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https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
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Merge InputMultisig into Multisig
There's no reason to use the latter.
This commit is contained in:
parent
22ac5ce3b6
commit
d6649fffb1
3 changed files with 54 additions and 127 deletions
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@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::{
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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mod multisig;
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#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
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pub use multisig::{TransactionData, Multisig, InputMultisig};
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pub use multisig::{TransactionData, Multisig};
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#[derive(Error, Debug)]
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pub enum Error {
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@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ struct ClsagSignInterim {
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct Multisig<D: TransactionData> {
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b: Vec<u8>,
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entropy: Vec<u8>,
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AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint, dfg::EdwardsPoint),
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input: Input,
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image: Option<EdwardsPoint>,
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image: EdwardsPoint,
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data: D,
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interim: Option<ClsagSignInterim>
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@ -61,30 +61,29 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Multisig<D> {
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) -> Result<Multisig<D>, MultisigError> {
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Ok(
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Multisig {
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b: vec![],
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entropy: vec![],
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AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity(), dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity()),
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input,
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image: None,
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image: EdwardsPoint::identity(),
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data,
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interim: None
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}
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)
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}
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pub fn set_image(&mut self, image: EdwardsPoint) {
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self.image = Some(image);
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}
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}
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impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
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// We arguably don't have to commit to at all thanks to xG and yG being committed to, both of
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// those being proven to have the same scalar as xH and yH, yet it doesn't hurt
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// We arguably don't have to commit to the nonces at all thanks to xG and yG being committed to,
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// both of those being proven to have the same scalar as xH and yH, yet it doesn't hurt
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// As for the image, that should be committed to by the msg from TransactionData, yet putting it
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// here as well ensures the security bounds of this
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fn addendum_commit_len() -> usize {
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64
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3 * 32
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}
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fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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@ -92,60 +91,74 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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nonces: &[dfg::Scalar; 2]
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) -> Vec<u8> {
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let (mut serialized, proof) = key_image::generate_share(rng, view);
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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let H = hash_to_point(&view.group_key().0);
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let h0 = nonces[0].0 * H;
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let h1 = nonces[1].0 * H;
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let mut serialized = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 32 + 64 + 64);
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serialized.extend(h0.compress().to_bytes());
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serialized.extend(h1.compress().to_bytes());
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serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[0].0, &H, &h0).serialize());
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serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[1].0, &H, &h1).serialize());
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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let nH = (nonces[0].0 * H, nonces[1].0 * H);
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serialized.reserve_exact(3 * (32 + 64));
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serialized.extend(nH.0.compress().to_bytes());
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serialized.extend(nH.1.compress().to_bytes());
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serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[0].0, &H, &nH.0).serialize());
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serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[1].0, &H, &nH.1).serialize());
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serialized.extend(proof);
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serialized
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}
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fn process_addendum(
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&mut self,
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_: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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l: usize,
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commitments: &[dfg::EdwardsPoint; 2],
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serialized: &[u8]
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) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
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if serialized.len() != 192 {
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if serialized.len() != (3 * (32 + 64)) {
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// Not an optimal error but...
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Err(FrostError::InvalidCommitmentQuantity(l, 6, serialized.len() / 32))?;
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Err(FrostError::InvalidCommitmentQuantity(l, 9, serialized.len() / 32))?;
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}
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// Use everyone's commitments to derive a random source all signers can agree upon
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// Cannot be manipulated to effect and all signers must, and will, know this
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self.entropy.extend(&l.to_le_bytes());
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self.entropy.extend(&serialized[0 .. (3 * 32)]);
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let (share, serialized) = key_image::verify_share(view, l, serialized).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidShare(l))?;
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self.image += share;
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let alt = &hash_to_point(&self.input.ring[self.input.i][0]);
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let h0 = <Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[0 .. 32]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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let H = (
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<Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[0 .. 32]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?,
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<Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[32 .. 64]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?
