Expand tests for ethereum-schnorr-contract

This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker 2024-10-28 18:08:31 -04:00
parent 0b61a75afc
commit ce1689b325
No known key found for this signature in database
9 changed files with 205 additions and 51 deletions

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@ -1,7 +1,13 @@
// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only // SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
pragma solidity ^0.8.26; pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
// See https://github.com/noot/schnorr-verify for implementation details /// @title A library for verifying Schnorr signatures
/// @author Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
/// @author Elizabeth Binks <elizabethjbinks@gmail.com>
/// @notice Verifies a Schnorr signature for a specified public key
/// @dev This contract is not complete. Only certain public keys are compatible
/// @dev See https://github.com/serai-dex/serai/blob/next/networks/ethereum/schnorr/src/tests/premise.rs for implementation details
// TODO: Pin to a specific branch/commit once `next` is merged into `develop`
library Schnorr { library Schnorr {
// secp256k1 group order // secp256k1 group order
uint256 private constant Q = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141; uint256 private constant Q = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFEBAAEDCE6AF48A03BBFD25E8CD0364141;
@ -11,31 +17,39 @@ library Schnorr {
// 2) An x-coordinate < Q // 2) An x-coordinate < Q
uint8 private constant KEY_PARITY = 27; uint8 private constant KEY_PARITY = 27;
// px := public key x-coordinate, where the public key has an even y-coordinate /// @notice Verifies a Schnorr signature for the specified public key
// message := the message signed /// @dev The y-coordinate of the public key is assumed to be even
// c := Schnorr signature challenge /// @dev The x-coordinate of the public key is assumed to be less than the order of secp256k1
// s := Schnorr signature solution /// @dev The challenge is calculated as `keccak256(abi.encodePacked(address(R), public_key, message))` where `R` is the commitment to the Schnorr signature's nonce
function verify(bytes32 px, bytes32 message, bytes32 c, bytes32 s) internal pure returns (bool) { /// @param public_key The x-coordinate of the public key
/// @param message The (hash of the) message signed
/// @param c The challenge for the Schnorr signature
/// @param s The response to the challenge for the Schnorr signature
/// @return If the signature is valid
function verify(bytes32 public_key, bytes32 message, bytes32 c, bytes32 s)
internal
pure
returns (bool)
{
// ecrecover = (m, v, r, s) -> key // ecrecover = (m, v, r, s) -> key
// We instead pass the following to obtain the nonce (not the key) // We instead pass the following to recover the Schnorr signature's nonce (not a public key)
// Then we hash it and verify it matches the challenge bytes32 sa = bytes32(Q - mulmod(uint256(s), uint256(public_key), Q));
bytes32 sa = bytes32(Q - mulmod(uint256(s), uint256(px), Q)); bytes32 ca = bytes32(Q - mulmod(uint256(c), uint256(public_key), Q));
bytes32 ca = bytes32(Q - mulmod(uint256(c), uint256(px), Q));
/* /*
The ecrecover precompile checks `r` and `s` (`px` and `ca`) are non-zero, The ecrecover precompile checks `r` and `s` (`public_key` and `ca`) are non-zero, banning the
banning the two keys with zero for their x-coordinate and zero challenge. two keys with zero for their x-coordinate and zero challenges. Each already only had a
Each has negligible probability of occuring (assuming zero x-coordinates negligible probability of occuring (assuming zero x-coordinates are even on-curve in the first
are even on-curve in the first place). place).
`sa` is not checked to be non-zero yet it does not need to be. The inverse `sa` is not checked to be non-zero yet it does not need to be. The inverse of it is never
of it is never taken. taken.
*/ */
address R = ecrecover(sa, KEY_PARITY, px, ca); address R = ecrecover(sa, KEY_PARITY, public_key, ca);
// The ecrecover failed // The ecrecover failed
if (R == address(0)) return false; if (R == address(0)) return false;
// Check the signature is correct by rebuilding the challenge // Check the signature is correct by rebuilding the challenge
return c == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(R, px, message)); return c == keccak256(abi.encodePacked(R, public_key, message));
} }
} }

