::hash_to_p3(e_p3, rct::hash2rct(crypto::cn_fast_hash(hashed.data(), hashed.size())));
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ge_p3_tobytes(e.bytes, &e_p3);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES(!(e == rct::identity()), "Exponent is point at infinity");
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return e;
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}
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@ -620,45 +620,17 @@ namespace rct {
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sc_reduce32(rv.bytes);
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return rv;
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}
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key hashToPointSimple(const key & hh) {
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key pointk;
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ge_p1p1 point2;
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ge_p2 point;
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ge_p3 res;
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key h = cn_fast_hash(hh);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_THROW_MES_L1(ge_frombytes_vartime(&res, h.bytes) == 0, "ge_frombytes_vartime failed at "+boost::lexical_cast<std::string>(__LINE__));
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ge_p3_to_p2(&point, &res);
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ge_mul8(&point2, &point);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&res, &point2);
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ge_p3_tobytes(pointk.bytes, &res);
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return pointk;
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}
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key hashToPoint(const key & hh) {
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key pointk;
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ge_p2 point;
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ge_p1p1 point2;
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ge_p3 res;
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key h = cn_fast_hash(hh);
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ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime(&point, h.bytes);
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ge_mul8(&point2, &point);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&res, &point2);
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ge_p3_tobytes(pointk.bytes, &res);
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return pointk;
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// Hash a key to p3 representation
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void hash_to_p3(ge_p3 &hash8_p3, const key &k) {
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key hash_key = cn_fast_hash(k);
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ge_p2 hash_p2;
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ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime(&hash_p2, hash_key.bytes);
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ge_p1p1 hash8_p1p1;
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ge_mul8(&hash8_p1p1, &hash_p2);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&hash8_p3, &hash8_p1p1);
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}
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void hashToPoint(key & pointk, const key & hh) {
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ge_p2 point;
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ge_p1p1 point2;
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ge_p3 res;
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key h = cn_fast_hash(hh);
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ge_fromfe_frombytes_vartime(&point, h.bytes);
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ge_mul8(&point2, &point);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&res, &point2);
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ge_p3_tobytes(pointk.bytes, &res);
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}
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//sums a vector of curve points (for scalars use sc_add)
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void sumKeys(key & Csum, const keyV & Cis) {
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identity(Csum);
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@ -172,10 +172,7 @@ namespace rct {
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key cn_fast_hash(const key64 keys);
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key hash_to_scalar(const key64 keys);
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//returns hashToPoint as described in https://github.com/ShenNoether/ge_fromfe_writeup
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key hashToPointSimple(const key &in);
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key hashToPoint(const key &in);
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void hashToPoint(key &out, const key &in);
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void hash_to_p3(ge_p3 &hash8_p3, const key &k);
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//sums a vector of curve points (for scalars use sc_add)
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void sumKeys(key & Csum, const key &Cis);
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@ -163,14 +163,11 @@ namespace rct {
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return verifyBorromean(bb, P1_p3, P2_p3);
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}
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//Multilayered Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (MLSAG signatures)
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//This is a just slghtly more efficient version than the ones described below
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//(will be explained in more detail in Ring Multisig paper
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//These are aka MG signatutes in earlier drafts of the ring ct paper
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// c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 2.
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// Gen creates a signature which proves that for some column in the keymatrix "pk"
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// the signer knows a secret key for each row in that column
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// Ver verifies that the MG sig was created correctly
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// MLSAG signatures
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// See paper by Noether (https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098)
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// This generalization allows for some dimensions not to require linkability;
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// this is used in practice for commitment data within signatures
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// Note that using more than one linkable dimension is not recommended.
