mirror of
https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
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a25e6330bd
1) Removes the key image DLEq on the Monero side of things, as the produced signature share serves as a DLEq for it. 2) Removes the nonce DLEqs from modular-frost as they're unnecessary for monero-serai. Updates documentation accordingly. Without the proof the nonces are internally consistent, the produced signatures from modular-frost can be argued as a batch-verifiable CP93 DLEq (R0, R1, s), or as a GSP for the CP93 DLEq statement (which naturally produces (R0, R1, s)). The lack of proving the nonces consistent does make the process weaker, yet it's also unnecessary for the class of protocols this is intended to service. To provide DLEqs for the nonces would be to provide PoKs for the nonce commitments (in the traditional Schnorr case).
229 lines
7.4 KiB
Rust
229 lines
7.4 KiB
Rust
use core::{marker::PhantomData, fmt::Debug};
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use std::io::{self, Read, Write};
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use zeroize::Zeroizing;
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use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
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use transcript::Transcript;
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use crate::{Participant, ThresholdKeys, ThresholdView, Curve, FrostError};
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pub use schnorr::SchnorrSignature;
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/// Write an addendum to a writer.
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pub trait WriteAddendum {
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fn write<W: Write>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> io::Result<()>;
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}
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impl WriteAddendum for () {
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fn write<W: Write>(&self, _: &mut W) -> io::Result<()> {
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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/// Trait alias for the requirements to be used as an addendum.
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pub trait Addendum: Send + Sync + Clone + PartialEq + Debug + WriteAddendum {}
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impl<A: Send + Sync + Clone + PartialEq + Debug + WriteAddendum> Addendum for A {}
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/// Algorithm trait usable by the FROST signing machine to produce signatures..
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pub trait Algorithm<C: Curve>: Send + Sync + Clone {
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/// The transcript format this algorithm uses. This likely should NOT be the IETF-compatible
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/// transcript included in this crate.
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type Transcript: Sync + Clone + Debug + Transcript;
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/// Serializable addendum, used in algorithms requiring more data than just the nonces.
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type Addendum: Addendum;
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/// The resulting type of the signatures this algorithm will produce.
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type Signature: Clone + PartialEq + Debug;
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/// Obtain a mutable borrow of the underlying transcript.
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fn transcript(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Transcript;
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/// Obtain the list of nonces to generate, as specified by the generators to create commitments
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/// against per-nonce.
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///
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/// The Algorithm is responsible for all transcripting of these nonce specifications/generators.
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///
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/// The prover will be passed the commitments, and the commitments will be sent to all other
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/// participants. No guarantees the commitments are internally consistent (have the same discrete
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/// logarithm across generators) are made. Any Algorithm which specifies multiple generators for
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/// a single nonce must handle that itself.
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fn nonces(&self) -> Vec<Vec<C::G>>;
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/// Generate an addendum to FROST"s preprocessing stage.
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fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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&mut self,
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rng: &mut R,
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keys: &ThresholdKeys<C>,
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) -> Self::Addendum;
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/// Read an addendum from a reader.
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fn read_addendum<R: Read>(&self, reader: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self::Addendum>;
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/// Process the addendum for the specified participant. Guaranteed to be called in order.
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fn process_addendum(
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&mut self,
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params: &ThresholdView<C>,
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l: Participant,
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reader: Self::Addendum,
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) -> Result<(), FrostError>;
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/// Sign a share with the given secret/nonce.
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/// The secret will already have been its lagrange coefficient applied so it is the necessary
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/// key share.
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/// The nonce will already have been processed into the combined form d + (e * p).
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fn sign_share(
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&mut self,
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params: &ThresholdView<C>,
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nonce_sums: &[Vec<C::G>],
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nonces: Vec<Zeroizing<C::F>>,
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msg: &[u8],
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) -> C::F;
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/// Verify a signature.
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#[must_use]
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fn verify(&self, group_key: C::G, nonces: &[Vec<C::G>], sum: C::F) -> Option<Self::Signature>;
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/// Verify a specific share given as a response.
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/// This function should return a series of pairs whose products should sum to zero for a valid
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/// share. Any error raised is treated as the share being invalid.
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#[allow(clippy::type_complexity, clippy::result_unit_err)]
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fn verify_share(
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&self,
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verification_share: C::G,
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nonces: &[Vec<C::G>],
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share: C::F,
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) -> Result<Vec<(C::F, C::G)>, ()>;
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}
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mod sealed {
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pub use super::*;
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/// IETF-compliant transcript. This is incredibly naive and should not be used within larger
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/// protocols.
