Merge InputMultisig into Multisig

There's no reason to use the latter.
This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker 2022-04-30 01:43:15 -04:00
parent 22ac5ce3b6
commit d6649fffb1
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: F9F1386DB1E119B6
3 changed files with 54 additions and 127 deletions

View file

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::{
#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
mod multisig;
#[cfg(feature = "multisig")]
pub use multisig::{TransactionData, Multisig, InputMultisig};
pub use multisig::{TransactionData, Multisig};
#[derive(Error, Debug)]
pub enum Error {

View file

@ -43,12 +43,12 @@ struct ClsagSignInterim {
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct Multisig<D: TransactionData> {
b: Vec<u8>,
entropy: Vec<u8>,
AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint, dfg::EdwardsPoint),
input: Input,
image: Option<EdwardsPoint>,
image: EdwardsPoint,
data: D,
interim: Option<ClsagSignInterim>
@ -61,30 +61,29 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Multisig<D> {
) -> Result<Multisig<D>, MultisigError> {
Ok(
Multisig {
b: vec![],
entropy: vec![],
AH: (dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity(), dfg::EdwardsPoint::identity()),
input,
image: None,
image: EdwardsPoint::identity(),
data,
interim: None
}
)
}
pub fn set_image(&mut self, image: EdwardsPoint) {
self.image = Some(image);
}
}
impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
// We arguably don't have to commit to at all thanks to xG and yG being committed to, both of
// those being proven to have the same scalar as xH and yH, yet it doesn't hurt
// We arguably don't have to commit to the nonces at all thanks to xG and yG being committed to,
// both of those being proven to have the same scalar as xH and yH, yet it doesn't hurt
// As for the image, that should be committed to by the msg from TransactionData, yet putting it
// here as well ensures the security bounds of this
fn addendum_commit_len() -> usize {
64
3 * 32
}
fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
@ -92,60 +91,74 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
nonces: &[dfg::Scalar; 2]
) -> Vec<u8> {
let (mut serialized, proof) = key_image::generate_share(rng, view);
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
let H = hash_to_point(&view.group_key().0);
let h0 = nonces[0].0 * H;
let h1 = nonces[1].0 * H;
let mut serialized = Vec::with_capacity(32 + 32 + 64 + 64);
serialized.extend(h0.compress().to_bytes());
serialized.extend(h1.compress().to_bytes());
serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[0].0, &H, &h0).serialize());
serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[1].0, &H, &h1).serialize());
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
let nH = (nonces[0].0 * H, nonces[1].0 * H);
serialized.reserve_exact(3 * (32 + 64));
serialized.extend(nH.0.compress().to_bytes());
serialized.extend(nH.1.compress().to_bytes());
serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[0].0, &H, &nH.0).serialize());
serialized.extend(&DLEqProof::prove(rng, &nonces[1].0, &H, &nH.1).serialize());
serialized.extend(proof);
serialized
}
fn process_addendum(
&mut self,
_: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
l: usize,
commitments: &[dfg::EdwardsPoint; 2],
serialized: &[u8]
) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
if serialized.len() != 192 {
if serialized.len() != (3 * (32 + 64)) {
// Not an optimal error but...
Err(FrostError::InvalidCommitmentQuantity(l, 6, serialized.len() / 32))?;
Err(FrostError::InvalidCommitmentQuantity(l, 9, serialized.len() / 32))?;
}
// Use everyone's commitments to derive a random source all signers can agree upon
// Cannot be manipulated to effect and all signers must, and will, know this
self.entropy.extend(&l.to_le_bytes());
self.entropy.extend(&serialized[0 .. (3 * 32)]);
let (share, serialized) = key_image::verify_share(view, l, serialized).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidShare(l))?;
self.image += share;
let alt = &hash_to_point(&self.input.ring[self.input.i][0]);
let h0 = <Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[0 .. 32]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
let H = (
<Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[0 .. 32]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?,
<Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[32 .. 64]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?
);
DLEqProof::deserialize(&serialized[64 .. 128]).ok_or(FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?.verify(
&alt,
&commitments[0],
&h0
&H.0
).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
let h1 = <Ed25519 as Curve>::G_from_slice(&serialized[32 .. 64]).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
DLEqProof::deserialize(&serialized[128 .. 192]).ok_or(FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?.verify(
&alt,
&commitments[1],
&h1
&H.1
).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidCommitment(l))?;
self.b.extend(&l.to_le_bytes());
