diff --git a/crypto/dleq/src/tests/cross_group/mod.rs b/crypto/dleq/src/tests/cross_group/mod.rs
index f39aa4ce..93ffeb0f 100644
--- a/crypto/dleq/src/tests/cross_group/mod.rs
+++ b/crypto/dleq/src/tests/cross_group/mod.rs
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ fn test_rejection_sampling() {
 }
 
 #[test]
-fn test_dleq() {
+fn test_cross_group_dleq() {
   let generators = generators();
 
   for i in 0 .. 2 {
diff --git a/crypto/frost/src/sign.rs b/crypto/frost/src/sign.rs
index c05e4a89..057ddc47 100644
--- a/crypto/frost/src/sign.rs
+++ b/crypto/frost/src/sign.rs
@@ -187,9 +187,6 @@ fn sign_with_share<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>>(
   Ok((Package { B, binding, R, share: share.clone() }, share))
 }
 
-// This doesn't check the signing set is as expected and unexpected changes can cause false blames
-// if legitimate participants are still using the original, expected, signing set. This library
-// could be made more robust in that regard
 fn complete<C: Curve, A: Algorithm<C>>(
   sign_params: &Params<C, A>,
   sign: Package<C>,
diff --git a/processor/Cargo.toml b/processor/Cargo.toml
index cf2eb7a3..c0a88e4f 100644
--- a/processor/Cargo.toml
+++ b/processor/Cargo.toml
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ description = "Multichain processor premised on canonicity to reach distributed
 license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
 authors = ["Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>"]
 edition = "2021"
+publish = false
 
 [dependencies]
 async-trait = "0.1"