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cuprate-hinto-janai/cryptonight/c/slow-hash.c
Boog900 42548f733d
add cryptonight bindings
2023-09-05 11:56:07 +01:00

1885 lines
56 KiB
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// Copyright (c) 2014-2023, The Monero Project
//
// All rights reserved.
//
// Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification, are
// permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
//
// 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this list of
// conditions and the following disclaimer.
//
// 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list
// of conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
// materials provided with the distribution.
//
// 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of its contributors may be
// used to endorse or promote products derived from this software without specific
// prior written permission.
//
// THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS" AND ANY
// EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
// MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL
// THE COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
// SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO,
// PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
// INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
// STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF
// THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
//
// Parts of this file are originally copyright (c) 2012-2013 The Cryptonote developers
#include <assert.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "int-util.h"
#include "hash-ops.h"
#include "oaes_lib.h"
#include "variant2_int_sqrt.h"
#include "variant4_random_math.h"
#include "CryptonightR_JIT.h"
#include <errno.h>
#define MEMORY (1 << 21) // 2MB scratchpad
#define ITER (1 << 20)
#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16
#define AES_KEY_SIZE 32
#define INIT_SIZE_BLK 8
#define INIT_SIZE_BYTE (INIT_SIZE_BLK * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#define THREADV __declspec(thread)
#else
#define THREADV __thread
#endif
extern void aesb_single_round(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *expandedKey);
extern void aesb_pseudo_round(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *expandedKey);
static void local_abort(const char *msg)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
#ifdef NDEBUG
_exit(1);
#else
abort();
#endif
}
volatile int use_v4_jit_flag = -1;
static inline int use_v4_jit(void)
{
#if defined(__x86_64__)
if (use_v4_jit_flag != -1)
return use_v4_jit_flag;
const char *env = getenv("MONERO_USE_CNV4_JIT");
if (!env) {
use_v4_jit_flag = 1;
}
else if (!strcmp(env, "0") || !strcmp(env, "no")) {
use_v4_jit_flag = 0;
}
else {
use_v4_jit_flag = 1;
}
return use_v4_jit_flag;
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
#if defined(__x86_64__) || defined(__aarch64__)
static inline int force_software_aes(void)
{
static int use = -1;
if (use != -1)
return use;
const char *env = getenv("MONERO_USE_SOFTWARE_AES");
if (!env) {
use = 0;
}
else if (!strcmp(env, "0") || !strcmp(env, "no")) {
use = 0;
}
else {
use = 1;
}
return use;
}
#endif
#define VARIANT1_1(p) \
do if (variant == 1) \
{ \
const uint8_t tmp = ((const uint8_t*)(p))[11]; \
static const uint32_t table = 0x75310; \
const uint8_t index = (((tmp >> 3) & 6) | (tmp & 1)) << 1; \
((uint8_t*)(p))[11] = tmp ^ ((table >> index) & 0x30); \
} while(0)
#define VARIANT1_2(p) \
do if (variant == 1) \
{ \
xor64(p, tweak1_2); \
} while(0)
#define VARIANT1_CHECK() \
do if (length < 43) \
{ \
fprintf(stderr, "Cryptonight variant 1 needs at least 43 bytes of data"); \
_exit(1); \
} while(0)
#define NONCE_POINTER (((const uint8_t*)data)+35)
#define VARIANT1_PORTABLE_INIT() \
uint8_t tweak1_2[8]; \
do if (variant == 1) \
{ \
VARIANT1_CHECK(); \
memcpy(&tweak1_2, &state.hs.b[192], sizeof(tweak1_2)); \
xor64(tweak1_2, NONCE_POINTER); \
} while(0)
#define VARIANT1_INIT64() \
if (variant == 1) \
{ \
VARIANT1_CHECK(); \
} \
const uint64_t tweak1_2 = (variant == 1) ? (state.hs.w[24] ^ (*((const uint64_t*)NONCE_POINTER))) : 0
#define VARIANT2_INIT64() \
uint64_t division_result = 0; \
uint64_t sqrt_result = 0; \
do if (variant >= 2) \
{ \
U64(b)[2] = state.hs.w[8] ^ state.hs.w[10]; \
U64(b)[3] = state.hs.w[9] ^ state.hs.w[11]; \
division_result = SWAP64LE(state.hs.w[12]); \
sqrt_result = SWAP64LE(state.hs.w[13]); \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INIT() \
uint64_t division_result = 0; \
uint64_t sqrt_result = 0; \
do if (variant >= 2) \
{ \
memcpy(b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, state.hs.b + 64, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); \
xor64(b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, state.hs.b + 80); \
xor64(b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE + 8, state.hs.b + 88); \
division_result = SWAP64LE(state.hs.w[12]); \
sqrt_result = SWAP64LE(state.hs.w[13]); \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_SSE2(base_ptr, offset) \
do if (variant >= 2) \
{ \
__m128i chunk1 = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x10))); \
const __m128i chunk2 = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x20))); \
const __m128i chunk3 = _mm_load_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x30))); \
_mm_store_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x10)), _mm_add_epi64(chunk3, _b1)); \
_mm_store_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x20)), _mm_add_epi64(chunk1, _b)); \
_mm_store_si128((__m128i *)((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x30)), _mm_add_epi64(chunk2, _a)); \
if (variant >= 4) \
{ \
chunk1 = _mm_xor_si128(chunk1, chunk2); \
_c = _mm_xor_si128(_c, chunk3); \
_c = _mm_xor_si128(_c, chunk1); \
} \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_NEON(base_ptr, offset) \
do if (variant >= 2) \
{ \
uint64x2_t chunk1 = vld1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x10))); \
const uint64x2_t chunk2 = vld1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x20))); \
const uint64x2_t chunk3 = vld1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x30))); \
vst1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x10)), vaddq_u64(chunk3, vreinterpretq_u64_u8(_b1))); \
vst1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x20)), vaddq_u64(chunk1, vreinterpretq_u64_u8(_b))); \
vst1q_u64(U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x30)), vaddq_u64(chunk2, vreinterpretq_u64_u8(_a))); \
if (variant >= 4) \
{ \
chunk1 = veorq_u64(chunk1, chunk2); \
_c = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(veorq_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_u8(_c), chunk3)); \
_c = vreinterpretq_u8_u64(veorq_u64(vreinterpretq_u64_u8(_c), chunk1)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT2_PORTABLE_SHUFFLE_ADD(out, a_, base_ptr, offset) \
do if (variant >= 2) \
{ \