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mgSig MLSAG_Gen(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const keyV & xx, const multisig_kLRki *kLRki, key *mscout, const unsigned int index, size_t dsRows, hw::device &hwdev) {
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mgSig rv;
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size_t cols = pk.size();
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@ -188,6 +185,7 @@ namespace rct {
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size_t i = 0, j = 0, ii = 0;
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key c, c_old, L, R, Hi;
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ge_p3 Hi_p3;
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sc_0(c_old.bytes);
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vector<geDsmp> Ip(dsRows);
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rv.II = keyV(dsRows);
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@ -208,7 +206,8 @@ namespace rct {
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rv.II[i] = kLRki->ki;
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}
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else {
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Hi = hashToPoint(pk[index][i]);
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hash_to_p3(Hi_p3, pk[index][i]);
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ge_p3_tobytes(Hi.bytes, &Hi_p3);
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hwdev.mlsag_prepare(Hi, xx[i], alpha[i] , aG[i] , aHP[i] , rv.II[i]);
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toHash[3 * i + 2] = aG[i];
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toHash[3 * i + 3] = aHP[i];
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@ -235,7 +234,8 @@ namespace rct {
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sc_0(c.bytes);
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for (j = 0; j < dsRows; j++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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hashToPoint(Hi, pk[i][j]);
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hash_to_p3(Hi_p3, pk[i][j]);
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ge_p3_tobytes(Hi.bytes, &Hi_p3);
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addKeys3(R, rv.ss[i][j], Hi, c_old, Ip[j].k);
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toHash[3 * j + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[3 * j + 2] = L;
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@ -260,43 +260,42 @@ namespace rct {
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return rv;
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}
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//Multilayered Spontaneous Anonymous Group Signatures (MLSAG signatures)
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//This is a just slghtly more efficient version than the ones described below
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//(will be explained in more detail in Ring Multisig paper
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//These are aka MG signatutes in earlier drafts of the ring ct paper
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// c.f. https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098 section 2.
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// Gen creates a signature which proves that for some column in the keymatrix "pk"
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// the signer knows a secret key for each row in that column
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// Ver verifies that the MG sig was created correctly
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// MLSAG signatures
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// See paper by Noether (https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1098)
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// This generalization allows for some dimensions not to require linkability;
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// this is used in practice for commitment data within signatures
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// Note that using more than one linkable dimension is not recommended.
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bool MLSAG_Ver(const key &message, const keyM & pk, const mgSig & rv, size_t dsRows) {
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size_t cols = pk.size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 2, false, "Error! What is c if cols = 1!");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(cols >= 2, false, "Signature must contain more than one public key");
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size_t rows = pk[0].size();
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rows >= 1, false, "Empty pk");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rows >= 1, false, "Bad total row number");
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for (size_t i = 1; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(pk[i].size() == rows, false, "pk is not rectangular");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(pk[i].size() == rows, false, "Bad public key matrix dimensions");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.II.size() == dsRows, false, "Bad II size");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss.size() == cols, false, "Bad rv.ss size");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.II.size() == dsRows, false, "Wrong number of key images present");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss.size() == cols, false, "Bad scalar matrix dimensions");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < cols; ++i) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss[i].size() == rows, false, "rv.ss is not rectangular");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(rv.ss[i].size() == rows, false, "Bad scalar matrix dimensions");
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(dsRows <= rows, false, "Bad dsRows value");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(dsRows <= rows, false, "Non-double-spend rows cannot exceed total rows");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.ss.size(); ++i)
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for (size_t j = 0; j < rv.ss[i].size(); ++j)
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.ss[i][j].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad ss slot");
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.cc.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad cc");
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for (size_t i = 0; i < rv.ss.size(); ++i) {
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for (size_t j = 0; j < rv.ss[i].size(); ++j) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.ss[i][j].bytes) == 0, false, "Bad signature scalar");
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}
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}
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(sc_check(rv.cc.bytes) == 0, false, "Bad initial signature hash");
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size_t i = 0, j = 0, ii = 0;
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key c, L, R, Hi;
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key c, L, R;
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key c_old = copy(rv.cc);
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vector<geDsmp> Ip(dsRows);
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for (i = 0 ; i < dsRows ; i++) {
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(rv.II[i] == rct::identity()), false, "Bad key image");
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precomp(Ip[i].k, rv.II[i]);
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}
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size_t ndsRows = 3 * dsRows; //non Double Spendable Rows (see identity chains paper
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size_t ndsRows = 3 * dsRows; // number of dimensions not requiring linkability
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keyV toHash(1 + 3 * dsRows + 2 * (rows - dsRows));
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toHash[0] = message;
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i = 0;
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@ -304,9 +303,14 @@ namespace rct {
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sc_0(c.bytes);
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for (j = 0; j < dsRows; j++) {
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addKeys2(L, rv.ss[i][j], c_old, pk[i][j]);
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hashToPoint(Hi, pk[i][j]);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(Hi == rct::identity()), false, "Data hashed to point at infinity");