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@ -3,7 +3,19 @@ pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
import "../Schnorr.sol"; import "../Schnorr.sol";
/// @title A thin wrapper around the library for verifying Schnorr signatures to test it with
/// @author Luke Parker <lukeparker5132@gmail.com>
/// @author Elizabeth Binks <elizabethjbinks@gmail.com>
contract TestSchnorr { contract TestSchnorr {
/// @notice Verifies a Schnorr signature for the specified public key
/// @dev The y-coordinate of the public key is assumed to be even
/// @dev The x-coordinate of the public key is assumed to be less than the order of secp256k1
/// @dev The challenge is calculated as `keccak256(abi.encodePacked(address(R), public_key, message))` where `R` is the commitment to the Schnorr signature's nonce
/// @param public_key The x-coordinate of the public key
/// @param message The (hash of the) message signed
/// @param c The challenge for the Schnorr signature
/// @param s The response to the challenge for the Schnorr signature
/// @return If the signature is valid
function verify(bytes32 public_key, bytes calldata message, bytes32 c, bytes32 s) function verify(bytes32 public_key, bytes calldata message, bytes32 c, bytes32 s)
external external
pure pure

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@ -31,8 +31,7 @@ impl PublicKey {
let x_coordinate = affine.x(); let x_coordinate = affine.x();
// Return None if the x-coordinate isn't mutual to both fields // Return None if the x-coordinate isn't mutual to both fields
// While reductions shouldn't be an issue, it's one less headache/concern to have // The trivial amount of public keys this makes non-representable aren't considered a concern
// The trivial amount of public keys this makes non-representable aren't a concern
if <Scalar as Reduce<KU256>>::reduce_bytes(&x_coordinate).to_repr() != x_coordinate { if <Scalar as Reduce<KU256>>::reduce_bytes(&x_coordinate).to_repr() != x_coordinate {
None?; None?;
} }

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@ -20,11 +20,17 @@ pub struct Signature {
impl Signature { impl Signature {
/// Construct a new `Signature`. /// Construct a new `Signature`.
#[must_use] #[must_use]
pub fn new(c: Scalar, s: Scalar) -> Signature { pub fn new(c: Scalar, s: Scalar) -> Option<Signature> {
Signature { c, s } if bool::from(c.is_zero()) {
None?;
}
Some(Signature { c, s })
} }
/// The challenge for a signature. /// The challenge for a signature.
///
/// With negligible probability, this MAY return 0 which will create an invalid/unverifiable
/// signature.
#[must_use] #[must_use]
pub fn challenge(R: ProjectivePoint, key: &PublicKey, message: &[u8]) -> Scalar { pub fn challenge(R: ProjectivePoint, key: &PublicKey, message: &[u8]) -> Scalar {
// H(R || A || m) // H(R || A || m)

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@ -17,6 +17,9 @@ use alloy_node_bindings::{Anvil, AnvilInstance};
use crate::{PublicKey, Signature}; use crate::{PublicKey, Signature};
mod public_key;
pub(crate) use public_key::test_key;
mod signature;
mod premise; mod premise;
#[expect(warnings)] #[expect(warnings)]
@ -88,12 +91,7 @@ async fn test_verify() {
let (_anvil, provider, address) = setup_test().await; let (_anvil, provider, address) = setup_test().await;
for _ in 0 .. 100 { for _ in 0 .. 100 {
let (key, public_key) = loop { let (key, public_key) = test_key();
let key = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
if let Some(public_key) = PublicKey::new(ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * key) {
break (key, public_key);
}
};
let nonce = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng); let nonce = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
let mut message = vec![0; 1 + usize::try_from(OsRng.next_u32() % 256).unwrap()]; let mut message = vec![0; 1 + usize::try_from(OsRng.next_u32() % 256).unwrap()];
@ -102,11 +100,37 @@ async fn test_verify() {
let c = Signature::challenge(ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * nonce, &public_key, &message); let c = Signature::challenge(ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * nonce, &public_key, &message);
let s = nonce + (c * key); let s = nonce + (c * key);
let sig = Signature::new(c, s); let sig = Signature::new(c, s).unwrap();
assert!(sig.verify(&public_key, &message)); assert!(sig.verify(&public_key, &message));
assert!(call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &sig).await); assert!(call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &sig).await);
// Test setting `s = 0` doesn't pass verification
{
let zero_s = Signature::new(c, Scalar::ZERO).unwrap();
assert!(!zero_s.verify(&public_key, &message));
assert!(!call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &zero_s).await);
}
// Mutate the message and make sure the signature now fails to verify // Mutate the message and make sure the signature now fails to verify
{
let mut message = message.clone();
message[0] = message[0].wrapping_add(1); message[0] = message[0].wrapping_add(1);
assert!(!sig.verify(&public_key, &message));
assert!(!call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &sig).await); assert!(!call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &sig).await);
} }
// Mutate c and make sure the signature now fails to verify
{
let mutated_c = Signature::new(c + Scalar::ONE, s).unwrap();
assert!(!mutated_c.verify(&public_key, &message));
assert!(!call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &mutated_c).await);
}
// Mutate s and make sure the signature now fails to verify
{
let mutated_s = Signature::new(c, s + Scalar::ONE).unwrap();
assert!(!mutated_s.verify(&public_key, &message));
assert!(!call_verify(&provider, address, &public_key, &message, &mutated_s).await);
}
}
} }

