Merge pull request #5321

e9519e98 cryptonote: fix calculating coinbase tx hash (moneromooo-monero)
This commit is contained in:
Riccardo Spagni 2019-03-24 19:04:27 +02:00
commit 0965b101f2
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: 55432DF31CCD4FCD
2 changed files with 8 additions and 10 deletions

View file

@ -987,14 +987,10 @@ namespace cryptonote
{ {
if (t.version == 1) if (t.version == 1)
return false; return false;
static const crypto::hash empty_hash = { (char)0x70, (char)0xa4, (char)0x85, (char)0x5d, (char)0x04, (char)0xd8, (char)0xfa, (char)0x7b, (char)0x3b, (char)0x27, (char)0x82, (char)0xca, (char)0x53, (char)0xb6, (char)0x00, (char)0xe5, (char)0xc0, (char)0x03, (char)0xc7, (char)0xdc, (char)0xb2, (char)0x7d, (char)0x7e, (char)0x92, (char)0x3c, (char)0x23, (char)0xf7, (char)0x86, (char)0x01, (char)0x46, (char)0xd2, (char)0xc5 };
const unsigned int unprunable_size = t.unprunable_size; const unsigned int unprunable_size = t.unprunable_size;
if (blob && unprunable_size) if (blob && unprunable_size)
{ {
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(unprunable_size <= blob->size(), false, "Inconsistent transaction unprunable and blob sizes"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(unprunable_size <= blob->size(), false, "Inconsistent transaction unprunable and blob sizes");
if (blob->size() - unprunable_size == 0)
res = empty_hash;
else
cryptonote::get_blob_hash(epee::span<const char>(blob->data() + unprunable_size, blob->size() - unprunable_size), res); cryptonote::get_blob_hash(epee::span<const char>(blob->data() + unprunable_size, blob->size() - unprunable_size), res);
} }
else else
@ -1007,9 +1003,6 @@ namespace cryptonote
const size_t mixin = t.vin.empty() ? 0 : t.vin[0].type() == typeid(txin_to_key) ? boost::get<txin_to_key>(t.vin[0]).key_offsets.size() - 1 : 0; const size_t mixin = t.vin.empty() ? 0 : t.vin[0].type() == typeid(txin_to_key) ? boost::get<txin_to_key>(t.vin[0]).key_offsets.size() - 1 : 0;
bool r = tt.rct_signatures.p.serialize_rctsig_prunable(ba, t.rct_signatures.type, inputs, outputs, mixin); bool r = tt.rct_signatures.p.serialize_rctsig_prunable(ba, t.rct_signatures.type, inputs, outputs, mixin);
CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to serialize rct signatures prunable"); CHECK_AND_ASSERT_MES(r, false, "Failed to serialize rct signatures prunable");
if (ss.str().empty())
res = empty_hash;
else
cryptonote::get_blob_hash(ss.str(), res); cryptonote::get_blob_hash(ss.str(), res);
} }
return true; return true;
@ -1047,6 +1040,9 @@ namespace cryptonote
} }
// prunable rct // prunable rct
if (t.rct_signatures.type == rct::RCTTypeNull)
hashes[2] = crypto::null_hash;
else
hashes[2] = pruned_data_hash; hashes[2] = pruned_data_hash;
// the tx hash is the hash of the 3 hashes // the tx hash is the hash of the 3 hashes

View file

@ -921,6 +921,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
catch (const std::exception &e) catch (const std::exception &e)
{ {
MERROR_VER("Exception in handle_incoming_tx_pre: " << e.what()); MERROR_VER("Exception in handle_incoming_tx_pre: " << e.what());
tvc[i].m_verifivation_failed = true;
results[i].res = false; results[i].res = false;
} }
}); });
@ -951,6 +952,7 @@ namespace cryptonote
catch (const std::exception &e) catch (const std::exception &e)
{ {
MERROR_VER("Exception in handle_incoming_tx_post: " << e.what()); MERROR_VER("Exception in handle_incoming_tx_post: " << e.what());
tvc[i].m_verifivation_failed = true;
results[i].res = false; results[i].res = false;
} }
}); });