meta/VULNERABILITY_RESPONSE_PROCESS.md

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# The Monero Project Vulnerability Response Process
## Preamble
1. This Vulnerability Response Process and subsequent bounty reward apply to the following:
- Code implementation as seen in the Monero Project GitHub repositories
* This includes code in all branches; including the master branch and any release branch
- Written research from the Monero Research Lab which dictates said code implementation
2. Researchers/Hackers: while you research/hack, we ask that you please refrain from committing the following:
- Denial of Service / Active exploiting against the Monero networks
- Social Engineering of Monero Project staff or contractors
- Any physical or electronic attempts against Monero community property and/or data centers
3. As a pro-privacy project we have volunteers running copies of the websites on hidden services on Tor and I2P, as well as on multiple public domains. **The live sites are NOT in the scope of this process; only the code is!**
4. Bounty will be released for all projects in Monero XMR only. For more information on how to use Monero, visit the [Monero website](https://getmonero.org)
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5. Bounty is not eligible to those who:
- do not abide by the VRP for responsible disclosure
- do not allow the completion of VRP points I through IV
6. Attacks which require more than 50% of the network hash rate (or equivalent luck for enough blocks to execute) are out of policy scope
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## I. Points of contact for security issues
**Please, CC all points of contact if you decide to use email instead of HackerOne**
```
ric [at] getmonero.org
PGP fingerprint = BDA6 BD70 42B7 21C4 67A9 759D 7455 C5E3 C0CD CEB9
luigi1111 [at] getmonero.org
PGP fingerprint = 8777 AB8F 778E E894 87A2 F8E7 F4AC A018 3641 E010
moneromooo on Freenode
PGP fingerprint = 48B0 8161 FBDA DFE3 93AD FC3E 686F 0745 4D6C EFC3
If pasting GPG encrypted data, use paste.centos.org or paste.debian.net
as these don't blackball Tor via Cloudflare.
OTR: 6C7966BB 72E42F33 E1A3F137 2133AC39 D343514A
```
## II. Security response team
- fluffypony
- luigi1111
- moneromooo
## III. Incident response
1. Researcher submits report via one or both of two methods:
- a. PGP encrypted Email (use the appropriate fingerprints [listed in section I](#i-points-of-contact-for-security-issues) or as included in the Monero repo in `utils/gpg_keys/`)
- b. [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
2. Response Team designates a Response Manager who is in charge of the particular report based on availability and/or knowledge-set
3. In no more than 3 working days, Response Team should gratefully respond to researcher using only encrypted, secure channels
4. Response Manager makes inquiries to satisfy any needed information to confirm if submission is indeed a vulnerability
- a. If submission proves to be vulnerable with PoC code / exploit, proceed to next step
- b. If not vulnerable:
- i. Response Manager responds with reasons why submission is not a vulnerability
- ii. Response Manager moves discussion to a new or existing ticket on GitHub if necessary
5. If over email, Response Manager opens a HackerOne issue for new submission
6. Define severity:
- a. Establish severity of vulnerability:
- i. HIGH: impacts network as a whole, has potential to break entire monero network, results in the loss of monero, or is on a scale of great catastrophe
- ii. MEDIUM: impacts individual nodes, routers, wallets, or must be carefully exploited
- iii. LOW: is not easily exploitable or is low impact
- b. If there are any disputes regarding bug severity, the Monero Response team will ultimately define bug severity
- c. Since a systematic DoS hunt has not been completed on any code, DoS's which do not crash a node remotely will receive a lower bounty reward
7. Respond according to the severity of the vulnerability:
- a. HIGH severities will be notified via at least one public communications platform (mailing list, reddit, website, or other) within 3 working days of patch release
- i. The notification should list appropriate steps for users to take, if any
- ii. The notification must not include any details that could suggest an exploitation path
- iii. The latter takes precedence over the former
- b. MEDIUM and HIGH severities will require a Point Release
- c. LOW severities will be addressed in the next Regular Release
8. Response Team applies appropriate patch(es)
- a. Response Manager designates a PRIVATE git "hotfix branch" to work in
- b. Patches are reviewed with the researcher
- c. Any messages associated with PUBLIC commits during the time of review should not make reference to the security nature of the PRIVATE branch or its commits
- d. Vulnerability announcement is drafted
- i. Include the severity of the vulnerability
- ii. Include all vulnerable systems/apps/code
- iii. Include solutions (if any) if patch cannot be applied
- e. Release date is discussed
9. At release date, Response Team coordinates with developers to finalize update:
- a. Response Manager propagates the "hotfix branch" to trunk
- b. Response Manager includes vulnerability announcement draft in release notes
- c. Proceed with the Point or Regular Release
## IV. Post-release disclosure process
1. Response Team has 90 days to fulfill all points within section III
2. If the Incident Response process in section III is successfully completed:
- a. Researcher decides whether or not to opt out of receiving name/handle/organization credit. By default, the researcher will receive name/handle/organization credit.
