serai/coordinator/tributary/tendermint
akildemir d5c6ed1a03
Improve provided handling (#381)
* fix typos

* remove tributary sleeping

* handle not locally provided txs

* use topic number instead of waiting list

* Clean-up, fixes

1) Uses a single TXN in provided
2) Doesn't continue on non-local provided inside verify_block, skipping further
   execution of checks
3) Upon local provision of already on-chain TX, compares

---------

Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
2023-10-13 19:45:47 -04:00
..
src Improve provided handling (#381) 2023-10-13 19:45:47 -04:00
tests Define BLOCK_PROCESSING_TIME, LATENCY_TIME in ms 2023-08-30 22:58:42 -04:00
Cargo.toml Add a LibP2P instantiation to coordinator 2023-08-08 15:12:47 -04:00
LICENSE Create a folder for tributary, the micro-blockchain 2023-04-11 10:18:31 -04:00
README.md Create a folder for tributary, the micro-blockchain 2023-04-11 10:18:31 -04:00

Tendermint

An implementation of the Tendermint state machine in Rust.

This is solely the state machine, intended to be mapped to any arbitrary system. It supports an arbitrary signature scheme, weighting, and block definition accordingly. It is not intended to work with the Cosmos SDK, solely to be an implementation of the academic protocol.

Caveats

  • Only SCALE serialization is supported currently. Ideally, everything from SCALE to borsh to bincode would be supported. SCALE was chosen due to this being under Serai, which uses Substrate, which uses SCALE. Accordingly, when deciding which of the three (mutually incompatible) options to support...

  • The only supported runtime is tokio due to requiring a sleep implementation. Ideally, the runtime choice will be moved to a feature in the future.

  • It is possible for add_block to be called on a block which failed (or never went through in the first place) validation. This is a break from the paper which is accepted here. This is for two reasons.

    1. Serai needing this functionality.
    2. If a block is committed which is invalid, either there's a malicious majority now defining consensus OR the local node is malicious by virtue of being faulty. Considering how either represents a fatal circumstance, except with regards to system like Serai which have their own logic for pseudo-valid blocks, it is accepted as a possible behavior with the caveat any consumers must be aware of it. No machine will vote nor precommit to a block it considers invalid, so for a network with an honest majority, this is a non-issue.

Paper

The paper describes the algorithm with pseudocode on page 6. This pseudocode isn't directly implementable, nor does it specify faulty behavior. Instead, it's solely a series of conditions which trigger events in order to successfully achieve consensus.

The included pseudocode segments can be minimally described as follows:

01-09 Init
10-10 StartRound(0)
11-21 StartRound
22-27 Fresh proposal
28-33 Proposal building off a valid round with prevotes
34-35 2f+1 prevote -> schedule timeout prevote
36-43 First proposal with prevotes -> precommit Some
44-46 2f+1 nil prevote -> precommit nil
47-48 2f+1 precommit -> schedule timeout precommit
49-54 First proposal with precommits -> finalize
55-56 f+1 round > local round, jump
57-60 on timeout propose
61-64 on timeout prevote
65-67 on timeout precommit

The corresponding Rust code implementing these tasks are marked with their related line numbers.