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https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
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128 lines
3.7 KiB
C++
128 lines
3.7 KiB
C++
#include <mutex>
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#include "device/device_default.hpp"
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#include "ringct/bulletproofs.h"
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#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
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typedef std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock;
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std::mutex rng_mutex;
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uint8_t rng_entropy[64];
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void rng(uint8_t* seed) {
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// Set the first half to the seed
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memcpy(rng_entropy, seed, 32);
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// Set the second half to the hash of a DST to ensure a lack of collisions
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crypto::cn_fast_hash("RNG_entropy_seed", 16, (char*) &rng_entropy[32]);
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}
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extern "C" {
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void generate_random_bytes_not_thread_safe(size_t n, uint8_t* value) {
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size_t written = 0;
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while (written != n) {
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uint8_t hash[32];
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crypto::cn_fast_hash(rng_entropy, 64, (char*) hash);
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// Step the RNG by setting the latter half to the most recent result
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// Does not leak the RNG, even if the values are leaked (which they are expected to be) due to
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// the first half remaining constant and undisclosed
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memcpy(&rng_entropy[32], hash, 32);
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size_t next = n - written;
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if (next > 32) {
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next = 32;
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}
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memcpy(&value[written], hash, next);
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written += next;
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}
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}
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void c_hash_to_point(uint8_t* point) {
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rct::key key_point;
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ge_p3 e_p3;
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memcpy(key_point.bytes, point, 32);
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rct::hash_to_p3(e_p3, key_point);
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ge_p3_tobytes(point, &e_p3);
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}
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uint8_t* c_generate_bp(uint8_t* seed, uint8_t len, uint64_t* a, uint8_t* m) {
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lock guard(rng_mutex);
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rng(seed);
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rct::keyV masks;
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std::vector<uint64_t> amounts;
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masks.resize(len);
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amounts.resize(len);
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < len; i++) {
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memcpy(masks[i].bytes, m + (i * 32), 32);
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amounts[i] = a[i];
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}
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rct::Bulletproof bp = rct::bulletproof_PROVE(amounts, masks);
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std::stringstream ss;
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binary_archive<true> ba(ss);
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::serialization::serialize(ba, bp);
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uint8_t* res = (uint8_t*) calloc(2 + ss.str().size(), 1); // malloc would also work
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memcpy(res + 2, ss.str().data(), ss.str().size());
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res[0] = ss.str().size() >> 8;
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res[1] = ss.str().size() & 255;
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return res;
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}
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bool c_verify_bp(uint8_t* seed, uint s_len, uint8_t* s, uint8_t c_len, uint8_t* c) {
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// BPs are batch verified which use RNG based challenges to ensure individual integrity
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// That's why this must also have control over RNG, to prevent interrupting multisig signing
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// while not using known seeds. Considering this doesn't actually define a batch,
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// and it's only verifying a single BP, it'd probably be fine, but...
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lock guard(rng_mutex);
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rng(seed);
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rct::Bulletproof bp;
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std::stringstream ss;
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std::string str;
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str.assign((char*) s, (size_t) s_len);
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ss << str;
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binary_archive<false> ba(ss);
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::serialization::serialize(ba, bp);
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if (!ss.good()) {
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return false;
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}
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bp.V.resize(c_len);
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < c_len; i++) {
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memcpy(bp.V[i].bytes, &c[i * 32], 32);
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}
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try { return rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(bp); } catch(...) { return false; }
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}
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bool c_verify_clsag(uint s_len, uint8_t* s, uint8_t k_len, uint8_t* k, uint8_t* I, uint8_t* p, uint8_t* m) {
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rct::clsag clsag;
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std::stringstream ss;
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std::string str;
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str.assign((char*) s, (size_t) s_len);
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ss << str;
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binary_archive<false> ba(ss);
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::serialization::serialize(ba, clsag);
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if (!ss.good()) {
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return false;
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}
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rct::ctkeyV keys;
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keys.resize(k_len);
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for (uint8_t i = 0; i < k_len; i++) {
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memcpy(keys[i].dest.bytes, &k[(i * 2) * 32], 32);
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memcpy(keys[i].mask.bytes, &k[((i * 2) + 1) * 32], 32);
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}
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memcpy(clsag.I.bytes, I, 32);
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rct::key pseudo_out;
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memcpy(pseudo_out.bytes, p, 32);
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rct::key msg;
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memcpy(msg.bytes, m, 32);
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try { return verRctCLSAGSimple(msg, clsag, keys, pseudo_out); } catch(...) { return false; }
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}
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}
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