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24 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
24 lines
1.3 KiB
Markdown
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Upon an issue with the DKG, the honest validators must remove the malicious
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validators. Ideally, a threshold signature would be used, yet that would require
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a threshold key (which would require authentication by a MuSig signature). A
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MuSig signature which specifies the signing set (or rather, the excluded
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signers) achieves the most efficiency.
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While that resolves the on-chain behavior, the Tributary also has to perform
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exclusion. This has the following forms:
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1) Rejecting further transactions (required)
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2) Rejecting further participation in Tendermint
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With regards to rejecting further participation in Tendermint, it's *ideal* to
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remove the validator from the list of validators. Each validator removed from
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participation, yet not from the list of validators, increases the likelihood of
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the network failing to form consensus.
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With regards to the economic security, an honest 67% may remove a faulty
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(explicitly or simply offline) 33%, letting 67% of the remaining 67% (4/9ths)
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take control of the associated private keys. In such a case, the malicious
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parties are defined as the 4/9ths of validators with access to the private key
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and the 33% removed (who together form >67% of the originally intended
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validator set and have presumably provided enough stake to cover losses).
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