Split Validators and Consensus docs

docs/protocol/Consensus.md

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+# Consensus
+
+Consensus is a modified Aura implementation with the following notes:
+
+- Stateful nodes exist in two forms. Contextless and contextual.
+- Context is inserted by external programs which are run under the same umbrella as the node and trusted.
+- Contextless nodes do not perform verification beyond technical validity on `Oraclization` and `Report`.
+- Contextual nodes do perform verification on `Oraclization` and `Report` and will reject transactions which do not represent the actual context.
+- If a block is finalized under Aura, contextual checks are always stated to be passing, even if the local context conflicts with it.
+
+Since validators will not accept a block which breaks context, it will never be finalized, bypassing the contextual checks. If validators do finalize a block which seemingly breaks context, the majority of validators are saying it doesn't, signifying a locally invalid context state (perhaps simply one which is behind). By disabling contextual checks accordingly, nodes can still keep up to date with the chain and validate/participate in other contextual areas (assuming only one local contextual area is invalid).
+
+By moving context based checks into consensus itself, we allow transforming the `Oraclization` and `Report` messages into a leader protocol. Instead of every validator publishing their own message and waiting for the chain's implementation to note 66% of the weight agrees on the duplicated messages, the validators agreeing on the block, which already happens under BFT consensus, ensures message accuracy.
+
+Aura may be further optimizable by moving to either BLS or FROST signatures. BLS is easy to work with yet has a significance performance overhead. Considering we already have FROST, it may be ideal to use, yet it is a 2-round protocol which exponentially scales for key generation. While GRANDPA, an alternative consensus protocol, is 2-round and therefore could be seamlessly extended with FROST, it's not used here as it finalizes multiple blocks at a time. Given the contextual validity checks, it's simplest to finalize each block on their own to prevent malicious/improper chains from growing too large.
+
+If the complexity challenge can be overcame, BABE's VRF selecting a block producer should be used to limit DoS attacks. The main issue is that BABE is traditionally partnered with GRANDPA and represents a more complex system than Aura. Further research is needed here.

docs/protocol/Validators.md

@@ -21,21 +21,3 @@ Ideally, a DPoS system will eventually be possible where stake takes a variadic
 # Report (message)
 
 `Report` reports a validator for malicious or invalid behavior. This may be publishing a false `Oraclization` or failing to participate as expected. These apply a penalty to the validator's assigned rewards, which is distinct from the bond which must be kept as a multiple of 1m. If the amount deducted exceeds their assigned rewards, they are scheduled for removal with an appropriately reduced bond.
-
-# Consensus
-
-Consensus is a modified Aura implementation with the following notes:
-
-- Stateful nodes exist in two forms. Contextless and contextual.
-- Context is inserted by external programs which are run under the same umbrella as the node and trusted.
-- Contextless nodes do not perform verification beyond technical validity on `Oraclization` and `Report`.
-- Contextual nodes do perform verification on `Oraclization` and `Report` and will reject transactions which do not represent the actual context.
-- If a block is finalized under Aura, contextual checks are always stated to be passing, even if the local context conflicts with it.
-
-Since validators will not accept a block which breaks context, it will never be finalized, bypassing the contextual checks. If validators do finalize a block which seemingly breaks context, the majority of validators are saying it doesn't, signifying a locally invalid context state (perhaps simply one which is behind). By disabling contextual checks accordingly, nodes can still keep up to date with the chain and validate/participate in other contextual areas (assuming only one local contextual area is invalid).
-
-By moving context based checks into consensus itself, we allow transforming the `Oraclization` and `Report` messages into a leader protocol. Instead of every validator publishing their own message and waiting for the chain's implementation to note 66% of the weight agrees on the duplicated messages, the validators agreeing on the block, which already happens under BFT consensus, ensures message accuracy.
-
-Aura may be further optimizable by moving to either BLS or FROST signatures. BLS is easy to work with yet has a significance performance overhead. Considering we already have FROST, it may be ideal to use, yet it is a 2-round protocol which exponentially scales for key generation. While GRANDPA, an alternative consensus protocol, is 2-round and therefore could be seamlessly extended with FROST, it's not used here as it finalizes multiple blocks at a time. Given the contextual validity checks, it's simplest to finalize each block on their own to prevent malicious/improper chains from growing too large.
-
-If the complexity challenge can be overcame, BABE's VRF selecting a block producer should be used to limit DoS attacks. The main issue is that BABE is traditionally partnered with GRANDPA and represents a more complex system than Aura. Further research is needed here.