uint64_t* chunk1 = U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x10)); \
uint64_t* chunk2 = U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x20)); \
uint64_t* chunk3 = U64((base_ptr) + ((offset) ^ 0x30)); \
\
uint64_t chunk1_old[2] = { SWAP64LE(chunk1[0]), SWAP64LE(chunk1[1]) }; \
const uint64_t chunk2_old[2] = { SWAP64LE(chunk2[0]), SWAP64LE(chunk2[1]) }; \
const uint64_t chunk3_old[2] = { SWAP64LE(chunk3[0]), SWAP64LE(chunk3[1]) }; \
\
uint64_t b1[2]; \
memcpy_swap64le(b1, b + 16, 2); \
chunk1[0] = SWAP64LE(chunk3_old[0] + b1[0]); \
chunk1[1] = SWAP64LE(chunk3_old[1] + b1[1]); \
\
uint64_t a0[2]; \
memcpy_swap64le(a0, a_, 2); \
chunk3[0] = SWAP64LE(chunk2_old[0] + a0[0]); \
chunk3[1] = SWAP64LE(chunk2_old[1] + a0[1]); \
\
uint64_t b0[2]; \
memcpy_swap64le(b0, b, 2); \
chunk2[0] = SWAP64LE(chunk1_old[0] + b0[0]); \
chunk2[1] = SWAP64LE(chunk1_old[1] + b0[1]); \
if (variant >= 4) \
{ \
uint64_t out_copy[2]; \
memcpy_swap64le(out_copy, out, 2); \
chunk1_old[0] ^= chunk2_old[0]; \
chunk1_old[1] ^= chunk2_old[1]; \
out_copy[0] ^= chunk3_old[0]; \
out_copy[1] ^= chunk3_old[1]; \
out_copy[0] ^= chunk1_old[0]; \
out_copy[1] ^= chunk1_old[1]; \
memcpy_swap64le(out, out_copy, 2); \
} \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_DIVISION_STEP(b, ptr) \
uint64_t tmpx = division_result ^ (sqrt_result << 32); \
((uint64_t*)(b))[0] ^= SWAP64LE(tmpx); \
{ \
const uint64_t dividend = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)(ptr))[1]); \
const uint32_t divisor = (SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)(ptr))[0]) + (uint32_t)(sqrt_result << 1)) | 0x80000001UL; \
division_result = ((uint32_t)(dividend / divisor)) + \
(((uint64_t)(dividend % divisor)) << 32); \
} \
const uint64_t sqrt_input = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)(ptr))[0]) + division_result
#define VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SSE2(b, ptr) \
do if ((variant == 2) || (variant == 3)) \
{ \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_DIVISION_STEP(b, ptr); \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SQRT_STEP_SSE2(); \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SQRT_FIXUP(sqrt_result); \
} while(0)
#if defined DBL_MANT_DIG && (DBL_MANT_DIG >= 50)
// double precision floating point type has enough bits of precision on current platform
#define VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INTEGER_MATH(b, ptr) \
do if ((variant == 2) || (variant == 3)) \
{ \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_DIVISION_STEP(b, ptr); \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SQRT_STEP_FP64(); \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SQRT_FIXUP(sqrt_result); \
} while (0)
#else
// double precision floating point type is not good enough on current platform
// fall back to the reference code (integer only)
#define VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INTEGER_MATH(b, ptr) \
do if ((variant == 2) || (variant == 3)) \
{ \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_DIVISION_STEP(b, ptr); \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SQRT_STEP_REF(); \
} while (0)
#endif
#define VARIANT2_2_PORTABLE() \
if (variant == 2 || variant == 3) { \
xor_blocks(long_state + (j ^ 0x10), d); \
xor_blocks(d, long_state + (j ^ 0x20)); \
}
#define VARIANT2_2() \
do if (variant == 2 || variant == 3) \
{ \
*U64(local_hp_state + (j ^ 0x10)) ^= SWAP64LE(hi); \
*(U64(local_hp_state + (j ^ 0x10)) + 1) ^= SWAP64LE(lo); \
hi ^= SWAP64LE(*U64(local_hp_state + (j ^ 0x20))); \
lo ^= SWAP64LE(*(U64(local_hp_state + (j ^ 0x20)) + 1)); \
} while (0)
#define V4_REG_LOAD(dst, src) \
do { \
memcpy((dst), (src), sizeof(v4_reg)); \
if (sizeof(v4_reg) == sizeof(uint32_t)) \
*(dst) = SWAP32LE(*(dst)); \
else \
*(dst) = SWAP64LE(*(dst)); \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH_INIT() \
v4_reg r[9]; \
struct V4_Instruction code[NUM_INSTRUCTIONS_MAX + 1]; \
int jit = use_v4_jit(); \
do if (variant >= 4) \
{ \
for (int i = 0; i < 4; ++i) \
V4_REG_LOAD(r + i, (uint8_t*)(state.hs.w + 12) + sizeof(v4_reg) * i); \
v4_random_math_init(code, height); \
if (jit) \
{ \
int ret = v4_generate_JIT_code(code, hp_jitfunc, 4096); \
if (ret < 0) \
local_abort("Error generating CryptonightR code"); \
} \
} while (0)
#define VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH(a, b, r, _b, _b1) \
do if (variant >= 4) \
{ \
uint64_t t[2]; \
memcpy(t, b, sizeof(uint64_t)); \
\
if (sizeof(v4_reg) == sizeof(uint32_t)) \
t[0] ^= SWAP64LE((r[0] + r[1]) | ((uint64_t)(r[2] + r[3]) << 32)); \
else \
t[0] ^= SWAP64LE((r[0] + r[1]) ^ (r[2] + r[3])); \
\
memcpy(b, t, sizeof(uint64_t)); \
\
V4_REG_LOAD(r + 4, a); \
V4_REG_LOAD(r + 5, (uint64_t*)(a) + 1); \
V4_REG_LOAD(r + 6, _b); \
V4_REG_LOAD(r + 7, _b1); \
V4_REG_LOAD(r + 8, (uint64_t*)(_b1) + 1); \
\
if (jit) \
(*hp_jitfunc)(r); \
else \
v4_random_math(code, r); \
\
memcpy(t, a, sizeof(uint64_t) * 2); \
\
if (sizeof(v4_reg) == sizeof(uint32_t)) { \
t[0] ^= SWAP64LE(r[2] | ((uint64_t)(r[3]) << 32)); \
t[1] ^= SWAP64LE(r[0] | ((uint64_t)(r[1]) << 32)); \
} else { \
t[0] ^= SWAP64LE(r[2] ^ r[3]); \
t[1] ^= SWAP64LE(r[0] ^ r[1]); \
} \
memcpy(a, t, sizeof(uint64_t) * 2); \
} while (0)
#if !defined NO_AES && (defined(__x86_64__) || (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN64)))
// Optimised code below, uses x86-specific intrinsics, SSE2, AES-NI
// Fall back to more portable code is down at the bottom
#include <emmintrin.h>
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#include <intrin.h>
#include <windows.h>
#define STATIC
#define INLINE __inline
#if !defined(RDATA_ALIGN16)
#define RDATA_ALIGN16 __declspec(align(16))
#endif
#elif defined(__MINGW32__)
#include <intrin.h>
#include <windows.h>
#define STATIC static
#define INLINE inline
#if !defined(RDATA_ALIGN16)
#define RDATA_ALIGN16 __attribute__ ((aligned(16)))
#endif
#else
#include <wmmintrin.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#define STATIC static
#define INLINE inline
#if !defined(RDATA_ALIGN16)
#define RDATA_ALIGN16 __attribute__ ((aligned(16)))
#endif
#endif
#if defined(__INTEL_COMPILER)
#define ASM __asm__
#elif !defined(_MSC_VER)
#define ASM __asm__
#else
#define ASM __asm
#endif
#define TOTALBLOCKS (MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
#define U64(x) ((uint64_t *) (x))
#define R128(x) ((__m128i *) (x))
#define state_index(x) (((*((uint64_t *)x) >> 4) & (TOTALBLOCKS - 1)) << 4)
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#if !defined(_WIN64)
#define __mul() lo = mul128(c[0], b[0], &hi);
#else
#define __mul() lo = _umul128(c[0], b[0], &hi);
#endif
#else
#if defined(__x86_64__)
#define __mul() ASM("mulq %3\n\t" : "=d"(hi), "=a"(lo) : "%a" (c[0]), "rm" (b[0]) : "cc");
#else
#define __mul() lo = mul128(c[0], b[0], &hi);
#endif
#endif
#define pre_aes() \
j = state_index(a); \
_c = _mm_load_si128(R128(&local_hp_state[j])); \
_a = _mm_load_si128(R128(a)); \
/*
* An SSE-optimized implementation of the second half of CryptoNight step 3.
