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// Copyright (c) 2018, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
# include "message_store.h"
# include <boost/archive/portable_binary_iarchive.hpp>
# include <boost/format.hpp>
# include <boost/algorithm/string.hpp>
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# include <boost/system/error_code.hpp>
# include <boost/filesystem.hpp>
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# include <fstream>
# include <sstream>
# include "file_io_utils.h"
# include "storages/http_abstract_invoke.h"
# include "wallet_errors.h"
# include "serialization/binary_utils.h"
# include "common/base58.h"
# include "common/util.h"
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# include "common/utf8.h"
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# include "string_tools.h"
# undef MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY
# define MONERO_DEFAULT_LOG_CATEGORY "wallet.mms"
namespace mms
{
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message_store : : message_store ( std : : unique_ptr < epee : : net_utils : : http : : abstract_http_client > http_client ) : m_transporter ( std : : move ( http_client ) )
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{
m_active = false ;
m_auto_send = false ;
m_next_message_id = 1 ;
m_num_authorized_signers = 0 ;
m_num_required_signers = 0 ;
m_nettype = cryptonote : : network_type : : UNDEFINED ;
m_run = true ;
}
namespace
{
// MMS options handling mirrors what "wallet2" is doing for its options, on-demand init and all
// It's not very clean to initialize Bitmessage-specific options here, but going one level further
// down still into "message_transporter" for that is a little bit too much
struct options
{
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > bitmessage_address = { " bitmessage-address " , mms : : message_store : : tr ( " Use PyBitmessage instance at URL <arg> " ) , " http://localhost:8442/ " } ;
const command_line : : arg_descriptor < std : : string > bitmessage_login = { " bitmessage-login " , mms : : message_store : : tr ( " Specify <arg> as username:password for PyBitmessage API " ) , " username:password " } ;
} ;
}
void message_store : : init_options ( boost : : program_options : : options_description & desc_params )
{
const options opts { } ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . bitmessage_address ) ;
command_line : : add_arg ( desc_params , opts . bitmessage_login ) ;
}
void message_store : : init ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , const std : : string & own_label ,
const std : : string & own_transport_address , uint32_t num_authorized_signers , uint32_t num_required_signers )
{
m_num_authorized_signers = num_authorized_signers ;
m_num_required_signers = num_required_signers ;
m_signers . clear ( ) ;
m_messages . clear ( ) ;
m_next_message_id = 1 ;
// The vector "m_signers" gets here once the required number of elements, one for each authorized signer,
// and is never changed again. The rest of the code relies on "size(m_signers) == m_num_authorized_signers"
// without further checks.
authorized_signer signer ;
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
signer . me = signer . index = = 0 ; // Strict convention: The very first signer is fixed as / must be "me"
m_signers . push_back ( signer ) ;
signer . index + + ;
}
set_signer ( state , 0 , own_label , own_transport_address , state . address ) ;
m_nettype = state . nettype ;
set_active ( true ) ;
m_filename = state . mms_file ;
save ( state ) ;
}
void message_store : : set_options ( const boost : : program_options : : variables_map & vm )
{
const options opts { } ;
std : : string bitmessage_address = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . bitmessage_address ) ;
epee : : wipeable_string bitmessage_login = command_line : : get_arg ( vm , opts . bitmessage_login ) ;
set_options ( bitmessage_address , bitmessage_login ) ;
}
void message_store : : set_options ( const std : : string & bitmessage_address , const epee : : wipeable_string & bitmessage_login )
{
m_transporter . set_options ( bitmessage_address , bitmessage_login ) ;
}
void message_store : : set_signer ( const multisig_wallet_state & state ,
uint32_t index ,
const boost : : optional < std : : string > & label ,
const boost : : optional < std : : string > & transport_address ,
const boost : : optional < cryptonote : : account_public_address > monero_address )
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index > = m_num_authorized_signers , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid signer index " + std : : to_string ( index ) ) ;
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authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ index ] ;
if ( label )
{
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m . label = get_sanitized_text ( label . get ( ) , 50 ) ;
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}
if ( transport_address )
{
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m . transport_address = get_sanitized_text ( transport_address . get ( ) , 200 ) ;
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}
if ( monero_address )
{
m . monero_address_known = true ;
m . monero_address = monero_address . get ( ) ;
}
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// Save to minimize the chance to loose that info
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save ( state ) ;
}
const authorized_signer & message_store : : get_signer ( uint32_t index ) const
{
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index > = m_num_authorized_signers , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid signer index " + std : : to_string ( index ) ) ;
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return m_signers [ index ] ;
}
bool message_store : : signer_config_complete ( ) const
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . label . empty ( ) | | m . transport_address . empty ( ) | | ! m . monero_address_known )
{
return false ;
}
}
return true ;
}
// Check if all signers have a label set (as it's a requirement for starting auto-config
// by the "manager")
bool message_store : : signer_labels_complete ( ) const
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . label . empty ( ) )
{
return false ;
}
}
return true ;
}
void message_store : : get_signer_config ( std : : string & signer_config )
{
std : : stringstream oss ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
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binary_archive < true > ar ( oss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , m_signers ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize signer config " ) ;
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signer_config = oss . str ( ) ;
}
void message_store : : unpack_signer_config ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , const std : : string & signer_config ,
std : : vector < authorized_signer > & signers )
{
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < signer_config ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < false > ar ( iss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , signers ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize signer config " ) ;
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}
catch ( . . . )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid structure of signer config " ) ;
}
uint32_t num_signers = ( uint32_t ) signers . size ( ) ;
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( num_signers ! = m_num_authorized_signers , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Wrong number of signers in config: " + std : : to_string ( num_signers ) ) ;
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for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < num_signers ; + + i )
{
authorized_signer & m = signers [ i ] ;
m . label = get_sanitized_text ( m . label , 50 ) ;
m . transport_address = get_sanitized_text ( m . transport_address , 200 ) ;
m . auto_config_token = get_sanitized_text ( m . auto_config_token , 20 ) ;
}
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}
void message_store : : process_signer_config ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , const std : : string & signer_config )
{
// The signers in "signer_config" and the resident wallet signers are matched not by label, but
// by Monero address, and ALL labels will be set from "signer_config", even the "me" label.