self.b.extend(&serialized[0 .. 64]);
self.AH.0 += h0;
self.AH.1 += h1;
self.AH.0 += H.0;
self.AH.1 += H.1;
Ok(())
}
fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut context = vec![];
// This should be redundant as the image should be in the addendum if using InputMultisig and
// in msg if signing a Transaction, yet this ensures CLSAG takes responsibility for its own
// security boundaries
context.extend(&self.image.unwrap().compress().to_bytes());
// This should be redundant as the image should be in the addendum if using Multisig and in msg
// if signing a Transaction, yet this ensures CLSAG takes responsibility for its own security
// boundaries
context.extend(&self.image.compress().to_bytes());
context.extend(&self.data.msg());
context.extend(&self.input.context());
context
@ -162,14 +175,12 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
// Apply the binding factor to the H variant of the nonce
self.AH.0 += self.AH.1 * b;
// Use everyone's commitments to derive a random source all signers can agree upon
// Cannot be manipulated to effect and all signers must, and will, know this
// Uses the context as well to prevent passive observers of messages from being able to break
// privacy, as the context includes the index of the output in the ring, which can only be
// known if you have the view key and know which of the wallet's TXOs is being spent
// Use the context with the entropy to prevent passive observers of messages from being able to
// break privacy, as the context includes the index of the output in the ring, which can only
// be known if you have the view key and know which of the wallet's TXOs is being spent
let mut seed = b"CLSAG_randomness".to_vec();
seed.extend(&self.context());
seed.extend(&self.b);
seed.extend(&self.entropy);
let mut rng = ChaCha12Rng::from_seed(Blake2b512::digest(seed)[0 .. 32].try_into().unwrap());
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
@ -177,7 +188,7 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
&mut rng,
&self.data.msg(),
&self.input,
&self.image.unwrap(),
&self.image,
self.data.mask_sum(),
nonce_sum.0,
self.AH.0.0
@ -199,7 +210,7 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
let mut clsag = interim.clsag.clone();
clsag.s[self.input.i] = Key { key: (sum.0 - interim.s).to_bytes() };
if verify(&clsag, &self.data.msg(), self.image.unwrap(), &self.input.ring, interim.C_out) {
if verify(&clsag, &self.data.msg(), self.image, &self.input.ring, interim.C_out) {
return Some((clsag, interim.C_out));
}
return None;
@ -217,87 +228,3 @@ impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for Multisig<D> {
);
}
}
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
pub struct InputMultisig<D: TransactionData>(EdwardsPoint, Multisig<D>);
impl<D: TransactionData> InputMultisig<D> {
pub fn new(
input: Input,
msg: D
) -> Result<InputMultisig<D>, MultisigError> {
Ok(InputMultisig(EdwardsPoint::identity(), Multisig::new(input, msg)?))
}
pub fn image(&self) -> EdwardsPoint {
self.0
}
}
impl<D: TransactionData> Algorithm<Ed25519> for InputMultisig<D> {
type Signature = (Clsag, EdwardsPoint);
fn addendum_commit_len() -> usize {
32 + Multisig::<D>::addendum_commit_len()
}
fn preprocess_addendum<R: RngCore + CryptoRng>(
rng: &mut R,
view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
nonces: &[dfg::Scalar; 2]
) -> Vec<u8> {
let (mut serialized, end) = key_image::generate_share(rng, view);
serialized.extend(Multisig::<D>::preprocess_addendum(rng, view, nonces));
serialized.extend(end);
serialized
}
fn process_addendum(
&mut self,
view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
l: usize,
commitments: &[dfg::EdwardsPoint; 2],
serialized: &[u8]
) -> Result<(), FrostError> {
let (image, serialized) = key_image::verify_share(view, l, serialized).map_err(|_| FrostError::InvalidShare(l))?;
self.0 += image;
if l == *view.included().last().unwrap() {
self.1.set_image(self.0);
}
self.1.process_addendum(view, l, commitments, &serialized)
}
fn context(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
self.1.context()
}
fn sign_share(
&mut self,
view: &ParamsView<Ed25519>,
nonce_sum: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
b: dfg::Scalar,
nonce: dfg::Scalar,
msg: &[u8]
) -> dfg::Scalar {
self.1.sign_share(view, nonce_sum, b, nonce, msg)
}
fn verify(
&self,
group_key: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
nonce: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
sum: dfg::Scalar
) -> Option<Self::Signature> {
self.1.verify(group_key, nonce, sum)
}
fn verify_share(
&self,
verification_share: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
nonce: dfg::EdwardsPoint,
share: dfg::Scalar,
) -> bool {
self.1.verify_share(verification_share, nonce, share)
}
}

View file

@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ fn test_multisig() -> Result<(), MultisigError> {
for i in 1 ..= t {
machines.push(
sign::AlgorithmMachine::new(
clsag::InputMultisig::new(
clsag::Multisig::new(
clsag::Input::new(ring.clone(), RING_INDEX, Commitment::new(randomness, AMOUNT)).unwrap(),
TransactionData
).unwrap(),