An extremely minimal subset of Monero is now all that's built, and I'm 
sufficiently happy with it.
This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker 2022-07-09 21:51:39 -04:00
parent 53267a46c8
commit 854fca3806
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: F9F1386DB1E119B6
5 changed files with 121 additions and 98 deletions

View file

@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ rand_chacha = { version = "0.3", optional = true }
rand = "0.8"
rand_distr = "0.4"
subtle = "2.4"
tiny-keccak = { version = "2", features = ["keccak"] }
blake2 = { version = "0.10", optional = true }
@ -31,13 +33,14 @@ transcript = { package = "flexible-transcript", path = "../../crypto/transcript"
frost = { package = "modular-frost", path = "../../crypto/frost", features = ["ed25519"], optional = true }
dleq = { path = "../../crypto/dleq", features = ["serialize"], optional = true }
base58-monero = "1"
monero = "0.16"
hex = "0.4"
serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0"
base58-monero = "1"
monero-epee-bin-serde = "1.0"
monero = "0.16"
reqwest = { version = "0.11", features = ["json"] }
[features]

View file

@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ fn main() {
// Use a file to signal if Monero was already built, as that should never be rebuilt
// If the signaling file was deleted, run this script again to rebuild Monero though
// TODO: Move this signaling file into OUT_DIR once Monero is built statically successfully
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=c/.build/monero");
if !Path::new("c/.build/monero").exists() {
if !Command::new("make").arg(format!("-j{}", &env::var("THREADS").unwrap_or("2".to_string())))
@ -28,81 +27,46 @@ fn main() {
}
}
println!("cargo:rerun-if-env-changed=OUT_DIR");
if !Path::new(
&format!(
"{}/{}cncrypto.{}",
out_dir,
&env::consts::DLL_PREFIX,
&env::consts::DLL_EXTENSION
)
).exists() {
let mut paths = vec![
"c/monero/build/release/contrib/epee/src/libepee.a".to_string(),
"c/monero/build/release/external/easylogging++/libeasylogging.a".to_string(),
"c/monero/build/release/external/randomx/librandomx.a".to_string()
];
for (folder, lib) in [
("common", "common"),
("crypto", "cncrypto"),
("crypto/wallet", "wallet-crypto"),
("cryptonote_basic", "cryptonote_basic"),
("cryptonote_basic", "cryptonote_format_utils_basic"),
("", "version"),
("device", "device"),
("ringct", "ringct_basic"),
("ringct", "ringct")
] {
paths.push(
format!(
"c/monero/build/release/src/{}/{}{}.a",
folder,
&env::consts::DLL_PREFIX,
lib
)
);
}
for path in paths {
if !Command::new("cp").args(&[&path, out_dir]).status().unwrap().success() {
panic!("Failed to cp {}", path);
}
}
}
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=c/wrapper.cpp");
if !Path::new(&format!("{}/{}wrapper.a", out_dir, &env::consts::DLL_PREFIX)).exists() {
cc::Build::new()
.file("c/wrapper.cpp")
.cpp(true)
.warnings(false)
.include("c/monero/contrib/epee/include")
.include("c/monero/src")
.compile("wrapper");
}
cc::Build::new()
.static_flag(true)
.warnings(false)
.extra_warnings(false)
.flag("-Wno-deprecated-declarations")
.include("c/monero/external/supercop/include")
.include("c/monero/contrib/epee/include")
.include("c/monero/src")
.include("c/monero/build/release/generated_include")
.define("AUTO_INITIALIZE_EASYLOGGINGPP", None)
.include("c/monero/external/easylogging++")
.file("c/monero/external/easylogging++/easylogging++.cc")
.file("c/monero/src/common/aligned.c")
.file("c/monero/src/common/perf_timer.cpp")
.include("c/monero/src/crypto")
.file("c/monero/src/crypto/crypto-ops-data.c")
.file("c/monero/src/crypto/crypto-ops.c")
.file("c/monero/src/crypto/keccak.c")
.file("c/monero/src/crypto/hash.c")
.include("c/monero/src/device")
.file("c/monero/src/device/device_default.cpp")
.include("c/monero/src/ringct")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/rctCryptoOps.c")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/rctTypes.cpp")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/rctOps.cpp")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/multiexp.cc")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/bulletproofs.cc")
.file("c/monero/src/ringct/rctSigs.cpp")
.file("c/wrapper.cpp")
.compile("wrapper");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-search={}", out_dir);
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=wrapper");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=ringct");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=ringct_basic");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=device");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=cryptonote_basic");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=cncrypto");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=cryptonote_format_utils_basic");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=version");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=wallet-crypto");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=easylogging");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=epee");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=common");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=randomx");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=unbound");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=sodium");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=boost_system");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=boost_thread");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=boost_filesystem");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=hidapi-hidraw");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-lib=stdc++");
println!("cargo:rustc-link-arg=-zmuldefs");
}