// In the auto-config process as implemented now the auto-config manager is responsible for defining
// the labels, and right at the end of the process ALL wallets use the SAME labels. The idea behind this
// is preventing problems like duplicate labels and confusion (Bob choosing a label "IamAliceHonest").
// (Of course signers are free to re-define any labels they don't like AFTER auto-config.)
//
// Usually this method will be called with only the "me" signer defined in the wallet, and may
// produce unexpected behaviour if that wallet contains additional signers that have nothing to do with
// those arriving in "signer_config".
std : : vector < authorized_signer > signers ;
unpack_signer_config ( state , signer_config , signers ) ;
uint32_t new_index = 1 ;
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = signers [ i ] ;
uint32_t index ;
uint32_t take_index ;
bool found = get_signer_index_by_monero_address ( m . monero_address , index ) ;
if ( found )
{
// Redefine existing (probably "me", under usual circumstances)
take_index = index ;
}
else
{
// Add new; neglect that we may erroneously overwrite already defined signers
// (but protect "me")
take_index = new_index ;
if ( ( new_index + 1 ) < m_num_authorized_signers )
{
new_index + + ;
}
}
authorized_signer & modify = m_signers [ take_index ] ;
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modify . label = get_sanitized_text ( m . label , 50 ) ; // ALWAYS set label, see comments above
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if ( ! modify . me )
{
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modify . transport_address = get_sanitized_text ( m . transport_address , 200 ) ;
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modify . monero_address_known = m . monero_address_known ;
if ( m . monero_address_known )
{
modify . monero_address = m . monero_address ;
}
}
}
save ( state ) ;
}
void message_store : : start_auto_config ( const multisig_wallet_state & state )
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( ! m . me )
{
setup_signer_for_auto_config ( i , create_auto_config_token ( ) , true ) ;
}
m . auto_config_running = true ;
}
save ( state ) ;
}
// Check auto-config token string and convert to standardized form;
// Try to make it as foolproof as possible, with built-in tolerance to make up for
// errors in transmission that still leave the token recognizable.
bool message_store : : check_auto_config_token ( const std : : string & raw_token ,
std : : string & adjusted_token ) const
{
std : : string prefix ( AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_PREFIX ) ;
uint32_t num_hex_digits = ( AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES + 1 ) * 2 ;
uint32_t full_length = num_hex_digits + prefix . length ( ) ;
uint32_t raw_length = raw_token . length ( ) ;
std : : string hex_digits ;
if ( raw_length = = full_length )
{
// Prefix must be there; accept it in any casing
std : : string raw_prefix ( raw_token . substr ( 0 , 3 ) ) ;
boost : : algorithm : : to_lower ( raw_prefix ) ;
if ( raw_prefix ! = prefix )
{
return false ;
}
hex_digits = raw_token . substr ( 3 ) ;
}
else if ( raw_length = = num_hex_digits )
{
// Accept the token without the prefix if it's otherwise ok
hex_digits = raw_token ;
}
else
{
return false ;
}
// Convert to strict lowercase and correct any common misspellings
boost : : algorithm : : to_lower ( hex_digits ) ;
std : : replace ( hex_digits . begin ( ) , hex_digits . end ( ) , ' o ' , ' 0 ' ) ;
std : : replace ( hex_digits . begin ( ) , hex_digits . end ( ) , ' i ' , ' 1 ' ) ;
std : : replace ( hex_digits . begin ( ) , hex_digits . end ( ) , ' l ' , ' 1 ' ) ;
// Now it must be correct hex with correct checksum, no further tolerance possible
std : : string token_bytes ;
if ( ! epee : : string_tools : : parse_hexstr_to_binbuff ( hex_digits , token_bytes ) )
{
return false ;
}
const crypto : : hash & hash = crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( token_bytes . data ( ) , token_bytes . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
if ( token_bytes [ AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES ] ! = hash . data [ 0 ] )
{
return false ;
}
adjusted_token = prefix + hex_digits ;
return true ;
}
// Create a new auto-config token with prefix, random 8-hex digits plus 2 checksum digits
std : : string message_store : : create_auto_config_token ( )
{
unsigned char random [ AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES ] ;
crypto : : rand ( AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES , random ) ;
std : : string token_bytes ;
token_bytes . append ( ( char * ) random , AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_BYTES ) ;
// Add a checksum because technically ANY four bytes are a valid token, and without a checksum we would send
// auto-config messages "to nowhere" after the slightest typo without knowing it
const crypto : : hash & hash = crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( token_bytes . data ( ) , token_bytes . size ( ) ) ;
token_bytes + = hash . data [ 0 ] ;
std : : string prefix ( AUTO_CONFIG_TOKEN_PREFIX ) ;
return prefix + epee : : string_tools : : buff_to_hex_nodelimer ( token_bytes ) ;
}
// Add a message for sending "me" address data to the auto-config transport address
// that can be derived from the token and activate auto-config
size_t message_store : : add_auto_config_data_message ( const multisig_wallet_state & state ,
const std : : string & auto_config_token )
{
authorized_signer & me = m_signers [ 0 ] ;
me . auto_config_token = auto_config_token ;
setup_signer_for_auto_config ( 0 , auto_config_token , false ) ;
me . auto_config_running = true ;
auto_config_data data ;
data . label = me . label ;
data . transport_address = me . transport_address ;
data . monero_address = me . monero_address ;
std : : stringstream oss ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < true > ar ( oss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , data ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize auto config data " ) ;
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return add_message ( state , 0 , message_type : : auto_config_data , message_direction : : out , oss . str ( ) ) ;
}
// Process a single message with auto-config data, destined for "message.signer_index"
void message_store : : process_auto_config_data_message ( uint32_t id )
{
// "auto_config_data" contains the label that the auto-config data sender uses for "me", but that's
// more for completeness' sake, and right now it's not used. In general, the auto-config manager
// decides/defines the labels, and right after completing auto-config ALL wallets use the SAME labels.
