Error if deallocation would remove fault tolerance

This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker 2023-10-12 23:05:29 -04:00
parent 6587590986
commit 9a1d10f4ea
No known key found for this signature in database

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@ -162,6 +162,32 @@ pub mod pallet {
}
}
struct SortedAllocationsIter<T: Config> {
_t: PhantomData<T>,
prefix: Vec<u8>,
last: Vec<u8>,
}
impl<T: Config> SortedAllocationsIter<T> {
fn new(network: NetworkId) -> Self {
let mut prefix = SortedAllocations::<T>::final_prefix().to_vec();
prefix.extend(&network.encode());
Self { _t: PhantomData, prefix: prefix.clone(), last: prefix }
}
}
impl<T: Config> Iterator for SortedAllocationsIter<T> {
type Item = (Public, Amount);
fn next(&mut self) -> Option<Self::Item> {
let next = sp_io::storage::next_key(&self.last)?;
if !next.starts_with(&self.prefix) {
return None;
}
let key = Pallet::<T>::recover_key_from_sorted_allocation_key(&next);
let amount = Pallet::<T>::recover_amount_from_sorted_allocation_key(&next);
self.last = next;
Some((key, amount))
}
}
/// Pending deallocations, keyed by the Session they become unlocked on.
#[pallet::storage]
type PendingDeallocations<T: Config> =
@ -217,31 +243,18 @@ pub mod pallet {
let allocation_per_key_share = Self::allocation_per_key_share(network).unwrap().0;
let mut prefix = SortedAllocations::<T>::final_prefix().to_vec();
prefix.extend(&network.encode());
let prefix = prefix;
let mut last = prefix.clone();
let mut iter = SortedAllocationsIter::<T>::new(network);
let mut participants = vec![];
let mut key_shares = 0;
while key_shares < u64::from(MAX_VALIDATORS_PER_SET) {
let Some(next) = sp_io::storage::next_key(&last) else { break };
if !next.starts_with(&prefix) {
break;
}
let key = Self::recover_key_from_sorted_allocation_key(&next);
let Some((key, amount)) = iter.next() else { break };
InSet::<T>::set(Self::in_set_key(network, key), Some(()));
participants.push(key);
// This can technically set key_shares to a value exceeding MAX_VALIDATORS_PER_SET
// Off-chain, the key shares per validator will be accordingly adjusted
// TODO: Recover the amount from `next` to avoud a new storage lookup
key_shares +=
Self::recover_amount_from_sorted_allocation_key(&next).0 / allocation_per_key_share;
last = next;
key_shares += amount.0 / allocation_per_key_share;
}
let set = ValidatorSet { network, session };
@ -264,6 +277,8 @@ pub mod pallet {
/// Deallocation would remove the participant from the set, despite the validator not
/// specifying so.
DeallocationWouldRemoveParticipant,
/// Deallocation would cause the validator set to no longer achieve fault tolerance.
DeallocationWouldRemoveFaultTolerance,
/// Validator Set already generated keys.
AlreadyGeneratedKeys,
/// An invalid MuSig signature was provided.
@ -358,6 +373,7 @@ pub mod pallet {
Err(Error::InsufficientAllocation) |
Err(Error::NotEnoughAllocated) |
Err(Error::DeallocationWouldRemoveParticipant) |
Err(Error::DeallocationWouldRemoveFaultTolerance) |
Err(Error::NonExistentValidator) |
Err(Error::BadSignature) => Err(InvalidTransaction::BadProof)?,
Err(Error::__Ignore(_, _)) => unreachable!(),
@ -405,19 +421,46 @@ pub mod pallet {
) -> Result<bool, Error<T>> {
// TODO: Check it's safe to decrease this set's stake by this amount
let new_allocation = Self::allocation((network, account))
.ok_or(Error::<T>::NonExistentValidator)?
.0
.checked_sub(amount.0)
.ok_or(Error::<T>::NotEnoughAllocated)?;
let old_allocation =
Self::allocation((network, account)).ok_or(Error::<T>::NonExistentValidator)?.0;
let new_allocation =
old_allocation.checked_sub(amount.0).ok_or(Error::<T>::NotEnoughAllocated)?;
// If we're not removing the entire allocation, yet the allocation is no longer at or above
// the threshold for a key share, error
if (new_allocation != 0) &&
(new_allocation < Self::allocation_per_key_share(network).unwrap_or(Amount(0)).0)
{
let allocation_per_key_share = Self::allocation_per_key_share(network).unwrap().0;
if (new_allocation != 0) && (new_allocation < allocation_per_key_share) {
Err(Error::<T>::DeallocationWouldRemoveParticipant)?;
}
// TODO: Error if we're about to be removed, and the remaining set size would be <4
let decrease_in_key_shares =
(old_allocation / allocation_per_key_share) - (new_allocation / allocation_per_key_share);
// If this decreases the validator's key shares, error if the new set is unable to handle
// byzantine faults
if decrease_in_key_shares != 0 {
// This is naive in that it only checks a key share may go offline, instead of checking the
// top validator may go offline
// TODO: Update accordingly. We'll also need to update increase_allocation to prevent
// becoming a 34% party
let mut key_shares = 0;
for (_, amount) in SortedAllocationsIter::<T>::new(network) {
key_shares += amount.0 / allocation_per_key_share;
// This first clause sets an execution bound on this iteration, one present during
// selection
// It should be impossible to reach though as it'll only trigger if
// decrease_in_key_shares is insanely close to it, when we'll error upon becoming 34%
if (key_shares > u64::from(MAX_VALIDATORS_PER_SET)) ||
((key_shares - decrease_in_key_shares) >= 4)
{
break;
}
}
// If key_shares was already not BFT, don't error
if (key_shares >= 4) && ((key_shares - decrease_in_key_shares) < 4) {
Err(Error::<T>::DeallocationWouldRemoveFaultTolerance)?;
}
}
// Decrease the allocation now
Self::set_allocation(network, account, Amount(new_allocation));