* After using AES to mix a scratchpad value into _c (done by the caller),
* this macro xors it with _b and stores the result back to the same index (j) that it
* loaded the scratchpad value from. It then performs a second random memory
* read/write from the scratchpad, but this time mixes the values using a 64
* bit multiply.
* This code is based upon an optimized implementation by dga.
*/
#define post_aes() \
VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_SSE2(local_hp_state, j); \
_mm_store_si128(R128(c), _c); \
_mm_store_si128(R128(&local_hp_state[j]), _mm_xor_si128(_b, _c)); \
VARIANT1_1(&local_hp_state[j]); \
j = state_index(c); \
p = U64(&local_hp_state[j]); \
b[0] = p[0]; b[1] = p[1]; \
VARIANT2_INTEGER_MATH_SSE2(b, c); \
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH(a, b, r, &_b, &_b1); \
__mul(); \
VARIANT2_2(); \
VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_SSE2(local_hp_state, j); \
a[0] += hi; a[1] += lo; \
p = U64(&local_hp_state[j]); \
p[0] = a[0]; p[1] = a[1]; \
a[0] ^= b[0]; a[1] ^= b[1]; \
VARIANT1_2(p + 1); \
_b1 = _b; \
_b = _c; \
#pragma pack(push, 1)
union cn_slow_hash_state
{
union hash_state hs;
struct
{
uint8_t k[64];
uint8_t init[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
};
};
#pragma pack(pop)
THREADV uint8_t *hp_state = NULL;
THREADV int hp_allocated = 0;
THREADV v4_random_math_JIT_func hp_jitfunc = NULL;
THREADV uint8_t *hp_jitfunc_memory = NULL;
THREADV int hp_jitfunc_allocated = 0;
#if defined(_MSC_VER)
#define cpuid(info,x) __cpuidex(info,x,0)
#else
void cpuid(int CPUInfo[4], int InfoType)
{
ASM __volatile__
(
"cpuid":
"=a" (CPUInfo[0]),
"=b" (CPUInfo[1]),
"=c" (CPUInfo[2]),
"=d" (CPUInfo[3]) :
"a" (InfoType), "c" (0)
);
}
#endif
/**
* @brief a = (a xor b), where a and b point to 128 bit values
*/
STATIC INLINE void xor_blocks(uint8_t *a, const uint8_t *b)
{
U64(a)[0] ^= U64(b)[0];
U64(a)[1] ^= U64(b)[1];
}
STATIC INLINE void xor64(uint64_t *a, const uint64_t b)
{
*a ^= b;
}
/**
* @brief uses cpuid to determine if the CPU supports the AES instructions
* @return true if the CPU supports AES, false otherwise
*/
STATIC INLINE int check_aes_hw(void)
{
int cpuid_results[4];
static int supported = -1;
if(supported >= 0)
return supported;
cpuid(cpuid_results,1);
return supported = cpuid_results[2] & (1 << 25);
}
STATIC INLINE void aes_256_assist1(__m128i* t1, __m128i * t2)
{
__m128i t4;
*t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(*t2, 0xff);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t1, 0x04);
*t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x04);
*t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x04);
*t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, t4);
*t1 = _mm_xor_si128(*t1, *t2);
}
STATIC INLINE void aes_256_assist2(__m128i* t1, __m128i * t3)
{
__m128i t2, t4;
t4 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(*t1, 0x00);
t2 = _mm_shuffle_epi32(t4, 0xaa);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(*t3, 0x04);
*t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x04);
*t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
t4 = _mm_slli_si128(t4, 0x04);
*t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t4);
*t3 = _mm_xor_si128(*t3, t2);
}
/**
* @brief expands 'key' into a form it can be used for AES encryption.
*
* This is an SSE-optimized implementation of AES key schedule generation. It
* expands the key into multiple round keys, each of which is used in one round
* of the AES encryption used to fill (and later, extract randomness from)
* the large 2MB buffer. Note that CryptoNight does not use a completely
* standard AES encryption for its buffer expansion, so do not copy this
* function outside of Monero without caution! This version uses the hardware
* AESKEYGENASSIST instruction to speed key generation, and thus requires
* CPU AES support.
* For more information about these functions, see page 19 of Intel's AES instructions
* white paper:
* https://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/white-paper/advanced-encryption-standard-new-instructions-set-paper.pdf
*
* @param key the input 128 bit key
* @param expandedKey An output buffer to hold the generated key schedule
*/
STATIC INLINE void aes_expand_key(const uint8_t *key, uint8_t *expandedKey)
{
__m128i *ek = R128(expandedKey);
__m128i t1, t2, t3;
t1 = _mm_loadu_si128(R128(key));
t3 = _mm_loadu_si128(R128(key + 16));
ek[0] = t1;
ek[1] = t3;
t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x01);
aes_256_assist1(&t1, &t2);
ek[2] = t1;
aes_256_assist2(&t1, &t3);
ek[3] = t3;
t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x02);
aes_256_assist1(&t1, &t2);
ek[4] = t1;
aes_256_assist2(&t1, &t3);
ek[5] = t3;
t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x04);
aes_256_assist1(&t1, &t2);
ek[6] = t1;
aes_256_assist2(&t1, &t3);
ek[7] = t3;
t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x08);
aes_256_assist1(&t1, &t2);
ek[8] = t1;
aes_256_assist2(&t1, &t3);
ek[9] = t3;
t2 = _mm_aeskeygenassist_si128(t3, 0x10);
aes_256_assist1(&t1, &t2);
ek[10] = t1;
}
/**
* @brief a "pseudo" round of AES (similar to but slightly different from normal AES encryption)
*
* To fill its 2MB scratch buffer, CryptoNight uses a nonstandard implementation
* of AES encryption: It applies 10 rounds of the basic AES encryption operation
* to an input 128 bit chunk of data <in>. Unlike normal AES, however, this is
* all it does; it does not perform the initial AddRoundKey step (this is done
* in subsequent steps by aesenc_si128), and it does not use the simpler final round.
* Hence, this is a "pseudo" round - though the function actually implements 10 rounds together.
*
* Note that unlike aesb_pseudo_round, this function works on multiple data chunks.
*
* @param in a pointer to nblocks * 128 bits of data to be encrypted
* @param out a pointer to an nblocks * 128 bit buffer where the output will be stored
* @param expandedKey the expanded AES key
* @param nblocks the number of 128 blocks of data to be encrypted
*/
STATIC INLINE void aes_pseudo_round(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *expandedKey, int nblocks)
{
__m128i *k = R128(expandedKey);
__m128i d;
int i;
for(i = 0; i < nblocks; i++)
{
d = _mm_loadu_si128(R128(in + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[0]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[1]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[2]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[3]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[4]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[5]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[6]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[7]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[8]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[9]));
_mm_storeu_si128((R128(out + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)), d);
}
}
/**
* @brief aes_pseudo_round that loads data from *in and xors it with *xor first
*
* This function performs the same operations as aes_pseudo_round, but before
* performing the encryption of each 128 bit block from <in>, it xors
* it with the corresponding block from <xor>.