const message & m = get_message_ref_by_id ( id ) ;
auto_config_data data ;
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < m . content ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < false > ar ( iss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , data ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize auto config data " ) ;
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}
catch ( . . . )
{
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid structure of auto config data " ) ;
}
authorized_signer & signer = m_signers [ m . signer_index ] ;
// "signer.label" does NOT change, see comment above
signer . transport_address = data . transport_address ;
signer . monero_address_known = true ;
signer . monero_address = data . monero_address ;
signer . auto_config_running = false ;
}
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void add_hash ( crypto : : hash & sum , const crypto : : hash & summand )
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < crypto : : HASH_SIZE ; + + i )
{
uint32_t x = ( uint32_t ) sum . data [ i ] ;
uint32_t y = ( uint32_t ) summand . data [ i ] ;
sum . data [ i ] = ( char ) ( ( x + y ) % 256 ) ;
}
}
// Calculate a checksum that allows signers to make sure they work with an identical signer config
// by exchanging and comparing checksums out-of-band i.e. not using the MMS;
// Because different signers have a different order of signers in the config work with "adding"
// individual hashes because that operation is commutative
std : : string message_store : : get_config_checksum ( ) const
{
crypto : : hash sum = crypto : : null_hash ;
uint32_t num = SWAP32LE ( m_num_authorized_signers ) ;
add_hash ( sum , crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( & num , sizeof ( num ) ) ) ;
num = SWAP32LE ( m_num_required_signers ) ;
add_hash ( sum , crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( & num , sizeof ( num ) ) ) ;
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
add_hash ( sum , crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( m . transport_address . data ( ) , m . transport_address . size ( ) ) ) ;
if ( m . monero_address_known )
{
add_hash ( sum , crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( & m . monero_address . m_spend_public_key , sizeof ( m . monero_address . m_spend_public_key ) ) ) ;
add_hash ( sum , crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( & m . monero_address . m_view_public_key , sizeof ( m . monero_address . m_view_public_key ) ) ) ;
}
}
std : : string checksum_bytes ;
checksum_bytes + = sum . data [ 0 ] ;
checksum_bytes + = sum . data [ 1 ] ;
checksum_bytes + = sum . data [ 2 ] ;
checksum_bytes + = sum . data [ 3 ] ;
return epee : : string_tools : : buff_to_hex_nodelimer ( checksum_bytes ) ;
}
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void message_store : : stop_auto_config ( )
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
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if ( ! m . auto_config_transport_address . empty ( ) )
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{
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// Try to delete the chan that was used for auto-config
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m_transporter . delete_transport_address ( m . auto_config_transport_address ) ;
}
m . auto_config_token . clear ( ) ;
m . auto_config_public_key = crypto : : null_pkey ;
m . auto_config_secret_key = crypto : : null_skey ;
m . auto_config_transport_address . clear ( ) ;
m . auto_config_running = false ;
}
}
void message_store : : setup_signer_for_auto_config ( uint32_t index , const std : : string token , bool receiving )
{
// It may be a little strange to hash the textual hex digits of the auto config token into
// 32 bytes and turn that into a Monero public/secret key pair, instead of doing something
// much less complicated like directly using the underlying random 40 bits as key for a
// symmetric cipher, but everything is there already for encrypting and decrypting messages
// with such key pairs, and furthermore it would be trivial to use tokens with a different
// number of bytes.
//
// In the wallet of the auto-config manager each signer except "me" gets set its own
// auto-config parameters. In the wallet of somebody using the token to send auto-config
// data the auto-config parameters are stored in the "me" signer and taken from there
// to send that data.
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THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( index > = m_num_authorized_signers , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid signer index " + std : : to_string ( index ) ) ;
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authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ index ] ;
m . auto_config_token = token ;
crypto : : hash_to_scalar ( token . data ( ) , token . size ( ) , m . auto_config_secret_key ) ;
crypto : : secret_key_to_public_key ( m . auto_config_secret_key , m . auto_config_public_key ) ;
2019-07-25 17:51:28 +00:00
m . auto_config_transport_address = m_transporter . derive_transport_address ( m . auto_config_token ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
}
bool message_store : : get_signer_index_by_monero_address ( const cryptonote : : account_public_address & monero_address , uint32_t & index ) const
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . monero_address = = monero_address )
{
index = m . index ;
return true ;
}
}
MWARNING ( " No authorized signer with Monero address " < < account_address_to_string ( monero_address ) ) ;
return false ;
}
bool message_store : : get_signer_index_by_label ( const std : : string label , uint32_t & index ) const
{
for ( uint32_t i = 0 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . label = = label )
{
index = m . index ;
return true ;
}
}
MWARNING ( " No authorized signer with label " < < label ) ;
return false ;
}
void message_store : : process_wallet_created_data ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , message_type type , const std : : string & content )
{
switch ( type )
{
case message_type : : key_set :
// Result of a "prepare_multisig" command in the wallet
// Send the key set to all other signers
case message_type : : additional_key_set :
// Result of a "make_multisig" command or a "exchange_multisig_keys" in the wallet in case of M/N multisig
// Send the additional key set to all other signers
case message_type : : multisig_sync_data :
// Result of a "export_multisig_info" command in the wallet
// Send the sync data to all other signers
for ( uint32_t i = 1 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
add_message ( state , i , type , message_direction : : out , content ) ;
}
break ;
case message_type : : partially_signed_tx :
// Result of a "transfer" command in the wallet, or a "sign_multisig" command
// that did not yet result in the minimum number of signatures required
// Create a message "from me to me" as a container for the tx data
if ( m_num_required_signers = = 1 )
{
// Probably rare, but possible: The 1 signature is already enough, correct the type
// Easier to correct here than asking all callers to detect this rare special case
type = message_type : : fully_signed_tx ;
}
add_message ( state , 0 , type , message_direction : : in , content ) ;
break ;
case message_type : : fully_signed_tx :
add_message ( state , 0 , type , message_direction : : in , content ) ;
break ;
default :
2018-12-22 15:51:33 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION ( tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Illegal message type " + std : : to_string ( ( uint32_t ) type ) ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
break ;
}
}
size_t message_store : : add_message ( const multisig_wallet_state & state ,
uint32_t signer_index , message_type type , message_direction direction ,
const std : : string & content )
{
message m ;
m . id = m_next_message_id + + ;
m . type = type ;
m . direction = direction ;
m . content = content ;
m . created = ( uint64_t ) time ( NULL ) ;
m . modified = m . created ;
m . sent = 0 ;
m . signer_index = signer_index ;
if ( direction = = message_direction : : out )
{
m . state = message_state : : ready_to_send ;
}
else
{
m . state = message_state : : waiting ;
} ;
m . wallet_height = ( uint32_t ) state . num_transfer_details ;
if ( m . type = = message_type : : additional_key_set )
{
m . round = state . multisig_rounds_passed ;
}
else
{
m . round = 0 ;
}
m . signature_count = 0 ; // Future expansion for signature counting when signing txs
m . hash = crypto : : null_hash ;
m_messages . push_back ( m ) ;
// Save for every new message right away (at least while in beta)
save ( state ) ;
MINFO ( boost : : format ( " Added %s message %s for signer %s of type %s " )
% message_direction_to_string ( direction ) % m . id % signer_index % message_type_to_string ( type ) ) ;
return m_messages . size ( ) - 1 ;
}
// Get the index of the message with id "id", return false if not found
bool message_store : : get_message_index_by_id ( uint32_t id , size_t & index ) const
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( m_messages [ i ] . id = = id )
{
index = i ;
return true ;
}
}
MWARNING ( " No message found with an id of " < < id ) ;
return false ;
}
// Get the index of the message with id "id" that must exist
size_t message_store : : get_message_index_by_id ( uint32_t id ) const
{
size_t index ;
bool found = get_message_index_by_id ( id , index ) ;
2018-12-22 15:51:33 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! found , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid message id " + std : : to_string ( id ) ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
return index ;
}
// Get the modifiable message with id "id" that must exist; private/internal use!