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);
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DLEqProof::deserialize(&serialized[64 .. 128]).ok_or(FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?.verify(
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&alt,
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&commitments[0],
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&h0
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&H.0
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).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
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let h1 = <Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[32 .. 64]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
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DLEqProof::deserialize(&serialized[128 .. 192]).ok_or(FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?.verify(
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&alt,
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&commitments[1],
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&h1
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&H.1
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).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
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self.b.extend(&l.to_le_bytes());
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self.b.extend(&serialized[0 .. 64]);
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self.AH.0 += h0;
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self.AH.1 += h1;
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self.AH.0 += H.0;
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self.AH.1 += H.1;
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Ok(())
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}
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fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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let mut context = vec![];
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// This should be redundant as the image should be in the addendum if using InputMultisig and
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// in msg if signing a Transaction, yet this ensures CLSAG takes responsibility for its own
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// security boundaries
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context.extend(&self.image.unwrap().compress().to_bytes());
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// This should be redundant as the image should be in the addendum if using Multisig and in msg
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// if signing a Transaction, yet this ensures CLSAG takes responsibility for its own security
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// boundaries
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context.extend(&self.image.compress().to_bytes());
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context.extend(&self.data.msg());
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context.extend(&self.input.context());
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context
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@ -162,14 +175,12 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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// Apply the binding factor to the H variant of the nonce
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self.AH.0 += self.AH.1 * b;
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// Use everyone's commitments to derive a random source all signers can agree upon
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// Cannot be manipulated to effect and all signers must, and will, know this
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// Uses the context as well to prevent passive observers of messages from being able to break
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// privacy, as the context includes the index of the output in the ring, which can only be
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// known if you have the view key and know which of the wallet's TXOs is being spent
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// Use the context with the entropy to prevent passive observers of messages from being able to
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// break privacy, as the context includes the index of the output in the ring, which can only
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// be known if you have the view key and know which of the wallet's TXOs is being spent
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let mut seed = b"CLSAG_randomness".to_vec();
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seed.extend(&self.context());
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seed.extend(&self.b);
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seed.extend(&self.entropy);
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let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::from_seed(Blake2b512::digest(seed)[0 .. 32].try_into().unwrap());
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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&mut rng,
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&self.data.msg(),
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&self.input,
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&self.image.unwrap(),
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&self.image,
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self.data.mask_sum(),
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nonce_sum.0,
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self.AH.0.0
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@ -199,7 +210,7 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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let mut clsag = interim.clsag.clone();
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clsag.s[self.input.i] = Key { key: (sum.0 - interim.s).to_bytes() };
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if verify(&clsag, &self.data.msg(), self.image.unwrap(), &self.input.ring, interim.C_out) {
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if verify(&clsag, &self.data.msg(), self.image, &self.input.ring, interim.C_out) {
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return Some((clsag, interim.C_out));
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}
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return None;
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@ -217,87 +228,3 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
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);
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}
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}
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#[allow(non_snake_case)]
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#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct InputMultisig<D: TransactionData>(EdwardsPoint, Multisig<D>);
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impl<D: TransactionData> InputMultisig<D> {
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pub fn new(
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input: Input,
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msg: D
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) -> Result<InputMultisig<D>, MultisigError> {
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Ok(InputMultisig(EdwardsPoint::identity(), Multisig::new(input, msg)?))
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}
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pub fn image(&self) -> EdwardsPoint {
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self.0
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}
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}
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impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for InputMultisig<D> {
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type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
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fn addendum_commit_len() -> usize {
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32 + Multisig::<D>::addendum_commit_len()
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}
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fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
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rng: &mut R,
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view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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nonces: &[dfg::Scalar; 2]
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) -> Vec<u8> {
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let (mut serialized, end) = key_image::generate_share(rng, view);
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serialized.extend(Multisig::<D>::preprocess_addendum(rng, view, nonces));
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serialized.extend(end);
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serialized
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}
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fn process_addendum(
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&mut self,
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view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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l: usize,
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commitments: &[dfg::EdwardsPoint; 2],
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serialized: &[u8]
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) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
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let (image, serialized) = key_image::verify_share(view, l, serialized).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidShare(l))?;
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self.0 += image;
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if l == *view.included().last().unwrap() {
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self.1.set_image(self.0);
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}
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self.1.process_addendum(view, l, commitments, &serialized)
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}
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fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
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self.1.context()
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}
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fn sign_share(
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&mut self,
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view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
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nonce_sum: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
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b: dfg::Scalar,
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nonce: dfg::Scalar,
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msg: &[u8]
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) -> dfg::Scalar {
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self.1.sign_share(view, nonce_sum, b, nonce, msg)
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}
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fn verify(
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&self,
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group_key: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
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nonce: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
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sum: dfg::Scalar
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) -> Option<Self::Signature> {
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self.1.verify(group_key, nonce, sum)
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}
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fn verify_share(
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&self,
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verification_share: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
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nonce: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
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share: dfg::Scalar,
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) -> bool {
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self.1.verify_share(verification_share, nonce, share)
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}
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}
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@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ fn test_multisig() -> Result<(), MultisigError> {
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for i in 1 ..= t {
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machines.push(
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sign::AlgorithmMachine::new(
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clsag::InputMultisig::new(
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clsag::Multisig::new(
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clsag::Input::new(ring.clone(), RING_INDEX, Commitment::new(randomness, AMOUNT)).unwrap(),
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TransactionData
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).unwrap(),
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