serai/substrate/client/tests/common/in_instructions.rs
Luke Parker d50fe87801
Correct the prior documented TOCTOU
Now, if a malicious validator set publishes a malicious `Batch` at the last
moment, it'll cause all future `Batch`s signed by the next validator set to
require a bool being set (yet they never will set it).

This will prevent the handover.

The only overhead is having two distinct `batch_message` calls on-chain.
2023-10-13 04:41:01 -04:00

62 lines
1.6 KiB
Rust

use blake2::{
digest::{consts::U32, Digest},
Blake2b,
};
use scale::Encode;
use sp_core::Pair;
use serai_client::{
primitives::insecure_pair_from_name,
validator_sets::primitives::{Session, ValidatorSet},
in_instructions::{
primitives::{Batch, SignedBatch, batch_message},
InInstructionsEvent,
},
Serai,
};
use crate::common::{serai, tx::publish_tx, validator_sets::set_validator_set_keys};
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn provide_batch(batch: Batch) -> [u8; 32] {
let serai = serai().await;
// TODO: Get the latest session
let set = ValidatorSet { session: Session(0), network: batch.network };
let pair = insecure_pair_from_name(&format!("ValidatorSet {:?}", set));
let keys = if let Some(keys) =
serai.get_keys(set, serai.get_latest_block_hash().await.unwrap()).await.unwrap()
{
keys
} else {
let keys = (pair.public(), vec![].try_into().unwrap());
set_validator_set_keys(set, keys.clone()).await;
keys
};
assert_eq!(keys.0, pair.public());
let block = publish_tx(&Serai::execute_batch(SignedBatch {
batch: batch.clone(),
// TODO: This `batch.id == 0` line only works when session == 0
signature: pair.sign(&batch_message(batch.id == 0, &batch)),
}))
.await;
let batches = serai.get_batch_events(block).await.unwrap();
// TODO: impl From<Batch> for BatchEvent?
assert_eq!(
batches,
vec![InInstructionsEvent::Batch {
network: batch.network,
id: batch.id,
block: batch.block,
instructions_hash: Blake2b::<U32>::digest(batch.instructions.encode()).into(),
}],
);
// TODO: Check the tokens events
block
}