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use k256::{
use alloy_core::primitives::Address; use alloy_core::primitives::Address;
use crate::{PublicKey, Signature}; use crate::{Signature, tests::test_key};
// The ecrecover opcode, yet with if the y is odd replacing v // The ecrecover opcode, yet with if the y is odd replacing v
fn ecrecover(message: Scalar, odd_y: bool, r: Scalar, s: Scalar) -> Option<[u8; 20]> { fn ecrecover(message: Scalar, odd_y: bool, r: Scalar, s: Scalar) -> Option<[u8; 20]> {
@ -64,12 +64,7 @@ fn test_ecrecover() {
// of efficiently verifying Schnorr signatures in an Ethereum contract // of efficiently verifying Schnorr signatures in an Ethereum contract
#[test] #[test]
fn nonce_recovery_via_ecrecover() { fn nonce_recovery_via_ecrecover() {
let (key, public_key) = loop { let (key, public_key) = test_key();
let key = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
if let Some(public_key) = PublicKey::new(ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * key) {
break (key, public_key);
}
};
let nonce = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng); let nonce = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
let R = ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * nonce; let R = ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * nonce;
@ -81,26 +76,28 @@ fn nonce_recovery_via_ecrecover() {
let s = nonce + (c * key); let s = nonce + (c * key);
/* /*
An ECDSA signature is `(r, s)` with `s = (H(m) + rx) / k`, where: An ECDSA signature is `(r, s)` with `s = (m + (r * x)) / k`, where:
- `m` is the message - `m` is the hash of the message
- `r` is the x-coordinate of the nonce, reduced into a scalar - `r` is the x-coordinate of the nonce, reduced into a scalar
- `x` is the private key - `x` is the private key
- `k` is the nonce - `k` is the nonce
We fix the recovery ID to be for the even key with an x-coordinate < the order. Accordingly, We fix the recovery ID to be for the even key with an x-coordinate < the order. Accordingly,
`kG = Point::from(Even, r)`. This enables recovering the public key via `k * G = Point::from(Even, r)`. This enables recovering the public key via
`((s Point::from(Even, r)) - H(m)G) / r`. `((s * Point::from(Even, r)) - (m * G)) / r`.
We want to calculate `R` from `(c, s)` where `s = r + cx`. That means we need to calculate We want to calculate `R` from `(c, s)` where `s = r + cx`. That means we need to calculate
`sG - cX`. `(s * G) - (c * X)`.
We can calculate `sG - cX` with `((s Point::from(Even, r)) - H(m)G) / r` if: We can calculate `(s * G) - (c * X)` with `((s * Point::from(Even, r)) - (m * G)) / r` if:
- Latter `r` = `X.x` - ECDSA `r` = `X.x`, the x-coordinate of the Schnorr public key
- Latter `s` = `c` - ECDSA `s` = `c`, the Schnorr signature's challenge
- `H(m)` = former `s` - ECDSA `m` = Schnorr `s`
This gets us to `(cX - sG) / X.x`. If we additionally scale the latter's `s, H(m)` values (the This gets us to `((c * X) - (s * G)) / X.x`. If we additionally scale the ECDSA `s, m` values
former's `c, s` values) by `X.x`, we get `cX - sG`. This just requires negating each to achieve (the Schnorr `c, s` values) by `X.x`, we get `(c * X) - (s * G)`. This just requires negating
`sG - cX`. to achieve `(s * G) - (c * X)`.
With `R`, we can recalculate and compare the challenges to confirm the signature is valid.
*/ */
let x_scalar = <Scalar as Reduce<U256>>::reduce_bytes(&public_key.point().to_affine().x()); let x_scalar = <Scalar as Reduce<U256>>::reduce_bytes(&public_key.point().to_affine().x());
let sa = -(s * x_scalar); let sa = -(s * x_scalar);