*
* @param in a pointer to nblocks * 128 bits of data to be encrypted
* @param out a pointer to an nblocks * 128 bit buffer where the output will be stored
* @param expandedKey the expanded AES key
* @param xor a pointer to an nblocks * 128 bit buffer that is xored into in before encryption (in is left unmodified)
* @param nblocks the number of 128 blocks of data to be encrypted
*/
STATIC INLINE void aes_pseudo_round_xor(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out,
const uint8_t *expandedKey, const uint8_t *xor, int nblocks)
{
__m128i *k = R128(expandedKey);
__m128i *x = R128(xor);
__m128i d;
int i;
for(i = 0; i < nblocks; i++)
{
d = _mm_loadu_si128(R128(in + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE));
d = _mm_xor_si128(d, *R128(x++));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[0]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[1]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[2]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[3]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[4]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[5]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[6]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[7]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[8]));
d = _mm_aesenc_si128(d, *R128(&k[9]));
_mm_storeu_si128((R128(out + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE)), d);
}
}
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__)
BOOL SetLockPagesPrivilege(HANDLE hProcess, BOOL bEnable)
{
struct
{
DWORD count;
LUID_AND_ATTRIBUTES privilege[1];
} info;
HANDLE token;
if(!OpenProcessToken(hProcess, TOKEN_ADJUST_PRIVILEGES, &token))
return FALSE;
info.count = 1;
info.privilege[0].Attributes = bEnable ? SE_PRIVILEGE_ENABLED : 0;
if(!LookupPrivilegeValue(NULL, SE_LOCK_MEMORY_NAME, &(info.privilege[0].Luid)))
return FALSE;
if(!AdjustTokenPrivileges(token, FALSE, (PTOKEN_PRIVILEGES) &info, 0, NULL, NULL))
return FALSE;
if (GetLastError() != ERROR_SUCCESS)
return FALSE;
CloseHandle(token);
return TRUE;
}
#endif
/**
* @brief allocate the 2MB scratch buffer using OS support for huge pages, if available
*
* This function tries to allocate the 2MB scratch buffer using a single
* 2MB "huge page" (instead of the usual 4KB page sizes) to reduce TLB misses
* during the random accesses to the scratch buffer. This is one of the
* important speed optimizations needed to make CryptoNight faster.
*
* No parameters. Updates a thread-local pointer, hp_state, to point to
* the allocated buffer.
*/
void cn_slow_hash_allocate_state(void)
{
if(hp_state != NULL)
return;
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__)
SetLockPagesPrivilege(GetCurrentProcess(), TRUE);
hp_state = (uint8_t *) VirtualAlloc(hp_state, MEMORY, MEM_LARGE_PAGES |
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_READWRITE);
#else
#if defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || \
defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
hp_state = mmap(0, MEMORY, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
#else
hp_state = mmap(0, MEMORY, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB, -1, 0);
#endif
if(hp_state == MAP_FAILED)
hp_state = NULL;
#endif
hp_allocated = 1;
if(hp_state == NULL)
{
hp_allocated = 0;
hp_state = (uint8_t *) malloc(MEMORY);
}
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__)
hp_jitfunc_memory = (uint8_t *) VirtualAlloc(hp_jitfunc_memory, 4096 + 4095,
MEM_COMMIT | MEM_RESERVE, PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE);
#else
#if defined(__APPLE__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__OpenBSD__) || \
defined(__DragonFly__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
#ifdef __NetBSD__
#define RESERVED_FLAGS PROT_MPROTECT(PROT_EXEC)
#else
#define RESERVED_FLAGS 0
#endif
hp_jitfunc_memory = mmap(0, 4096 + 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | RESERVED_FLAGS,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON, -1, 0);
#else
hp_jitfunc_memory = mmap(0, 4096 + 4096, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
#endif
if(hp_jitfunc_memory == MAP_FAILED)
hp_jitfunc_memory = NULL;
#endif
hp_jitfunc_allocated = 1;
if (hp_jitfunc_memory == NULL)
{
hp_jitfunc_allocated = 0;
hp_jitfunc_memory = malloc(4096 + 4095);
}
hp_jitfunc = (v4_random_math_JIT_func)((size_t)(hp_jitfunc_memory + 4095) & ~4095);
}
/**
*@brief frees the state allocated by slow_hash_allocate_state
*/
void cn_slow_hash_free_state(void)
{
if(hp_state == NULL)
return;
if(!hp_allocated)
free(hp_state);
else
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__)
VirtualFree(hp_state, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
#else
munmap(hp_state, MEMORY);
#endif
}
if(!hp_jitfunc_allocated)
free(hp_jitfunc_memory);
else
{
#if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__MINGW32__)
VirtualFree(hp_jitfunc_memory, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
#else
munmap(hp_jitfunc_memory, 4096 + 4095);
#endif
}
hp_state = NULL;
hp_allocated = 0;
hp_jitfunc = NULL;
hp_jitfunc_memory = NULL;
hp_jitfunc_allocated = 0;
}
/**
* @brief the hash function implementing CryptoNight, used for the Monero proof-of-work
*
* Computes the hash of <data> (which consists of <length> bytes), returning the
* hash in <hash>. The CryptoNight hash operates by first using Keccak 1600,
* the 1600 bit variant of the Keccak hash used in SHA-3, to create a 200 byte
* buffer of pseudorandom data by hashing the supplied data. It then uses this
* random data to fill a large 2MB buffer with pseudorandom data by iteratively
* encrypting it using 10 rounds of AES per entry. After this initialization,
* it executes 524,288 rounds of mixing through the random 2MB buffer using
* AES (typically provided in hardware on modern CPUs) and a 64 bit multiply.
* Finally, it re-mixes this large buffer back into
* the 200 byte "text" buffer, and then hashes this buffer using one of four
* pseudorandomly selected hash functions (Blake, Groestl, JH, or Skein)
* to populate the output.
*
* The 2MB buffer and choice of functions for mixing are designed to make the
* algorithm "CPU-friendly" (and thus, reduce the advantage of GPU, FPGA,
* or ASIC-based implementations): the functions used are fast on modern
* CPUs, and the 2MB size matches the typical amount of L3 cache available per
* core on 2013-era CPUs. When available, this implementation will use hardware
* AES support on x86 CPUs.