View file

@ -6,36 +6,50 @@
#include "ringct/rctSigs.h"
typedef std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock;
std::mutex rng_mutex;
std::mutex rng_mutex;
uint8_t rng_entropy[64];
void rng(uint8_t* seed) {
// Set the first half to the seed
memcpy(rng_entropy, seed, 32);
// Set the second half to the hash of a DST to ensure a lack of collisions
crypto::cn_fast_hash("RNG_entropy_seed", 16, (char*) &rng_entropy[32]);
}
extern "C" {
void generate_random_bytes_not_thread_safe(size_t n, uint8_t* value) {
void rng(uint8_t* seed) {
// Set the first half to the seed
memcpy(rng_entropy, seed, 32);
// Set the second half to the hash of a DST to ensure a lack of collisions
crypto::cn_fast_hash("RNG_entropy_seed", 16, (char*) &rng_entropy[32]);
}
}
extern "C" void monero_wide_reduce(uint8_t* value);
namespace crypto {
void generate_random_bytes_not_thread_safe(size_t n, void* value) {
size_t written = 0;
while (written != n) {
uint8_t hash[32];
crypto::cn_fast_hash(rng_entropy, 64, (char*) hash);
// Step the RNG by setting the latter half to the most recent result
// Does not leak the RNG, even if the values are leaked (which they are expected to be) due to
// the first half remaining constant and undisclosed
// Does not leak the RNG, even if the values are leaked (which they are
// expected to be) due to the first half remaining constant and
// undisclosed
memcpy(&rng_entropy[32], hash, 32);
size_t next = n - written;
if (next > 32) {
next = 32;
}
memcpy(&value[written], hash, next);
memcpy(&((uint8_t*) value)[written], hash, next);
written += next;
}
}
void random32_unbiased(unsigned char *bytes) {
uint8_t value[64];
generate_random_bytes_not_thread_safe(64, value);
monero_wide_reduce(value);
memcpy(bytes, value, 32);
}
}
extern "C" {
void c_hash_to_point(uint8_t* point) {
rct::key key_point;
ge_p3 e_p3;
@ -62,16 +76,24 @@ extern "C" {
std::stringstream ss;
binary_archive<true> ba(ss);
::serialization::serialize(ba, bp);
uint8_t* res = (uint8_t*) calloc(ss.str().size(), 1); // malloc would also work
uint8_t* res = (uint8_t*) calloc(ss.str().size(), 1);
memcpy(res, ss.str().data(), ss.str().size());
return res;
}
bool c_verify_bp(uint8_t* seed, uint s_len, uint8_t* s, uint8_t c_len, uint8_t* c) {
// BPs are batch verified which use RNG based challenges to ensure individual integrity
// That's why this must also have control over RNG, to prevent interrupting multisig signing
// while not using known seeds. Considering this doesn't actually define a batch,
// and it's only verifying a single BP, it'd probably be fine, but...
bool c_verify_bp(
uint8_t* seed,
uint s_len,
uint8_t* s,
uint8_t c_len,
uint8_t* c
) {
// BPs are batch verified which use RNG based weights to ensure individual
// integrity
// That's why this must also have control over RNG, to prevent interrupting
// multisig signing while not using known seeds. Considering this doesn't
// actually define a batch, and it's only verifying a single BP,
// it'd probably be fine, but...
lock guard(rng_mutex);
rng(seed);
@ -94,7 +116,15 @@ extern "C" {
try { return rct::bulletproof_VERIFY(bp); } catch(...) { return false; }
}
bool c_verify_clsag(uint s_len, uint8_t* s, uint8_t k_len, uint8_t* k, uint8_t* I, uint8_t* p, uint8_t* m) {
bool c_verify_clsag(
uint s_len,
uint8_t* s,
uint8_t k_len,
uint8_t* k,
uint8_t* I,
uint8_t* p,
uint8_t* m
) {
rct::clsag clsag;
std::stringstream ss;
std::string str;
@ -121,6 +151,8 @@ extern "C" {
rct::key msg;
memcpy(msg.bytes, m, 32);
try { return verRctCLSAGSimple(msg, clsag, keys, pseudo_out); } catch(...) { return false; }
try {
return verRctCLSAGSimple(msg, clsag, keys, pseudo_out);
} catch(...) { return false; }
}
}

View file

@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
use std::slice;
use lazy_static::lazy_static;
use rand_core::{RngCore, CryptoRng};
use subtle::ConstantTimeEq;
use tiny_keccak::{Hasher, Keccak};
use curve25519_dalek::{
@ -32,6 +36,29 @@ lazy_static! {
static ref H_TABLE: EdwardsBasepointTable = EdwardsBasepointTable::create(&*H);
}
// Function from libsodium our subsection of Monero relies on. Implementing it here means we don't
// need to link against libsodium
#[no_mangle]
unsafe extern "C" fn crypto_verify_32(a: *const u8, b: *const u8) -> isize {
isize::from(
slice::from_raw_parts(a, 32).ct_eq(slice::from_raw_parts(b, 32)).unwrap_u8()
) - 1
}
// Offer a wide reduction to C. Our seeded RNG prevented Monero from defining an unbiased scalar
// generation function, and in order to not use Monero code (which would require propagating its
// license), the function was rewritten. It was rewritten with wide reduction, instead of rejection
// sampling however, hence the need for this function
#[no_mangle]
unsafe extern "C" fn monero_wide_reduce(value: *mut u8) {
let res = Scalar::from_bytes_mod_order_wide(
std::slice::from_raw_parts(value, 64).try_into().unwrap()
);
for (i, b) in res.to_bytes().iter().enumerate() {
value.add(i).write(*b);
}
}
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Debug)]
pub struct Commitment {

View file

@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
fn main() {
println!("cargo:rustc-link-arg=-zmuldefs");
}