message & message_store : : get_message_ref_by_id ( uint32_t id )
{
return m_messages [ get_message_index_by_id ( id ) ] ;
}
// Get the message with id "id", return false if not found
// This version of the method allows to check whether id is valid without triggering an error
bool message_store : : get_message_by_id ( uint32_t id , message & m ) const
{
size_t index ;
bool found = get_message_index_by_id ( id , index ) ;
if ( found )
{
m = m_messages [ index ] ;
}
return found ;
}
// Get the message with id "id" that must exist
message message_store : : get_message_by_id ( uint32_t id ) const
{
message m ;
bool found = get_message_by_id ( id , m ) ;
2018-12-22 15:51:33 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! found , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Invalid message id " + std : : to_string ( id ) ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
return m ;
}
bool message_store : : any_message_of_type ( message_type type , message_direction direction ) const
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( ( m_messages [ i ] . type = = type ) & & ( m_messages [ i ] . direction = = direction ) )
{
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}
bool message_store : : any_message_with_hash ( const crypto : : hash & hash ) const
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( m_messages [ i ] . hash = = hash )
{
return true ;
}
}
return false ;
}
// Count the ids in the vector that are set i.e. not 0, while ignoring index 0
// Mostly used to check whether we have a message for each authorized signer except me,
// with the signer index used as index into 'ids'; the element at index 0, for me,
// is ignored, to make constant subtractions of 1 for indices when filling the
// vector unnecessary
size_t message_store : : get_other_signers_id_count ( const std : : vector < uint32_t > & ids ) const
{
size_t count = 0 ;
for ( size_t i = 1 /* and not 0 */ ; i < ids . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
if ( ids [ i ] ! = 0 )
{
count + + ;
}
}
return count ;
}
// Is in every element of vector 'ids' (except at index 0) a message id i.e. not 0?
bool message_store : : message_ids_complete ( const std : : vector < uint32_t > & ids ) const
{
return get_other_signers_id_count ( ids ) = = ( ids . size ( ) - 1 ) ;
}
void message_store : : delete_message ( uint32_t id )
{
delete_transport_message ( id ) ;
size_t index = get_message_index_by_id ( id ) ;
m_messages . erase ( m_messages . begin ( ) + index ) ;
}
void message_store : : delete_all_messages ( )
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
delete_transport_message ( m_messages [ i ] . id ) ;
}
m_messages . clear ( ) ;
}
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
// Make a text, which is "attacker controlled data", reasonably safe to display
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
// This is mostly geared towards the safe display of notes sent by "mms note" with a "mms show" command
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
std : : string message_store : : get_sanitized_text ( const std : : string & text , size_t max_length )
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
// Restrict the size to fend of DOS-style attacks with heaps of data
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
size_t length = std : : min ( text . length ( ) , max_length ) ;
std : : string sanitized_text = text . substr ( 0 , length ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
try
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
sanitized_text = tools : : utf8canonical ( sanitized_text , [ ] ( wint_t c )
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
if ( ( c < 0x20 ) | | ( c = = 0x7f ) | | ( c > = 0x80 & & c < = 0x9f ) )
{
// Strip out any controls, especially ESC for getting rid of potentially dangerous
// ANSI escape sequences that a console window might interpret
c = ' ? ' ;
}
else if ( ( c = = ' < ' ) | | ( c = = ' > ' ) )
{
// Make XML or HTML impossible that e.g. might contain scripts that Qt might execute
// when displayed in the GUI wallet
c = ' ? ' ;
}
return c ;
} ) ;
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
sanitized_text = " (Illegal UTF-8 string) " ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
}
2020-05-04 09:31:46 +00:00
return sanitized_text ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
}
void message_store : : write_to_file ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , const std : : string & filename )
{
std : : stringstream oss ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < true > ar ( oss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , * this ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize MMS state " ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
std : : string buf = oss . str ( ) ;
crypto : : chacha_key key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha_key ( & state . view_secret_key , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) , key , 1 ) ;
2019-06-26 14:39:41 +00:00
file_data write_file_data = { } ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
write_file_data . magic_string = " MMS " ;
write_file_data . file_version = 0 ;
write_file_data . iv = crypto : : rand < crypto : : chacha_iv > ( ) ;
std : : string encrypted_data ;
encrypted_data . resize ( buf . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha20 ( buf . data ( ) , buf . size ( ) , key , write_file_data . iv , & encrypted_data [ 0 ] ) ;
write_file_data . encrypted_data = encrypted_data ;
std : : stringstream file_oss ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < true > file_ar ( file_oss ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! : : serialization : : serialize ( file_ar , write_file_data ) , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to serialize MMS state " ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
bool success = epee : : file_io_utils : : save_string_to_file ( filename , file_oss . str ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! success , tools : : error : : file_save_error , filename ) ;
}
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
void message_store : : read_from_file ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , const std : : string & filename , bool load_deprecated_formats )
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
boost : : system : : error_code ignored_ec ;
bool file_exists = boost : : filesystem : : exists ( filename , ignored_ec ) ;
if ( ! file_exists )
{
// Simply do nothing if the file is not there; allows e.g. easy recovery
// from problems with the MMS by deleting the file
2020-04-27 15:43:22 +00:00
MINFO ( " No message store file found: " < < filename ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
return ;
}
std : : string buf ;
bool success = epee : : file_io_utils : : load_file_to_string ( filename , buf ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! success , tools : : error : : file_read_error , filename ) ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
