Don't allow the Bitcoin set to mint sriETH

substrate/in-instructions/pallet/src/lib.rs

@@ -122,9 +122,6 @@ pub mod pallet {
         instructions_hash: blake2_256(&batch.instructions.encode()),
       });
       for (i, instruction) in batch.instructions.into_iter().enumerate() {
-        // TODO: Check this balance's coin belongs to this network
-        // If they don't, the validator set should be completely slashed, without question
-
         if Self::execute(instruction).is_err() {
           Self::deposit_event(Event::InstructionFailure {
             network: batch.network,
@@ -201,6 +198,20 @@ pub mod pallet {
         Err(InvalidTransaction::Future)?;
       }
 
+      // Verify all Balances in this Batch are for this network
+      for instruction in &batch.batch.instructions {
+        // Verify this coin is for this network
+        // If this is ever hit, it means the validator set has turned malicious and should be fully
+        // slashed
+        // Because we have an error here, no validator set which turns malicious should execute
+        // this code path
+        // Accordingly, there's no value in writing code to fully slash the network, when such an
+        // even would require a runtime upgrade to fully resolve anyways
+        if instruction.balance.coin.network() != batch.batch.network {
+          Err(InvalidTransaction::Custom(0))?;
+        }
+      }
+
       ValidTransaction::with_tag_prefix("in-instructions")
         .and_provides((batch.batch.network, batch.batch.id))
         // Set a 10 block longevity, though this should be included in the next block

substrate/validator-sets/pallet/src/lib.rs

@@ -711,11 +711,7 @@ pub mod pallet {
         account,
         Balance { coin: Coin::Serai, amount },
       )?;
-      Self::deposit_event(Event::DeallocationClaimed {
-        validator: account,
-        network,
-        session,
-      });
+      Self::deposit_event(Event::DeallocationClaimed { validator: account, network, session });
       Ok(())
     }
   }