Ecosystem/serai
Ecosystem/serai
1
0
Fork 0
mirror of https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git synced 2025-01-03 17:40:34 +00:00
Code Issues Projects Releases Packages Wiki Activity Actions 1

Add slightly nicer formatting re: Protocol Changes doc

Browse source
This commit is contained in:
Luke Parker 2024-03-12 00:59:51 -04:00
parent 9662d94bf9
commit 4a6496a90b
No known key found for this signature in database
1 changed files with 4 additions and 2 deletions
Show stats Download patch file Download diff file Expand all files Collapse all files

6
docs/protocol_changes/index.md
View file

@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ layout: default
nav_order: 5 nav_order: 5
--- ---
# Protocol Changes
The protocol has no central authority nor organization nor actors (such as The protocol has no central authority nor organization nor actors (such as
liquidity providers/validators) who can compel new protocol rules. The Serai liquidity providers/validators) who can compel new protocol rules. The Serai
protocol is as-written with all granted functionality and declared rules protocol is as-written with all granted functionality and declared rules
@ -11,7 +13,7 @@ present.
Validators are explicitly granted the ability to signal for two things to occur: Validators are explicitly granted the ability to signal for two things to occur:
1) Halt another validator set. ### 1) Halt another validator set.
This will presumably occur if another validator set turns malicious and is the This will presumably occur if another validator set turns malicious and is the
expected incident response in order to apply an economic penalty of ideally expected incident response in order to apply an economic penalty of ideally
@ -22,7 +24,7 @@ validator sets have accepted responsibility, and accepting responsibility
requires `Batch` publication). This effectively burns the malicious validators' requires `Batch` publication). This effectively burns the malicious validators'
stake. stake.
2) Retire the protocol. ### 2) Retire the protocol.
A supermajority of validators may favor a signal (an opaque 32-byte ID). A A supermajority of validators may favor a signal (an opaque 32-byte ID). A
common signal gaining sufficient favor will cause the protocol to stop producing common signal gaining sufficient favor will cause the protocol to stop producing