bool loaded = false ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
file_data read_file_data ;
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < buf ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < false > ar ( iss ) ;
if ( : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , read_file_data ) )
if ( : : serialization : : check_stream_state ( ar ) )
loaded = true ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
}
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
catch ( . . . ) { }
if ( ! loaded & & load_deprecated_formats )
{
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < buf ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > read_file_data ;
loaded = true ;
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
MERROR ( " MMS file " < < filename < < " has bad structure <iv,encrypted_data>: " < < e . what ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : file_read_error , filename ) ;
}
}
if ( ! loaded )
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
MERROR ( " MMS file " < < filename < < " has bad structure <iv,encrypted_data> " ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : file_read_error , filename ) ;
}
crypto : : chacha_key key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha_key ( & state . view_secret_key , sizeof ( crypto : : secret_key ) , key , 1 ) ;
std : : string decrypted_data ;
decrypted_data . resize ( read_file_data . encrypted_data . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha20 ( read_file_data . encrypted_data . data ( ) , read_file_data . encrypted_data . size ( ) , key , read_file_data . iv , & decrypted_data [ 0 ] ) ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
loaded = false ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < decrypted_data ;
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
binary_archive < false > ar ( iss ) ;
if ( : : serialization : : serialize ( ar , * this ) )
if ( : : serialization : : check_stream_state ( ar ) )
loaded = true ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
}
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
catch ( . . . ) { }
if ( ! loaded & & load_deprecated_formats )
{
try
{
std : : stringstream iss ;
iss < < decrypted_data ;
boost : : archive : : portable_binary_iarchive ar ( iss ) ;
ar > > * this ;
loaded = true ;
}
catch ( const std : : exception & e )
{
MERROR ( " MMS file " < < filename < < " has bad structure: " < < e . what ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : file_read_error , filename ) ;
}
}
if ( ! loaded )
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
{
replace most boost serialization with existing monero serialization
This reduces the attack surface for data that can come from
malicious sources (exported output and key images, multisig
transactions...) since the monero serialization is already
exposed to the outside, and the boost lib we were using had
a few known crashers.
For interoperability, a new load-deprecated-formats wallet
setting is added (off by default). This allows loading boost
format data if there is no alternative. It will likely go
at some point, along with the ability to load those.
Notably, the peer lists file still uses the boost serialization
code, as the data it stores is define in epee, while the new
serialization code is in monero, and migrating it was fairly
hairy. Since this file is local and not obtained from anyone
else, the marginal risk is minimal, but it could be migrated
later if needed.
Some tests and tools also do, this will stay as is for now.
2020-06-24 23:26:58 +00:00
MERROR ( " MMS file " < < filename < < " has bad structure " ) ;
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( true , tools : : error : : file_read_error , filename ) ;
}
m_filename = filename ;
}
// Save to the same file this message store was loaded from
// Called after changes deemed "important", to make it less probable to lose messages in case of
// a crash; a better and long-term solution would of course be to use LMDB ...
void message_store : : save ( const multisig_wallet_state & state )
{
if ( ! m_filename . empty ( ) )
{
write_to_file ( state , m_filename ) ;
}
}
bool message_store : : get_processable_messages ( const multisig_wallet_state & state ,
bool force_sync , std : : vector < processing_data > & data_list , std : : string & wait_reason )
{
uint32_t wallet_height = ( uint32_t ) state . num_transfer_details ;
data_list . clear ( ) ;
wait_reason . clear ( ) ;
// In all scans over all messages looking for complete sets (1 message for each signer),
// if there are duplicates, the OLDEST of them is taken. This may not play a role with
// any of the current message types, but may with future ones, and it's probably a good
// idea to have a clear and somewhat defensive strategy.
std : : vector < uint32_t > auto_config_messages ( m_num_authorized_signers , 0 ) ;
bool any_auto_config = false ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( ( m . type = = message_type : : auto_config_data ) & & ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting ) )
{
if ( auto_config_messages [ m . signer_index ] = = 0 )
{
auto_config_messages [ m . signer_index ] = m . id ;
any_auto_config = true ;
}
// else duplicate auto config data, ignore
}
}
if ( any_auto_config )
{
bool auto_config_complete = message_ids_complete ( auto_config_messages ) ;
if ( auto_config_complete )
{
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : process_auto_config_data ;
data . message_ids = auto_config_messages ;
data . message_ids . erase ( data . message_ids . begin ( ) ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr ( " Auto-config cannot proceed because auto config data from other signers is not complete " ) ;
return false ;
// With ANY auto config data present but not complete refuse to check for any
// other processing. Manually delete those messages to abort such an auto config
// phase if needed.
}
}
// Any signer config that arrived will be processed right away, regardless of other things that may wait
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( ( m . type = = message_type : : signer_config ) & & ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting ) )
{
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : process_signer_config ;
data . message_ids . push_back ( m . id ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
}
// ALL of the following processings depend on the signer info being complete
if ( ! signer_config_complete ( ) )
{
wait_reason = tr ( " The signer config is not complete. " ) ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! state . multisig )
{
if ( ! any_message_of_type ( message_type : : key_set , message_direction : : out ) )
{
// With the own key set not yet ready we must do "prepare_multisig" first;
// Key sets from other signers may be here already, but if we process them now
// the wallet will go multisig too early: we can't produce our own key set any more!