*
* A diagram of the inner loop of this function can be found at
* https://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dga/crypto/xmr/cryptonight.png
*
* @param data the data to hash
* @param length the length in bytes of the data
* @param hash a pointer to a buffer in which the final 256 bit hash will be stored
*/
void cn_slow_hash(const void *data, size_t length, char *hash, int variant, int prehashed, uint64_t height)
{
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint8_t expandedKey[240]; /* These buffers are aligned to use later with SSE functions */
uint8_t text[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t a[2];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t b[4];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t c[2];
union cn_slow_hash_state state;
__m128i _a, _b, _b1, _c;
uint64_t hi, lo;
size_t i, j;
uint64_t *p = NULL;
oaes_ctx *aes_ctx = NULL;
int useAes = !force_software_aes() && check_aes_hw();
static void (*const extra_hashes[4])(const void *, size_t, char *) =
{
hash_extra_blake, hash_extra_groestl, hash_extra_jh, hash_extra_skein
};
// this isn't supposed to happen, but guard against it for now.
if(hp_state == NULL)
cn_slow_hash_allocate_state();
// locals to avoid constant TLS dereferencing
uint8_t *local_hp_state = hp_state;
/* CryptoNight Step 1: Use Keccak1600 to initialize the 'state' (and 'text') buffers from the data. */
if (prehashed) {
memcpy(&state.hs, data, length);
} else {
hash_process(&state.hs, data, length);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
VARIANT1_INIT64();
VARIANT2_INIT64();
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH_INIT();
/* CryptoNight Step 2: Iteratively encrypt the results from Keccak to fill
* the 2MB large random access buffer.
*/
if(useAes)
{
aes_expand_key(state.hs.b, expandedKey);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
aes_pseudo_round(text, text, expandedKey, INIT_SIZE_BLK);
memcpy(&local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
}
else
{
aes_ctx = (oaes_ctx *) oaes_alloc();
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, state.hs.b, AES_KEY_SIZE);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
memcpy(&local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
}
U64(a)[0] = U64(&state.k[0])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[0];
U64(a)[1] = U64(&state.k[0])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[1];
U64(b)[0] = U64(&state.k[16])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[0];
U64(b)[1] = U64(&state.k[16])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[1];
/* CryptoNight Step 3: Bounce randomly 1,048,576 times (1<<20) through the mixing buffer,
* using 524,288 iterations of the following mixing function. Each execution
* performs two reads and writes from the mixing buffer.
*/
_b = _mm_load_si128(R128(b));
_b1 = _mm_load_si128(R128(b) + 1);
// Two independent versions, one with AES, one without, to ensure that
// the useAes test is only performed once, not every iteration.
if(useAes)
{
for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)
{
pre_aes();
_c = _mm_aesenc_si128(_c, _a);
post_aes();
}
}
else
{
for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)
{
pre_aes();
aesb_single_round((uint8_t *) &_c, (uint8_t *) &_c, (uint8_t *) &_a);
post_aes();
}
}
/* CryptoNight Step 4: Sequentially pass through the mixing buffer and use 10 rounds
* of AES encryption to mix the random data back into the 'text' buffer. 'text'
* was originally created with the output of Keccak1600. */
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
if(useAes)
{
aes_expand_key(&state.hs.b[32], expandedKey);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
// add the xor to the pseudo round
aes_pseudo_round_xor(text, text, expandedKey, &local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], INIT_SIZE_BLK);
}
}
else
{
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, &state.hs.b[32], AES_KEY_SIZE);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
{
xor_blocks(&text[j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE], &local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE + j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
}
}
oaes_free((OAES_CTX **) &aes_ctx);
}
/* CryptoNight Step 5: Apply Keccak to the state again, and then
* use the resulting data to select which of four finalizer
* hash functions to apply to the data (Blake, Groestl, JH, or Skein).
* Use this hash to squeeze the state array down
* to the final 256 bit hash output.
*/
memcpy(state.init, text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
hash_permutation(&state.hs);
extra_hashes[state.hs.b[0] & 3](&state, 200, hash);
}
#elif !defined NO_AES && (defined(__arm__) || defined(__aarch64__))
#ifdef __aarch64__
#include <sys/mman.h>
THREADV uint8_t *hp_state = NULL;
THREADV int hp_malloced = 0;
void cn_slow_hash_allocate_state(void)
{
if(hp_state != NULL)
return;
#ifndef MAP_HUGETLB
#define MAP_HUGETLB 0
#endif
hp_state = mmap(0, MEMORY, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANON | MAP_HUGETLB, -1, 0);
if(hp_state == MAP_FAILED)
hp_state = NULL;
if(hp_state == NULL)
{
hp_malloced = 1;
hp_state = (uint8_t *) malloc(MEMORY);
}
}
void cn_slow_hash_free_state(void)
{
if(hp_state == NULL)
return;
if (hp_malloced)
free(hp_state);
else
munmap(hp_state, MEMORY);
hp_state = NULL;
hp_malloced = 0;
}
#else
void cn_slow_hash_allocate_state(void)
{
// Do nothing, this is just to maintain compatibility with the upgraded slow-hash.c
return;
}
void cn_slow_hash_free_state(void)
{
// As above
return;
}
#endif
#if defined(__GNUC__)
#define RDATA_ALIGN16 __attribute__ ((aligned(16)))
#define STATIC static
#define INLINE inline
#else
#define RDATA_ALIGN16
#define STATIC static
#define INLINE
#endif
#define U64(x) ((uint64_t *) (x))
#define hp_jitfunc ((v4_random_math_JIT_func)NULL)
STATIC INLINE void xor64(uint64_t *a, const uint64_t b)
{
*a ^= b;
}
#pragma pack(push, 1)
union cn_slow_hash_state
{
union hash_state hs;
struct
{
uint8_t k[64];
uint8_t init[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
};
};
#pragma pack(pop)
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__ARM_FEATURE_CRYPTO)
/* ARMv8-A optimized with NEON and AES instructions.
* Copied from the x86-64 AES-NI implementation. It has much the same
* characteristics as x86-64: there's no 64x64=128 multiplier for vectors,
* and moving between vector and regular registers stalls the pipeline.
*/
#include <arm_neon.h>
#ifndef __APPLE__
#include <sys/auxv.h>
#include <asm/hwcap.h>
#endif
STATIC INLINE int check_aes_hw(void)
{
#ifdef __APPLE__
return 1;
#else
static int supported = -1;
if(supported < 0)
supported = (getauxval(AT_HWCAP) & HWCAP_AES) != 0;
return supported;
#endif
}
#define TOTALBLOCKS (MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
#define state_index(x) (((*((uint64_t *)x) >> 4) & (TOTALBLOCKS - 1)) << 4)
#define __mul() __asm__("mul %0, %1, %2\n\t" : "=r"(lo) : "r"(c[0]), "r"(b[0]) ); \
__asm__("umulh %0, %1, %2\n\t" : "=r"(hi) : "r"(c[0]), "r"(b[0]) );
#define pre_aes() \
j = state_index(a); \
_c = vld1q_u8(&local_hp_state[j]); \
_a = vld1q_u8((const uint8_t *)a); \
#define post_aes() \
VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_NEON(local_hp_state, j); \
vst1q_u8((uint8_t *)c, _c); \
vst1q_u8(&local_hp_state[j], veorq_u8(_b, _c)); \
VARIANT1_1(&local_hp_state[j]); \
j = state_index(c); \
p = U64(&local_hp_state[j]); \
b[0] = p[0]; b[1] = p[1]; \
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INTEGER_MATH(b, c); \
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH(a, b, r, &_b, &_b1); \
__mul(); \
VARIANT2_2(); \
VARIANT2_SHUFFLE_ADD_NEON(local_hp_state, j); \
a[0] += hi; a[1] += lo; \
p = U64(&local_hp_state[j]); \
p[0] = a[0]; p[1] = a[1]; \
a[0] ^= b[0]; a[1] ^= b[1]; \
VARIANT1_2(p + 1); \
_b1 = _b; \
_b = _c; \
/* Note: this was based on a standard 256bit key schedule but
* it's been shortened since Cryptonight doesn't use the full
* key schedule. Don't try to use this for vanilla AES.