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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
use rand_core::OsRng;
use subtle::Choice;
use group::ff::{Field, PrimeField};
use k256::{
elliptic_curve::{
FieldBytesEncoding,
ops::Reduce,
point::{AffineCoordinates, DecompressPoint},
},
AffinePoint, ProjectivePoint, Scalar, U256 as KU256,
};
use crate::PublicKey;
// Generates a key usable within tests
pub(crate) fn test_key() -> (Scalar, PublicKey) {
loop {
let key = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
let point = ProjectivePoint::GENERATOR * key;
if let Some(public_key) = PublicKey::new(point) {
// While here, test `PublicKey::point` and its serialization functions
assert_eq!(point, public_key.point());
assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_eth_repr(public_key.eth_repr()).unwrap(), public_key);
return (key, public_key);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn test_odd_key() {
// We generate a valid key to ensure there's not some distinct reason this key is invalid
let (_, key) = test_key();
// We then take its point and negate it so its y-coordinate is odd
let odd = -key.point();
assert!(PublicKey::new(odd).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_non_mutual_key() {
let mut x_coordinate = KU256::from(-(Scalar::ONE)).saturating_add(&KU256::ONE);
let y_is_odd = Choice::from(0);
let non_mutual = loop {
if let Some(point) = Option::<AffinePoint>::from(AffinePoint::decompress(
&FieldBytesEncoding::encode_field_bytes(&x_coordinate),
y_is_odd,
)) {
break point;
}
x_coordinate = x_coordinate.saturating_add(&KU256::ONE);
};
let x_coordinate = non_mutual.x();
assert!(<Scalar as Reduce<KU256>>::reduce_bytes(&x_coordinate).to_repr() != x_coordinate);
// Even point whose x-coordinate isn't mutual to both fields (making it non-zero)
assert!(PublicKey::new(non_mutual.into()).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_zero_key() {
let y_is_odd = Choice::from(0);
if let Some(A_affine) =
Option::<AffinePoint>::from(AffinePoint::decompress(&[0; 32].into(), y_is_odd))
{
let A = ProjectivePoint::from(A_affine);
assert!(PublicKey::new(A).is_none());
}
}

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@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
use rand_core::OsRng;
use group::ff::Field;
use k256::Scalar;
use crate::Signature;
#[test]
fn test_zero_challenge() {
assert!(Signature::new(Scalar::ZERO, Scalar::random(&mut OsRng)).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_signature_serialization() {
let c = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
let s = Scalar::random(&mut OsRng);
let sig = Signature::new(c, s).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sig.c(), c);
assert_eq!(sig.s(), s);
let sig_bytes = sig.to_bytes();
assert_eq!(Signature::from_bytes(sig_bytes).unwrap(), sig);
{
let mut sig_written_bytes = vec![];
sig.write(&mut sig_written_bytes).unwrap();
assert_eq!(sig_bytes.as_slice(), &sig_written_bytes);
}
let mut sig_read_slice = sig_bytes.as_slice();
assert_eq!(Signature::read(&mut sig_read_slice).unwrap(), sig);
assert!(sig_read_slice.is_empty());
}

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@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ impl SignatureMachine<Transaction> for ActionSignatureMachine {
self.machine.complete(shares).map(|signature| { self.machine.complete(shares).map(|signature| {
let s = signature.s; let s = signature.s;
let c = Signature::challenge(signature.R, &self.key, &self.action.message()); let c = Signature::challenge(signature.R, &self.key, &self.action.message());
Transaction(self.action, Signature::new(c, s)) Transaction(self.action, Signature::new(c, s).unwrap())
}) })
} }
} }