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : prepare_multisig ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
// Ids of key set messages per signer index, to check completeness
// Naturally, does not care about the order of the messages and is trivial to secure against
// key sets that were received more than once
// With full M/N multisig now possible consider only key sets of the right round, i.e.
// with not yet multisig the only possible round 0
std : : vector < uint32_t > key_set_messages ( m_num_authorized_signers , 0 ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( ( m . type = = message_type : : key_set ) & & ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting )
& & ( m . round = = 0 ) )
{
if ( key_set_messages [ m . signer_index ] = = 0 )
{
key_set_messages [ m . signer_index ] = m . id ;
}
// else duplicate key set, ignore
}
}
bool key_sets_complete = message_ids_complete ( key_set_messages ) ;
if ( key_sets_complete )
{
// Nothing else can be ready to process earlier than this, ignore everything else and give back
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : make_multisig ;
data . message_ids = key_set_messages ;
data . message_ids . erase ( data . message_ids . begin ( ) ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr ( " Wallet can't go multisig because key sets from other signers are missing or not complete. " ) ;
return false ;
}
}
if ( state . multisig & & ! state . multisig_is_ready )
{
// In the case of M/N multisig the call 'wallet2::multisig' returns already true
// after "make_multisig" but with calls to "exchange_multisig_keys" still needed, and
// sets the parameter 'ready' to false to document this particular "in-between" state.
// So what may be possible here, with all necessary messages present, is a call to
// "exchange_multisig_keys".
// Consider only messages belonging to the next round to do, which has the number
// "state.multisig_rounds_passed".
std : : vector < uint32_t > additional_key_set_messages ( m_num_authorized_signers , 0 ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( ( m . type = = message_type : : additional_key_set ) & & ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting )
& & ( m . round = = state . multisig_rounds_passed ) )
{
if ( additional_key_set_messages [ m . signer_index ] = = 0 )
{
additional_key_set_messages [ m . signer_index ] = m . id ;
}
// else duplicate key set, ignore
}
}
bool key_sets_complete = message_ids_complete ( additional_key_set_messages ) ;
if ( key_sets_complete )
{
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : exchange_multisig_keys ;
data . message_ids = additional_key_set_messages ;
data . message_ids . erase ( data . message_ids . begin ( ) ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr ( " Wallet can't start another key exchange round because key sets from other signers are missing or not complete. " ) ;
return false ;
}
}
// Properly exchanging multisig sync data is easiest and most transparent
// for the user if a wallet sends its own data first and processes any received
// sync data afterwards so that's the order that the MMS enforces here.
// (Technically, it seems to work also the other way round.)
//
// To check whether a NEW round of syncing is necessary the MMS works with a
// "wallet state": new state means new syncing needed.
//
// The MMS monitors the "wallet state" by recording "wallet heights" as
// numbers of transfers present in a wallet at the time of message creation. While
// not watertight, this quite simple scheme should already suffice to trigger
// and orchestrate a sensible exchange of sync data.
if ( state . has_multisig_partial_key_images | | force_sync )
{
// Sync is necessary and not yet completed: Processing of transactions
// will only be possible again once properly synced
// Check first whether we generated already OUR sync info; take note of
// any processable sync info from other signers on the way in case we need it
bool own_sync_data_created = false ;
std : : vector < uint32_t > sync_messages ( m_num_authorized_signers , 0 ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( ( m . type = = message_type : : multisig_sync_data ) & & ( force_sync | | ( m . wallet_height = = wallet_height ) ) )
// It's data for the same "round" of syncing, on the same "wallet height", therefore relevant
// With "force_sync" take ANY waiting sync data, maybe it will work out
{
if ( m . direction = = message_direction : : out )
{
own_sync_data_created = true ;
// Ignore whether sent already or not, and assume as complete if several other signers there
}
else if ( ( m . direction = = message_direction : : in ) & & ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting ) )
{
if ( sync_messages [ m . signer_index ] = = 0 )
{
sync_messages [ m . signer_index ] = m . id ;
}
// else duplicate sync message, ignore
}
}
}
if ( ! own_sync_data_created )
{
// As explained above, creating sync data BEFORE processing such data from
// other signers reliably works, so insist on that here
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : create_sync_data ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
uint32_t id_count = ( uint32_t ) get_other_signers_id_count ( sync_messages ) ;
// Do we have sync data from ALL other signers?
bool all_sync_data = id_count = = ( m_num_authorized_signers - 1 ) ;
// Do we have just ENOUGH sync data to have a minimal viable sync set?
// In cases like 2/3 multisig we don't need messages from ALL other signers, only
// from enough of them i.e. num_required_signers minus 1 messages
bool enough_sync_data = id_count > = ( m_num_required_signers - 1 ) ;
bool sync = false ;
wait_reason = tr ( " Syncing not done because multisig sync data from other signers are missing or not complete. " ) ;
if ( all_sync_data )
{
sync = true ;
}
else if ( enough_sync_data )
{
if ( force_sync )
{
sync = true ;
}
else
{
// Don't sync, but give a hint how this minimal set COULD be synced if really wanted
wait_reason + = ( boost : : format ( " \n Use \" mms next sync \" if you want to sync with just %s out of %s authorized signers and transact just with them " )
% ( m_num_required_signers - 1 ) % ( m_num_authorized_signers - 1 ) ) . str ( ) ;
}
}
if ( sync )
{
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : process_sync_data ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < sync_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
uint32_t id = sync_messages [ i ] ;
if ( id ! = 0 )
{
data . message_ids . push_back ( id ) ;
}
}
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
else
{
// We can't proceed to any transactions until we have synced; "wait_reason" already set above
return false ;
}
}
bool waiting_found = false ;
bool note_found = false ;
bool sync_data_found = false ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < m_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
message & m = m_messages [ i ] ;
if ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting )
{
waiting_found = true ;
switch ( m . type )
{
case message_type : : fully_signed_tx :
{
// We can either submit it ourselves, or send it to any other signer for submission
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : submit_tx ;
data . message_ids . push_back ( m . id ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
data . processing = message_processing : : send_tx ;
for ( uint32_t j = 1 ; j < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + j )
{
data . receiving_signer_index = j ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
}
return true ;
}
case message_type : : partially_signed_tx :
{
if ( m . signer_index = = 0 )
{
// We started this ourselves, or signed it but with still signatures missing:
// We can send it to any other signer for signing / further signing
// In principle it does not make sense to send it back to somebody who
// already signed, but the MMS does not / not yet keep track of that,
// because that would be somewhat complicated.