*/
static void aes_expand_key(const uint8_t *key, uint8_t *expandedKey) {
static const int rcon[] = {
0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,
0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d,0x0c0f0e0d, // rotate-n-splat
0x1b,0x1b,0x1b,0x1b };
__asm__(
" eor v0.16b,v0.16b,v0.16b\n"
" ld1 {v3.16b},[%0],#16\n"
" ld1 {v1.4s,v2.4s},[%2],#32\n"
" ld1 {v4.16b},[%0]\n"
" mov w2,#5\n"
" st1 {v3.4s},[%1],#16\n"
"\n"
"1:\n"
" tbl v6.16b,{v4.16b},v2.16b\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v3.16b,#12\n"
" st1 {v4.4s},[%1],#16\n"
" aese v6.16b,v0.16b\n"
" subs w2,w2,#1\n"
"\n"
" eor v3.16b,v3.16b,v5.16b\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v5.16b,#12\n"
" eor v3.16b,v3.16b,v5.16b\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v5.16b,#12\n"
" eor v6.16b,v6.16b,v1.16b\n"
" eor v3.16b,v3.16b,v5.16b\n"
" shl v1.16b,v1.16b,#1\n"
" eor v3.16b,v3.16b,v6.16b\n"
" st1 {v3.4s},[%1],#16\n"
" b.eq 2f\n"
"\n"
" dup v6.4s,v3.s[3] // just splat\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v4.16b,#12\n"
" aese v6.16b,v0.16b\n"
"\n"
" eor v4.16b,v4.16b,v5.16b\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v5.16b,#12\n"
" eor v4.16b,v4.16b,v5.16b\n"
" ext v5.16b,v0.16b,v5.16b,#12\n"
" eor v4.16b,v4.16b,v5.16b\n"
"\n"
" eor v4.16b,v4.16b,v6.16b\n"
" b 1b\n"
"\n"
"2:\n" : : "r"(key), "r"(expandedKey), "r"(rcon));
}
/* An ordinary AES round is a sequence of SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns, AddRoundKey. There
* is also an InitialRound which consists solely of AddRoundKey. The ARM instructions slice
* this sequence differently; the aese instruction performs AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows.
* The aesmc instruction does the MixColumns. Since the aese instruction moves the AddRoundKey
* up front, and Cryptonight's hash skips the InitialRound step, we have to kludge it here by
* feeding in a vector of zeros for our first step. Also we have to do our own Xor explicitly
* at the last step, to provide the AddRoundKey that the ARM instructions omit.
*/
STATIC INLINE void aes_pseudo_round(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *expandedKey, int nblocks)
{
const uint8x16_t *k = (const uint8x16_t *)expandedKey, zero = {0};
int i;
for (i=0; i<nblocks; i++)
{
uint8x16_t tmp = vld1q_u8(in + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, zero);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[0]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[1]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[2]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[3]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[4]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[5]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[6]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[7]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[8]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = veorq_u8(tmp, k[9]);
vst1q_u8(out + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, tmp);
}
}
STATIC INLINE void aes_pseudo_round_xor(const uint8_t *in, uint8_t *out, const uint8_t *expandedKey, const uint8_t *xor, int nblocks)
{
const uint8x16_t *k = (const uint8x16_t *)expandedKey;
const uint8x16_t *x = (const uint8x16_t *)xor;
int i;
for (i=0; i<nblocks; i++)
{
uint8x16_t tmp = vld1q_u8(in + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, x[i]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[0]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[1]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[2]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[3]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[4]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[5]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[6]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[7]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = vaeseq_u8(tmp, k[8]);
tmp = vaesmcq_u8(tmp);
tmp = veorq_u8(tmp, k[9]);
vst1q_u8(out + i * AES_BLOCK_SIZE, tmp);
}
}
#ifdef FORCE_USE_HEAP
STATIC INLINE void* aligned_malloc(size_t size, size_t align)
{
void *result;
#ifdef _MSC_VER
result = _aligned_malloc(size, align);
#else
if (posix_memalign(&result, align, size)) result = NULL;
#endif
return result;
}
STATIC INLINE void aligned_free(void *ptr)
{
#ifdef _MSC_VER
_aligned_free(ptr);
#else
free(ptr);
#endif
}
#endif /* FORCE_USE_HEAP */
STATIC INLINE void xor_blocks(uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b)
{
U64(a)[0] ^= U64(b)[0];
U64(a)[1] ^= U64(b)[1];
}
void cn_slow_hash(const void *data, size_t length, char *hash, int variant, int prehashed, uint64_t height)
{
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint8_t expandedKey[240];
uint8_t *local_hp_state;
uint8_t text[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t a[2];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t b[4];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint64_t c[2];
union cn_slow_hash_state state;
uint8x16_t _a, _b, _b1, _c, zero = {0};
uint64_t hi, lo;
size_t i, j;
uint64_t *p = NULL;
oaes_ctx *aes_ctx = NULL;
int useAes = !force_software_aes() && check_aes_hw();
static void (*const extra_hashes[4])(const void *, size_t, char *) =
{
hash_extra_blake, hash_extra_groestl, hash_extra_jh, hash_extra_skein
};
// this isn't supposed to happen, but guard against it for now.
if(hp_state == NULL)
cn_slow_hash_allocate_state();
// locals to avoid constant TLS dereferencing
local_hp_state = hp_state;
// locals to avoid constant TLS dereferencing
/* CryptoNight Step 1: Use Keccak1600 to initialize the 'state' (and 'text') buffers from the data. */
if (prehashed) {
memcpy(&state.hs, data, length);
} else {
hash_process(&state.hs, data, length);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
VARIANT1_INIT64();
VARIANT2_INIT64();
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH_INIT();
/* CryptoNight Step 2: Iteratively encrypt the results from Keccak to fill
* the 2MB large random access buffer.
*/
if(useAes)
{
aes_expand_key(state.hs.b, expandedKey);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
aes_pseudo_round(text, text, expandedKey, INIT_SIZE_BLK);
memcpy(&local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
}
else
{
aes_ctx = (oaes_ctx *) oaes_alloc();
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, state.hs.b, AES_KEY_SIZE);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
memcpy(&local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
}
U64(a)[0] = U64(&state.k[0])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[0];
U64(a)[1] = U64(&state.k[0])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[1];
U64(b)[0] = U64(&state.k[16])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[0];
U64(b)[1] = U64(&state.k[16])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[1];
/* CryptoNight Step 3: Bounce randomly 1,048,576 times (1<<20) through the mixing buffer,
* using 524,288 iterations of the following mixing function. Each execution
* performs two reads and writes from the mixing buffer.
