mirror of
https://github.com/serai-dex/serai.git
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82 lines
3.1 KiB
Solidity
82 lines
3.1 KiB
Solidity
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only
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pragma solidity ^0.8.26;
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/*
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The expected deployment process of the Router is as follows:
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1) A transaction deploying Deployer is made. Then, a deterministic signature is
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created such that an account with an unknown private key is the creator of
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the contract. Anyone can fund this address, and once anyone does, the
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transaction deploying Deployer can be published by anyone. No other
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transaction may be made from that account.
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2) Anyone deploys the Router through the Deployer. This uses a sequential nonce
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such that meet-in-the-middle attacks, with complexity 2**80, aren't feasible.
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While such attacks would still be feasible if the Deployer's address was
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controllable, the usage of a deterministic signature with a NUMS method
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prevents that.
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This doesn't have any denial-of-service risks and will resolve once anyone steps
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forward as deployer. This does fail to guarantee an identical address across
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every chain, though it enables letting anyone efficiently ask the Deployer for
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the address (with the Deployer having an identical address on every chain).
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Unfortunately, guaranteeing identical addresses aren't feasible. We'd need the
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Deployer contract to use a consistent salt for the Router, yet the Router must
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be deployed with a specific public key for Serai. Since Ethereum isn't able to
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determine a valid public key (one the result of a Serai DKG) from a dishonest
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public key, we have to allow multiple deployments with Serai being the one to
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determine which to use.
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The alternative would be to have a council publish the Serai key on-Ethereum,
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with Serai verifying the published result. This would introduce a DoS risk in
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the council not publishing the correct key/not publishing any key.
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*/
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contract Deployer {
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struct Deployment {
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uint64 block_number;
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address created_contract;
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}
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mapping(bytes32 => Deployment) public deployments;
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error Reentrancy();
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error PriorDeployed();
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error DeploymentFailed();
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function deploy(bytes memory init_code) external {
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// Prevent re-entrancy
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// If we did allow it, one could deploy the same contract multiple times (with one overwriting
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// the other's set value in storage)
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bool called;
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// This contract doesn't have any other use of transient storage, nor is to be inherited, making
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// this usage of the zero address safe
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assembly { called := tload(0) }
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if (called) {
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revert Reentrancy();
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}
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assembly { tstore(0, 1) }
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// Check this wasn't prior deployed
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bytes32 init_code_hash = keccak256(init_code);
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Deployment memory deployment = deployments[init_code_hash];
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if (deployment.created_contract == address(0)) {
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revert PriorDeployed();
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}
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// Deploy the contract
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address created_contract;
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assembly {
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created_contract := create(0, add(init_code, 0x20), mload(init_code))
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}
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if (created_contract == address(0)) {
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revert DeploymentFailed();
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}
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// Set the dpeloyment to storage
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deployment.block_number = uint64(block.number);
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deployment.created_contract = created_contract;
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deployments[init_code_hash] = deployment;
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}
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}
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