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : send_tx ;
data . message_ids . push_back ( m . id ) ;
for ( uint32_t j = 1 ; j < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + j )
{
data . receiving_signer_index = j ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
}
return true ;
}
else
{
// Somebody else sent this to us: We can sign it
// It would be possible to just pass it on, but that's not directly supported here
processing_data data ;
data . processing = message_processing : : sign_tx ;
data . message_ids . push_back ( m . id ) ;
data_list . push_back ( data ) ;
return true ;
}
}
case message_type : : note :
note_found = true ;
break ;
case message_type : : multisig_sync_data :
sync_data_found = true ;
break ;
default :
break ;
}
}
}
if ( waiting_found )
{
wait_reason = tr ( " There are waiting messages, but nothing is ready to process under normal circumstances " ) ;
if ( sync_data_found )
{
wait_reason + = tr ( " \n Use \" mms next sync \" if you want to force processing of the waiting sync data " ) ;
}
if ( note_found )
{
wait_reason + = tr ( " \n Use \" mms note \" to display the waiting notes " ) ;
}
}
else
{
wait_reason = tr ( " There are no messages waiting to be processed. " ) ;
}
return false ;
}
void message_store : : set_messages_processed ( const processing_data & data )
{
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < data . message_ids . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
set_message_processed_or_sent ( data . message_ids [ i ] ) ;
}
}
void message_store : : set_message_processed_or_sent ( uint32_t id )
{
message & m = get_message_ref_by_id ( id ) ;
if ( m . state = = message_state : : waiting )
{
// So far a fairly cautious and conservative strategy: Only delete from Bitmessage
// when fully processed (and e.g. not already after reception and writing into
// the message store file)
delete_transport_message ( id ) ;
m . state = message_state : : processed ;
}
else if ( m . state = = message_state : : ready_to_send )
{
m . state = message_state : : sent ;
}
m . modified = ( uint64_t ) time ( NULL ) ;
}
void message_store : : encrypt ( crypto : : public_key public_key , const std : : string & plaintext ,
std : : string & ciphertext , crypto : : public_key & encryption_public_key , crypto : : chacha_iv & iv )
{
crypto : : secret_key encryption_secret_key ;
crypto : : generate_keys ( encryption_public_key , encryption_secret_key ) ;
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
bool success = crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( public_key , encryption_secret_key , derivation ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! success , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation for message encryption " ) ;
crypto : : chacha_key chacha_key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha_key ( & derivation , sizeof ( derivation ) , chacha_key , 1 ) ;
iv = crypto : : rand < crypto : : chacha_iv > ( ) ;
ciphertext . resize ( plaintext . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha20 ( plaintext . data ( ) , plaintext . size ( ) , chacha_key , iv , & ciphertext [ 0 ] ) ;
}
void message_store : : decrypt ( const std : : string & ciphertext , const crypto : : public_key & encryption_public_key , const crypto : : chacha_iv & iv ,
const crypto : : secret_key & view_secret_key , std : : string & plaintext )
{
crypto : : key_derivation derivation ;
bool success = crypto : : generate_key_derivation ( encryption_public_key , view_secret_key , derivation ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! success , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Failed to generate key derivation for message decryption " ) ;
crypto : : chacha_key chacha_key ;
crypto : : generate_chacha_key ( & derivation , sizeof ( derivation ) , chacha_key , 1 ) ;
plaintext . resize ( ciphertext . size ( ) ) ;
crypto : : chacha20 ( ciphertext . data ( ) , ciphertext . size ( ) , chacha_key , iv , & plaintext [ 0 ] ) ;
}
void message_store : : send_message ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , uint32_t id )
{
message & m = get_message_ref_by_id ( id ) ;
const authorized_signer & me = m_signers [ 0 ] ;
const authorized_signer & receiver = m_signers [ m . signer_index ] ;
transport_message dm ;
crypto : : public_key public_key ;
dm . timestamp = ( uint64_t ) time ( NULL ) ;
dm . subject = " MMS V0 " + tools : : get_human_readable_timestamp ( dm . timestamp ) ;
dm . source_transport_address = me . transport_address ;
dm . source_monero_address = me . monero_address ;
if ( m . type = = message_type : : auto_config_data )
{
// Encrypt with the public key derived from the auto-config token, and send to the
// transport address likewise derived from that token
public_key = me . auto_config_public_key ;
dm . destination_transport_address = me . auto_config_transport_address ;
// The destination Monero address is not yet known
memset ( & dm . destination_monero_address , 0 , sizeof ( cryptonote : : account_public_address ) ) ;
}
else
{
// Encrypt with the receiver's view public key
public_key = receiver . monero_address . m_view_public_key ;
const authorized_signer & receiver = m_signers [ m . signer_index ] ;
dm . destination_monero_address = receiver . monero_address ;
dm . destination_transport_address = receiver . transport_address ;
}
encrypt ( public_key , m . content , dm . content , dm . encryption_public_key , dm . iv ) ;
dm . type = ( uint32_t ) m . type ;
dm . hash = crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( dm . content . data ( ) , dm . content . size ( ) ) ;
dm . round = m . round ;
crypto : : generate_signature ( dm . hash , me . monero_address . m_view_public_key , state . view_secret_key , dm . signature ) ;
m_transporter . send_message ( dm ) ;
m . state = message_state : : sent ;
m . sent = ( uint64_t ) time ( NULL ) ;
}
bool message_store : : check_for_messages ( const multisig_wallet_state & state , std : : vector < message > & messages )
{
m_run . store ( true , std : : memory_order_relaxed ) ;
const authorized_signer & me = m_signers [ 0 ] ;
std : : vector < std : : string > destinations ;