*/
_b = vld1q_u8((const uint8_t *)b);
_b1 = vld1q_u8(((const uint8_t *)b) + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
if(useAes)
{
for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)
{
pre_aes();
_c = vaeseq_u8(_c, zero);
_c = vaesmcq_u8(_c);
_c = veorq_u8(_c, _a);
post_aes();
}
}
else
{
for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)
{
pre_aes();
aesb_single_round((uint8_t *) &_c, (uint8_t *) &_c, (uint8_t *) &_a);
post_aes();
}
}
/* CryptoNight Step 4: Sequentially pass through the mixing buffer and use 10 rounds
* of AES encryption to mix the random data back into the 'text' buffer. 'text'
* was originally created with the output of Keccak1600. */
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
if(useAes)
{
aes_expand_key(&state.hs.b[32], expandedKey);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
// add the xor to the pseudo round
aes_pseudo_round_xor(text, text, expandedKey, &local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], INIT_SIZE_BLK);
}
}
else
{
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, &state.hs.b[32], AES_KEY_SIZE);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
{
xor_blocks(&text[j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE], &local_hp_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE + j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
}
}
oaes_free((OAES_CTX **) &aes_ctx);
}
/* CryptoNight Step 5: Apply Keccak to the state again, and then
* use the resulting data to select which of four finalizer
* hash functions to apply to the data (Blake, Groestl, JH, or Skein).
* Use this hash to squeeze the state array down
* to the final 256 bit hash output.
*/
memcpy(state.init, text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
hash_permutation(&state.hs);
extra_hashes[state.hs.b[0] & 3](&state, 200, hash);
}
#else /* aarch64 && crypto */
// ND: Some minor optimizations for ARMv7 (raspberrry pi 2), effect seems to be ~40-50% faster.
// Needs more work.
#ifdef NO_OPTIMIZED_MULTIPLY_ON_ARM
/* The asm corresponds to this C code */
#define SHORT uint32_t
#define LONG uint64_t
void mul(const uint8_t *ca, const uint8_t *cb, uint8_t *cres) {
const SHORT *aa = (SHORT *)ca;
const SHORT *bb = (SHORT *)cb;
SHORT *res = (SHORT *)cres;
union {
SHORT tmp[8];
LONG ltmp[4];
} t;
LONG A = aa[1];
LONG a = aa[0];
LONG B = bb[1];
LONG b = bb[0];
// Aa * Bb = ab + aB_ + Ab_ + AB__
t.ltmp[0] = a * b;
t.ltmp[1] = a * B;
t.ltmp[2] = A * b;
t.ltmp[3] = A * B;
res[2] = t.tmp[0];
t.ltmp[1] += t.tmp[1];
t.ltmp[1] += t.tmp[4];
t.ltmp[3] += t.tmp[3];
t.ltmp[3] += t.tmp[5];
res[3] = t.tmp[2];
res[0] = t.tmp[6];
res[1] = t.tmp[7];
}
#else // !NO_OPTIMIZED_MULTIPLY_ON_ARM
#ifdef __aarch64__ /* ARM64, no crypto */
#define mul(a, b, c) cn_mul128((const uint64_t *)a, (const uint64_t *)b, (uint64_t *)c)
STATIC void cn_mul128(const uint64_t *a, const uint64_t *b, uint64_t *r)
{
uint64_t lo, hi;
__asm__("mul %0, %1, %2\n\t" : "=r"(lo) : "r"(a[0]), "r"(b[0]) );
__asm__("umulh %0, %1, %2\n\t" : "=r"(hi) : "r"(a[0]), "r"(b[0]) );
r[0] = hi;
r[1] = lo;
}
#else /* ARM32 */
#define mul(a, b, c) cn_mul128((const uint32_t *)a, (const uint32_t *)b, (uint32_t *)c)
STATIC void cn_mul128(const uint32_t *aa, const uint32_t *bb, uint32_t *r)
{
uint32_t t0, t1, t2=0, t3=0;
__asm__ __volatile__(
"umull %[t0], %[t1], %[a], %[b]\n\t"
"str %[t0], %[ll]\n\t"
// accumulating with 0 can never overflow/carry
"eor %[t0], %[t0]\n\t"
"umlal %[t1], %[t0], %[a], %[B]\n\t"
"umlal %[t1], %[t2], %[A], %[b]\n\t"
"str %[t1], %[lh]\n\t"
"umlal %[t0], %[t3], %[A], %[B]\n\t"
// final add may have a carry
"adds %[t0], %[t0], %[t2]\n\t"
"adc %[t1], %[t3], #0\n\t"
"str %[t0], %[hl]\n\t"
"str %[t1], %[hh]\n\t"
: [t0]"=&r"(t0), [t1]"=&r"(t1), [t2]"+r"(t2), [t3]"+r"(t3), [hl]"=m"(r[0]), [hh]"=m"(r[1]), [ll]"=m"(r[2]), [lh]"=m"(r[3])
: [A]"r"(aa[1]), [a]"r"(aa[0]), [B]"r"(bb[1]), [b]"r"(bb[0])
: "cc");
}
#endif /* !aarch64 */
#endif // NO_OPTIMIZED_MULTIPLY_ON_ARM
STATIC INLINE void copy_block(uint8_t* dst, const uint8_t* src)
{
memcpy(dst, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
STATIC INLINE void sum_half_blocks(uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b)
{
uint64_t a0, a1, b0, b1;
a0 = U64(a)[0];
a1 = U64(a)[1];
b0 = U64(b)[0];
b1 = U64(b)[1];
a0 += b0;
a1 += b1;
U64(a)[0] = a0;
U64(a)[1] = a1;
}
STATIC INLINE void swap_blocks(uint8_t *a, uint8_t *b)
{
uint64_t t[2];
U64(t)[0] = U64(a)[0];
U64(t)[1] = U64(a)[1];
U64(a)[0] = U64(b)[0];
U64(a)[1] = U64(b)[1];
U64(b)[0] = U64(t)[0];
U64(b)[1] = U64(t)[1];
}
STATIC INLINE void xor_blocks(uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b)
{
U64(a)[0] ^= U64(b)[0];
U64(a)[1] ^= U64(b)[1];
}
void cn_slow_hash(const void *data, size_t length, char *hash, int variant, int prehashed, uint64_t height)
{
uint8_t text[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
uint8_t a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t a1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
uint8_t c[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t c1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t d[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t aes_key[AES_KEY_SIZE];
RDATA_ALIGN16 uint8_t expandedKey[256];
union cn_slow_hash_state state;
size_t i, j;
uint8_t *p = NULL;
oaes_ctx *aes_ctx;
static void (*const extra_hashes[4])(const void *, size_t, char *) =
{
hash_extra_blake, hash_extra_groestl, hash_extra_jh, hash_extra_skein
};
#ifndef FORCE_USE_HEAP
uint8_t long_state[MEMORY];
#else
uint8_t *long_state = (uint8_t *)malloc(MEMORY);
#endif
if (prehashed) {
memcpy(&state.hs, data, length);
} else {
hash_process(&state.hs, data, length);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
aes_ctx = (oaes_ctx *) oaes_alloc();
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, state.hs.b, AES_KEY_SIZE);
VARIANT1_INIT64();
VARIANT2_INIT64();
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH_INIT();
// use aligned data
memcpy(expandedKey, aes_ctx->key->exp_data, aes_ctx->key->exp_data_len);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], expandedKey);
memcpy(&long_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
U64(a)[0] = U64(&state.k[0])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[0];
U64(a)[1] = U64(&state.k[0])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[32])[1];
U64(b)[0] = U64(&state.k[16])[0] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[0];
U64(b)[1] = U64(&state.k[16])[1] ^ U64(&state.k[48])[1];
for(i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++)
{
#define MASK ((uint32_t)(((MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - 1) << 4))
#define state_index(x) ((*(uint32_t *) x) & MASK)
// Iteration 1
j = state_index(a);
p = &long_state[j];
aesb_single_round(p, c1, a);
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_SHUFFLE_ADD(c1, a, long_state, j);
copy_block(p, c1);
xor_blocks(p, b);
VARIANT1_1(p);
// Iteration 2
j = state_index(c1);
p = &long_state[j];
copy_block(c, p);
copy_block(a1, a);
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INTEGER_MATH(c, c1);
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH(a1, c, r, b, b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