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addKeys3(R, rv.ss[i][j], Hi, c_old, Ip[j].k);
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// Compute R directly
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ge_p3 hash8_p3;
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hash_to_p3(hash8_p3, pk[i][j]);
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ge_p2 R_p2;
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ge_double_scalarmult_precomp_vartime(&R_p2, rv.ss[i][j].bytes, &hash8_p3, c_old.bytes, Ip[j].k);
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ge_tobytes(R.bytes, &R_p2);
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toHash[3 * j + 1] = pk[i][j];
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toHash[3 * j + 2] = L;
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toHash[3 * j + 3] = R;
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@ -317,6 +321,7 @@ namespace rct {
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toHash[ndsRows + 2 * ii + 2] = L;
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}
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c = hash_to_scalar(toHash);
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CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(!(c == rct::zero()), false, "Bad signature hash");
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copy(c_old, c);
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i = (i + 1);
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}
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@ -57,7 +57,6 @@
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#include "rct_mlsag.h"
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#include "equality.h"
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#include "range_proof.h"
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#include "rct_mlsag.h"
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#include "bulletproof.h"
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#include "crypto_ops.h"
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#include "multiexp.h"
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@ -214,14 +213,8 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
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TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_cn_fast_hash, 32);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_cn_fast_hash, 16384);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 3, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 5, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 10, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 100, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 3, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 5, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 10, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 100, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 11, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_equality, memcmp32, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE2(filter, p, test_equality, memcmp32, false);
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@ -251,15 +244,6 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
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TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof, false, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE6(filter, p, test_aggregated_bulletproof, true, 2, 1, 1, 0, 64); // 64 proof, each with 2 amounts
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 3, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 5, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 10, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 100, false);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 3, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 5, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 10, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE3(filter, p, test_ringct_mlsag, 1, 100, true);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_crypto_ops, op_sc_add);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_crypto_ops, op_sc_sub);
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TEST_PERFORMANCE1(filter, p, test_crypto_ops, op_sc_mul);
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@ -35,13 +35,13 @@
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#include "single_tx_test_base.h"
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template<size_t inputs, size_t ring_size, bool ver>
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template<size_t ring_size, bool ver>
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class test_ringct_mlsag : public single_tx_test_base
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{
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public:
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static const size_t cols = ring_size;
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static const size_t rows = inputs;
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static const size_t loop_count = 100;
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static const size_t rows = 2; // single spend and commitment data
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static const size_t loop_count = 1000;
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bool init()
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{
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@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ public:
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{
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sk[j] = xm[ind][j];
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}
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IIccss = MLSAG_Gen(rct::identity(), P, sk, NULL, NULL, ind, rows, hw::get_device("default"));
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IIccss = MLSAG_Gen(rct::identity(), P, sk, NULL, NULL, ind, rows-1, hw::get_device("default"));
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return true;
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}
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bool test()
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{
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if (ver)
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MLSAG_Ver(rct::identity(), P, IIccss, rows);
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MLSAG_Ver(rct::identity(), P, IIccss, rows-1);
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else
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MLSAG_Gen(rct::identity(), P, sk, NULL, NULL, ind, rows, hw::get_device("default"));
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MLSAG_Gen(rct::identity(), P, sk, NULL, NULL, ind, rows-1, hw::get_device("default"));
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return true;
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}
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@ -788,7 +788,20 @@ TEST(ringct, HPow2)
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{
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key G = scalarmultBase(d2h(1));
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key H = hashToPointSimple(G);
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// Note that H is computed differently than standard hashing
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// This method is not guaranteed to return a curvepoint for all inputs
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// Don't use it elsewhere
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key H = cn_fast_hash(G);
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ge_p3 H_p3;
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int decode = ge_frombytes_vartime(&H_p3, H.bytes);
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ASSERT_EQ(decode, 0); // this is known to pass for the particular value G
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ge_p2 H_p2;
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ge_p3_to_p2(&H_p2, &H_p3);
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ge_p1p1 H8_p1p1;
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ge_mul8(&H8_p1p1, &H_p2);
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ge_p1p1_to_p3(&H_p3, &H8_p1p1);
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ge_p3_tobytes(H.bytes, &H_p3);
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for (int j = 0 ; j < ATOMS ; j++) {
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ASSERT_TRUE(equalKeys(H, H2[j]));
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addKeys(H, H, H);
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