destinations . push_back ( me . transport_address ) ;
for ( uint32_t i = 1 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . auto_config_running )
{
destinations . push_back ( m . auto_config_transport_address ) ;
}
}
std : : vector < transport_message > transport_messages ;
2021-01-23 09:38:50 +00:00
if ( ! m_transporter . receive_messages ( destinations , transport_messages ) )
{
return false ;
}
2018-10-28 13:46:58 +00:00
if ( ! m_run . load ( std : : memory_order_relaxed ) )
{
// Stop was called, don't waste time processing the messages
// (but once started processing them, don't react to stop request anymore, avoid receiving them "partially)"
return false ;
}
bool new_messages = false ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < transport_messages . size ( ) ; + + i )
{
transport_message & rm = transport_messages [ i ] ;
if ( any_message_with_hash ( rm . hash ) )
{
// Already seen, do not take again
}
else
{
uint32_t sender_index ;
bool take = false ;
message_type type = static_cast < message_type > ( rm . type ) ;
crypto : : secret_key decrypt_key = state . view_secret_key ;
if ( type = = message_type : : auto_config_data )
{
// Find out which signer sent it by checking which auto config transport address
// the message was sent to
for ( uint32_t i = 1 ; i < m_num_authorized_signers ; + + i )
{
const authorized_signer & m = m_signers [ i ] ;
if ( m . auto_config_transport_address = = rm . destination_transport_address )
{
take = true ;
sender_index = i ;
decrypt_key = m . auto_config_secret_key ;
break ;
}
}
}
else if ( type = = message_type : : signer_config )
{
// Typically we can't check yet whether we know the sender, so take from any
// and pretend it's from "me" because we might have nothing else yet
take = true ;
sender_index = 0 ;
}
else
{
// Only accept from senders that are known as signer here, otherwise just ignore
take = get_signer_index_by_monero_address ( rm . source_monero_address , sender_index ) ;
}
if ( take & & ( type ! = message_type : : auto_config_data ) )
{
// If the destination address is known, check it as well; this additional filter
// allows using the same transport address for multiple signers
take = rm . destination_monero_address = = me . monero_address ;
}
if ( take )
{
crypto : : hash actual_hash = crypto : : cn_fast_hash ( rm . content . data ( ) , rm . content . size ( ) ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( actual_hash ! = rm . hash , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Message hash mismatch " ) ;
bool signature_valid = crypto : : check_signature ( actual_hash , rm . source_monero_address . m_view_public_key , rm . signature ) ;
THROW_WALLET_EXCEPTION_IF ( ! signature_valid , tools : : error : : wallet_internal_error , " Message signature not valid " ) ;
std : : string plaintext ;
decrypt ( rm . content , rm . encryption_public_key , rm . iv , decrypt_key , plaintext ) ;
size_t index = add_message ( state , sender_index , ( message_type ) rm . type , message_direction : : in , plaintext ) ;
message & m = m_messages [ index ] ;
m . hash = rm . hash ;
m . transport_id = rm . transport_id ;
m . sent = rm . timestamp ;
m . round = rm . round ;
m . signature_count = rm . signature_count ;
messages . push_back ( m ) ;
new_messages = true ;
}
}
}
return new_messages ;
}
void message_store : : delete_transport_message ( uint32_t id )
{
const message & m = get_message_by_id ( id ) ;
if ( ! m . transport_id . empty ( ) )
{
m_transporter . delete_message ( m . transport_id ) ;
}
}
std : : string message_store : : account_address_to_string ( const cryptonote : : account_public_address & account_address ) const
{
return get_account_address_as_str ( m_nettype , false , account_address ) ;
}
const char * message_store : : message_type_to_string ( message_type type )
{
switch ( type )
{
case message_type : : key_set :
return tr ( " key set " ) ;
case message_type : : additional_key_set :
return tr ( " additional key set " ) ;
case message_type : : multisig_sync_data :
return tr ( " multisig sync data " ) ;
case message_type : : partially_signed_tx :
return tr ( " partially signed tx " ) ;
case message_type : : fully_signed_tx :
return tr ( " fully signed tx " ) ;
case message_type : : note :
return tr ( " note " ) ;
case message_type : : signer_config :
return tr ( " signer config " ) ;
case message_type : : auto_config_data :
return tr ( " auto-config data " ) ;
default :
return tr ( " unknown message type " ) ;
}
}
const char * message_store : : message_direction_to_string ( message_direction direction )
{
switch ( direction )
{
case message_direction : : in :
return tr ( " in " ) ;
case message_direction : : out :
return tr ( " out " ) ;
default :
return tr ( " unknown message direction " ) ;
}
}
const char * message_store : : message_state_to_string ( message_state state )
{
switch ( state )
{
case message_state : : ready_to_send :
return tr ( " ready to send " ) ;
case message_state : : sent :
return tr ( " sent " ) ;
case message_state : : waiting :
return tr ( " waiting " ) ;
case message_state : : processed :
return tr ( " processed " ) ;
case message_state : : cancelled :
return tr ( " cancelled " ) ;
default :
return tr ( " unknown message state " ) ;
}
}
// Convert a signer to string suitable for a column in a list, with 'max_width'
// Format: label: transport_address
std : : string message_store : : signer_to_string ( const authorized_signer & signer , uint32_t max_width )
{
std : : string s = " " ;
s . reserve ( max_width ) ;
uint32_t avail = max_width ;
uint32_t label_len = signer . label . length ( ) ;
if ( label_len > avail )
{
s . append ( signer . label . substr ( 0 , avail - 2 ) ) ;
s . append ( " .. " ) ;
return s ;
}
s . append ( signer . label ) ;
avail - = label_len ;
uint32_t transport_addr_len = signer . transport_address . length ( ) ;
if ( ( transport_addr_len > 0 ) & & ( avail > 10 ) )
{
s . append ( " : " ) ;
avail - = 2 ;
if ( transport_addr_len < = avail )
{
s . append ( signer . transport_address ) ;
}
else
{
s . append ( signer . transport_address . substr ( 0 , avail - 2 ) ) ;
s . append ( " .. " ) ;
}
}
return s ;
}
}