mul(c1, c, d);
VARIANT2_2_PORTABLE();
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_SHUFFLE_ADD(c1, a, long_state, j);
sum_half_blocks(a1, d);
swap_blocks(a1, c);
xor_blocks(a1, c);
VARIANT1_2(U64(c) + 1);
copy_block(p, c);
if (variant >= 2) {
copy_block(b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, b);
}
copy_block(b, c1);
copy_block(a, a1);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, &state.hs.b[32], AES_KEY_SIZE);
memcpy(expandedKey, aes_ctx->key->exp_data, aes_ctx->key->exp_data_len);
for(i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++)
{
for(j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++)
{
xor_blocks(&text[j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE], &long_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE + j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], expandedKey);
}
}
oaes_free((OAES_CTX **) &aes_ctx);
memcpy(state.init, text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
hash_permutation(&state.hs);
extra_hashes[state.hs.b[0] & 3](&state, 200, hash);
#ifdef FORCE_USE_HEAP
free(long_state);
#endif
}
#endif /* !aarch64 || !crypto */
#else
// Portable implementation as a fallback
#define hp_jitfunc ((v4_random_math_JIT_func)NULL)
void cn_slow_hash_allocate_state(void)
{
// Do nothing, this is just to maintain compatibility with the upgraded slow-hash.c
return;
}
void cn_slow_hash_free_state(void)
{
// As above
return;
}
static void (*const extra_hashes[4])(const void *, size_t, char *) = {
hash_extra_blake, hash_extra_groestl, hash_extra_jh, hash_extra_skein
};
static size_t e2i(const uint8_t* a, size_t count) { return (SWAP64LE(*((uint64_t*)a)) / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & (count - 1); }
static void mul(const uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b, uint8_t* res) {
uint64_t a0, b0;
uint64_t hi, lo;
a0 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)a)[0]);
b0 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)b)[0]);
lo = mul128(a0, b0, &hi);
((uint64_t*)res)[0] = SWAP64LE(hi);
((uint64_t*)res)[1] = SWAP64LE(lo);
}
static void sum_half_blocks(uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b) {
uint64_t a0, a1, b0, b1;
a0 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)a)[0]);
a1 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)a)[1]);
b0 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)b)[0]);
b1 = SWAP64LE(((uint64_t*)b)[1]);
a0 += b0;
a1 += b1;
((uint64_t*)a)[0] = SWAP64LE(a0);
((uint64_t*)a)[1] = SWAP64LE(a1);
}
#define U64(x) ((uint64_t *) (x))
static void copy_block(uint8_t* dst, const uint8_t* src) {
memcpy(dst, src, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
}
static void swap_blocks(uint8_t *a, uint8_t *b){
uint64_t t[2];
U64(t)[0] = U64(a)[0];
U64(t)[1] = U64(a)[1];
U64(a)[0] = U64(b)[0];
U64(a)[1] = U64(b)[1];
U64(b)[0] = U64(t)[0];
U64(b)[1] = U64(t)[1];
}
static void xor_blocks(uint8_t* a, const uint8_t* b) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
a[i] ^= b[i];
}
}
static void xor64(uint8_t* left, const uint8_t* right)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < 8; ++i)
{
left[i] ^= right[i];
}
}
#pragma pack(push, 1)
union cn_slow_hash_state {
union hash_state hs;
struct {
uint8_t k[64];
uint8_t init[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
};
};
#pragma pack(pop)
void cn_slow_hash(const void *data, size_t length, char *hash, int variant, int prehashed, uint64_t height) {
#ifndef FORCE_USE_HEAP
uint8_t long_state[MEMORY];
#else
uint8_t *long_state = (uint8_t *)malloc(MEMORY);
#endif
union cn_slow_hash_state state;
uint8_t text[INIT_SIZE_BYTE];
uint8_t a[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t a1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t b[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2];
uint8_t c1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t c2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
uint8_t d[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
size_t i, j;
uint8_t aes_key[AES_KEY_SIZE];
oaes_ctx *aes_ctx;
if (prehashed) {
memcpy(&state.hs, data, length);
} else {
hash_process(&state.hs, data, length);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
memcpy(aes_key, state.hs.b, AES_KEY_SIZE);
aes_ctx = (oaes_ctx *) oaes_alloc();
VARIANT1_PORTABLE_INIT();
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INIT();
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH_INIT();
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, aes_key, AES_KEY_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++) {
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
}
memcpy(&long_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE], text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
}
for (i = 0; i < AES_BLOCK_SIZE; i++) {
a[i] = state.k[ i] ^ state.k[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 2 + i];
b[i] = state.k[AES_BLOCK_SIZE + i] ^ state.k[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 + i];
}
for (i = 0; i < ITER / 2; i++) {
/* Dependency chain: address -> read value ------+
* written value <-+ hard function (AES or MUL) <+
* next address <-+
*/
/* Iteration 1 */
j = e2i(a, MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
copy_block(c1, &long_state[j]);
aesb_single_round(c1, c1, a);
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_SHUFFLE_ADD(c1, a, long_state, j);
copy_block(&long_state[j], c1);
xor_blocks(&long_state[j], b);
assert(j == e2i(a, MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
VARIANT1_1(&long_state[j]);
/* Iteration 2 */
j = e2i(c1, MEMORY / AES_BLOCK_SIZE) * AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
copy_block(c2, &long_state[j]);
copy_block(a1, a);
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_INTEGER_MATH(c2, c1);
VARIANT4_RANDOM_MATH(a1, c2, r, b, b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
mul(c1, c2, d);
VARIANT2_2_PORTABLE();
VARIANT2_PORTABLE_SHUFFLE_ADD(c1, a, long_state, j);
sum_half_blocks(a1, d);
swap_blocks(a1, c2);
xor_blocks(a1, c2);
VARIANT1_2(c2 + 8);
copy_block(&long_state[j], c2);
if (variant >= 2) {
copy_block(b + AES_BLOCK_SIZE, b);
}
copy_block(b, c1);
copy_block(a, a1);
}
memcpy(text, state.init, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
oaes_key_import_data(aes_ctx, &state.hs.b[32], AES_KEY_SIZE);
for (i = 0; i < MEMORY / INIT_SIZE_BYTE; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < INIT_SIZE_BLK; j++) {
xor_blocks(&text[j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE], &long_state[i * INIT_SIZE_BYTE + j * AES_BLOCK_SIZE]);
aesb_pseudo_round(&text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], &text[AES_BLOCK_SIZE * j], aes_ctx->key->exp_data);
}
}
memcpy(state.init, text, INIT_SIZE_BYTE);
hash_permutation(&state.hs);
/*memcpy(hash, &state, 32);*/
extra_hashes[state.hs.b[0] & 3](&state, 200, hash);
oaes_free((OAES_CTX **) &aes_ctx);
#ifdef FORCE_USE_HEAP
free(long_state);
#endif
}
#endif
void slow_hash_allocate_state(void)
{
cn_slow_hash_allocate_state();
}
void slow_hash_free_state(void)
{
cn_slow_hash_free_state();
}
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