Online validators should inherently have them. Offline validators will receive
from the sync protocol.
This does somewhat eliminate the class of nodes who would follow the blockchain
(without validating it), yet that's fine for the performance benefit.
Part of https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/issues/345.
The lack of full DB persistence does mean enough nodes rebooting at the same
time may cause a halt. This will prevent slashes.
* complete various todos
* fix pr comments
* Document bounds on unique hashes in TransactionKind
---------
Co-authored-by: Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
* report_slashes plumbing in Substrate
Notably delays the SetRetired event until it provides a slash report or the set
after it becomes the set to report its slashes.
* Add dedicated AcceptedHandover event
* Add SlashReport TX to Tributary
* Create SlashReport TXs
* Handle SlashReport TXs
* Add logic to generate a SlashReport to the coordinator
* Route SlashReportSigner into the processor
* Finish routing the SlashReport signing/TX publication
* Add serai feature to processor's serai-client
Not only is this more performant, the definition of retired won't be if a newer
session is active. It will be if the session has posted a slash report or the
stake for that session has unlocked.
Initial commit towards implementing SlashReports.
* Use an extended timeout for DKGs specifically
* Add a log statement when message-queue connection fails
* Add a 60 second keep-alive to connections
* Use zalloc for processor/message-queue/coordinator
An additional layer which protects us against edge cases with Zeroizing
(objects which don't support it or don't miss it).
* Add further logs to message-queue
* Further increase re-attempt timeouts in CI
* Remove misplaced continue inmessage-queue client
Fixes observed CI failures.
* Revert "Further increase re-attempt timeouts in CI"
This reverts commit 3723530cf6.
* Route validators for any active set through sc-authority-discovery
Additionally adds an RPC route to retrieve their P2P addresses.
* Have the coordinator get peers from substrate
* Have the RPC return one address, not up to 3
Prevents the coordinator from believing it has 3 peers when it has one.
* Add missing feature to serai-client
* Correct network argument in serai-client for p2p_validators call
* Add a test in serai-client to check DHT population with a much quicker failure than the coordinator tests
* Update to latest Substrate
Removes distinguishing BABE/AuthorityDiscovery keys which causes
sc_authority_discovery to populate as desired.
* Update to a properly tagged substrate commit
* Add all dialed to peers to GossipSub
* cargo fmt
* Reduce common code in serai-coordinator-tests with amore involved new_test
* Use a recursive async function to spawn `n` DockerTests with the necessary networking configuration
* Merge UNIQUE_ID and ONE_AT_A_TIME
* Tidy up the new recursive code in tests/coordinator
* Use a Mutex in CONTEXT to let it be set multiple times
* Make complimentary edits to full-stack tests
* Augment coordinator P2p connection logs
* Drop lock acquisitions before recursing
* Better scope lock acquisitions in full-stack, preventing a deadlock
* Ensure OUTER_OPS is reset across the test boundary
* Add cargo deny allowance for dockertest fork
Slight downscope which helps combat the antipattern which is the futures glob
crate. While futures_util is still a large crate, it has better defaults and
is smaller by virtue of not pulling the executor.
Makes RemoveParticipantDueToDkg a voted-on event instead of a Provided.
This removes the requirement for offline parties to be able to fully validate
blame, yet unfortunately lets an dishonest supermajority have an honest node
label any arbitrary node as dishonest.
Corrects a variety of `.i(...)` calls which panicked when they shouldn't have.
Cleans up a couple no-longer-used storage values.
With a DKG removal comes a reduction in the amount of participants which was
ignored by re-attempts.
Now, we determine n/i based on the parties removed, and deterministically
obtain the context of who was removd.
* Schedule re-attempts and add a (not filled out) match statement to actually execute them
A comment explains the methodology. To copy it here:
"""
This is because we *always* re-attempt any protocol which had participation. That doesn't
mean we *should* re-attempt this protocol.
The alternatives were:
1) Note on-chain we completed a protocol, halting re-attempts upon 34%.
2) Vote on-chain to re-attempt a protocol.
This schema doesn't have any additional messages upon the success case (whereas
alternative #1 does) and doesn't have overhead (as alternative #2 does, sending votes and
then preprocesses. This only sends preprocesses).
"""
Any signing protocol which reaches sufficient participation will be
re-attempted until it no longer does.
* Have the Substrate scanner track DKG removals/completions for the Tributary code
* Don't keep trying to publish a participant removal if we've already set keys
* Pad out the re-attempt match a bit more
* Have CosignEvaluator reload from the DB
* Correctly schedule cosign re-attempts
* Actuall spawn new DKG removal attempts
* Use u32 for Batch ID in SubstrateSignableId, finish Batch re-attempt routing
The batch ID was an opaque [u8; 5] which also included the network, yet that's
redundant and unhelpful.
* Clarify a pair of TODOs in the coordinator
* Remove old TODO
* Final comment cleanup
* Correct usage of TARGET_BLOCK_TIME in reattempt scheduler
It's in ms and I assumed it was in s.
* Have coordinator tests drop BatchReattempts which aren't relevant yet may exist
* Bug fix and pointless oddity removal
We scheduled a re-attempt upon receiving 2/3rds of preprocesses and upon
receiving 2/3rds of shares, so any signing protocol could cause two re-attempts
(not one more).
The coordinator tests randomly generated the Batch ID since it was prior an
opaque byte array. While that didn't break the test, it was pointless and did
make the already-succeeded check before re-attempting impossible to hit.
* Add log statements, correct dead-lock in coordinator tests
* Increase pessimistic timeout on recv_message to compensate for tighter best-case timeouts
* Further bump timeout by a minute
AFAICT, GH failed by just a few seconds.
This also is worst-case in a single instance, making it fine to be decently long.
* Further further bump timeout due to lack of distinct error