- i. If bounty is applicable, release bounty to the researcher as defined in section "Bounty Distribution"
- b. Finalize vulnerability announcement draft and include the following:
- i. Project name and URL
- ii. Versions known to be affected
- iii. Versions known to be not affected (for example, the vulnerable code was introduced in a recent version, and older versions are therefore unaffected)
- iv. Versions not checked
- v. Type of vulnerability and its impact
- vi. If already obtained or applicable, a CVE-ID
- vii. The planned, coordinated release date
- viii. Mitigating factors (for example, the vulnerability is only exposed in uncommon, non-default configurations)
- ix. Workarounds (configuration changes users can make to reduce their exposure to the vulnerability)
- x. If applicable, credits to the original reporter
- c. Release finalized vulnerability announcement on public communications platform (mailing list, reddit, website, or other)
- d. For HIGH severities, release finalized vulnerability announcement on well-known mailing lists:
- i. oss-security@lists.openwall.com
- ii. bugtraq@securityfocus.com
- e. If applicable, developers request a CVE-ID
- i. The commit that applied the fix is made reference too in a future commit and includes a CVE-ID
3. If the Incident Response process in section III is *not* successfully completed:
- a. Response Team and developers organize an IRC meeting to discuss why/what points in section III were not resolved and how the team can resolve them in the future
- b. Any developer meetings immediately following the incident should include points made in section V
- c. If disputes arise about whether or when to disclose information about a vulnerability, the Response Team will publicly discuss the issue via IRC and attempt to reach consensus
- d. If consensus on a timely disclosure is not met (no later than 90 days), the researcher (after 90 days) has every right to expose the vulnerability to the public
## V. Bounty distribution
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- XMR for vulnerability-related bounties are solely contributed by community donators and escrowed by unpaid volunteers. Total availability of XMR contributed for bounties can be tracked [here](https://forum.getmonero.org/8/funding-required/87597/monero-bounty-for-hackerone). XMR market values can be found at the various exchanges. See also [Cryptowatch](https://cryptowat.ch/) and [Live Coin Watch](https://www.livecoinwatch.com/).
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- As reports come in and payouts are made, the total bounty supply shrinks. This gives incentive for bug hunters to report bugs a.s.a.p.
- The following percentages apply to available XMR bounty (severity is defined above in section III. 6.):
1. 10% reserved for LOW severity bugs
2. 30% reserved for MEDIUM severity bugs
3. 60% for HIGH severity bugs
- Each bug will at most receive 10% of each category. Example: 10% of 60% for a HIGH severity bug.
## VI. Incident analysis
1. Isolate codebase
- a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
- i. Problematic implementation of classes/libraries/functions, etc.
- ii. Focus on apps/distro packaging, etc.
- iii. Operator/config error, etc.
2. Auditing
- a. Response Team and developers should coordinate to work on the following:
- i. Auditing of problem area(s) as discussed in point 1
- ii. Generate internal reports and store for future reference
- iii. If results are not sensitive, share with the public via IRC or GitHub
3. Response Team has 45 days following completion of section III to ensure completion of section V
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## VII. Resolutions
Any further questions or resolutions regarding the incident(s) between the researcher and response + development team after public disclosure can be addressed via the following:
- IRC on Freenode
- `#monero-dev`
- [GitHub](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
- [Monero (CLI)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero/issues/)
- [Monero (GUI)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero-core/issues/)
- [Monero (Website)](https://github.com/monero-project/monero-site/issues/)
- [HackerOne](https://hackerone.com/monero)
- [Reddit /r/Monero](https://reddit.com/r/Monero/)
- Email
## VIII. Continuous improvement
1. Response Team and developers should hold annual meetings to review the previous year's incidents
2. Response Team or designated person(s) should give a brief presentation, including:
- a. Areas of Monero affected by the incidents
- b. Any network downtime or monetary cost (if any) of the incidents
- c. Ways in which the incidents could have been avoided (if any)
- d. How effective this process was in dealing with the incidents
3. After the presentation, Response Team and developers should discuss:
- a. Potential changes to development processes to reduce future incidents
- b. Potential changes to this process to improve future responses