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct IetfTranscript(pub(crate) Vec<u8>);
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impl Transcript for IetfTranscript {
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type Challenge = Vec<u8>;
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fn new(_: &'static [u8]) -> IetfTranscript {
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IetfTranscript(vec![])
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}
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fn domain_separate(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
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fn append_message<M: AsRef<[u8]>>(&mut self, _: &'static [u8], message: M) {
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self.0.extend(message.as_ref());
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}
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fn challenge(&mut self, _: &'static [u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.0.clone()
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}
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// FROST won't use this and this shouldn't be used outside of FROST
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fn rng_seed(&mut self, _: &'static [u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
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unimplemented!()
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}
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}
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}
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pub(crate) use sealed::IetfTranscript;
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/// HRAm usable by the included Schnorr signature algorithm to generate challenges.
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pub trait Hram<C: Curve>: Send + Sync + Clone {
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/// HRAm function to generate a challenge.
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/// H2 from the IETF draft, despite having a different argument set (not being pre-formatted).
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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fn hram(R: &C::G, A: &C::G, m: &[u8]) -> C::F;
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}
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/// Schnorr signature algorithm ((R, s) where s = r + cx).
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub struct Schnorr<C: Curve, T: Sync + Clone + Debug + Transcript, H: Hram<C>> {
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transcript: T,
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c: Option<C::F>,
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_hram: PhantomData<H>,
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}
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/// IETF-compliant Schnorr signature algorithm.
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///
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/// This algorithm specifically uses the transcript format defined in the FROST IETF draft.
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/// It's a naive transcript format not viable for usage in larger protocols, yet is presented here
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/// in order to provide compatibility.
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///
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/// Usage of this with key offsets will break the intended compatibility as the IETF draft does not
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/// specify a protocol for offsets.
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pub type IetfSchnorr<C, H> = Schnorr<C, IetfTranscript, H>;
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impl<C: Curve, T: Sync + Clone + Debug + Transcript, H: Hram<C>> Schnorr<C, T, H> {
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/// Construct a Schnorr algorithm continuing the specified transcript.
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pub fn new(transcript: T) -> Schnorr<C, T, H> {
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Schnorr { transcript, c: None, _hram: PhantomData }
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}
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}
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impl<C: Curve, H: Hram<C>> IetfSchnorr<C, H> {
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/// Construct a IETF-compatible Schnorr algorithm.
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///
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/// Please see the `IetfSchnorr` documentation for the full details of this.
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pub fn ietf() -> IetfSchnorr<C, H> {
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Schnorr::new(IetfTranscript(vec![]))
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}
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}
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impl<C: Curve, T: Sync + Clone + Debug + Transcript, H: Hram<C>> Algorithm<C> for Schnorr<C, T, H> {
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type Transcript = T;
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type Addendum = ();
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type Signature = SchnorrSignature<C>;
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fn transcript(&mut self) -> &mut Self::Transcript {
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&mut self.transcript
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}
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fn nonces(&self) -> Vec<Vec<C::G>> {
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vec![vec![C::generator()]]
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}
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fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(&mut self, _: &mut R, _: &ThresholdKeys<C>) {}
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fn read_addendum<R: Read>(&self, _: &mut R) -> io::Result<Self::Addendum> {
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Ok(())
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}
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fn process_addendum(
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&mut self,
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_: &ThresholdView<C>,
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_: Participant,
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(): (),
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) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
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Ok(())
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}
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fn sign_share(
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&mut self,
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params: &ThresholdView<C>,
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nonce_sums: &[Vec<C::G>],
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mut nonces: Vec<Zeroizing<C::F>>,
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msg: &[u8],
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) -> C::F {
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let c = H::hram(&nonce_sums[0][0], ¶ms.group_key(), msg);
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self.c = Some(c);
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SchnorrSignature::<C>::sign(params.secret_share(), nonces.swap_remove(0), c).s
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}
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#[must_use]
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fn verify(&self, group_key: C::G, nonces: &[Vec<C::G>], sum: C::F) -> Option<Self::Signature> {
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let sig = SchnorrSignature { R: nonces[0][0], s: sum };
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Some(sig).filter(|sig| sig.verify(group_key, self.c.unwrap()))
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}
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fn verify_share(
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&self,
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verification_share: C::G,
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nonces: &[Vec<C::G>],
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share: C::F,
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) -> Result<Vec<(C::F, C::G)>, ()> {
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Ok(
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SchnorrSignature::<C> { R: nonces[0][0], s: share }
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.batch_statements(verification_share, self.c.unwrap())
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.to_vec(),
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)
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}
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}
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